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ABSTRACT

32 IN ’44: A MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY OF
SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION AT PORTSMOUTH NAVY YARD DURING
WORLD WAR II
By
Rodney Keith Watterson
University of New Hampshire, May 2007

After averaging the completion of less than two submarines a year in the 1930s,
the Portsmouth Navy Yard completed an astonishing thirty-two submarines in 1944.
The yard’s outstanding performance during World War II was the product of a highly
motivated work force and a management team that thrived in a decentralized wartime
shipyard environment. Employing aggressive and innovative management techniques that
included employee empowerment, small teams, and mass production techniques to the
extent that they could be applied to submarine construction at the time, the shipyard
delivered submarines at unprecedented rates.
There were downsides to the shipyard’s crowning achievements during the war
that included landfills contaminated with toxic industrial waste, increased pollution of the
Piscataqua River, and lost wetlands. In addition, the greatly increased employment and
military presence at the yard brought challenges to local communities that struggled to
increase housing, infrastructure, and services to accommodate the increased numbers of
new residents. Not the least of these struggles included efforts to curb prostitution and an
alarming increase in venereal disease. While wrestling with these day-to-day problems

xii
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during the war, local communities feared an uncertain, and possibly economically
disastrous, postwar future should peace bring dramatically reduced employment or
closure of the yard.
This dissertation looks at both sides of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s war years: the
tremendous upside wherein remarkable submarine production records were achieved that
brought economic prosperity to the area, and the downside that saw significant
environmental abuse and sociological turmoil as communities adjusted to the problems
that accompanied a Navy boomtown. A preliminary review places the yard in context
with important national and international events between the wars to set the stage for an
analysis of how the shipyard achieved 32 in ’44, and the consequences of that success.

xiii
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“The enemy has struck a savage, treacherous blow. We are at war, all of
us: there is no time now for disputes or delay of any kind. We must have
ships and more ships, guns and more guns, men and more men - faster
and faster. There is no time to lose. The navy must lead the way. Speed
up - it is our navy and your nation.”1
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox
11 December 1941

As seawater poured through the flood gates into Dry Dock #1 in the early morning
hours of 27 January 1944, Fred White was more than a little concerned about the
launchings planned for that afternoon. White was the shipyard’s Master Rigger,
responsible for the men who would be handling the mooring lines later that day when the
shipyard would become the first shipyard to launch three submarines simultaneously. The
launchings o f Ronquil, Redfish, and Razorback would be accomplished by floating the
partially completed submarines off their blocks in Dry Dock #1. The pressure hull
cylinders had been welded together, making the submarines watertight, but much work
remained to be done alongside the pier. White was concerned because the three
submarines were jammed into the dry dock with little separation and it was the
responsibility o f White and his line handlers to insure that the submarines did not damage

1 Secretary o f the Navy Frank Knox ALNAV Dispatch to all Naval Stations o f 11 Dec 1941.
National Archives and Records Administration, Waltham, Massachusetts, Record Group 181, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f Nations with
Reference to War and Peace.” Hereafter NARA Waltham, RG 181.

-
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each other as they floated free of the blocks. Three 1,800 ton submarines, moving about
unrestrained in close quarters, could do considerable damage.
White’s workday would only be half over with the 1:00 pm triple launching. A
fourth, and more traditional, launching was scheduled for 2:30 pm that same afternoon
when the Scabbardfish would be released to slide down Building Way #4 into the
Piscataqua River. The fourth launching would set another record for the most submarines
launched by a shipyard on the same day. Before the year was over, these four submarines
would be included in the record setting thirty-two submarines that the yard completed in
1944. No United States shipyard before, or since, has built so many submarines in one
year, hence the title of this dissertation, 32 in ’44.
White had observed daily the side-by-side construction progress of Ronquil,
Redfish, and Razorback in Dry Dock #1 since their keels had been laid on the same day, 9
September 1943, just four and one half months earlier. Since that time, the submarines
had grown in size and gradually filled the dock until only a few feet separated the hulls.
At the points o f least separation, one could almost step from hull to hull. White and the
other civilian managers had already convinced Yard Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas
Withers that this should be the first, and last, triple simultaneous launching from a dry
dock at Portsmouth Navy Yard. Having pushed the envelope this one time, the managers
were convinced that working conditions were too tight and the risks too great to attempt
to build and launch “three at a time.” This was no easy decision because the managers at

2 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
3 The 32 submarines completed at Portsmouth Navy Yard in 1944 included one, USS Lionfish
(SS298), that was towed from Cramp Shipbuilding Company in Philadelphia to Portsmouth Navy Yard
after it was 45 % completed. USS Manta (SS299), also towed from Cramp Shipbuilding after 45%
completed, was finished at Portsmouth in January 1945.

-

2
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Portsmouth Navy Yard prided themselves on innovative submarine building techniques
and a willingness to accept considerable risk for the sake of increased production.

Figure 1: Redfish, Ronquil, and Razorback Building in Dry Dock #1. Courtesy
of Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
To further complicate matters at the triple launch, Commandant Rear Admiral
Withers had invited a number o f dignitaries to fill the stands at the head o f the dry dock
to witness the record setting event. Those dignitaries included the Mayor of Portsmouth,
Charles M. Dale, who would be elected Governor of New Hampshire before the year was
out. Extensive media coverage had also been arranged to insure that the shipyard received
due credit for its record-setting accomplishments. Fred White was one of the managers
tasked to insure that the launchings were problem free and that the publicity received was
all positive. Hopefully, the only breakage that day would be the traditional champagne
bottles with which the sponsors would christen each hull.

-3 -
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Figure 2: Triple Simultaneous Launching of Redfish, Ronquil, and
Razorback. Courtesy of Milne Special Collection and Archives Department,
University of New Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.
The submarines were sponsored by two wives and two daughters of senior officers at the
shipyard. One of the sponsors was Hazel Grant Davis, the wife of Captain Henry F.D.
Davis, the Industrial Manager, who was ultimately responsible for all submarine
construction at the yard. The ladies were appreciative, and deserving of the honor, as
were the other forty women who had performed the same ritual at the yard since the war
started.
Attending an outdoor ceremony at the shipyard in late January might have been a
cold, snowy, miserable experience. The attendees at the triple launch, however, got a
reprieve on the weather. It was a cool, cloudy day with temperatures reaching the low
forties in the afternoon. The ladies, bundled in warm, stylishly tailored coats and pill box
hats, looked a little out o f place in the stands at the head of the dry dock. Submarine

-4 -
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pressure hull sections and frames for the next submarine to be built were stacked all
around the dock, huge cranes moved back and forth, and hundreds of industrial workers
and sailors moved about doing their jobs. The scene also included offerings from the
shipyard band.4
Despite Fred White’s concerns, the triple launching went well, and the slide of the
Scabbardfish into the river was equally successful. Torpedoman Third Class Dan
Maclsaac watched the triple launching from the side of the dry dock that afternoon with a
few other crewmembers of the USS Redfish. He recalled that the three sponsors carefully
smashed the champagne bottles on the bow of the three submarines at precisely the same
time to preserve the purity of the advertised triple simultaneous launching.5 Rear Admiral
Withers had obviously alerted the highest levels of the Navy of the planned launchings
because, later that same day, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal sent a congratulatory
message to the yard. Secretary Forrestal wrote, “In the launching of four submarines in a
single day, the Portsmouth Navy Yard sets another record in the submarine program.”6
Indeed, Portsmouth had set other submarine production records before this one and
would go on to establish even more records before the war was over.

4 The description o f the scene is reconstructed from several sources including interviews with
participants Fred White and Dan Maclsaac; the Portsmouth H erald o f 26 Jan 1944, “Portsmouth Will
Launch 4 Submarines Tomorrow;” 1; 27 Jan 1944, “Portsmouth Launches 4 Subs, Hits World Record,” 1;
and 28 Jan 1944, “4 New Subs Launched for World Record,” 1. Figures 1 and 2, showing the three
submarines in dry dock before and after the launching, also provide details o f the scene.
5 Interview with Dan Maclsaac, 9 Nov 2006, at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum.
6 Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal letter o f 27 Jan 1944 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard, Subject: Commendation from Navy Department. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), 1925-56, Box 18, Folder S-6, “Launching General, Jan
1944-47.”

-5 -
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The quadruple launching on 27 January 1944 was a microcosm of events at
Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II. Innovative and creative management
combined with a dedicated and very capable workforce to set submarine production
records that brought great credit and recognition to the shipyard. This study tells the story
of how Portsmouth Navy Yard was able to achieve remarkable production performance
which transformed the shipyard and the surrounding communities. Sixty years later, those
transformations continue to influence many aspects of life in the seacoast area.
However, there were downsides to the shipyard’s crowning achievements during
the war. The by-products of greatly increased production included landfills contaminated
with toxic industrial waste, increased pollution of the Piscataqua River as the result of the
dumping o f raw sewage and shop waste effluents, increased accident rates, and lost
wetlands. In addition, the greatly increased employment and military presence at the yard
brought challenges to local communities that struggled to increase infrastructure and
services to accommodate the increased numbers of new residents while adjusting to the
sociological problems that accompanied a Navy boomtown. Not the least of these
struggles included efforts to curb prostitution and an alarming increase in venereal
disease. While wrestling with these day-to-day problems during the war, local
communities feared an uncertain, and possibly disastrous, postwar future should the
inevitable peace bring dramatically reduced employment or closure of the yard.
This dissertation presents both sides of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s war years: the
tremendous upside wherein a remarkable workforce set submarine production records
and the downside that saw significant environmental abuse and citizens’ apprehension
about their rapidly and radically changing communities. Both sides are presented with an

-

6

-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

overarching theme that emphasizes the shipyard and community transformations that
occurred as the result of activity at the yard during Word War II.

After averaging the completion of less than two submarines a year in the 1930s,
the Portsmouth Navy Yard completed seventy-nine submarines between 1 July 1940 and
1 July 1945.7 Similarly, the shipyard employed an average of about 2,000 employees per
year in the 1930s and grew to employ a peak of 20,465 in November 1943. Figure 3
shows the dramatic increase in employment and completed submarines during World
War II.8

Figure 3: Employment & Submarines Built
Portsmouth Navy Yard (1930-1950)
25000
20000
15000
15

10000

1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940
I Civilian Employment

«

942 1944 1946 1948 1950
Submarines Built

This study argues that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s outstanding performance was the
direct result of a highly motivated workforce and innovative management techniques that
thrived in the World War II naval shipbuilding environment. A key conclusion is that the
7 Portsmouth Herald, 19 Jul 1945, “Yard is Tops in Sub Production,” 1.
8 Figure 3 is constructed from shipyard employment numbers and submarine construction records
in Cradle o f American Shipbuilding, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: Government Printing Office, 1979, 7683.

-7 -
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management of Portsmouth Navy Yard, either by design or necessity, employed
successful industrial management practices that were forty years ahead of their time.
These practices included employee empowerment, special small teams, and mass
production techniques to the extent that they could be applied to submarine construction
at the time.
The naval shipbuilding environment during the war was highly decentralized and
characterized by loose Navy Department oversight of navy yards, especially those that
were performing well. This environment existed because the newly created Bureau of
Ships was overwhelmed with other matters and unable to effectively oversee navy yard
operations. Newly created in June 1942, the Bureau of Ships was quickly consumed with
the administrative burden of organizing a rapidly expanding bureaucracy while
mobilizing civilian industry to support an accelerated shipbuilding program. Left with
little or no corporate oversight in an expanding market, and very much to its own devices,
Portsmouth Navy Yard excelled.
On one level of study, Portsmouth Navy Yard’s remarkable performance can be
attributed to superior leadership, massive hiring, extensive facility upgrades, effective
training programs, innovative production techniques, and an intelligent and highly
dedicated workforce. Another level of analysis shows that each o f these attributes
contained its own set of challenges. The massive hiring added large numbers of women
and untrained employees to the shipyard workforce. The training programs were
constantly disrupted by Selective Service recruitment of the younger and more physically
qualified. The facility upgrades, funded nearly instantaneously in 1940 after a decade of
neglect and minimal investment in shipyard infrastructure, were quite extensive and

-
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potentially disruptive to the accelerated submarine construction schedules. Finally, with
only five building ways at the start of the war, the desired building rates could be
achieved only if submarine hulls were forced off the building ways very early in the
construction schedule to free the ways for the next keels. Submarines were launched at
unprecedented rates and much of the work normally done on the building ways was
completed pier side. Necessity was very much the mother of invention as the shipyard
turned a shortage of building ways into an advantage by developing and optimizing
techniques to build submarines side-by-side in the newly constructed dry dock and
building basin.
Portsmouth Navy Yard did have two distinct advantages over the other navy yards
during World War II. First, unlike the seven other navy yards (Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, Bremerton, and Mare Island) that dealt with multiple
ship types and disruptive repair and overhaul work, Portsmouth Navy Yard was able to
specialize in the design and construction of submarines. The yard’s ability to focus and
streamline its resources and energies into one line of work during the war was the logical
extension of the navy’s efforts to develop the yard’s submarine design and construction
capabilities during the 1920s and 1930s to provide competition to private industry.9

9 Portsmouth Navy Yard’s ability to streamline resources and energies to the construction o f
submarines is an integral part o f this study’s argument. Up front it is acknowledged that Portsmouth Navy
Yard did considerable other work during the war. However, to a large extent, that work was minimal
compared to other yards and did not compete with the priorities o f new construction, as was the case at
other shipyards. According to Philip N. Guyol, in addition to completing 82 submarines between 1940 and
1945, the yard also completed 3 torpedo testing barges, 7 pier caissons, 3 100 ton floating cranes, quantities
o f electrical fixtures, and about 700 boats, including wherries, motor whaleboats, motor launches, and fast
torpedo retrievers. Guyol also notes the manufacture o f aluminum stretching machines for the aircraft
industry, the manufacture o f 240 mm gun-recoil mechanisms, and the repair o f 26 American, 3 British, 1
Free-French, 6 Italian and 4 German submarines, and 34 other vessels o f various kinds between 1941 and
August 1945. Many o f these submarine and ship repairs were done at the beginning and end o f the war
leaving the middle years o f the war free for streamlining for new construction. Phillip N. Guyol,
Democracy Fights: A History o f New Hampshire in World War II (Hanover: Dartmouth Publications,
1951), 162.

-9 -
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Portsmouth’s second advantage was its small size, in comparison to the other
navy yards. Despite expanding six fold between 1940 and 1943, Portsmouth was the
smallest navy yard in March 1943. At that time, Portsmouth Navy Yard had 20,465
employees and the other seven navy yards averaged 38,377 employees.10 A small
shipyard with a specialized mission and a well defined, though constantly increasing,
workload had a distinct advantage over larger shipyards with a workload o f multiple ship
types and frequent emergent work. Still, it is a credit to Portsmouth Navy Yard’s
management and employees that they were able to capitalize on these advantages and
exceed all performance expectations. By consistently exceeding the Navy’s expectations,
the shipyard was assigned increased orders for submarines and allowed to specialize in
new construction.11
This study also addresses the consequences of the shipyard’s increased production
during the war. The first and most obvious consequence is the contribution made by the
Portsmouth submarines to the winning of the war. Portsmouth-built submarines sank 434
enemy ships totaling about 1.7 million tons.

19

This represents about one-third of the

leaving the middle years o f the war free for streamlining for new construction. Phillip N. Guyol,
Democracy Fights: A History o f New Hampshire in World War II (Hanover: Dartmouth Publications,
1951), 162.
10 Navy Department, SOSED (Industrial Manpower Section) letter o f 1 May 1943 to Distribution
List. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md., RG 38, Naval Operations General
Correspondence, Box 151, Folder NY 1, 1 July 1942 to 30 Jun 1943. Hereafter NARA College Park.
11 Electric Boat Company in Groton, Ct. was also a small private shipyard that specialized in
submarine construction during World War II. In general, Portsmouth built submarines much more quickly
than Electric Boat at a slightly higher cost. See Chapter V for a more complete comparison o f Portsmouth
and Electric Boat costs.
12 Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II (Annapolis: United
States Naval Institute, 1949), 527-565. This work accounts for enemy tonnage sunk by individual
submarines. The 1.7 million tons is the author’s count for Portsmouth-built submarines. Another source,
John D. Horn, “Submarines and the Electric Boat Company,” (A.B. Degree, Princeton University, 1948),
89, provides the following summary o f sunk tonnage by shipyard: 80 Electric Boat submarines sunk
1,990,454 tons (38.5%), 69 Portsmouth submarines sunk 1,607,016 tons (32.8%), 22 Mare Island
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tonnage sunk by United States submarines during the war.

1T

In September 1943, at the

height of the war in the Pacific, the percentage was even higher. In a congratulatory letter
to the shipyard, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral F.J. Horne, noted that:
The Secretary o f the Navy revealed that the Japanese had lost one-third of
their available tonnage up to 3 September 1943, and that seventy-seven
percent of that tonnage loss was sunk by our submarines. O f the submarines
contributing to these sinkings, forty percent were built by your Navy Yard.
This is, indeed, a record o f which you can be proud.14
Portsmouth-built USS Kingfish (SS 234), completed on 20 May 1942, was credited with
the sinking of an enemy ship, a Japanese freighter off southern Kyushu,15 on 1 October
1942 just thirteen months after her keel had been laid. When other shipyards were having
difficulty delivering submarines in thirteen months, Kingfish had been built, steamed half
way around the world, and sunk Japanese shipping.
In its 27 August 1945 issue, the shipyard’s newspaper, The Portsmouth Periscope,
celebrated the yard’s wartime accomplishments with considerable pride:
The war is over! And the part that Portsmouth played in the war is something that
every loyal workingman can look back on with a feeling of pride .. . The
Portsmouth submarine fleet was the scourge of the famed Japanese merchant
ships. From the very darkest days of the war, Portsmouth started to swing at the
little yellow men who had pulled the sneak attack on Pearl H arbor... They rained

Submarines sunk 988,357 tons (22%), and 19 Manitowoc submarines sunk 494,737 tons (9.6%). Horn
cited the source for these totals “Figures courtesy Electric Boat Company.” Thus, two independent
accounts credit Portsmouth-built submarines with about 1.7 million tons o f enemy tonnage sunk,
representing about one third o f the total tonnage sunk.
13 Ibid. Graph inside back cover shows 5,329,000 tons o f enemy shipping sunk by U.S.
submarines.
14 Chief o f Naval Operations, Admiral F.J. Home, letter o f 26 Apr 1944 to Commandant
Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA College Park, RG 38, Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box
1182, Folder NY1, 1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jun 1944.
15Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 175.
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If one can look beyond the emotion and racially charged language of the moment, the
Periscope was accurate in its reporting that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s performance had
contributed significantly to the winning of the war.
Another consequence of wartime operations was the physical transformation of
the shipyard, most noticeably the addition of significant acreage, by filling channels
between nearby islands and reclaiming wetlands and shoal waters. Land reclamation and
the connecting of islands to increase the size of the shipyard during the war continued a
consistent practice throughout the history of the shipyard from its establishment in 1800.
The physical transformation of the yard during the war included the construction of a 12
acre fitting out pier, a dry dock, a building basin, and the upgrade and expansion of
numerous shop buildings and facilities.
There were other, and sometimes less noble, consequences of Portsmouth Navy
Yard operations during the war. On the positive side, women gradually assumed positions
of increased responsibility and played an increasingly important role as the war
progressed. Politically, another Portsmouth prewar condition, strongly entrenched male
dominated Republican government, was overturned with a Democratic victory in
November 1944 that included the election of the first female mayor in the state of New
Hampshire. This study argues that the greatly increased population, and military
presence, during the war caused unsettling conditions in Portsmouth that may have
contributed to the Democratic victory.
The Portsmouth-Kittery economy was greatly stimulated by the defense dollars
that poured into the shipyard. Commerce thrived, the standard of living was raised, and

1958, Sweetser Family Papers, Milne Special Collections, University o f New Hampshire Library, Durham,
N.H.
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considerable building of housing and community infrastructure resulted. The
communities also benefited from the federal and state sponsored industrial training
programs that dramatically reversed a prewar shortage of skilled workers in the area.
On the negative side, the exploding employment and industrial activity at the
physically constrained shipyard aggravated the existing inadequate sewage and industrial
waste-disposal system. These inadequacies, readily apparent during the war, continued
after the war and contributed to Portsmouth Navy Yard being declared a Superfund
clean-up site in 1993. The EPA studies that led to the Superfund status rarely extended
back earlier than 1945 for lack of evidence. This study does provide pre-1945 evidence of
the environmental impact of activity at the shipyard during the war. Other negative
effects associated with the dramatically increased population at the shipyard included
increased industrial accident rates and increased communicable disease rates, with an
unusually high incidence of venereal disease among the enlisted military population at
the shipyard. With regard to the latter, this study highlights the Navy’s attempts to deal
with the problem in-house, the Navy’s periodic efforts to pressure Portsmouth city
officials to rid their town of disease carrying prostitutes, and the city’s reluctance to
acknowledge the existence o f same.
In summary, this study tells the story of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s remarkable
production accomplishments during World War II, describes the shipyard’s management
practices and production methods that led to those accomplishments, and highlights
important environmental and community consequences that transformed the shipyard and
the surrounding communities. The story is prefaced by placing Portsmouth Navy Yard in
the context of broader national and international events of the 1920s and 1930s, including
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disarmament conferences, neutrality acts, the Great Depression, and New Deal recovery
programs. These events set the stage for Portsmouth Navy Yard’s World War II story to
unfold as it did.

As suggested by the subtitle, A Management and Environmental Study o f
Submarine Construction at Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II, this study
addresses three primary themes; local history, industrial mobilization, and the
environmental consequences of industrial mobilization. What contributions does this
dissertation make to these three primary themes?
As for local history, this work adds considerably to the limited analytical history
that has been written about the Portsmouth Navy Yard and the city of Portsmouth during
World War II. Early shipyard histories include Walter H. Fentress’ Centennial History o f
the United States Navy Yard at Portsmouth, N.H. (1876), Rear Admiral George Henry
Preble’s History o f the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. (1892), and Captain
David S. Boyd’s Continuation o f Preble’s History o f the United States Navy Yard,
Covering the Years 1878-1930. Portsmouth Navy Yard, like most naval activities, wrote
World War II administrative histories. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s World War II selfhistory is a compilation of various department inputs that records events at the shipyard
during the war in great detail. All of the above works are a wealth of data and
•

•

information, if short on analysis and criticism.

17

17

Walter E.H. Fentress, Centennial History o f the United States Navy Yard, at Portsmouth, N.H.
(Portsmouth: M. Knight, 1876); George Henry Preble, History o f the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth,
N.H. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1892); David F. Boyd, “Continuation o f Preble’s
History o f the United States Navy Yard, Covering the Years 1878-1930,” typescript with handwritten
corrections and additions, Maine Room, Rice Public Library, Kittery, Me.; Administrative History:
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More recent works include a shipyard publication, The Cradle o f American
Shipbuilding (1979), Robert H. Whittaker’s Portsmouth-Kittery Naval Shipyard in Old
Photographs (1993), Richard E. Winslow Ill’s Portsmouth-Built: Submarines o f the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (1985), Constructing Munitions o f War: The Portsmouth
Navy Yard Confronts the Confederacy, 1861-1865 (1995), and “Do Your Job ”: An
Illustrated Bicentennial History o f the Portsmouth Naval Yard, 1800-2000 (2000), and
Nelson Lawry’s Portsmouth Harbor’s Military and Naval Heritage (2004).18 These
works are rich in pictures and anecdotes. Suffice it to say that events at Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, since its establishment in 1800, have been well chronicled by local historians in
works written for a popular audience.
The above works touch, but briefly, on World War II activity at the yard. Richard
Winslow Ill’s bicentennial history, “Do Your Job,” provides the most discussion of
activity at the yard during the war. Even then, when covering 200 years of history,
Winslow could only afford to devote 20 of 250 pages to the World War II period. In the
bibliography for “Do Your Job, ” Winslow wrote, “For those who elect to follow me in
pursuing this topic [Portsmouth Navy Yard], I recommend research at the Naval
Historical Center [Washington Navy Y ard],. . . National Archives [College Park, M d .],.
.. and the National Archives in Waltham, Massachusetts.” This dissertation, unlike the

Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II (Portsmouth Navy Yard: Government Printing Office, 1946),
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me.
18 The Cradle o f American Shipbuilding (Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: Government Printing
Office, 1979); Robert H. Whittaker, Portsmouth-Kittery Naval Shipyard in O ld Photographs (Dover N.H.:
Allan Sutton, 1993); Richard E. Winslow Ill’s, Portsmouth-Built: Submarines o f the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, (Portsmouth, N.H.: Portsmouth Marine Society, 1985), Constructing Munitions o f War: The
Portsmouth Navy Yard Confronts the Confederacy, 1861-1865 (Portsmouth: Portsmouth Marine Society,
1995) and “D o Your Job ”: An Illustrated Bicentennial History o f the Portsmouth Naval Yard, 1800-2000
(Portsmouth: Portsmouth Marine Society, 2000); Nelson H. Lawry, Glen M. Williford, and Leo K. Polaski,
Portsmouth H arbor’s Military and Naval Heritage (Portsmouth, N.H.: Arcadia Publishing, 2004).
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other shipyard histories, is based on extensive research at all three of those archives,
especially NARA Waltham.
This dissertation differs from earlier works in that it is the most extensive and
detailed treatment of any period of history at the Portsmouth Navy Yard. Having the
luxury of concentrating on a rather short period of history, it is able to place more
emphasis on context, analysis, and synthesis than the others. Specifically, this dissertation
digs deeper than the others to explain, not just what happened, but why events unfolded
as they did during the war. In addition, great effort is made to analyze Navy Department
and internal shipyard developments between the wars that positioned the yard to excel as
it did during World War II.
How does this dissertation add to Portsmouth and New Hampshire histories?
Neither has been shortchanged by historians, especially colonial Portsmouth. However,
World War II home front histories of both are surprisingly scarce. Philip N. Guyol’s
Democracy Fights: a History o f New Hampshire in World War 7/(1951) is a
comprehensive history of the state’s economic, industrial, and military involvement in the
war that may have intimidated others from revisiting the subject.19 Barbara McLean
Ward’s Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square: The Grocer and the Consumer on
the Home-Front Battlefield during World War II, is a collection of essays primarily
depicting day-to-day life in Portsmouth and Strawbery Banke during the war.

90

It draws

extensively on Portsmouth War Records to recreate the Portsmouth social and cultural

19 Philip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights: a History o f New Hampshire in World War II (Hanover:
Dartmouth Publications, 1951).
20 Barbara McLean Ward, Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square: The Grocer and the
Consumer on the Home-Front Battlefield during World War II (Portsmouth: University Press o f New
England, 1994).
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scene during the war with emphasis on home front sacrifices. Both works credit
Portsmouth Navy Yard with making a huge economic and social impact on Portsmouth
and other local communities during the war. However, neither Guyol nor Ward chose to
examine the interface and interactions between the shipyard and local communities
during the war in any significant detail.
In summary, Portsmouth Navy Yard histories to date have, for the most part, been
chronicles rich in facts, photographs, and anecdotes with limited analysis of the World
War II period, and little attempt to reach beyond the boundaries of the shipyard. On the
other hand, New Hampshire and Portsmouth World War II histories have reflected home
front happenings to the exclusion of events on the yard, except to note the impressive
bottom line production accomplishments that contributed to the social and economic
transformations of local communities. In addition to a comprehensive analysis of
operations at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war, this dissertation bridges the gap
between the shipyard and community lacking in previous works.

The industrial mobilization theme takes the form of a comprehensive case study
o f how wartime mobilization was implemented at one industrial facility, the Portsmouth
Navy Yard. Few similar case studies of World War II mobilization exist.
World War II mobilization studies usually present top-down views from
Washington D.C. where decisions were made and policies were implemented. Keith E.
Eiler’s Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort 1940-45 (1997)
describes the national mobilization story. Robert Connery’s The Navy and Industrial
Mobilization in World War 7/(1951) and Connery and Robert Albion’s Forrestal and the
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Navy (1962) tell the mobilization story at the Navy Department level.21 Few studies of
World War II industrial mobilization reach down to the internal workings of an industrial
activity, let alone a navy yard, to analyze the shopfloor implementation of mobilization.
According to one mobilization historian, “Perhaps, because the war is such a towering
subject of historical inquiry, few works on wartime industry concretely discuss war work
itself.”22 This dissertation does discuss war work in great detail by examining the day-today shopfloor decisions and waterfront operations of Portsmouth Navy Yard.
The few mobilization studies that do reach down into shipyard operations focus
on commercial shipbuilding, not submarines. Frederic C. Lane’s Ships fo r Victory (1951),
the comprehensive study of shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World
War II, focuses on commercial ships and private shipyards. Lane’s impressive work
spans a wide range of mobilization subjects from U.S. Maritime Commission policy and
administration to discrete events at a few selected shipyards. A more recent work,
Christopher James Tassava’s Ph.D. dissertation “Launching a Thousand Ships:
Entrepreneurs, War, Workers, and the State in American Shipbuilding, 1940-45 (2003)”
analyzes the implementation of mobilization policies from a corporate and private
shipyard level. Tassava also focuses on the U.S. Maritime Commission and San
Francisco Bay Shipyards run by Kaiser and Bechtel to analyze how relationships between
the federal government and private contractors led to remarkable building rates of
commercial ships, especially Liberty ships. Marilyn Johnson’s The Second Gold Rush:
21 Keith E. Eiler, Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort 1940-45 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1997); Robert Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951); Robert Albion and Robert H. Connery, Forrestal and the
Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).
22 Christopher James Tassava, “Launching a Thousand Ships: Entrepreneurs, War, Workers, and
the State in American Shipbuilding, 1940-45,” Ph.D. Diss., Northwestern University, 2003.
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Oakland & the East Bay in World War 7/ (1996) also examines commercial shipbuilding
in the San Francisco Bay Shipyards. The limited literature on World War II shipbuilding
mobilization has concentrated on private industry and commercial shipbuilding on the
West Coast.23
The overall history of submarine construction has been well covered by Gary
Weir’s technical and industrial analysis of submarine construction in his two works,
Building American Submarines 1914-1940 (1991) and Forged in War: The NavalIndustrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940-1961 (1998).24 Weir’s
work, especially Forged in War, focuses on the technological development of submarines
and the building of the necessary relationships between the Navy and private industry
that accommodated that development. Weir discusses submarine construction at all
shipyards, including Portsmouth Navy Yard. However, Weir’s emphasis is on the
technological development of United States submarines and not the performance of any
one particular shipyard during a specific period. This dissertation draws heavily on
Weir’s work to set the background and context for Portsmouth Navy Yard’s production
success during the war.
Two unpublished histories of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s primary competitor during
the war, Electric Boat Company, discuss events at that shipyard during World War II.
They are John D. Horn’s “Submarines and Electric Boat Company (1948),” and an

23 Frederic C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951);
Christopher James Tassava, “Launching a Thousand Ships,” Ph.D. Diss., Northwestern University, 2003;
Marilyn Johnson, The Second G old Rush: Oakland & the East Bay in World War II (Berkeley: University
o f California Press, 1996).
24 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940 (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical
Center, 1991) and Forged in War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine
Construction, 1940-1961 (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1993).
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unpublished typescript on file at the Navy Department Library, National Historical
Center by an unknown author, “History of the Electric Boat Company, 1899-1949.”
These histories of Electric Boat Company are chronicles of the company’s achievements
that are short on analysis and criticism.

'ye

However, they provide benchmarks against

which to measure the operations and performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard.
All of this is to say that studies of shipyard mobilization for submarine
construction during World War II are limited. Furthermore, the few comprehensive
studies o f shipyard mobilization that do exist deal primarily with commercial
shipbuilding on the West Coast. This detailed study of the World War II mobilization for
submarine construction at an East Coast navy yard adds a new dimension to a limited
volume of work. This dissertation highlights similarities between the innovative efforts of
Portsmouth Navy Yard to streamline production for the rapid construction of submarines
and the efforts of private West Coast shipyards to do the same for the accelerated
construction of Liberty ships. However, unlike World War II mobilization studies of
private shipyards, where government orders were received and ships constructed with
little deviation from contractual plans, this study of a government yard presents evidence
of a continuing cooperative dialogue between the yard and the offices of the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy that often resulted in policy decisions
favorable to maximizing submarine production while, at the same time, insuring a
maximum shipyard effort to include the latest design features on new submarines as
dictated by wartime feedback and experience.
25 John D. Horn, “Submarines and the Electric Boat Company,” A.B. Degree, Princeton
University, 1948 and “History o f the Electric Boat Company 1899-1949,” Unpublished Typescript. Navy
Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
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This dissertation argues that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s outstanding performance
during World War II was the product of a highly motivated work force and a
management team that thrived in a decentralized wartime shipyard environment. All three
had to work together to achieve success. In addition, the war provided an overarching
crisis filled environment that rallied both employees and management to the common
objective o f increased production to defeat the enemy. So then, what part of the
shipyard’s success was due purely to the stimulation of war, and what part was due to the
other factors, including enlightened management practices and well trained, skillful
employees? That question, of course, is impossible to answer. Undoubtedly the threat of
war heightens an individual’s performance and 20,000 heightened performances can
produce extraordinary results. The performance of organizations in threatening
environments is a study unto itself, well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice it
to say that management scholars have argued that leaders of threatened organizations, in
conjunction with employees having an increased awareness of the need for organizational
changes, are often able to successfully transform their organizations through efforts that
include increased flexibility, decentralized problem solving and decision making,
increased productivity, and innovation.

9(\

All of these factors, and more, will be amply

illustrated in the case of Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II.
One of the reasons for Portsmouth Navy Yard’s success during the war was its
ability to thrive in a decentralized shipbuilding environment. In 1940, decentralization
was gaining in popularity in private industry but had not achieved the widespread
application that it would find after the war. At the turn of the century, American industry
26 Carole K. Barnett and Michael G. Pratt, “’’From Threat-rigidity to Flexibility: Toward a
Learning Model o f Autogenic Crisis in Organizations,” Journal o f Organizational Change Management,
Vol. 13, No. 1,2000.
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was gaining in popularity in private industry but had not achieved the widespread
application that it would find after the war. At the turn of the century, American industry
was characterized by little product diversification and strong central management
structures. With the development of the automotive industry, diversification o f product
increased, the need for professional managers increased, and decentralization began to be
the management model of choice to manage numerous product lines. This was especially
true at General Motors where William C. Durant instituted a high degree of
decentralization, albeit, not well coordinated. In the early 1920s, Alfred Sloan improved
the General Motors decentralized model by creating a coordinating office of staff
specialists and general officers. The Sloan model became the standard for decentralized
industrial management for years to come. However, decentralization had not been
implemented by a high percentage of companies prior to World War II. Reporting the
results of a late 1950s management study of sixteen major firms in the chemical,
electrical, and automotive industries, management historian Alfred C. Chandler wrote,
“Twelve [firms] have come since 1921 to such a decentralized structure. Eight [firms]
have done so since 1940.”27 Debate about optimal industrial management structure was
put on hold during the 1930s as concern about the availability of work took precedence
over concerns about worker productivity. As World War II began, no management
philosophy prevailed for how best to organize for maximum production.

28

Wartime

mobilization accelerated the move towards decentralization.

27 Alfred C. Chandler, Jr., “Management Decentralization: An Historical Analysis,” in James P.
Baughman, ed., The History o f American Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969),
212 and 242.
28

See Alfred D. Chandler. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History o f the Industrial
Enterprise (Cambridge, Ma.: The M.I.T. Press, 1962) for a thorough discussion o f the evolution o f
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Frederick C. Lane, Christopher Tassava and others have noted that wartime
urgency demanded loose organizational structure and decentralization of the commercial
shipbuilding industry.

According to Tassava, it was decentralization that freed Bechtel

and Kaiser to build “breathtaking” numbers of commercial ships, especially Liberty
ships.30 This dissertation extends the importance of decentralized operations and loose
corporate oversight to the achievements of Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. In
Portsmouth’s case, with the newly created Bureau of Ships overwhelmed with other
responsibilities, the yard was released to operate, not just decentralized from the Bureau
of Ships, but as independently as possible. It the process, Portsmouth Navy Yard
achieved its own “breathtaking” results.
Prior to the war, management optimization and productivity were more often
associated with the correct corporate organizational wiring diagram than workplace
practices and employee motivation. Just as wartime urgency drove decentralized
operations throughout the shipbuilding industry, greatly increased production schedules
and enlightened leadership drove a move to employee empowerment and self-managing
industrial corporate organizations and practices during the first half o f the 20th century. Also applicable are
Chandler’s The Visible Hand, The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977) and Scale and Scope: The Dynamics o f Industrial Capitalism Business (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977); David Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 18001932: The Development o f Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1984); Thomas K. McCraw,.ed., The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a
Historical Theory o f Big Business( Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988); Alfred D. Chandler, and
Herman Daems, eds. ( Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise o f the Modern
Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). The last work notes that
“Professionalization began, in fact, as a strong demand appeared for managers to oversee production,
marketing, financial, and other specialized activities. .. some o f the nation’s most prestigious universitiesamong them Harvard, Dartmouth, . . . set up schools or courses o f business administration to train
managers . . . during the first two decades o f the twentieth centuiy, national professional associations . .
.were established,” 34.
29 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory, Christopher Tassava, “Launching a Thousand Ships:
Entrepreneurs, War, Workers, and the State in American Shipbuilding, 1940-45.”
30 Christopher Tassava, “Launching a Thousand Ships,” 1.
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Peters’ works, while lacking in academic rigor, spawned a management culture that
rushed to implement employee empowerment, self-managing small teams, and other
programs to advance employee participation and decision making in the workplace.31 The
concept gained popularity throughout the 1990s as the key to increased productivity,
quality, and worker satisfaction.32 By the late 1990s, the concept had expanded from
self-managing teams to self-managing organizations where “There are no clear cut
divisions between those who manage and those who are managed. Rather, everyone in
the enterprise community is viewed as having full membership status, with a real share of
the voice, and with a legitimate right to fully participate in the management of his or her
own work.”33 While Portsmouth Navy Yard certainly was not a self-managing
organization during the war, it did reap great benefits from the small independent work
teams that roamed the waterfront doing their jobs with little or no supervision.
In time, as more and more companies empowered employees, numerous studies
have debated the concept. Studies by Chris Argyris, Bradley L. Kirkman, Benson Rosen
and others have confirmed the value of the concept when sincerely implemented with

31 Thomas J. Peters, In Search o f Excellence: Lessons from Am erica’s Best Run Companies (New
York: Harper & Row, 1982); A Passion fo r Excellence: The Leadership Difference, New York: Random
House, 1985; Thriving on Chaos: Handbook fo r Management Revolution (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1994);
Liberation Management: Necessary Disorganization fo r the Nanosecond Nineties (New York: A.A. Knopf,
1992). Peters’ first work, In Search o f Excellence (1982), advanced the principle that increased
management trust and confidence in employees would lead to increased production. Several works later,
Peters had progressed to the belief that “The self-managing team should be the basic organizational
building block,” Thriving on Chaos (1994), 297.
32William C. Byham, Zapp: The Lightning o f Empowerment: How to Improve Productivity,
Quality, and Employee Satisfaction (New York: Harmony Books, 1990); Thomas A. Potterfield, The
Business o f Employee Empowerment: Democracy and Ideology in the Workplace (Westport, Ct.: Quorum
Books, 1999).
33 Ronald E. Purser and Steven Cabana, The S elf Managing Organization: How Leading
Companies are Transforming the Work o f Teams fo r Real Impact (New York: Free Press, 1998).
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total dedication and commitment throughout the corporation.34 Argyris, in particular,
argues that anything less is a recipe for disappointing results. According to Argyris,
superficial implementation of employee empowerment can bring more problems than
progress. In normal peacetime industry, the creation, cultivation, and maintenance of the
proper corporate environment are critical factors to the success of employee
empowerment programs. At Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II, there was no
need to create and cultivate an environment to promote employee empowerment. Such an
environment already existed. All shipyard managers and employees were focused on one
goal, the acceleration of wartime production. Commitment and dedication towards that
end permeated the entire shipyard. Employee empowerment was not a management
option, it was a necessity recognized and endorsed by all hands.
Studies by Mark Fenton-O’Creevy and others argue that the success of self
managing teams hinges on the support of middle management and that roadblocks are
experienced in companies where middle management resists employee empowerment for
-5C

selfish reasons including concern for managerial job loss or management delayering.
Wartime urgency and near unlimited job security insured no such selfish resistance by
middle management at the Portsmouth Navy Yard.

34 Chris Argyris, “Empowerment: The Emperor’s New Clothes,” H arvard Business Review,
May/June 98, Vol. 76 Issue 3, 98-105; Bradley L. Kirkman and Benson Rosen, “Beyond Self-Management:
Antecedents and Consequences o f Team Empowerment,” The Academy o f Management Journal, vol. 42,
no. 1 (Feb., 1999). This study concluded that “More empowered teams were more productive than less
empowered teams and had higher levels o f customer service, job satisfaction, and organizational and team
commitment.” Mark Fenton-O’Creevy, “Employee Involvement and the Middle Manager: Evidence from
a Survey o f Organizations,” Journal o f Organizational Behavior, vol. 19, no. 1 (Jan., 1998), 67-84.
35 Mark Fenton-O’Creevy, “Employee Involvement and the Middle Manager: Evidence from a
Survey o f Organizations,” 67-84.
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Studies, especially those by Bradley L. Kirkman and Benson Rosen, have shown
that the benefits of successful self-managing work teams greatly exceed the initially
sought improvements to productivity, quality, and worker satisfaction.

It has been

shown that, as self-managing work teams gain experience and success, confidence,
commitment, and even greater success follow. In addition, commitment to the concept,
team, and organization increases. And employees develop a willingness to accept more
responsibility for innovation on the job, improved customer relations, harmonious
employee-management relations, accountability for results, and continuous improvement
in production. In effect, a cascading flood of good things happen when employees are
well trained, trusted, empowered, and set free to do their jobs. A seemingly never ending
stream of successes typified Portsmouth Navy Yard operations during the war. Many of
the positive and highly desirable organizational attributes described above were included
in those successes. This dissertation augments the body of work that argues that
employee empowerment, sincerely implemented with commitment and dedication,
contributes significantly to outstanding production and other highly desirable corporate
goals.
Any study of World War II mobilization necessarily includes discussion of
women in the workplace and this dissertation is no exception. Studies by Ruth Milkman
advance the accomplishments of women during the war while lamenting the
defeminization of industry after the war. Milkman accuses management of restructuring
postwar industry along the lines of prewar industry, where the workplace was
characterized by gender inequality. Other studies, including those by Shema Berger
36 Bradley L. Kirkman and Benson Rosen, “Beyond Self-Management: Antecedents and
Consequences o f Team Empowerment.”
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Gluck, look at the same wartime experiences by women and conclude that “Women’s
wartime experiences played a vital role in that process of redefinition [women’s
definition of themselves] - the reverberations of which are still being felt today.”37 On
the other hand, Alice Kessler-Harris and Claudia Goldin find little to suggest that the war
was a turning point for women. Rather, Kessler-Harris argues that the advances made by
women during the war “reflect continuity with previous attempts by some women to
break out of traditional roles.”38 Specifically, she noted that the labor force participation
rate for married women in the age group twenty to fifty steadily increased from the early
1900s through World War II and well into the postwar period.39 According to KesslerHarris, women entered the workforce in large numbers during the depression and that
trend continued throughout the war. Specifically, “older married women contributed most
of the increase that occurred among female workers”40 during the war years. Goldin also
found that “married, rather than single women were the primary means of bolstering the
nation’s labor force”41 during the latter stages of the war and post-war period through
1950. Based on the above noted continuity, Kessler-Harris argues that war was “less a

37 Ruth Milkman, Gender at Work: The Dynamics o f Job Segregation by Sex during World War II
(Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1987); Shema Berger Gluck, Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, the
War, and Social Change (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987); Deborah Ann Hirshfield, “Rosie also
Welded: Women and Technology in Shipbuilding during World War II,” Ph.D. Diss., University o f
Califormia, Irvine. 1987; Karen Anderson, Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations and the Status o f
Women during World War //(W estport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1981).
38

Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History o f Wage-Earning Women in the United States
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 278.
39 Ibid., Figure 5.1, 131.
40 Ibid.
41 Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History o f American Women
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 153.
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milestone for women than a natural response” to the call for patriotism, lucrative jobs,
and husband’s absences.42
This dissertation finds some level of agreement with all these studies. The
significant wartime accomplishments by women at Portsmouth Navy Yard are well
documented along with the dramatic decrease of women employees with the return of
servicemen and the great postwar reduction in employment. At the same time, the
political accomplishments of women in the city of Portsmouth, during the latter stages of
the war, redefined women’s definition of themselves and the role that they would play in
the city’s political scene for the rest of the twentieth century and beyond. Finally, as
argued by Kessler-Harris and Goldin, wartime employment of women at the yard was
more a passing event greatly motivated by patriotism, better pay, and the availability of
jobs vacated by departing servicemen than a turning point of lasting consequence.
Unlike progress made by women in the workplace during the war, which has been
the subject of considerable debate, worker empowerment during the war appears to have
received less study than deserved. Other shipyards and industries must have shared
wartime environments and experiences similar to those at Portsmouth Navy Yard that
were so conducive to increased worker responsibilities. Yet, little has been written
exploring the wartime contributions of worker empowerment. Studies of management’s
postwar abandonment of the wartime production advantages experienced as the result of
women in the workplace should probably also include the abandonment of worker
empowerment. Perhaps, as Gluck argues for women in the workplace, worker
empowerment was part o f a worker redefinition process that, despite the temporary step-

42 Ibid., 299.

-

28

-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

back after the war, provided the genesis for later resurrection and even greater fulfillment
of employee potential.

The environmental theme explores the consequences of wartime mobilization at
the yard on natural resources, health, and community. In general, the environmental
theme validates the lack of awareness and concern noted by others for industrial practices
that severely affected the natural environment and caused significant health issues prior
to the postwar environmental enlightenment. The community portion o f the
environmental theme takes the form of a shipyard boomtown case study.
Writing of the effect of wartime industry on California’s environment, Roger W.
Lotchin says:
Wars obviously drain the physical and mental resources of a nation... It
voraciously consumed scrap iron and iron ore for ships, tanks, trucks, and
weapons, huge amounts of copper for ammunition and communications wire,
.. Immense quantities of petroleum .. lumber to house 16 million service
men [in California] .. Pollution accompanied this depletion... war workers
nearly overwhelmed the sewer capacities of several California arsenals.. .
polluted their ocean beaches... The conflict almost exhausted San Diego’s
water supply... areas became the sites for the marvels of ship production,
only to be just as rapidly abandoned in 1945 to rust, rot, and desuetude.43
Portsmouth had much in common with the California shipyards. Sewer capacities were
overwhelmed, federal housing projects sprang up overnight, water supplies were
challenged, and immense quantities of raw materials were consumed in the production of
submarines - and pollution.
Few attempts have been made to assess or quantify the environmental
consequences of the shipbuilding boom during World War II. With the curtailment of
43 Roger T. Lotchin, ed., “Introduction: World War II in the Golden State,” The Way We Really
Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 2000), 9.
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record keeping for the sake of production, there is little quantitative evidence of industrial
pollution during the war at Portsmouth Navy Yard, and probably most other shipyards.
There is also a notable lack of awareness or concern about shipyard industrial pollution
during the war found in the testimony of former shipyard employees or the shipyard’s
annual inspection reports. Andrew Hurley noted in Environmental Inequalities, his
postwar study o f Gary, Indiana, that U.S. Steel employees were initially reluctant to
report pollution concerns for fear of job loss.44 This dissertation finds a similar lack of
reporting at the shipyard during the war but fear of job loss was certainly not the reason.
Rather, it appears that industrial pollution was simply not recognized or judged worthy of
notice relative to other more important concerns, especially wartime production.
Some historians argue that World War II not only put a fresh and slowly
developing public interest in environmental issues on hold, but caused those issues to be
suppressed after the war. According to Sarah S. Elkind:
Although the United States went into the Depression with relatively broad
definitions o f the public good, it came out of the Second World War nearly
obsessed with growth and security. Dissension on either of these two topics
became increasingly difficult until the modern environmental movement
defined new crises and challenged the hegemony of industrial growth.45
While Elkind was addressing the advent of postwar offshore drilling in California, her
observation has equal application to the building and overhaul of submarines at
Portsmouth Navy Yard. Growing public concern, in the late 1930s, about industrial
sewage pollution of the river and bay was overwhelmed, during the war, with an

44Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary,
Indiana, 1945-1980 (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1995), 149.
45Sarah S. Elkind. “Public Oil, Private Oil: The Tidelands Controversy, World War II, and Control
o f the Environment,” The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War. Roger W.
Lotchin, ed. (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 2000), 137.
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obsession for growth and security. Growth and security concerns continued to reign
supreme after the war, until the modem environmental movement reversed priorities.
Locally, late in the war, a growing concern about the pollution of local waters was
pioneered by Dr. C.F. Jackson of the University of New Hampshire. Dr. Jackson’s
Biological Survey o f Great Bay, New Hampshire (1944) included pollution levels of the
Piscataqua River and the Great Bay that make it clear that additional studies and better
postwar controls were needed over shipyard and community discharges to the bay and
river.46 Despite Jackson’s early work, as argued by Sarah Elkind, interest in the pollution
of local waters waned in light of overriding postwar interests. Fred Short’s Bibliography
o f Research on the Great Bay Estuary and Adjacent Upland Region (1989) shows a lack
of postwar studies of local water quality and pollution. Such studies break down by
decade as follows, 1940s (1 [Jackson’s study]), 1950s (0), 1960s (9), 1970s (29), and
1980s (39).47 The postwar studies and discharge controls recommended by Dr. Jackson,
while slow in coming, were nevertheless an eventual byproduct of the unconstrained
wartime waste discharge practices of Portsmouth Navy Yard, and the surrounding
communities, that are described in this dissertation.
This dissertation bolsters Samuel P. Hays’ contention in Beauty, Health, and
Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States 1955-1985 that up until the
mid-twentieth century “Sources responsible for air and water pollution as well as solid
waste had long since dumped their waste on the most readily available land, into nearby

46 C.F. Jackson, A Biological Survey o f Great Bay New Hampshire by the Marine Fisheries
Commission (Durham: University o f New Hampshire, 1944).
47 Frederick T. Short ed., Biography o f Research on the Great Bay Estuary and Adjacent Upland
Region (Durham: University o f New Hampshire, 1989).
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streams, or into the air.”48 Hays maintains that, beginning in the 1930s and extending up
to the early 1960s, the state public-health agencies were impotent and ineffective in their
efforts to regulate sewage discharge into streams, and industrial discharges were of little
concern until after World War II. This dissertation presents official correspondence
between the shipyard and the states of Maine and New Hampshire immediately prior to
the war that illustrates the impotency and ineffectiveness of those states’ efforts to
regulate sewage and industrial discharges into streams.
Lorraine McConaghy’s “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, A Small
Town during World War II” discusses the disastrous pollution of Lake Washington by
boom shipyards in the Seattle area that contaminated local water supplies.49 Like the local
histories discussed at the outset of this section, McConaghy’s study does not cross the
community-shipyard interface to examine the industrial practices that caused the
pollution of Lake Washington. This study does examine the practices of Portsmouth
Navy Yard that contributed to an increase in the pollution of the Piscataqua River,
specifically the discharge of raw sewage and untreated industrial effluents. There is little
doubt that Portsmouth Navy Yard subscribed in spades to the waste disposal philosophy
described by Samuel P. Hays, namely, until mid-century waste was dumped to the most
readily available stream, relying on dispersion to be the solution to pollution.
Another major environmental sub-theme is the loss of wetlands as the result of
shipyard expansion during the war. Ann Vileisis, Nancy Seasoles, and others have

48 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States
1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 72.
49 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, A Small Town during
World War II,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly vol. 80, 1989,42-51.
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written extensively about the loss of America’s wetlands and the environmental
consequences of uncontrolled land reclamation projects.50 Seasholes argues that
Boston’s growth was the result of “its original location on a small confined location [that]
the town did not want to abandon when it began to grow rapidly and the fact that the
landform was surrounded by large areas of shallow water that could be easily filled.”51
Like Boston, when Portsmouth Navy Yard needed to grow rapidly at the start of the war,
it also took advantage of the shallow waters that surrounded the island shipyard and
renewed its long history of land reclamation.
Similar to industrial pollution, the environmental consequences of wetlands
reclamation, was little appreciated until after World War II. Since that time many studies,
including local studies of the Great Bay Estuary by Fred Short, have confirmed the
ecological value of the marine life nutrients contributed by eel grass and other marsh
growth. Likewise, Short and others have emphasized the importance of controlling
reclamation projects to guard against the loss of those nutrients.52 The consequences of

50 Ann Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape: A History o f Am erica’s Wetlands.
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1997); Nancy Seasholes, Gaining Ground: A History ofLandmaking in
Boston, (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2003) and Walking Tours o f Boston’s Made Land (Cambridge Ma.:
MIT Press, 2006); Ivan Valiela, Deborah Rutecki, and Sophia Fox, “Salt Marshes: Biological Controls o f
Food Webs in a Diminishing Environment, “Journal o f Experimental Marine Biology & Ecology; Mar
2004, Vol. 300 Issue 1 /2 ,1 3 1 -1 5 0 and “Theorizing Land-Cover and Land-Use Change: The Case o f the
Florida Everglades and it Degradation,” Annals o f the Association o f American Geographers, Jun 2004,
Vol. 94 Issue 2, 311-328.
51 Nancy Seasholes, Gaining Ground: A History ofLandmaking in Boston, 2. Boston’s original
peninsula o f 487 acres is now surrounded by about 500 acres o f reclaimed land. Boston and its environs
now include about 5,250 acres o f reclaimed land. Seasholes says that “Boston probably has more made
land than any other city on North America.” 2.
52

Fred Short et al., Bibliography on the Great Bay Estuary and Adjacent Upland Region
(Durham, N.H.: University o f New Hampshire / University o f Maine Sea Grant College Program, 1989);
The Ecology o f the Great Bay Estuary, New Hampshire and Maine (Durham, N.H.: Jackson Estuarine
Laboratory, University o f New Hampshire, 1992); Eelgrass in Estuarine Research Reserves Along the East
Coast, U.S.A. (Durham, N.H.: Jackson Estuarine Laboratory, University o f New Hampshire, 1993); and
Eeelgrass as an Indicator o f Nutrient Over-Enrichment in Estuaries: A Final Report, (Durham, N .H .:
Jackson Estuarine Laboratory, University o f New Hampshire, 2003).
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wetlands reclamation, like industrial pollution, were under appreciated during the war.
This dissertation provides further evidence of unrestrained wetlands reclamation, in the
name of progress, that characterized the era.
Many accounts have been written about wartime experiences in small towns
across the United States.

ST

Fewer accounts have been written analyzing shipyard

boomtown experiences and transformations. In general, shipyard boomtown histories
reflect the struggles of communities to cope with rapidly changing economies,
infrastructure, and environmental degradation. Boomtown Portsmouth, N.H. experienced
similar struggles.
The shipyard boomtown studies that have been written, like shipyard mobilization
studies, have been limited to West Coast commercial shipyard towns. McConaghy’s
“Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington” examines the economic, political,
environmental, and social transformation of a small shipyard boomtown.54 Kirkland’s
wartime experience was so severe that community leaders rejected a continued shipyard
or military presence after the war. Portsmouth leaders, on the other hand, were committed
to maintaining as much of the increased shipyard employment as possible to insure the
continued postwar economic viability of the seacoast area. On a larger geographic scale,
Marilyn Johnson’s The Second Gold Rush: Oakland & the East Bay in World War II

53 Clarence Andrews, “Sheldon, Iowa during World War II,” Palimpest 70 (1989), 146-165;
Lonnie E. Maness, “A West Tennessee Town and World War II,” West Tennessee Historical Society
Papers, 110-119; Perry Duis and Scott LaFrance, We've Got a Job to Do: Chicagoans and World War II
(Chicago: Chicago Historical Society, 1992); Miller, Marc Scott, The Irony o f Victory: World War II and
Lowell, Massachusetts ( Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1988).

54 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, A Small Town during
World War II,” 42-51.
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argues that new war defense industries, including commercial shipbuilding, sparked a
mass migration to the Bay Area that resulted in lasting social, cultural, and political
changes.55 On an even grander scale, Gerald Nash and Roger Lotchin have shown how
federal spending during the war transformed the entire West Coast by generating
unprecedented economic growth and prosperity.56 Studies of communities transformed by
wartime mobilization have been primarily focused on the West Coast. This analysis of a
New Hampshire shipyard boomtown is an exception to the rule.
One of the social consequences of boomtown developments near military
installations during wartime is typically an increase in prostitution and venereal disease.
In his classic history o f venereal disease, A Magic Bullet, Alan M. Brandt described the
military’s wartime efforts to limit the trade, and control the disease, by pressuring
communities to clean up establishments specifically targeted by the military as highly
suspect centers of prostitution and likely distribution centers for venereal disease. The
Portsmouth experience during the war, especially the aggressive efforts by the U.S. Navy
to force Portsmouth officials to rid the city of prostitutes, would make a good case study
for Brandt’s social history of venereal disease. The remarkable developments that
accompanied the introduction of the magic bullet, penicillin, as a treatment at the

55 Marilyn S. Johnson, The Second G old Rush: Oakland and the East Bay in World War II.
56 Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact o f the Second World War
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); Gerald D. Nash, World War II and the West: Reshaping the
Economy (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1990); Roger Lotchin, “The Historians War or the Home
Front War?: Some Thoughts for Western Historians,” Western Historical Quarterly vol 26, No 2, (Summer
1995), 185-196; Roger W. Lotchin,. ed. The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great
War (Chicago: The University o f Illinois Press, 2000).
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shipyard hospital in January 1944, also track well with Brandt’s presentation of this
dramatic breakthrough in venereal disease control.57
Many World War II boomtown histories have relied extensively on interviews
with citizens and soldiers who were there. This dissertation incorporates the personal
testimony of a number of retired shipyard employees and one veteran who worked at the
yard during the war. Sadly, the most knowledgeable source of information for this
dissertation, ninety-six year old Fred White, passed away a few months after being
interviewed. This dissertation is far richer for the contributions of White and the others
who consented to be interviewed. It is painfully obvious that it will not be too many years
before personal testimony will no longer be available as a primary source for World War
II histories.

This dissertation, advertised as a study of submarine construction at Portsmouth
Navy Yard during World War II, is obviously a multilayered treatment that spans a
number of disciplines, themes, and sub-themes. Mobilization, which is frequently
presented as a straight line event that kick-started industry and won the war, was far more
complex and multi-directional. Mobilization set in motion strong forces that not only won
the war, but swept across the nation and reverberated through all levels of society,
transforming lives and communities in the process. This dissertation is an account of
these mobilization forces as they passed through Portsmouth Navy Yard and the seacoast
area.

57 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History o f Venereal Disease in the United States
Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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CHAPTER II

BETWEEN THE WARS

“The working force at the Portsmouth Yard has been unusually steady
and the result has been an excellent product at reasonable cost. . . The
ability of the Portsmouth Yard to meet its completion dates has in recent
years been amply demonstrated by the excellent and unique record
established of meeting every contract date of delivery.”1
Rear Admiral W.G. DuBosn Chief Bureau of Construction & Repair
Rear Admiral H.G. Bowen Chief Bureau of Engineering
Joint letter of 10 August 1938

The expertise in submarine design and construction that characterized Portsmouth
Navy Yard at the start of World War II can be traced back to the U.S. Navy’s
dissatisfaction with the submarine acquisition process that it had experienced prior to,
and during, World War I. During that period of early submarine development, private
submarine builders Electric Boat Company and Lake Torpedo Company controlled the
design of submarines with little or no input solicited, or accepted, from the U.S. Navy.
According to naval historian Gary Weir, “The relationship between private shipbuilders
and the navy before 1914 was essentially that of vendor and customer in the classic
sense.”2 This relationship continued during World War I, causing the Navy to look for

1 Bureau Construction & Repair and Bureau o f Engineering joint letter o f 10 Aug 1938 to
Secretary o f the Navy. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1,
Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
2 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines, 1914-1940, 5.
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alternatives. The fleet wanted to define the operating capabilities and technologies that
went into their submarines instead of buying what happened to be on the shelf.
Captain Andrew I. McKee, Planning Officer at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the
war, wrote an article on submarine development in 1945 for Historical Transactions
1893-1943, a 50th anniversary special publication by the Society of Naval Engineers and
Marine Architects. McKee described the process by which the Navy used Portsmouth
Navy Yard to wrest control of submarine design from the private yards:
As the first step in familiarizing its personnel with submarines and their
designs, an order was placed in June 1914 for the building of the L -8, to the
design of the Lake Torpedo Company, at the Navy Yard Portsmouth, N.H.
Two years later, the 0-1, of the Holland type, was ordered built at
Portsmouth to the design of the Electric Boat Company. Late in 1916, the
Navy Department decided that Portsmouth had acquired enough experience
in its work on these two ships to be trusted with the development of the
working plans for a third design, the preliminary design of which had been
prepared by the Navy Department, and [the Navy Department] placed an
order for one submarine, the S-3, at Portsmouth. At the same time, orders
were placed for the S-l with Electric Boat and the S-2 with the Lake Torpedo
Company.3
In effect, the Navy had set up a design competition between the two well established
private submarine design shipyards and the newcomer, the Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Within a year the Portsmouth design was judged superior to the Lake design and the large
order o f submarines that the Lake Torpedo Company received in June 1917 was required
to be built to the Portsmouth design. Electric Boat continued to build to its own design
throughout the war. However, the company was given no submarine orders after World
War I until 1933.4

3 A.I. McKee, “Development o f Submarines in the United States,” Historical Transactions 18931943 (New York: Society o f Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1945), 347.
4 Ibid.
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Many thought that the motivations of private shipbuilders had more to do with
profiteering than providing the fleet with the submarines they needed.5 In short, the U.S.
Navy felt that it was paying too much for an inferior and ill designed product. Gary
Weir’s Building American Submarines, 1914-1940 describes how the United States
Navy, dissatisfied with private industry during World War I, made a commitment to
strengthen Portsmouth Navy Yard’s submarine design and new construction capabilities
during the 1920s and 1930s.6 According to Weir, the Navy “utilized available assets to
develop Portsmouth into a first-class submarine yard” including the assembly of a “fine
design team.”7 Captain McKee noted in his article in Historical Transactions 1893-1943
that “For fourteen years, from 1919 until 1933, all the submarines ordered, and there
were only nine but these were of five different classes, were built to plans prepared by
o

Portsmouth.” With the nation focused on disarmament during the 1920s, Portsmouth
Navy Yard’s design team had limited submarine design opportunities while Electric Boat
and other yards had no opportunities at all.
The post-World War I slump in shipbuilding was the death knell for a number of
private shipyards. According to the Bureau of Ships self-history, “By 1933, only six
private yards remained in operation: the ‘Big Three,’ Bethlehem, New York, and
5 The excessive profits that many Americans thought private industry had reaped during World
War I resulted in numerous Congressional efforts to bring the situation under control. According to Robert
Connery, “In the years between 1918 and April 1942, some 140 bills and resolutions to reduce or eliminate
profits on war production and equalize the economic burdens o f war were introduced into Congress.”
Robert Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 266.
6 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines, 114.
1 Ibid., 114, 60.
8 A. I. McKee, “Development o f Submarines in the United States,” 347. The first Electric Boat
submarine order after World War I was for the Cuttlefish and it was required to be built to Portsmouth
plans with only minor departures. The nine submarines are commonly grouped together as the Victory class
but, as McKee notes, they were, at the time, considered to be five different classes because the
characteristics varied considerably between submarines.
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Newport News; and three smaller companies, Bath Iron Works, Federal Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Company, and Electric Boat Company.”9 As noted by maritime historian
Frederick C. Lane, “In the lean years from 1922 to 1938 only the very strong
shipbuilding companies were able to keep going.”10 Lane summarized well the state of
shipyards between the wars when he wrote:
Dominating the clatter and seemingly random dispersion of a shipyard,
guiding the work of its huge cranes, heavy presses, and other special
equipment were the calculations of highly trained engineers and experienced
managers. Their practical and theoretical knowledge had to be kept employed
if the industry was to survive and have in it the possibility of sudden growth
to meet a new emergency.11
This was precisely the case at Portsmouth Navy Yard between the wars. Naval architects,
marine engineers, and experienced managers were kept employed, to the maximum
extent possible by the U.S. Navy, despite a budget that was severely constrained by
economic depression, politics, and foreign policy. In the end, Portsmouth Navy Yard not
only survived, but also improved its design and production capabilities throughout the
1920s and 1930s. As a result, the yard was more ready than most shipyards for the
industrial mobilization that preceded World War II.

Portsmouth Navy Yard’s fate between the two wars was, to a large extent,
determined by the U.S. Navy’s commitment to develop it as competition to private
industry. However, the Navy’s ability to do that was heavily influenced by larger national
events including disarmament, neutrality, and the New Deal. The first two, in conjunction
9 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 5.
10 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory, A History o f Shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime
Commission in World War II, 32.
11 Ibid

40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with very limited naval appropriations during the Great Depression, restricted the number
of submarines able to be built and, thus, the submarine design and new construction
experience that the yard could acquire during the interim war years. New Deal policies,
especially the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) that kick-started the nation’s
renewed naval shipbuilding program in 1933, including two submarines at Portsmouth
Navy Yard, were crucial to the yard’s development between the wars.
Other New Deal policies channeled funding to navy yards for the maintenance
and limited upgrade of shops and facilities, during the 1930s, when naval funding for
such projects was virtually nonexistent. The Bureau of Yards and Docks’ self-history of
operations during World War II credits New Deal programs with the accomplishment of
limited, but important, rehabilitation, modernization, and improvements at navy yards
during the 1930s:
In the period between 1928 and 1938 only a moderate amount of important
construction was accomplished at Navy Yards. A large machine shop was
built at Puget Sound in 1934, a sheet metal and electrical shop was built at
Norfolk in 1936, and a graving dock was undertaken at Mare Island in 1937.
However, a considerable amount of work of lesser magnitude was
accomplished during this period under naval public works appropriations but
principally through allocations from National Industrial Recovery
Administration, Civil Works Administration, Works Program Administration,
and Public Works Administration appropriations for unemployment relief
during the depression.12
According to that report, the yards would have been “critically unprepared” for World
War II without these programs.
It should be noted, that while Portsmouth Navy Yard benefited from the NIRA
and other New Deal programs, it was not among the navy yards cited in the above
quotation as having experienced important construction projects during the 1930s. For the
12 Bureau o f Yards and Docks, Administrative History o f World War II, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 169.
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most part, proposed major construction projects at Portsmouth were put on hold during
the 1930s. This construction lull ended immediately prior to the initial stages of the war
with the passing of legislation that brought massive facility upgrades to Portsmouth and
the other navy yards.
Any analysis of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s production during World War II
requires an understanding of how events between the wars positioned the yard to perform
as it did. The discussion that follows examines the yard’s pre-World War II history in
light of the nation’s involvement with disarmament treaties, neutrality acts, and the New
Deal, in that order.
Submarine Disarmament
The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 began a series of post-World War I
disarmament conferences and international agreements that restrained United States’
naval construction until the eve of World War II. As time went by, the various powers
involved enforced or ignored disarmament treaty provisions to satisfy their own selfinterests. The United States, however, remained a strong proponent of disarmament and
the United States Navy declined dramatically as a result.
From the Navy’s standpoint, the years between the Washington Disarmament
Conference and 1945 can be divided into periods of decline (1922-1931), awakening
(1932-36), and rebuilding and expansion (1936-1945). From Portsmouth Navy Yard’s
standpoint, the yard did not suffer as greatly as other yards during the declining period
because of the U.S. Navy’s commitment to develop the yard’s submarine design and
construction capabilities during the 1920s. The relative stability that the shipyard enjoyed
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during the 1920s enabled it to be poised and ready to capitalize on the awakening period
and thrive during the rebuilding period.
During the 1920s and early 1930s, the United States Congress, initially influenced
by the nation’s predisposition towards disarmament, and subsequently burdened by the
economic realities of the Great Depression, voluntarily restricted submarine building to
below the limitations of any disarmament conference agreements. Thomas H. Healy,
Assistant Dean of Foreign Relations at Georgetown University, summarized the strong
national support for disarmament in a March 1932 address:
There is probably no country in the world where the agitation for world peace
and reduction of armaments has made more headway than in the United
States. The work is being carried on directly or indirectly by some 400
organizations whose total membership may number as many as 15,000,000
persons. Their activities have spread to every nook and corner of the United
States through conventions, the press, special publications, the radio, and
11
every other means.
A consequence of this national commitment to disarmament was the limited building of
naval ships and submarines and minimal investment in shipyard facilities.
As late as August 1939, the Secretary of the Navy was still strictly controlling the
earliest acceptable launch dates for submarines under construction, in accordance with
agreements made at the latest disarmament conference, the disappointing London Naval
Conference o f 1936.14 Thus, the United States continued to comply with debatable treaty
obligations until late 1939, even as Germany was beginning to march through Europe.

13 Address given by Thomas A. Healy, Ph.D., Assistant Dean and Professor o f Foreign Relations
at Georgetown University School o f Foreign Service, 3 Mar 1932 at All Souls Unitarian Church,
Washington, D.C. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central
Files), Box 24, Folder A14-7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
14 Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter o f 9 Aug 1939 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box
24, Folder A 14-7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
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The discussion that follows tracks submarine disarmament efforts from the Washington
Naval Conference to the brink of World War II.

Submarine numbers and tonnage were not effectively limited by any of the
disarmament conferences between the wars. The primary participants, Great Britain,
France, United States, Japan, and Italy, were never able to compromise their self-interests
to the point that a consensus could be reached on any serious proposal for submarine
disarmament. Nevertheless, attempts to include submarine disarmament in the various
disarmament treaties discouraged support for any United States’ submarine rebuilding
programs prior to the mid-1930s.
The nation’s dedication to naval disarmament started at the Washington Naval
Conference of 1921. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes astonished the participants
(United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy) with a proposal for drastic
armament reductions that had the United States leading the way by scrapping thirty
capital ships totaling 845,750 tons. The treaty limited the world’s capital ships at 500,000
tons each for the United States and Britain; 300,000 tons for Japan; 175,000 each for Italy
and France.15
Other treaty provisions included a ten-year capital ship building holiday, tonnage
limits for specific warships, and bore diameter limits for gun mounts. Unable to reach
agreement on submarine numbers or tonnage limitations, the conferees made an
15 The capital ships were battleships and battle cruisers. The United States also proposed that Great
Britain scrap 23 capital ships totaling 583,375 tons and Japan scrap 25 capital ships totaling 448,928 tons.
In addition to actual ships, the proposal covered ships included in all capital shipbuilding programs
underway or projected. Not commonly appreciated is the fact that the treaty’s well advertised tonnages and
ratios would not be achieved until 1942. At the outset, in 1922, Great Britain had a decided advantage o f 22
capital ships and 640,450 tons in comparison to the United States’ 18 capital ships and 500,650 tons,
Japan’s 10 capital ships and 299,700 tons, France’s 10 capital ships and 221,170 tons, and Italy’s 10 capital
ships and 182,800 tons. George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None, 286-288.
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unsuccessful attempt to limit the use of submarines as commerce raiders. The NonFortification Clause of the treaty obligated the United States and Great Britain to refrain
from fortifying possessions in the Pacific Ocean while leaving Japan relatively free to
strengthen its home islands militarily.16
In retrospect, some historians argue that the Washington Naval Disarmament
Conference of 1921 set in motion events that would ultimately lead, not to world peace,
but to Pearl Harbor and world war.17 Other historians, like Thomas H. Buckley, maintain
that the failure was not with the Washington treaties but, rather, a failure “to follow up
the auspicious detente of pragmatic advantage and reciprocity drawn up in 1921 in
Washington.”

1

0

,,

Political leaders failed to take advantage of the opportunity to solve

other areas of conflict and, according to Buckley, “With the advent of the Great
Depression, time ran out.” In American Foreign Policy and National Security Policies,
1914-1945, Thomas Buckley and Edwin B. Strong argue that those who criticize the
supporters of the Washington Treaty for giving up naval supremacy, agreeing to nonfortification of key Pacific Islands, and failing to achieve more iron-clad promises against
aggression ignore some basic historical facts. Buckley and Strong maintain that there was
little or no possibility that Congress would have funded naval construction or island
fortification, and the Senate never would have approved any iron-clad nonaggression

16 E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, Eds., Sea Power, A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), 480-483.
171bid.
18 Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville:
The University o f Tennessee Press, 1970), 190.
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agreements.19 Historian Roger Dingman also finds fault with the lack of political followup more than with the treaty itself. According to Dingman:
The Washington naval treaties symbolize an important truth, one that
transcends the particulars of a half century ago. The truth is this: Arms
limitation is, above all else, a political process... The success or failure,
wisdom or folly of arms limitation by international agreement depends,
above all else, on careful, constantly changing, and correct estimates of the
domestic political risks and opportunities it presents to one’s own leaders
and to their prospective negotiating partners.20
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, political leaders in the United States did little
assessing o f the risks and opportunities presented by the arms limitation agreements.
Instead, a national commitment to disarmament at any cost seemingly prevailed that led
to the disastrous decline of the United States naval fleet and the loss of international
leverage that may have contributed to more successful disarmament negotiations.
The debate over submarine tonnage limitations at the Washington Naval
Conference saw Great Britain, at one extreme, proposing the scrapping of all submarines
and France, at the other extreme, favoring generous limits that would permit the
construction of large submarine fleets. Great Britain, dependent on high seas trade for
survival, and with recent memories of German submarines devastating their trade during
World War I, wanted to abolish all submarines. At best, Great Britain would settle for
drastic limitations on submarine tonnage. France and Japan, on the other hand,
consistently rejected extreme tonnage limitations in favor of limits that permitted the
building of enough submarines to neutralize their naval inferiority in other areas. These
two irreconcilable views tended to dominate the Washington, and subsequent, naval
19 Thomas H. Buckley and Edwin B. Strong, Jr., American Foreign ands National Security
Policies, 1914-1945 (Knoxville: The University o f Tennessee Press, 1987), 69.
20 Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins o f Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1933
(Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1976), 218.
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disarmament conferences. The United States, in general, followed Americans’
inclinations towards pacification and took a position closer to that of Great Britain than
the other powers. The United States, however, was more flexible in its position than
Great Britain and was always willing to negotiate, with hopes of limiting the arms race to
•

•

whatever degree was possible at the time.

01

The Washington Naval Conference concluded with an ineffective supplementary
treaty designed to limit submarine operations as commerce raiders. The supplemental
treaty, a poor alternative to the setting of limits on numbers or tonnage, was an attempt to
restrict submarine warfare, specifically outlawing German practices, through
international law reinforced by public opinion. However, the proposal was never ratified
by the French Parliament, removing any obligation for compliance by the other powers.
Thus, the Washington Naval Conference essentially placed no restrictions on the building
or use of submarines, and nations were free to engage in unlimited submarine building
programs.22 The United States, unyielding in its commitment to the spirit of disarmament,
built only three submarines between the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 and the
Geneva Naval Conference in 1927. Japan, on the other hand, built thirty submarines
during the same period.

'J'X

Thus, Japan capitalized on the failure of the Washington Naval

Conference to restrict the building of submarines to greatly enlarge its submarine fleet.

21 See Dean C. Douglas, Submarine Disarmament, 1919-1936 (Ph.D. Diss., Syracuse University,
1970) for a complete study o f submarine disarmament
22 Ibid., 92-145.
23 Rep Carl Vinson, Congressional Record, 69th Cong. 2d session, 4 Jan 1927, 1095-96, quoted in
George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None: The Development o f Modern Naval Policy (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and Co., 1940), 314.
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At the Geneva Naval Conference (1927), the United States, Great Britain, and
Japan sought limitations for the auxiliary ships not covered by the Washington Naval
Treaty. Auxiliary ships primarily included cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The
submarine discussions centered on tonnage limitations. Finding no support for abolition,
Great Britain proposed that tonnage limitations be set for the categories of small (under
600 tons) and large (1000 to 1600 tons) submarines in numbers that favored her existing
submarine fleet. Once again, the participants could not reach agreement on submarine
limitations o f any description.24 The extent of the U.S. Navy’s submarine building
between 1924 and 1930 was five V-class submarines, all built at Portsmouth.
Unrestrained by any treaty limitations, the United States voluntarily restricted submarine
construction to a rate of less than one submarine a year.
The end result of the haggling and posturing of the five nations actively involved
in the naval disarmament conferences of the 1920s was expansive naval shipbuilding
programs for four of them and a near moratorium on naval shipbuilding for the other, the
United States. Massachusetts Senator David L. Walsh’s Congressional testimony in 1944
in favor of maintaining a strong navy after World War II highlighted the dangers of
repeating the disastrous naval decline of the 1920s:
Following that conference [Washington] and up to January 1, 1929, the great
powers o f the world laid down and appropriated for naval expansion as
follows: Japan 125 naval vessels; Great Britain, 74 naval vessels, France,
119, Italy, 82: and to the everlasting credit of our own country, the United
States, exclusive of small river gunboats, l l . 25

24 Dean C. Douglas, Submarine Disarmament, 1919-1936, 146 -172.
25

Senator David L. Walsh, Chairman o f the Committee on Naval Affairs, “The Decline and
Renaissance o f the Navy, 1922-1944.” Presented to the 78th Congress, 2nd Session on 7 June 1944. Senate
Serial No. 10862, Document No. 202. NARA, Waltham, RG 181, PNSY, Box 24, Folder A14-7,
“Scrapping o f Ships.”
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The overall disarmament scorecard for the 1920s shows the United States Navy
increasing its fleet by 11 ships while the other negotiating powers increased their fleets
by 400 ships. Obviously, the other nations had elected to exploit the holes in the treaties
that permitted unrestrained building of non-capital naval ships like cruisers, destroyers,
and submarines while the United States did not. The end result was that the United States
Navy, which had been the largest navy in the world at the time of the Washington Naval
Conference in 1922, was in total decline by 1930.
At the London Naval Conference (1930) the same five powers that had met at the
Washington Naval Conference revived many of the same issues that had eluded
consensus at Geneva three years earlier. The conference concluded with Japan gaining an
altered 10:10:7 ratio in cruisers as compared to the 10:10:6 ratio in capital ships
established at the Washington conference. However, only the United States, Great
Britain, and Japan were signatories to the entire treaty. France and Italy refused to agree
to any further tonnage limitations in any category and abstained from signing the part of
the treaty dealing with tonnage limitations of any sort. The ban on capital ship
construction was extended to the end of 1936 and escape clauses were provided for the
United States, Great Britain, and Japan should France and Italy reestablish capital
shipbuilding programs deemed threatening by any of the three signatories.

Of t

Naval

disarmament had degenerated to a house of cards replete with haggling, distrust, and
outright refusals to participate.
As for submarines, the conference opened with Great Britain once again
proposing the abolishing of the submarine as an instrument of war. As expected, France

26 Dean C. Douglas, Submarine Disarmament, 1919-1936, 173 -204.
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and Japan once again rejected the proposal outright. After further negotiation, submarine
tonnage for the three signatories was capped at 52,700 tons and the individual submarine
tonnage was fixed at 2,000 tons. This agreement was a hollow victory for submarine
disarmament. In the absence of any submarine disarmament restrictions after the
Washington conference, Japan had launched an ambitious submarine building program
during the 1920s that greatly increased that country’s bargaining position at the London
conference in 1930. The end result was that Japan was able to negotiate submarine parity
with Great Britain and the United States at a level significantly higher than Great Britain
and the United States would have preferred.27
Meanwhile, Hitler was rising to power and Germany would soon resume its role
as a naval power. Britain accommodated Germany’s return to power with a bilateral
naval treaty in 1935 that permitted Germany 35 percent of Britain’s naval tonnage and 45
percent o f Britain’s submarine tonnage. With Britain grasping at any disarmament straws
offering the opportunity to limit submarine building and France continuing to reject
submarine limitations, Germany, Italy, and Japan became increasingly aggressive on the
international stage and contemptuous of all treaties.28 The United States, on the other
hand, continued not only to honor the London Naval Treaty (1930), but to build
substantially below treaty limits. To comply with the provisions of the Treaty of London
(1930) that required the United States to reduce submarine fleet tonnage in excess of the
52,700 tons limit,29 the United States eliminated overage “S” and “R” submarines. In the

27 George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None, 343.
28 Dean C. Douglas, Submarine Disarmament, 1919-1936, 173 -204.
29 United States had 68,700 tons, Great Britain 77,842 tons, and Japan 63,324 tons. George T.
Davis, A Navy Second to None, 343.
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process, the United States neglected an opportunity to eliminate even more overage
submarines and build modern replacements up to the 52,700 ton limit. The end result was
a substantially reduced and aged submarine fleet by the mid-1930s.
The first four years o f the 1930’s were particularly lean years for the Portsmouth
Navy Yard. Employment averaged a little over 1,500, about the same as in 1916 before
the build up for World War I. During those four years the shipyard built only three
submarines, the last of the V-class submarines and the last surface combatant the yard
would ever build, the Coast Guard Cutter U.S.S. Hudson.30 As inactive as the shipyard
was in the early 1930s, it was fortunate to have been favored with the few contracts it did
receive. Other yards did not fare as well.
When ex-Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed the
presidency in March 1933, some legislators began to search for ways to reverse the
decline of the United States Navy and move the fleet, at least, towards the limits of the
London Naval Treaty. Increased Japanese militancy and national economic needs
provided what little impetus Roosevelt needed to proceed with substantial naval
expansion.

T1

The first step in the process was to include, under the National Industrial

Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, authorization and funding to increase the navy by 32
ships, including four submarines. The next year, 1934, saw the passage of the VinsonTrammel Bill authorizing the construction of another 102 ships, including 28 submarines,
designed to bring the fleet up to the Washington and London Naval Treaty limits by

30 Cradle o f American Shipbuilding, 76, 78, 80.
31 Japan officially withdrew from the League o f Nations in March 1933 and announced intentions
to abandon the naval limitations agreements. In the summer o f 1933, it was learned that Japan had
increased its naval budget by 25% and speculation was strong that a Russo-Japanese conflict was
inevitable. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, 75.
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1942. Having been favored with the V-class submarine building program during the
1920s, Portsmouth Navy Yard greeted the renewed naval shipbuilding programs with an
experienced submarine design team and a stable workforce experienced in submarine
construction. The yard was well positioned to capitalize on the renewed naval
shipbuilding programs of the mid-1930s.
President Roosevelt had to walk a tightrope to insure that his support for a
rejuvenated Navy did not strike a response from the isolationists that would “weaken him
politically and undermine his ability to put across economic reform.”32 According to
historian Robert Dallek:
When Navy Department officials spoke publicly, he urged them to use restraint,
suggesting that they not overstate the case for a strong Navy, or “hit and assail”
the professional pacifists, since replies only create a controversy... Moreover,
when the White House received . . . letters . . . opposing the Vincent-Trammell
bill as wasteful and contrary to America’s professed peace aims, Roosevelt felt
compelled to explain that the bill authorized the construction of 102 new ships but
did not appropriate money for them. Congress, he pointed out, would have to do
this.33
Part of Roosevelt’s balancing act included the assuring of his adversaries to naval
expansion that his administration would continue to aggressively pursue arms limitation
at the forthcoming 1935 London Naval Conference with the hope that the naval build-up
could be moderated. This conference shaped up as a last resort for disarmament as the
agreements o f the London Conference (1930) were to end in December 1936 unless the
signatories agreed to extend them at a conference in 1935. Moreover, the agreements of
the Washington Treaty (1922) were also to end in 1936 if any of the adherents disavowed
its provisions by December 1935. Japan, having indicated its intention to seek fall parity
32 Ibid, 76
33 / bid.
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in tonnage with the United States and Great Britain, was set to scuttle any extension of
disarmament plans.34
As suspected, the London Naval Conference of 1935 marked the end of any hopes
for disarmament. Japan’s representatives walked out of the conference when their
demands for full parity in all naval categories were not acceptable to the others and Italy
refused to sign any agreements. According to historian George T. Davis:
The other powers [United States, Great Britain, and France], seeking to salvage
something from the collapse of the system of naval limitations, agreed on March
28,1936, to a treaty in which the emphasis was placed on qualitative limitations
and upon an exchange of information on building progress.. . This meant that the
three powers would adhere to the type of ship [tonnage, gun diameters, etc.]
incorporated in the London treaty of 1930, but they would be free to build as
many as they wanted in each class.35
Thus the three signatories agreed to build submarines with a maximum displacement of
2,000 tons with no treaty limit to the number of submarines that could be built. Even
though the quantitative tonnage limitations of the Washington and London had expired,
an exchange of letters between the United States and Great Britain affirmed adherence to
the principle of parity between the two countries. This agreement created the need for
both countries to keep the other informed of ship building schedules and progress.
Desperately clinging to last resort hopes for disarmament and neutrality, the
United States, Great Britain, and France signed a treaty that naval historian E.B. Potter
said was “so watered down with escalator clauses as to be virtually meaningless.” Potter
added that, “For all practical purposes, all treaty limitations of navies expired December

34 Ibid, 87.
35 George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None, 367.
36 Ibid., 369.
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31, 1936.”37 Even though treaty limitations may have expired for all practical purposes at
the end of 1936, the U.S. Navy continued to control the start dates for submarine
construction at Portsmouth, Electric Boat Company, and Mare Island Navy Yard in
accordance with the 1936 London Naval Treaty. In August 1939 the Bureau of
Construction and Repair reminded the shipyards that the keels of Grayling (SS209),
Grendier (SS219), and Gudgeon (SS211) should not be laid down until 7 October 1939
to comply with the treaty.

on

On 1 November 1939, two months after Germany’s invasion

of Poland, the shipyards were finally advised by the Navy that the 1936 London Treaty
was suspended and that, “The keels for combatant vessels under construction may
OQ

therefore be laid at any time without a delay.” The United States had complied with the
ineffective and superficial 1936 London Naval Treaty and limited the rate of submarine
construction until World War II had actually begun.
Neutrality
The same political climate and national attitude that had encouraged disarmament
conferences and international peace movements also led to a series of five Neutrality
Acts between 1935 and 1939 designed to distance the United States from entangling
events that might lead to another war. Disarmament, while it certainly affected
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s workload and future, took place on distant stages with indirect
results. Neutrality, on the other hand, was woven into the day-to-day occurrences of

37 E. B. Potter, Sea Power, A Naval History, 483-484.
38 Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter o f 9 Aug 1939 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box
24, Folder A14-7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
39 Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter A14-7-3 (RP) o f 9 N ov 1939 to Commandant
Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence
(Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
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shipyard and local community life by the late 1930s. On the eve of World War II,
Portsmouth Navy Yard and the other navy yards were frequently reminded of the
provisions of the Neutrality Acts and counseled about the importance of compliance. At
the same time that the yard was being cautioned to observe the neutrality rules, it was
being directed to mobilize for war. By the summer of 1941, British submarines were
being overhauled at the yard under the Lend-Lease Act. It was a time of mixed signals,
secrecy, deception, and confusion.

As things heated up in Europe in the latter half of the 1930s, the United States
Congress passed a long list of neutrality legislation geared to avoid any international
involvement that might lead to war. The 1935 Neutrality Act forbade the sale of
munitions to a belligerent and prohibited Americans from traveling on belligerent ships,
the 1936 amendment prohibited loans to belligerents, the 1937 Neutrality Act permitted
sales o f non-munitions to belligerents on a “cash and carry” basis only, and the 1939
Neutrality Act authorized the president to preclude American ships from entering “danger
zones.” The provisions of the Neutrality Acts grew like topsy in an attempt to cover, with
paper, every possible event that might lead to war. Neutrality efforts continued right up
until 13 November 1941 when the Neutrality Act of 1939 was finally repealed.40
Right up until the repeal of the Neutrality Acts, President Roosevelt consistently
sought, with little success, to modify the acts to increase his executive authority and
flexibility of implementation. As the war in Europe expanded, the acts prevented the
President from providing the level of support that Winston Churchill expected and

40 E. B. Potter, Sea Power, A Naval History, 488, footnote 17.
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Roosevelt was inclined to provide. According to historian Robert Dallek, “Antagonism
towards the President and the New D eal. . . isolationism, Republican partisanship, and
antipathy toward Roosevelt in his own party joined to sink Neutrality reform.”41
Roosevelt was especially sensitive to public opinion and the potential political
consequences of his efforts to curb the Neutrality Acts. In the summer of 1940, concerned
about the November presidential election, Roosevelt packaged war aid to Great Britain
under the more politically agreeable titles of “Destroyers for Bases” and “Lend-Lease.”
The neutrality maneuvering that took place prior to the repeal of the Neutrality
Acts presented a curious and confusing picture to the navy yards. The maneuvering
resulted in a series o f Navy Department messages that announced the broadening of the
European conflict, followed immediately by a reminder of the navy’s obligations under
the Neutrality Acts. For example, Portsmouth Navy Yard received the following cryptic
“ALNAV” [All Navy] message from the Secretary of the Navy on 3 September 1939;
“England and France are now at war with Germany, You will govern yourself
accordingly.”42 Two days later another ALNAV provided further guidance on how the
navy yards should “govern themselves accordingly” when it stressed compliance with
President Roosevelt’s recently issued Proclamation of Neutrality:
On 5 September the President signed a proclamation of neutrality as follows
quote whereas a state of war unhappily exists between Germany and France
semicolon Poland semicolon and the United Kingdom, India, Australia, and
New Zealand and whereas the United States is on terms o f friendship and
amity with the contending powers and with the peoples inhabiting their
several dominions . . . Franklin D Roosevelt President of the United States of

41 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt an American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, 190.
42 ALNAV o f 3 Sep 1930. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f Nations with Reference to War and
Peace.”
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Am erica. . . does hereby declare and proclaim. . . [the provisions of the
neutrality laws].43
Choosing his words carefully to keep his options open, the President claimed friendship
and amity with Germany as well as the Great Britain and its allies in September 1939.
Late 1939 was a time of confusion and mixed signals at the shipyard. The
beginnings of the war in Europe overlapped with disarmament treaty obligations that, in
turn, overlapped with the need to comply with the Neutrality Acts that overlapped with a
declared limited national emergency on 8 September 1939. For example, on 8 September
1939, when the shipyard was delaying the starts of Grayling and Gudgeon to comply
with treaty obligations, President Roosevelt declared a limited national emergency that
called for increased effort and vigilance on the part of the shipyard. The conflicting
direction must have seemed like a classic case of “hurry up and wait” to the shipyard
managers.
During this time, the shipyard was a microcosm of the entire country as the initial
stirrings of the mobilization for war were intermixed with strong sentiments for a
continued peace. On 1 November, the Bureau of Construction & Repair finally advised
the shipyards that the London Naval Treaty of 1936 had been suspended and that the
keels for combatant vessels under constmction could be laid at any time without a
delay.44 To further complicate matters, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson
proclaimed on 11 December 1939 that the overtime and Sunday work previously

43 ALNAV 38 & ALNAV 39 o f 5 Sep 1939. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f Nations with
Reference to War and Peace.” (emphasis added).
44 Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter o f 9 Nov 1939 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box
24, Folder A14 -7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
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authorized under the President’s Proclamation of a Limited National Emergency was
revoked because it was no longer needed.45 This period o f indecision would continue for
another six months until the first of the naval expansion acts was passed in the summer of
1940 and the nation’s course became clearer.
At the same time that he was reemphasizing the current provisions of the
Neutrality Acts to the Secretary of the Navy and others in the fall of 1939, the President,
looking for ways to increase aid to Britain, called Congress into special session in an
attempt to revise the portions of the Neutrality Act dealing with the mandatory embargo
on the exportation of arms and munitions to foreign states at war. The President’s
proposed amendment to allow the sale of arms and munitions on a “cash and carry” basis
had been rejected by Congress that spring and he sought to revisit the subject after the
outbreak of war in Europe in September. Even with war underway and the President’s
declaration of a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939, the proposed
amendment met with considerable Congressional opposition. Many Congressmen felt
that any move away from absolute neutrality was an invitation to war. The amendment,
however, eventually passed in November 1939 46
As events in Europe rapidly took a turn for the worse in 1940, the Secretary of the
Navy continued to dutifully report events, as they unfolded, to the shipyards. At times,
the messages from the office of the Secretary of the Navy appeared to be no more than
scorecard revisions to keep track of the belligerent nations. On 26 April 1940, the
message from Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison read, “State of war exists between
45 Secretary o f the Navy Circular Letter o f 11 Dec 1939. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14 -7, “Scrapping o f Ships.”
46 Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 51-53.
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Germany and Norway,”47 the 14 May message announced a state of war between
Germany and Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg,48 and on 10 June the shipyards
learned that, “Italy has entered war as ally Germany.”49 With any possibility for peace
slipping away with each passing day, Congress passed the Eleven Percent Naval
Expansion Act on 10 June 1940 and the Seventy Percent Naval Expansion Act on 19 July
1940. These huge increases to the size of the fleet included submarine increases of 21,000
tons and 70,000 tons, respectively, totaling about 61 submarines.50 The passage of these
acts went a long way towards removing any ambiguous signals the yards had been
receiving about submarine construction.
The destroyers-for-bases deal announced by President Roosevelt in early
September 1940 was another important step away from strict neutrality and towards
providing support to the British. The deal involved the exchange of fifty overage United
States destroyers with the British for bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda, and 99 year
leases for bases in the West Indies. Portsmouth Navy Yard initially supported the
destroyers-for-bases deal in early January 1941 when the yard shipped fifty hose nozzles

47 ALNAV 24 o f 26 April 1940 and SECNAV 29 o f 14 May 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f
Nations with Reference to War and Peace.”
48 SECNAV 29 o f 14 May 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f Nations with Reference to War and
Peace.”
49 Chief o f Naval Operations Message o f 10 Jun 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A14-6, “Status o f Nations with
Reference to War and Peace.”
50 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940, 9.

59

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to Philadelphia Navy Yard for use on the destroyers to be “turned over” to Great
Britain.51
The neutrality issue was highlighted again to Portsmouth Navy Yard officials in
January 1941 when the Commandant of the First Naval District asked the Commandant
of the Portsmouth Naval Yard to designate officers to act as boarding officers to
“welcome” submarines of belligerent nations should they be forced to enter ports north of
Boston.

C')

Things changed dramatically between January 1941 when the shipyard was

prepared to meet, board, and welcome belligerent submarines and May 1941 when the
Chief o f Naval Operations told Portsmouth Navy Yard to anticipate a “continuous
[repair] workload of one British sub at a time.”

While officials in the yard were dealing with the neutrality issues, so also were
the citizens of Portsmouth and the surrounding communities. Neutrality enjoyed strong
support in the Portsmouth area in January 1941. Daily during the late 1930s and early
1940s the editorial page of the Portsmouth Herald boldly proclaimed “The Herald’s [3
point] Platform,” the first point of which was “Keep the United States of America out of
War.” The other two points of the platform were local civic-minded initiatives.

51 Bureau o f Ships letter o f 2 Jan 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 43, Folder EF13/L9-3,
“British Empire - Alterations, Repairs, Overhauls, 1926-42.”
52 C ommandant First Naval District letter o f 16 Jan 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24,
Folder A 14-6, “Status o f Nations with Reference to War and Peace.”

53 Chief o f Naval Operations letter o f 14 May 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 43,
Folder EF13/L9-3, “British Empire - Alterations, Repairs, Overhauls, 1926-42.”
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In January 1941, with black-out drills being conducted at the shipyard and in the
city o f Portsmouth,54 and with Great Britain being bombed into oblivion, a poll
conducted by the Portsmouth Herald showed that 32% of the readers favored no help at
all for Britain, 18% favored limited help short of war, 28% favored all help short of war,
and 22% favored all help possibly including war.55 The poll had been conducted as a
follow-up to President Roosevelt’s fireside chat in late December during which he voiced
his strong support for Great Britain. Thus, contrary to the President’s convictions, and
with war seemingly inevitable, 78% of the local citizenry wanted no part of helping Great
Britain if it might lead to war.
The results of the Portsmouth Herald’s poll differed only slightly from a national
poll taken the same month. That national poll showed that two-thirds of the respondents
approved of the Lend-Lease bill that was being debated in Congress at the time.56 If 67%
o f the American people favored aid to Britain under Lend-Lease, then roughly 33% must
have favored less or no aid to Britain, whereas 32% of the Herald’s readers favored no
aid at all. Historian David M. Kennedy says that the results of the national poll indicated
that, “Despite Roosevelt’s studied reluctance to cross all his t ’s and dot all his i ’s, he had
edged them [the American people] closer to a commitment to aid the democracies, even
at the risk of war.”57 In January 1941, while the President may have edged the country

54 According to the Portsm outh H erald, the shipyard’s first black-out drill was conducted on
Sunday, 8 Sep 1940 and the first Portsmouth black-out drill was on Sunday 27 Oct 1940.
55 Portsmouth Herald, “Poll Continues to Show Trend Against British Aid,” 5 January 1940, 1.
56 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 19291945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 474.
57 Ibid
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towards British support, and war, roughly a third of the country, including the residents
of Portsmouth, were against aid to Britain.
On 18 March 1941, as President Roosevelt continued to show support for Great
Britain, including his signing of the Lend Lease Act on 11 March 1941, the Portsmouth
Herald, in a major departure from its long-time commitment to neutrality, replaced the
anti-war plank in its platform with one calling for “A united effort in behalf of the
Democratic nations to win the war and establish a just and lasting peace.”58 Referring to a
recent FDR address, in which he called for a total victory, the paper reported “After
serious reflection, we sadly have realized that, on Saturday last, President Roosevelt
delivered the funeral oration on the number one plank in our platform and with sincere
regret it is herewith buried.” With that statement, complete with a sketch of a R.I.P.
tombstone, the Portsmouth Herald buried its strong stance on neutrality. On 27 May
1941, the Herald’s editorial went one step further and demanded an end to the neutrality
deception that the president’s administration had been orchestrating.
Let us no longer be deceived by words - by leases that are more than leases; by
lending that is more than lending; by patrols that are more than patrols; and in this
speech by an “unlimited emergency” that is actually war.59
With those words, the Herald’s editor had summarized well United States foreign policy
for the first half of 1941.
The Portsmouth Herald’s burial of its hopes for neutrality in May 1941 was part
o f a growing, but reluctant, national movement. Robert H. Connery wrote that “public
opinion was still suspicious of any action which might lead to war” after the President
declared a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939 and “public opinion changed
58 Portsmouth Herald, 18 March 1941,’’This is War,” 4.
59 Ibid.
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slowly” after his declaration of an unlimited emergency on 27 May 1941.60 Harold G.
Vatter says that 1940 and the first half of 1941 “constituted an eighteen month period
during which the vision of inevitable American participation gradually came to replace
the abhorrence toward involvement.”61 The Portsmouth Herald, like the rest of the
country, had held on to hopes for neutrality as long as possible.
Historians agree with the Portsmouth Herald’s assertion the President had been
carefully orchestrating events to move the nation towards war. Thomas H. Buckley and
Edwin B Strong, Jr. wrote:
As the fateful day that was to change the course of history drew nearer, it was
preceded by an increasingly expert and effective campaign on the part of the
White House to secure public acceptance for policies that in and of themselves
could never be popular... Public opinion was being drawn irrevocably to a point
where complete and total commitment to a two-front war against two incredibly
powerful adversaries was a foregone conclusion on the morning of December 7,
1941 62
In late March 1941, President Roosevelt took the nation one step closer to war when he
extended Lend-Lease to include the repair of British vessels in American shipyards.63
Starting in the summer of 1941, and continuing through the rest of the year, three British
submarines, HMS Truant, Pandora, and Parthian, and one Free French submarine,
Surcouf, were overhauled at Portsmouth Navy Yard.64 Curiously, no mention of the
British submarines appeared in the Portsmouth Herald until 21 September 1941. On that
60 Robery H. Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 52.
61 Harold G. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II (New York: Columbia University Press,

1985), 3.
62 Thomas H. Buckley and Edwin B. Strong, American Foreign and National Policies, 1914-1945
(Knoxville: The University o f Tennessee Press, 1987), 136.
63 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Ploicy, 1932-1945, 260.
64 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 1.
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date, a front page article, with a Washington dateline, revealed that more than a dozen
British ships were being repaired in United States shipyards, including the British
submarine, HMS Pandora, at Portsmouth, N.H. An editor’s note indicated that, “This has
been common knowledge in Portsmouth for many weeks, but the Portsmouth Herald, in
co-operation with the Navy Department’s request, has refrained from publishing it.”
Lend-Lease had been flourishing at Portsmouth Navy Yard for some time before it was
acknowledged by the local press.
Not mentioned in the article or press release from Washington was the fact that
the Free French submarine Surcouf was also at the yard at the time. Eleven days earlier,

Figure 4: Free French Submarine Surcouf in Dry Dock #2 (Summer 1941).
Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire,
Durham, N.H.
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on 10 September, seventeen men who “had been working on the bottom of a French
ship,”65 removing hull paint, were treated at the shipyard hospital for skin and eye
irritations. If the Pandora’s stay at the shipyard had been common knowledge, the
Surcouf’s visit must have been even more obvious because it was a huge submarine.
The submarine was the world’s largest with a displacement of 4,000 tons, two eight inch
guns, an airplane, and “more decks than the average city hotel has floors.”66 Over twice
the displacement of the fleet-type submarines being built at the navy yard at the time, the
Surcouf could hardly have transited up the narrow confines of the Piscataqua River to the
shipyard without being noticed. Yet the Free French submarine was at the yard for a
couple weeks before it was even mentioned in the press, and then only after authorization
by the U.S. Navy. Such was the world of secrecy and intrigue that surrounded events at
Portsmouth Navy Yard in the fall of 1941.
The Portsmouth Herald further lifted the veil of secrecy about foreign submarine
visits two weeks after the first article when, on 3 October 1941, it published an interview
with the Commanding Officers of the Surcouf1 and HMS Parthian, the next British
submarine to be overhauled at the yard.

The interview was complete with pictures of

65 Medical Officer Portsmouth Navy Yard memo o f 10 Sep 1941 to the Commandant. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 43, Folder
EP13/L9-3 (161), “British Empire, Surcouf 1941-42.”
66 Portsmouth Herald, 3 October 1941, “Parthian Once Sank Italian Sub; Free French Surcouf
Unlucky,” 1 & 9.
67 The Portsmouth Herald reporter was especially captivated with the Surcouf s acting
Commanding Officer, Lcdr Louis G. Blaison. When asked if the Surcouf had sunk any enemy ships yet,
Blaison replied, “W e’ve been unlucky,” meaning they had not yet engaged the enemy. Surcouf's luck
changed and then went bad. The Portsmouth H erald sadly reported on 18 April 1942 that the Free French
had announced that the Surcouf with its crew o f 150 men was long overdue and presumed lost.
68 Portsmouth Herald, 3 October 1941, “Parthian Once Sank Italian Sub; Free French Surcouf
‘Unlucky,” 1 & 9.
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the Parthian in dock at the yard and several of the foreign officers seated around a table
discussing matters. The article claimed that HMS Pandora was still in the yard but the
Pandora’s Commanding Officer was suspiciously absent from the interview. Whereas a
month earlier there were rumors of a British submarine at the yard, in early October the
local newspaper had front page headlines and pictures that replaced rumor with fact.
Portsmouth, like the nation, was slowly but surely dropping the pretense of neutrality and
embracing the Allies.
During the summer of 1941, when Pandora, Surcouf, and Parthian were at the
yard stretching the boundaries of the neutrality envelope, United States submarines were
on “Neutrality Patrols” doing the same. On 11 April 1941, President Roosevelt, searching
for ways short-of-war to aid Britain, for which he could reasonably expect Congressional
and public support, extended the coastal American security zone into the mid-Atlantic
and gave patrolling American naval vessels instructions to notify the British about any
enemy ships or aircraft sighted.69 The next month, the USS Bonita (SSI 65), one of three
old V-Class submarines that had been towed up from Philadelphia Navy Yard to be
recommissioned at Portsmouth in the spring of 1941, left the yard for a neutrality patrol
near Bermuda. According to Dan Maclsaac, the Bonita spent the summer of 1940 on
•

neutrality patrol looking for German submarines to be reported to the British.

7ft

The

neutrality patrols, begun in great secrecy, were common knowledge to reporters within a
few weeks.71

69 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, 261.
70 Interview with Dan Maclsaac on 9 Nov 2006 at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
71 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 493.
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By the summer of 1941, disarmament treaties and neutrality sentiments no longer
constrained production at Portsmouth Navy Yard in any way. The ramp-up of facilities
was in full swing, employees were being hired at record rates, British submarines were
being repaired routinely at the yard, and large orders for new submarines were being
received.72 Twenty years of restrained submarine building would be quickly replaced by
a submarine building boom unlike anything ever seen before or again at Portsmouth
Navy Yard.
With mobilization in full gear, and almost as an afterthought, on 13 November
1941, the House of Representatives voted 212-194 to kill the two-year old Neutrality
Law. The closeness of the vote speaks to a continuing reluctance on the part o f Congress
and the American people to abandon all hope for the avoidance of war. However, with
the death o f the last of the Neutrality Acts, all the neutrality shell games were over.
American merchantmen could officially be armed to transport munitions, and eventually
troops, to Great Britain. British newspapers screamed “The Yanks are Coming” and
indeed they were.

72 See Chapter III, “Ramp-up for War.”
73 Portsmouth Herald, 14 November 1941, “The Yanks are Coming,” 1.
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The New Deal
As noted earlier, the Bureau of Ships World War II self-history judged New Deal
programs to be critical to the renewed naval shipbuilding programs and the maintenance
and upgrading of shipyard shops and facilities during the 1930s. The importance of the
New Deal programs to the navy yards is obvious from Figure 5 that shows the various
funding sources available for the upgrade and maintenance of navy yard public works
during the 1930s.74

Figure 5: Public Works Expenditures:
Navy Yards (1933-39)
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Figure 5 shows that $19.8M were appropriated in 1933 to navy yards for public
works projects, all from naval funds. In 1934, after the passage of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933, the annual budget increased slightly to $20.3M, but
$11.4M (56%) of that total were funds appropriated for NIRA designated projects. This
trend continued throughout the 1930s as NIRA, then the Emergency Recovery Act
(ERA), and finally Public Works Administration (PWA) funding consistently supplied
74 The graph is constructed from Bureau o f Construction and Repair’s Annual Reports, NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder
A9-1/EN 7, “Annual Reports Bureau o f Construction and Repair.”
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well over 50% of the annual funding for navy yard public works projects. Despite modest
navy appropriations for shipyard projects between 1933 and 1939, the navy yards
experienced a 348% increase in public works expenditures. Also important is the fact that
public works expenditures more than doubled between 1937 and 1939 thanks to large
PWA and NRA funding increases. These two New Deal programs helped to pave the way
for the massive navy yard facility upgrades that followed, in the summer o f 1940, when
the funding floodgates were opened with the 11% and 70% Naval Expansion Acts.

Navy yard public works programs and facilities were neglected between the end
of World War I and 1934 because of inactivity at the yards. The U.S. Navy was largely
unsuccessful in gaining appropriations for any significant new ship construction during
that period. Consequently, there was no need for shipyard facility upgrades.
In October 1931, Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Adams promulgated a policy
for the development of navy yards and shore stations that stated, “In general, plans for
development of Navy Yard and Shore Stations should be based on a Treaty Navy and
should be capable o f further expansion in time of war.”75 In other words, the navy was
not building many ships and the limited funding available would not be wasted on
needless or marginal navy yard facilities. The navy yards were still encouraged to plan
and develop their contingency plans and wish lists. However, the yards were told that,
“These plans should remain in the paper state, unless the drift of international affairs
indicates clearly that a world condition exists, which would, in all probability, draw the
75 Chief o f Naval Operations letter to the Secretary o f the Navy o f 8 Oct 1931 and Senior Member,
Board for the Development o f Navy Yard Plans letter o f 31 Dec 1931. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1,
“Local Development Boards.”

69

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

United States into war [and the fleet needed to be increased].”

nc

In 1931, there was not

yet much of a threat of war and, consequently, funding would not be wasted on facilities
perceived to be in excess of actual needs. The emphasis was clearly on the avoidance of
spending scarce federal monies rather than the maintenance of minimal shipyard
capabilities.
In March 1932, that policy became painfully apparent to Portsmouth Navy Yard
management when the shipyard’s request for funds for an extension to a highly congested
structural shop, and the conversion of another shop to a storage building, was denied by
the Board of Development for Navy Yards. It was the opinion o f the Board that, “In view
of the small workload, which in absence of an emergency appears permanent in
character, it seems doubtful if justification exists for any extension of facilities at
Portsmouth at the present time.”

77

After the shipyard had greatly reduced the scope of its
70

request and pleaded its case for less costly upgrades, the project was finally approved
for $290,000.79 Even though Portsmouth Navy Yard was the only yard building
submarines at the time, it still had great difficulty getting funding for needed projects
early in 1932. The situation began to improve in the summer of 1932 when President
Hoover approved the first federal relief programs and then improved significantly when

76 Ibid.
77

Senior Member, Board for the Development o f Navy Yard Plans letter o f 24 Mar 1932 to
Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, “Local Development Boards.”
78 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter to Senior Member, Board for the Development o f
Navy Yard Plans o f 7 April 1932. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, “Local Development Boards.”
79 The Senior Member, Board for Development o f Navy Yard Plans letter to Commandant
Portsmouth Navy Yard o f 14 May 1932. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, “Local Development Boards.”
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Franklin D. Roosevelt, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, assumed the Presidency
in March 1933.
The Emergency Relief and Construction Act, signed by President Herbert Hoover,
on 21 July 21, 1932 was the precursor of later New Deal programs that would benefit the
navy yards. The approval of this act was a reversal o f policy for Hoover who typically
resisted federal relief programs in favor of volunteerism and cooperation with business
leaders to resolve the deepening economic crisis. Hoover, often blamed for the
depression, and rarely recognized for his efforts to stem the crisis during the latter stages
of his administration, received little credit for this act. By the summer of 1932,
cartoonists routinely caricatured Hoover as a “dour, heartless, skinflint, whose rigid
adherence to obsolete doctrines caused men and women to go jobless and hungry.”80
Contrary to his growing reputation as a skinflint, the Emergency Relief and Construction
Act authorized $1.5 billion in public works and loans up to $300 million to the states for
relief purposes. The act included an appropriation of $10 million for navy public works
that created opportunities for federal funding on navy yard improvements that had been
nearly nonexistent for many years. With hopes of tapping into this funding windfall,
Portsmouth submitted public works requests totaling $2,770,000 of which $350,000 for
power and water plant improvements were funded immediately.81 The remaining line
items of the request became subjects of extensive debate and fragmented approvals under
subsequent various funding sources.

80 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 19291945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 91
81 Local Board for Development o f Navy Yard Plans letter o f 21 Sep 1932 to Commandant First
Naval District,. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central
Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, f‘Local Development Boards.”
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The Democratic landslide victory that accompanied FDR’s victory in November
1932 increased the Democrats’ majority in the House of Representatives from 9 to 100,
and the loss of 12 Republican seats in the Senate gave the Democrats firm control of that
body for the first time since 1920. With the economic realities of the early 1930s still
causing resistance to any proposed increases of naval appropriations, Carl Vinson, the
Chairman of the House Navy Affairs Committee, led the effort to gain Congressional
support to include naval construction under the public works provisions of New Deal
programs. In so doing, Vinson, Roosevelt, and other Navy supporters found a way to cut
or contain the Navy budget while increasing the nation’s shipbuilding accounts.
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the last of the sweeping reform
measures implemented during the first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration,
passed on 16 June 1933, became the vehicle for increasing naval funding for ships and
submarines as well as public works. The NIRA was part of the Hundred Days package of
legislation that included the Emergency Banking Act, Agriculture Adjustment Act
(AAA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), Federal Emergency Relief
Administration (FERA), and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). David M. Kennedy
wrote that, “Taken together, the accomplishments of the Hundred Days constituted a
masterpiece of presidential leadership unexampled then and unmatched since.”

O '}

The NIRA provided for federal regulation of maximum hours and minimum
wages in various industries, recognized the right of industrial workers to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, created the National
Recovery Administration (NRA) to reform and regulate American industry, and created

82 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 139.
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the Public Works Administration (PWA) to undertake an ambitious construction program
of public buildings and infrastructure.

Historian David M. Kennedy likened the NRA to

the chassis of the legislation and the PWA as the “engine, or at least the starting motor”
that would drive economic recovery.

84

In the President’s own words, “The task [of the

NIRA] is in two stages; first, to get many hundreds of thousands of the unemployed back
on the payroll by snowfall and, second, to plan for a better future for the long pull.”85
Among other things, the act released $200,000,000 for the Navy to start building ships up
to the limits of the London Treaty of 1930, including two submarines at Portsmouth Navy
Yard.86 This appropriation provided funds to begin to rebuild the United States Navy that
had been in decline since the Washington Naval Conference. While the NIRA served the
Navy well, it was short lived. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, nullified the
act on 27 May 1935. Figure 5 shows navy yard NIRA funded projects being phased out
in 1936 with the rise of ERA funded projects.
The initial new construction, authorized under the NIRA, included two aircraft
carriers, four cruisers, twenty destroyers, four submarines, and two gunboats, a total of
thirty-two ships. This package represented the “greatest stimulus to the shipbuilding
on

industry since World War I.” The work was to be roughly split between private
shipyards and navy yards, increasing the work forces by 14,000 and 12,000 employees

83 Ibid., 131-159.

84 Ibid., 151.
85 Franklin Roosevelt’s Statement on the National Industrial Recovery Act, 16 June 1933 at
http://www.fdrlibrarv.marist.edu/odnnirast.hml.
86 Michael West, “Laying the Legislative Foundation: The House Naval Affairs Committee and
the Construction o f the Treaty Navy, 1926-1934,” 332.
87 Ibid
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respectively. The number of ships under construction in private shipyards would increase
300% and in navy yards 150%.

oo

The NIRA shipbuilding program lifted the shipyards

out of the shipbuilding doldrums of the 1920s and “greased the skids for the enactment of
a future comprehensive, multi-year shipbuilding authorization . . . if it did not in fact
make such action inevitable.”89 Once the NIRA commitment had been made to put the
nation’s shipyards back to work, that investment would only make sense if the increased
workforce could be kept employed with follow-on shipbuilding programs. In the case of
Portsmouth Navy Yard, the V-class submarine building program had helped maintain
some semblance of workload and employment stability during the latter half of the 1920s
and early 1930s. The two NIRA submarines did the same for the mid-1930s until the
Vincent-Trammel Bill (1934) and its amendments steadily increased naval shipbuilding
throughout the rest of the 1930s within treaty constraints.
Keeping with the required NIRA split of work between private and navy yards,
Portsmouth Navy Yard and Electric Boat Company were each awarded two submarines.
The orders for the Portsmouth submarines, USS Porpoise (SS171) and USS Pike
(SSI 72), were placed on 19 June 193 3.90 Figure 6 shows the laying of the keel for the
Pike with a proud banner that reads, “Second Navy Yard Man of War Keel Under NIRA,
Submarine Pike, Dec. 20, 1933.”

88 Ibid.
%9 Ibid., 341.
90 Production Officer memo o f 15 Jun 1934 to Manager. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A9/A1-3/ENR, “Reports o f Projects
NIRA to Y[ards] & D[ocks] 1933-35 [Shore Projects].”
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Figure 6: Keel Laying for NIRA Submarine USS Pike. Courtesy of Milne
Special Collections and Archives Department, University of New Hampshire
Library, Durham, N.H.
The first man- of-war under NIRA, the USS Porpoise, was commissioned 15 August
1935. The Secretary o f the Navy complimented the shipyard on the completion of
Porpoise ahead of schedule:
The Porpoise was authorized and appropriated for under the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, and the Department notes, with pleasure,
that this vessel is not only the first vessel of this 1933 program to be
completed but also that it has been completed fifteen days ahead of contract
Q1
time. 1
As will be discussed later, the shipyard commenced using a new more efficient sectional
construction process with Porpoise that contributed to the early delivery. Instead of
custom building the submarine at one site, sections were preassembled in various
91 Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 18 Jan 1936 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l,
“New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

locations of the shipyard and transported to the building ways for assembly. The yard
continued to perfect this process during the 1930s and Porpoise was but one of many
early completions to follow that enhanced Portsmouth’s reputation for submarine
construction, insuring a steady flow of new construction contracts into the shipyard.
The NIRA projects at Portsmouth Navy Yard were not limited to Porpoise and
Pike. They also included power plant upgrades, boiler installations, and repairs to floating
derricks, cranes, and building ways.92 By December 1933, the shipyard had 650 men per
day working on NIRA submarine construction and about 40 men per day on other NIRA
projects.93 The 690 men working NIRA projects represented 43% of the total shipyard
employment of 1600. Without the NIRA projects, Portsmouth Navy Yard would have
been forced to release many of its skilled workers.

Another New Deal program, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) program,
launched on 9 November 1933, was more bureaucratic trouble for the yard than it was
worth. The CWA was a work-relief program that put 4.2 million people to work by
January 1934. This labor-only program was administered through state agencies, and
Portsmouth Navy Yard had the misfortune of having to deal with two different state
bureaucracies. The shipyard benefited modestly from CWA projects that involved road

92 Manager memo to Commandant o f 14 Aug 1933. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29
May 1940.”
93 See the Industrial Manger’s weekly status reports o f NIRA manning. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder A9/A1-3/ENR,
“Reports o f Projects NIRA to Y & D 1933-35 [Shore Projects].”

76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and railroad track upgrades and general painting during the first few months of 1934.94
Nationally, 12,000 men had been assigned to Navy and Marine Corps stations, but
Portsmouth Navy Yard benefited little from the program before it closed down at all
naval installations in April 1934. According to historian David Kennedy, President
Roosevelt terminated the CWA because of its expense, $200 million a month, and
concerns that “working for the government might become a habit with the country.”95
The Secretary of the Navy’s final report in July 1934 complimented the stations and
shipyards involved with CWA projects because there had been no fatal accidents or
serious injuries despite the fact that many of the men employed had been physically
unqualified and inexperienced in the type of work to which they were assigned.96 The
absence of fatalities or serious injuries was faint praise for this New Deal work program.
The closing down of this program was no great loss for Portsmouth Navy Yard as the
yard needed skilled workers and not just warm bodies.
Later in 1934, the shipyard attempted to add labor to the yard by taking advantage
of relief labor available under the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA).
According to historian David M. Kennedy:
With FERA, the federal government took its first steps into the business of direct
relief, and began, however modestly, to chart the path toward the modern
American welfare state.. . . FERA was an emergency body, hastily established
and rushing without precedent or staff to cope with a vast national crisis. Its
skeletal Washington office, never numbering more than a few hundred people,
94

Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 23 May 1934 to the Assistant Secretary o f the
Navy. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box
1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
95 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 176.
96 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 16 Jul 1934 to Distribution. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans,
Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
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necessarily relied on state and county officials to screen applicants and distribute
benefits.97
Portsmouth Navy Yard became very familiar with the local officials administering FERA
programs for the states of New Hampshire and Maine. Commandant Rear Admiral C.P.
Snyder, in a letter to the state of New Hampshire, wrote:
It has recently come to the Commandant’s attention that at other Navy Yards
and Stations there are employed approximately 2,500 relief workers on
FERA projects. This Navy Yard has had no relief labor since the CWA
closed down last April.98
The Commandant went on to note several shipyard projects deserving of FERA
assignment. After further investigation, a December 1934 memo from the Public Works
Officer to Commandant Snyder described the torturous process that had to be followed to
obtain FERA workers from the state of New Hampshire:
Certain formalities were necessary before any projects could actually be
started in the field. It is necessary for Lieutenant Hall to get in touch with
Colonel Cavanaugh at Concord, who in turn will contact the Navy Yard in
order to fill out certain necessary papers with regard to projects . . . before
work can be authorized. As soon as this is done, it is believed that the
Colonel in charge turns the matter over to an assistant of Mrs. Wilder who in
turn authorizes the project and instructs Fort Constitution to furnish us with
the men required. This necessary red tape will possibly take several days
before any actual employment can be made at the yard.99
To further complicate matters, it was explained that:

97 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 171.
98 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 20 Nov 1934 to Bernice Wilder, State
Administrator, Federal Emergency R elief Administration, 11 School St, Concord. NARA Waltham, RG
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans,
Projects, Policies,”PKG #2.”
99 Public Works Office Gaylord Church endorsement o f Lieutenant Junior Grade H.E. Wilson
(CEC), USN memo o f 11 December 1934 to Commandant, Subject: Interview with Mrs. Abby Wilder,
State Administrator, E.R.A. - Regarding work projects for Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA Waltham,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l/N l - “Plans, Projects,
Policies, PKG #2.”
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50% of current ERA funds are appropriated by the state, 25 % by the
township where the work is being done, and 25% comes from Federal
sources. In view of the local participation in the expense of the work, it is
necessary to obtain the sanction of local authorities before a project is
authorized as there have been cases where without such prior agreement, the
township has refused to assume its share of the expenses.100
Unfortunately, all of this complexity and confusion was doubled because the shipyard
had to deal with the state of Maine as well as New Hampshire.
In January 1935, after working with New Hampshire state officials and
successfully navigating through the obligatory sea of bureaucratic red tape, a project was
approved for 26,000 man-hours. This project involved men available from the Transient
Bureau Camp at Fort Constitution and 22,500 man-hours involving 60 FERA men
assigned through the city of Portsmouth. The New Hampshire FERA projects that were
approved included the general cleaning and painting of buildings and cleanup of
grounds.101 Efforts to acquire FERA labor through the state of Maine at that time were
unsuccessful because, as the state explained in a letter to the shipyard, “The allocation
allowed the Town of Kittery is not sufficient to put an ERA project in the Navy Yard
from the state of Maine.”102 It seems the height of inefficiency that Federal regulations
forced the yard to seek labor support from the town offices of Kittery. It mattered little,

100 Lieutenant Junior Grade H.E. Wilson (CEC), USN memo to Commandant o f 11 Dec 1934,
Subject: Interview with Mrs Abby Wilder, State Administrator, E.R.A. - Regarding work projects for Navy
Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box
1, Folder A l/N l - Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
101 Lcdr H.E. Wilson (CEC), USN memo to Commandant o f 11 Dec 1934. NARA Waltham, RG
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans,
Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
102 State o f Maine, Emergency R elief Administration letter o f 31 Jan 1935. NARA Waltham RG
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans,
Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
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however, because the early labor projects under New Deal programs were mostly of a
housekeeping nature with minimal advantages to the shipyard.
The first weekly report of FERA labor shows 44 men (no women) from the city of
Portsmouth assigned to cleaning shops and buildings and 15 men (no women) assigned
from Fort Constitution for cleaning and painting of the interior of shop buildings.103 The
shipyard reports consistently emphasized that no women were included in any o f the
labor pools. Follow-on reports indicate a peak assignment of 102 men (90 from
Portsmouth, 12 from Fort Constitution) in April 1934, dwindling to single digits (usually
6 people) from Fort Constitution during the July to October 1934 time frame. The
Portsmouth project closed as of 1 July 1935 and the Fort Constitution project closed in
November 1935 as no further labor was available from those sources.104 The FERA
program, like the CWA program before it, faded in importance and benefit to the
shipyard.
The frustrations of dealing with the CWA and FERA programs were many. In
addition to the bureaucratic red tape of two different states, projects had to be
continuously reassessed and approved, and the reporting requirements were seemingly
endless. In addition, after going through all the bureaucratic wickets to gain approval for
a CWA or FERA labor-only project, the shipyard then had to go back to the Bureau of

103 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 17 Jan 1935 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy
(Shore Establishment Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
104 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 21 N ov 1935 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy
(Shore Establishment Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l, “Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”

80

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Yards and Docks for the funds needed to purchase materials for the additional laborers.105
The necessity to work through two different state bureaucracies often resulted in workers
assigned to the same jobs in the shipyard having different wage rates. Unlike the NIRA
funded programs that left the yard responsible for the administration of those funds under
strict, but manageable, guidelines, Portsmouth Navy Yard’s experience with New Deal
labor-only programs was initially a frustrating exercise in dealing with bureaucratic
complexity and the overlapping jurisdiction of agencies.
In addition, as Commandant Rear Admiral C.P. Snyder noted in August 1935,
many worthwhile shipyard projects could not be successfully completed because of a
shortage o f FERA skilled labor. Commandant Rear Admiral Snyder wrote his superior at
the Bureau of Yards and Docks, in August 1935, that he would “continue to make every
effort to obtain the required employees for those programs which have not progressed
satisfactorily,” but doubted “the possibility of obtaining the necessary skilled labor from
relief rolls in this vicinity.”106
Even when limited skilled labor was available, the shipyard was further frustrated
by the “ten percent rule” that required that not more than ten percent of a work crew be
skilled labor. Shipyard skilled labor could be used but, even then, the “ten percent” rule
still applied. As the commandant noted, many of the shipyard’s potential FERA projects
required small numbers o f FERA labor and the assignment of any skilled labor at all

105 Commandant letter o f 9 Jan 1935 to Chief o f Bureau o f Yards and Docks. NARA Waltham,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/N l,
“Plans, Projects, Policies, PKG #2.”
106 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 13 Aug 1935 to Chief Bureau o f Yards & Docks.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works
Progress Administration (WPA).”
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exceeded the ten percent rule.107 The commandant argued, and rightly so, that the rules
were overly restrictive. In time, rules were relaxed and the New Deal programs that
followed FERA became much more useful to the shipyard.
The Works Progress Administration (WPA), part of the Emergency Relief Act of
1935, proved to be a much more manageable New Deal program than the others. Public
works upgrades were accomplished under WPA projects, not just housekeeping chores.
Over the next five years the shipyard became much more adept at working with the WPA
than the previous relief programs, and the WPA administration became much more
accommodating to shipyard needs.

10S

As more workers were assigned, they gained

shipyard experience and acquired on-the-job shop training that made them valuable
shipyard resources. During 1936, WPA projects included not only labor-intensive work
like railroad track repairs, demolishing and removing piers and World War I structures,
and wide-spread painting of buildings, but more technical tasks such as surveying
subsurface foundations and service tunnels, upgrading electrical distribution systems, and
improving lighting in the shipyard. By October 1936, the shipyard had 189 WPA workers
assigned to such tasks and Commandant Rear Admiral C.P. Cole was able to report in his
annual report that “In general, the appearance of the Yard has been improved by this
work and many needed repairs accomplished.”109 The progress continued and, by April

108 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 29 Aug 1935 to Bureau o f Yards & Docks,
Subject: Application for Allotment o f Funds under Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, 1935. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works Progress
Administration (WPA).”
109 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 29 Oct 1936 to Chief Bureau Yards & Docks,
Subject: Emergency R elief Navy Projects for Fiscal Year 1936 —Report o f Completion. NARA Waltham,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works Progress
Administration (WPA).”
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1939, over 500 relief workers were employed and involved in important facility upgrades
to the power plant and other buildings.110 The shipyard also benefited from the WPA
Federal Theater Project that presented at least eight performances at the shipyard between
1935 and the summer o f 1938.111
In July 1938, the shipyard provided Congressman George J. Bates (Mass-R), 6th
District, a requested comprehensive list of shipyard EPA, WPA, and PWA projects as
well as Navy funded projects.

112

That list showed Navy funded projects totaling

$1,090,000 and EPA, PWA, and WPA projects totaling $1,020,000. The latter included
improvements to the foundry and power plant, extensions to the electrical manufacturing
and machine shops, and the building of a general storehouse and steel storage area, all
important facilities that would be needed for the war effort. There is no doubt that the
shipyard was getting a lot more accomplished with relief labor and New Deal programs
in 1938 than it did in 1935.
The importance of WPA and PWA projects to the navy yards began to wane with
the appropriation of significant public works funds under the Naval Act of 1940. In June
1939, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Rear Admiral Ben Moreell, advised
the yards that Fiscal Year 1940 would mark the return of naval funding for shipyard

110 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 25 Apr 1939 to Chief Bureau Yards & Docks.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works
Progress Administration (WPA).”
111 NARA Waltham’s files hold programs and other evidence o f performances on 27 May 1936,
25 Jun 1936, 9 July 1936,27 Aug 1936,26 Oct 1936 , Jan 21 1937, Feb 4, 1937, 27 Jun 1938 with
reference to at least one performance in 1935.
112

Commandant Portsmouth Naval Yard letter o f 27 Jul 1938 to Congressman George J. Bates.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1,
Folder A l/Y l, PKG #1, “Local Development Boards.”
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projects and the curtailment of PWA and WPA funding. Moreell further advised that
“The transfer of part of the WPA force to the building trades shops would undoubtedly be
desirable to assist yards and stations in carrying out their yard labor responsibilities under
the “Public Works” program.”

tn

WPA workers with minimal benefits were eager to gain

the benefits that came with Civil Service status. However, during 1940, the shipyard
continued to employ several hundred relief workers per month on various projects of
importance throughout the yard.114
By January 1941, one had difficulty distinguishing civil service employees from
relief workers within the shops at Portsmouth Navy Yard. The WPA assigned allotments,
not workers, to the shipyard and it became an accounting exercise to insure workers were
charged to the proper WPA budget line items.115 As war approached, and Department of
Defense budgets increased, the authorized shipyard employment ceiling was raised, and
many employees moved, as Rear Admiral Moreell had suggested, from the WPA relief
worker category to Civil Service status.116 Hundreds of skilled relief workers, with
several years of experience in the shipyard, were hired as permanent shipyard employees
with a stroke of the pen and no disruption to shop projects or schedules. The WPA
projects had been excellent on-the-job training for these workers.
113 Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks Rear Admiral B. Moreell letter o f 9 June 1939, Subject:
WPA Construction Program - FY 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General
Correspondence, Box 2, Folder A -l, “Works Progress Administration (WPA).”
114 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 24 Apr 1940 to Chief Bureau Yards & Docks.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works
Progress Administration (WPA).”
115 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 30 Jan 1941 to Chief Bureau o f Yards and
Docks. NARA Waltham, RG181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l,
“Works Progress Administration (WPA).”
116 Chief Bureau Yards & Dock letter o f 9 Jun 1939. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works Progress Administration (WPA).”
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With the start of the war, WPA projects continued to fill an important role in the
shipyard, employing upwards of 500 workers at times during 1942.

11 7

At the same time,

the Navy budgets had kicked into high gear and funding had ceased to be a problem for
the public works upgrades that were so urgently needed by the shipyard. The
commandant was able to report with pride to his boss, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards
and Docks, in March 1942 that public works construction expenditures in the shipyard
had increased from $331,000 in December 1941 to $521,000 in January 1942, and nearly
doubled to $1,100,000 in February 1942.118 The New Deal programs had done their job
and bridged the gap until Congress opened the mobilization funding floodgates.119
Portsmouth Navy Yard Operations (1920-1940)
This section examines events at the shipyard between the wars, with emphasis on
workload, performance, and management strategy. It was not just the U.S. Navy’s desire
to develop the yard as a competitor for private industry that placed it in a preeminent
position of submarine design and construction by the start of World War II. It was to the
credit of the shipyard’s management and employees that they were able to reward the
Navy’s favoritism with consistent, superlative performance that reinforced the yard’s
position as the leader in submarine design and construction. At the same time, it became
management’s strategy, during the mid-1930s, to optimize the yard’s new construction
117 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 24 Jul 1942 to Chief Bureau Yards & Docks.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works
Progress Administration (WPA).”
118 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 7 Mar 1942 to Bureau Yards & Docks. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, PNB, Box 1, Folder A -l, “Works Progress Administration (WPA).”
U9 The war, economic prosperity, and conservative Congressmen brought an end to many o f the
N ew Deal programs including the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Works Progress Administration
which were gone by 1943. Social security, farm price supports, child labor and minimum wage legislation,
and banking and securities regulation survived as the legacies o f the New Deal. David M. Kennedy,
Freedom from Fear, 783.
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workload at two submarines a year while attempting to shed as much of the disruptive
multi-ship repair and overhaul work as possible so that the yard could be streamlined for
new submarine construction. This streamlining philosophy prevailed during World War
II and the yard’s remarkable production was the direct result.

According to the Bureau of Ships’ World War II self-history, “At one time or
another during the period after World War I new construction disappeared from every
Navy Yard except Portsmouth.”

190

•

This steady new construction workload enabled the

shipyard to maintain a well trained and stable workforce during the 1920s. Table 1 shows
the number o f employees at each of the navy yards between 1917 and 1929. The percent
change in employment during that period shows the workforce stability that Portsmouth
Navy Yard enjoyed over other navy yards.

191

Table 1: Navy Yards Employees (1917-1929)

Portsmouth
New York
Norfolk
Philadelphia
Boston
Puget Sound
Charleston
Mare Island
Pearl Harbor

120

1917

1924

1926

1929

% Change

1650
6800
4350
3350
2950
1600
1700
2900
0

1600
3100
2100
3000
2050
2700
400
2350
1050

1950
2750
2800
2750
2600
2550
450
2450
950

1700
3400
3500
3100
1550
3250
450
4350
800

+3%
-50%
-19%
-4%
-47%
+103%
-73%
+50%

United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, Navy Department

Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.,

7.

121 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 7 Jul 1930 to Commandants Navy Yards. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Shipyard Formerly Confidential Correspondence 1930-50 - Declassified by NARS per
NCD Project #745085 and by the Navy Department, Box 3, Folder L5-3/NY, “ Navy Yards Inspection o f
Equipment Machine Tools.”
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The employment levels at Portsmouth Navy Yard stayed remarkably constant from 1917
to 1929 when other navy yards showed great fluctuation, which would be expected going
from war to peace. The employment at east coast yards, with the exception of Portsmouth
and Philadelphia, dropped precipitously, while the west coast yards moved as
dramatically in the positive direction. Because Portsmouth Navy Yard enjoyed some
measure of stability during the declining period of the U.S. Navy (1922-31), the shipyard
was poised and ready to capitalize on the awakening period (1932-36), and then thrive
during the rebuilding years (1936-1945).
During the early 1920s, the yard fulfilled World War I contracts with the
completion o f eleven S-boats (S-3 through S-13). Portsmouth had fared well in the
competition with Lake Torpedo Company and Electric Boat. According to the S-Class
Trial Board:

Aside from all general features of design, a casual inspection shows a great
difference in the care and thoroughness with which the three plants design
and work out the details of all interior and exterior arrangements and fitting.
In this respect, there is no great difference in the product of the two private
plants, that of the Lake Torpedo Boat Company being perhaps somewhat
better. But the Navy yard (Portsmouth) boats are far superior to the others,
particularly in the interiors. In the S-3 to S-9 (Portsmouth-built boats) there is
full evidence o f careful design by personnel that know what is best, followed
by good workmanship, everything being done in a painstaking manner.122
In addition to the high quality of design noted by the trial board, the Chief of Naval
Operations annual report for 1923 reported that, “Analysis of results obtained shows
beyond question that submarines can be more economically and expeditiously overhauled
at Portsmouth than at any other east coast yard within the limitation of size of yard

122 Quoted in Portsmouth Herald, 23 April 1942, “Portsmouth Won Fame with First Sub It Built,
Has Kept Proud Record,” 1.
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force.” 123 Recognition for high quality, low cost, and short building periods reinforced
\

the navy’s plan to develop an in-house submarine design and construction capability at
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the 1920s.
Building on the reputation it had earned with the S-class submarines, the yard was
awarded seven V-class submarines that were delivered between 1924 and 1932. These
large submarines, the first to be given names of fish, were 381 feet in length with a
complement of about 100 men and officers. The V-class program expanded the yard’s
submarine design expertise at a time when the navy was ignoring private industry. This
workload carried the yard from the S-class program until the award of the two NIRA
submarines, Porpoise and Pike that began the revitalization of submarine construction in
1933.
While Portsmouth Navy Yard was assigned more than its fair share of new
submarine construction in the 1920s, the yard by no means was able to specialize in new
construction. For example, in 1921, the yard completed one submarine (S-9), launched
three more (S-l 1,12, and 13), and laid the keels for three others (V -l, V-2, and V-3), but
the yard also repaired 11 submarines, 10 destroyers, 1 hospital ship, 2 cargo vessels and 1
Coast Guard ship. Likewise, the yard remained primarily a repair and overhaul yard in
the late 1920s and early 1930s. The yard worked on 22 submarines and two submarine
tenders in 1928, six S-Class submarines and three R-Class submarines in 1931, eight SClass submarines in 1932, and 7 R-class submarines and two tenders in 1933.124 Repair

123 David F. Boyd, “Continuation o f Preble’s History o f the United States Navy Yard, Portsmouth,
N.H. Covering the Years 1875-1930,” Maine Room, Rice Public Library, Kittery, Maine.
124 Industrial Manager’s Annual Reports for 1928-1934. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder A9-1/NY1, “Annual Reports
Commandant First Naval District 1925-34.” The annual overhaul numbers are for fiscal years beginning 1
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and overhaul work, often chaotic, unpredictable, and difficult to schedule, was a large
part of the yard’s workload. Given a choice, Portsmouth Navy Yard preferred the
orderliness and discipline of a submarine new construction program over other work.125
While Portsmouth was receiving favored treatment from the U.S. Navy in the
1920s, the private submarine construction shipyards, Electric Boat Company and Lake
Torpedo Boat Company, were neglected by the U.S. Navy and struggled to remain open.
Electric Boat continued to build submarines after World War I at a reduced rate, to
complete contracts received during the war, delivering the last submarine in 1925.
However, the United States Navy awarded Electric Boat no new submarine contracts
between 1918 and 1931, when it was awarded the USS Cuttlefish. By the time of the
Cuttlefish award in 1931, Electric Boat employment had dropped to 200 men.126
Electric Boat Company survived during the 1920’s by completing 32 cargo ships,
which were still under contract at the end of World War I, and taking on miscellaneous
work including the overhauling of thirty “S” Class submarines, the building of pleasure
craft, ferries, tow boats, and trawlers, and the construction of four submarines for the

July. For example, the 1928 numbers are for 1 July 1927 to 1 July 1928. The Industrial Manager’s annual
reports for 1929 and 1930 provide no numbers and only indicate routine repairs accomplished on
submarines.
125 Navy policy statements for 1934 designated Portsmouth Navy Yard as a submarine
construction shipyard and emphasized that it was “not contemplated to overhaul vessels at the Yard.” See
Assistant Secretary o f the Navy Henry Latrobe Roosevelt letter o f 3 May 1934 to Commandant Portsmouth
Navy Yard, etc. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 1930-1950, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence,
B ox 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.” Despite this policy statement, a lot o f
overhauls were assigned to Portsmouth Navy Yard. All the other government yards, according to the policy
statements for each, were to be involved with multiple ship types and workloads.
126 “History o f Electric Boat, 1899-1949,” Chapter IV, 1-18, Navy Department Library, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
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Peruvian Navy.

The Lake Torpedo Company, however, folded in 1924 for lack of

submarine work.

Submarine construction began to pick up in 1933 when Portsmouth and Electric
Boat were each awarded contracts for two NIRA submarines. The trend towards
increased submarine construction continued with the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 that
guaranteed both yards sufficient submarine new construction for many years in the
future.

198

The passage o f the Vinson-Trammel Act marked a departure from the nation’s

strong commitment to disarmament and the end of the decline of the U.S. Navy. The
rebuilding of the fleet was to include submarines, which had survived international
attempts to limit their use as weapons of war since World War I. When the submarine
building program was renewed in 1933, Portsmouth Navy Yard had enjoyed fifteen years
of steady workload and stable employment whereas most of the other yards had
experienced fifteen years o f turmoil. With this in mind, it is not surprising that
Portsmouth performed well on submarine contracts throughout the 1930s.

There was another important factor that contributed to the revitalized submarine
construction program. The Navy, after extensive debate during the 1920s about how best
to employ the submarine in battle, had decided on independent operations similar to the

127 Ibid.
128 The Vinson-Trammel Act provided for a significant increase to the fleet; one carrier, 99,200
tons o f destroyers to replace overage destroyers, and 35,350 tons o f submarines to replace overage
submarines. The Act also limited private contractors to a 10% profit for any contract over $10,000. See
United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, 6. The requirement to split
construction between private and navy shipyards and the 10% cap on profits stemmed from the deep seated
conviction by many that World War I had been precipitated by munitions makers as a business venture and
that the United States federal government had been exploited for exorbitant profits by private industry.
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German wolf-pack operations of World War I, instead of operating as a support element
of a task force as had been the case for U.S. submarines during that war. Having
redefined the submarine’s tactical use, naval authorities could agree on the design
characteristics needed to fill that role. Thus, when the nation’s leaders decided to rebuild
the fleet, the submarine force had a much better idea of what submarine they wanted to
build. Designs could be standardized to a certain extent, multiple submarines of the same
class design could be built, and the opportunities were increased for something other than
•

custom-built submarines.

190

It is important to note that the naval officer who is given much of the credit for
this change in submarine tactics, Commander Thomas Withers, is the same Rear Admiral
Withers who commanded Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II. According to
naval historian Gary Weir:
The climax of this dispute [about how best to employ U.S. submarines in
battle] occurred between 1928 and 1930, when Commander Thomas Withers,
commanding officer of Submarine Division 4, with the support of the Naval
War College and the Submarine Officer’s Conference proposed imitating the
offensive strategy and solo tactics employed by the Imperial Navy during the
Great War. Only then did the major authorities begin to consider seriously the
prospect of independent submarine operations and a vessel design suitable to
the task.130
During World War II, U.S. submarines used the tactics developed by Commander
Withers and his supporters to win the war in the Pacific. Also during the war, Rear
Admiral Withers, as Commandant of Portsmouth Navy Yard, played a critical role in
129 In way o f explanation for those unfamiliar with the generic submarine design process, the
operators o f submarines provide desired operating characteristics for a future submarine to a technical
bureau for the development o f technical specifications. Those specifications are then provided to a design
shipyard for the production o f drawings or, today, digitized information that can be used for production
processes. One can not even proceed to the first step, identifying the desired submarine operating
characteristics, if the ultimate use o f the submarine is in doubt.
130 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940, 114.
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insuring that the submarines that Portsmouth Navy Yard sent to war incorporated the
latest design characteristics needed to achieve their missions.

In September 1934, in accordance with existing legislation that required
government yards to be assigned at least 50% of new construction submarines, the navy
assigned SSI79 and SSI80 to Portsmouth, SSI81 to Mare Island, and SSI76, 177, and
j *5 I

178 to Electric Boat.

Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson outlined the Navy’s

policy for splitting naval construction between public and private shipyards in a
September 1935 letter:
The policy o f the Department in connection with new construction has been,
in general, to follow the intent of Congress, as indicated in the so-called
Dillinger Amendment to the cruiser bill. The intent was confirmed by the
Vinson-Trammell Bill, and the present practice of the Department has been
and is, in general, to follow a 50-50 division of classes of ships between navy
yards and private yards.132
In the same letter, Swanson let it be known that he was “not entirely satisfied with the
progress being made on new construction at navy yards” and that it was his intent,
beginning in 1935, to discontinue the 50-50 rule and award new construction to navy
yards on a competitive basis with private shipyards.133 Swanson considered new
construction award policy to be his prerogative because, as he explained, “Beginning
with the next fiscal year, there are no Emergency Funds for the construction of naval
vessels, and the Department’s appropriations will be obtained in the usual manner,
131 Bureau o f Construction & Repair & Bureau o f Engineering joint letter o f 15 Sep 1934. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction
27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
132 Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 16 Sep 1935. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
133 Ibid.
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normally under [the classification of] Increase of the Navy.”134 Secretary Swanson
planned to manage the Navy’s funds in the best interests of the Navy, meaning contracts
would be awarded on the basis of performance.
Portsmouth Navy Yard Commandant Rear Admiral C.P. Snyder passed Secretary
Swanson’s challenge to the yard’s employees and urged them to continue to perform in a
manner that would build on the shipyard’s excellent reputation and gain future contract
awards. Snyder took the opportunity to emphasize time over cost, a strategy that
prevailed throughout the 1930s and peaked during the war years:
The essence of a contract is cost and time. There is reason to believe that the
Navy Department policy favors faster construction over time at slightly higher
cost if necessary. A shorter construction period indicates increased efficiency and
econom y... The Navy Department desires speed in construction .. .It does not
want excuses.135
Clearly, Commandant Snyder saw a niche opportunity for his shipyard to develop a
reputation for timely completions that would serve it well in years to come.
Portsmouth Navy Yard was more than up to Secretary Swanson’s challenge but,
as it turned out, Swanson was premature in his assumption that he could institute pure
competition between the private and public sector. His plans were foiled because the
1935 shipbuilding program was an extension of the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 that
carried the requirement that “the first and each succeeding alternate vessel of each
category . . . shall be constructed or manufactured in the government navy yards.”

134 Ibid.
135 Portsmouth Navy Yard Commandant Rear Admiral C.P. Snyder memo o f 20 Sep 1935 to All
Officers and Civilian Supervisors, Subject: The Navy Shipbuilding Program - Progress of. NARA
Waltham, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, RG 181, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction
27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
136 Quoted in Michael West, “Laying the Legislative Foundation: The House Naval Affairs
Committee and the Construction o f the Treaty Navy, 1926-1934,” 542.
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Even though Swanson was not able to institutionalize pure competition between public
and private shipyards, Portsmouth Navy Yard management took every opportunity to cite
the yard’s outstanding performance as evidence of compliance with his mandate for
improved performance by navy yards.

1"37

Having completed Porpoise 14 days ahead of schedule and Pike 17 days ahead of
schedule, each $550,000 under budget, Portsmouth pushed for the assignment of two
more submarines under the Naval Appropriation Act of 1937. A 29 April 1936 letter from
Commandant Greenlee highlighted the shipyard’s commitment to Secretary Swanson’s
challenge for improved performance and clearly pointed out that Portsmouth deserved the
work requested, because “This Yard feels that it has fully met the Secretary of the Navy’s
desires expressed in reference (a) [Swanson’s letter of 16 Sep 1935] for the efficient,
expeditious production of submarines.”

138

In the same correspondence, Commandant

Greenlee took the opportunity to push for a future workload that was devoid of overhauls,
heavy with the construction of new submarines, and complimented with important
submarine electrical work that had direct application to the submarines being built at the
yard:

137 At the time o f Secretary Swanson’s threat to tie future navy yard awards to performance,
Portsmouth had two submarines on the waterfront being completed (Porpoise and Pike), two submarines on
the ways under construction (Plunger and Pollack), and two submarines in the design stage. Commandant
Rear Admiral C.P. Snyder’s memo o f 19 Sep 1935 made it clear to all shipyard officers and employees that
future awards would depend on the shipyard’s performance on the four submarines then at the yard.
Snyder further emphasized that, “A continuation o f the present construction program o f two ships
[submarines] a year is the criterion o f this yard’s success for the future.” NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29
May 1940.”
138 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 29 Apr 1936 to Chief Bureau o f Construction
and Repair and Chief Bureau o f Engineering. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General
Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
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The mission of this yard appears to be to build submarines, manufacture
electrical fittings, and make repairs to submarine [main motor] armatures. It
is not contemplated that vessels be overhauled at this Yard. This Yard is
interested in authorization fo r new construction o f submarines onlyP 9
Clearly, by 1936, it was the long term strategy of the management of Portsmouth Navy
Yard to minimize all other types of work in order to protect its growing reputation for
timely, high quality, submarine construction. More importantly, the office of the
Secretary of the Navy supported the shipyard’s desires to exclude or minimize overhauls
in favor of new construction. The budget guidance promulgated by Secretary of the Navy
Charles Edison, on 14 June 1937, indicated, for Portsmouth Navy Yard, that “it is not
contemplated to overhaul vessels at this yard.”140 It was necessary to moderate this policy
of excluding overhauls from Portsmouth Navy Yard in the years immediately preceding
and during the war, however, the fact remains that, in the late 1930s, both the shipyard
and the office o f the Secretary o f the Navy were dedicated to streamlining the shipyard,
to the maximum extent possible, for the construction of new submarines.
By 1937, Portsmouth Navy Yard scheduled submarine overhauls for shorter
durations than either Electric Boat or Mare Island, the only other shipyards involved with
submarine overhauls. As of 1 July 1937, there were four submarines under construction
at Portsmouth Navy Yard, six at Electric Boat, and three at Mare Island Navy Yard. The
four Portsmouth submarines had contracted building periods of 27, 30, 30, and 27
months, individually adjusted to maintain a steady workload and stable workforce. The
Electric Boat submarines were scheduled for durations that varied from 27 to 34 1/2

139 Ibid (emphasis added).
140 Secretary o f the Navy Charles Edison letter o f 14 Jun 1937, Subject: Policy for Industrial Navy
Yard Budget 1939. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1,
Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
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months, averaging 32 1/2 months, and all three Mare Island submarines were scheduled
for building periods of 30 months.141 In 1937, Portsmouth not only scheduled submarine
overhauls for shorter durations than the other yards, but the yard went on to deliver those
submarines on or before the scheduled dates. In a letter dated 13 January 1939,
Commandant Rear Admiral C. W. Cole alerted the Secretary of the Navy that, “For four
years [1935 through 1938] the Portsmouth yard has consistently met or anticipated the
completion dates of its ships under construction.”142 While it is true that the Navy was not
placing the urgency on short submarine construction durations in 1937 that it would a few
years later, it was also obvious that Commandant Rear Admiral Cole and the
management of Portsmouth Navy Yard were dedicated to continuing the yard’s
reputation as a high performing shipyard that had begun with the early deliveries of the
NIRA submarines, Porpoise and Pike.
As requested, the Navy assigned Portsmouth Navy Yard an optimum workload of
two submarines a year from 1934 through 1938.143 Table 2 compares submarine new
construction assignments at Portsmouth, Mare Island, and Electric Boat Company, the
only shipyards involved with submarine construction immediately prior to World War II.

141 Annual Report o f the Bureau o f Construction and Repair for 1937. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder A9-1/EN5, “Annual
Reports Bureau o f Yards and Docks, 1926-42.”
142 Commandant Rear Admiral C. W. Cole letter o f 13 Jan 1939 to Secretary o f the Navy. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 20, Folder FS, “Ships 14 Nov
1925 to 15 Nov 1939.”
143 The Secretary o f the Navy, impressed with Portsmouth’s performance, assigned two
submarines, USS Sculpin (SS191) and USS Squalus (SS192) under the 1937 appropriation, two more, USS
Searaven (SS196) and USS Seaw olf (SS197) under the 1938 appropriation, and two more, USS Triton
(SS201) and USS Trout (SS 202) under the 1939 appropriation.
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Table 2: Submarine New Construction Shipyard Assignments

Portsmouth .
Mare Island
Electric Boat

1934
2
1

1935
2
1
2

1936
2
0
3

1937
2
1
3

1938
2
1
3

1939
3
1
3

The submarine workload, as required by law, was evenly divided between public and
private yards with Electric Boat getting all the private yard work. Electric Boat had
reestablished itself as the preeminent private submarine yard by the mid-1930s, but with
much less leverage over the Navy than it had enjoyed prior to 1920, as the result of
Portsmouth’s emergence as a submarine design yard. Portsmouth’s increased design
capability was the critical factor in the Navy’s efforts to wrest control of submarine
construction from private industry. According to Gary Weir:
Electric Boat would still play a vital role in the submarine construction
program, but would now do so within the context of both the Navy’s
expertise in submarine technology and its substantial design and construction
capability at Portsmouth. Hence from 1931 to 1940 teamwork with the Navy
was EB ’s only option.144
The eve of World War II found Portsmouth Navy Yard filling the lead submarine design
role that the Navy had envisioned for it at the close of World War I. 145
144 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940, 62-63.
145 Portsmouth Navy Yard’s design role had expanded even more in 1935 when the yard was
funded for the “preparation and reproducing o f working and finished plans, ordering materials, preparing
war plans and booklets o f general information, planning and clerical work” to support Mare Island Navy
Yard for the construction o f submarines SS 185, 186, and 187. See Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard
letter o f 8 Jun 1940 to Commandant Mare Island Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Base General Correspondence, Box 18, Folder S -l, “Design o f Vessels, Specifications, Plans, etc. (19251947).” Portsmouth Navy Yard continued to expand its role as lead design yard for Mare Island Navy Yard
such that by 1940 much “Portsmouth procured material” was being pushed to Mare Island for submarine
construction. Shortly after the war started, Portsmouth provided the same lead yard service for Cramp
Shipbuilding Company o f Philadelphia, Pa. to support the submarine contracts that had been awarded to
that company. See Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 20 Jun 1942 to Cramp Shipbuilding
Company and Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f no date in 1942 (probably 13 Nov 1942) to
Cramp Shipbuilding Company. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General
Correspondence, Box 18, Folder S -l, “Design o f Vessels, Specifications, Plans, etc. (1925-1947).” Electric
Boat provided similar submarine design support for Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company in Wisconsin
during the war.
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In 1937, there was little or no emphasis from the Navy Department on the
upgrading of facilities that would be needed to achieve shorter building periods. This
began to change in the summer of 1938, when an enlarged shipbuilding program created
the need for increased building rates, improved facilities and increased employment. In
June 1938, the Secretary of the Navy advised the navy yards that, due to increased
shipbuilding programs, layoffs were undesirable and a substantial increase in
employment was expected at navy yards, during 1939, which was expected to continue
until peaking in 1942.146
Responding to the Secretary’s directive, Commandant Rear Admiral C.W Cole
noted that “this navy yard has reached a very desirable stability of labor employment.”147
Furthermore, if consideration was being given to increasing Portsmouth’s workload to
three submarines a year, this rate “could not be effective until after the building ways are
completed next year.”148 The building ways under construction were needed to replace
those lost in the Franklin House fire of 1936.149 Although not an active building site when
it burned, the shipyard’s urgent need for building ways at the onset of World War II

146 Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 24 Jun 193 8. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base
General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
147 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 10 Aug 1938 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy
(Shore Establishments Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep
1932 to 29 May 1940.”

148 / bid.
149 Increased ship construction during the Civil War and the need for weather protected ship
construction facilities resulted in "Ship Houses" strategically located on the waterfront so that ships could
be constructed and launched - even in the harshest o f New England winters. The largest Shiphouse was the
Franklin House, which was one o f the largest (240’ x 131’ x72’) wooden structures in the United States at
the time. The shipyard’s first submarine (L-8) was launched from the Franklin Shiphouse in 1917. The
structure burned to the ground on 10 March 1936 in a few hours in one o f the most spectacular fires ever
seen in the Seacoast area.
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would have been less critical had the Franklin House been available.150 In the summer of
1938, when consideration was being given to increasing the yard’s workload from two to
three submarines a year, that plan had to be put on hold for lack of a building way.
While Portsmouth Navy Yard was completing submarines ahead of schedule,
other yards were having great difficulty completing ships on time. For example, in
August 1938, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, in noting the yard’s outstanding
performance relative to contracted delivery dates, wrote, “The ability of the Portsmouth
Yard to meet its completion dates has in recent years been amply demonstrated by the
excellent and unique record established of meeting every contract date of delivery.”151 A
few months later, Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson wrote that shipbuilding
delays were “a matter of grave concern”

1^9

and that the situation was “decidedly

unsatisfactory.” 153 Swanson was especially disturbed about destroyers, under construction
in navy yards, whose completion dates had been extended to 44 months and were now in
jeopardy of taking even longer.
Commandant C.W. Cole took advantage of the situation and responded to
Secretary Swanson’s concern about shipbuilding delays, on 11 January 1939, with a letter
that advertised Portsmouth Navy Yard’s recent accomplishments, rescheduled three
additional submarines for early completions, and suggested that Portsmouth should not be

150 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 April 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
151 Bureau Construction & Repair and Bureau o f Engineering joint letter o f 10 Aug 1938 to
Secretary o f the Navy. NARA Waltham,, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box
1, Folder A l, “N ew Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
152 Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 30 Dec 1938 to Chiefs o f Bureaus and Continental Shipyards.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 20, Folder FS, “Ships,
N ov 1925 to 15 N ov 1939.”
153 Ibid.
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grouped with those yards having problems meeting scheduled completion dates. Cole
noted:
This yard has consistently met or anticipated its completion dates on new
construction during the past four years... With close attention to detail,
cooperation of all hands, and Portsmouth Navy Yard’s established skillful
workmanship, the new dates can be met, and the shipbuilding record
continued that is unequaled elsewhere in this country.154
During the late 1930s, Commandant Rear Admiral C.W. Cole and his management team
conducted a justified self promotion public relations program that emphasized the yard’s
superior performance and solicited a continued optimum workload of two, or possibly
three submarines a year.

Portsmouth had been on a five year roll of early deliveries when disaster struck
with the sinking of the Squalus on 23 May 1939. The submarine sank off the Isles of
Shoals, while on routine sea trials, with the loss of 26 officers and men, when the main
induction valve failed to close on a dive. While the subsequent investigation failed to
establish conclusively why the large valve failed to close, operator error was suspected.
Features were incorporated into future submarine designs to preclude similar operator
error but, in the meantime, five years of superlative shipyard performance had been
instantly compromised with the sinking o f the Squalus. Thirty-three survivors were
brought to the surface on 25 May 1939 in a remarkable rescue operation and the
submarine was eventually raised on 13 September 1939.155

154 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral C.W. Cole letter o f 11 Jan 1939 to
Secretary o f the Navy. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box
20, Folder FS, “Ships 14 Nov 1925 to 15 Nov 1939.”
155 For accounts o f the Squalus recovery see Richard E. Winslow III, D o Your Job: An Illustrated
Bicentennial History o f the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 1800-2000 (Portsmouth: Portsmouth Marine
Society, 2000), 139-140 and Portsmouth-Built: Submarines o f the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth,
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On 9 June 1939, Commandant Rear Admiral C.W. Cole advised the Secretary of
the Navy Claude A. Swanson that any further accelerated completion dates for
submarines under construction at Portsmouth “have been compromised by the sinking of
the Squalus and the large volume of work incident to her rebuilding.”156 While in the
throes o f rebuilding Squalus, Portsmouth Navy Yard was requested to define its needs in
order to increase annual production of submarines to three or four annually, with
durations o f between twenty-two and twenty-six months.157 Commandant Rear Admiral
C.W. Cole’s response identified the shipyard’s additional needs to include a fourth
building way, increased officer personnel, improved component deliveries from
suppliers, and additional housing for the increasing numbers of civilians and military
personnel. Resuming the yard’s self-promotion program, the commandant once again
took the opportunity to highlight the shipyard’s consistently excellent performance,
despite the Squalus setback:
The force is being increased gradually from the present yard force of about
3900 to about 4800 to meet the requirements for reconditioning the Squalus
and the construction of the Marlin which are in excess of the standard
N.H.(Portsmouth Marine Society, 1985), 64-66; Portsmouth Herald,23 May-5 Jul 1939; Nathaniel
Barrows, Blow A ll Ballast! The Story o f the Squalus (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940); Carl LaVo, Back
from the Deep: The Strange Story o f the Sister Subs Squalus and Sculpin. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1988) and recorded eye witness testimonies at Cummings Library and Archives, Strawbery Bank Museum,
Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96 Portsmouth War Records, Box 1, Folder 3. “U.S. Navy Yard.” On 29 June 1941
with the shipyard ramp-up nearing its peak, the yard had to deal with another submarine sinking. The
submarine 0 -9 sank o ff Portsmouth Harbor on a test dive shortly after its arrival from New London, Ct.
just two years after the Squalus disaster. Unlike the Squalus, recovery operations were impossible because
the 0 -9 sank in 370 feet o f water as opposed to the 200 feet o f water in which Squalus had sunk. Thirtythree men were lost on 0 -9 . See Portsmouth War Records, Cummings Library, Strawbery Banke Museum,
MS 96 Box 1, Folder 19, “Harbor Defense.”
156 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 9 Jun 1939 to Secretary o f the Navy. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “ New
Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
157 Bureau Construction & Repair and Bureau o f Engineering joint letter o f 28 Nov 1939 to
Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General
Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
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program of two submarines a year. In addition, the Searaven was completed
one and a half months prior to her official completion date .. Seawolf is
scheduled for a similar advance.. . Triton and Trout are scheduled for
completion three months in advance of their scheduled completion dates...
Grayling and Grayback are being scheduled for completion in twenty-two
and twenty-five months instead of the twenty-five and twenty-nine months
now officially set as their building period... These modifications of building
periods are being made to meet the Secretary of the Navy’s directives to
speed up new construction and also to permit the yard to undertake without
loss of time, the new enlarged program expected to be authorized by the next
Congress.158
With the war raging in Europe, Portsmouth was no longer being thought of as a two
submarine a year shipyard. In early 1940, studies were setting goals of three or four
submarines a year, still a modest increase over past performance and nothing like the
production that would follow in a few years.159

By late 1940, the Seventy Percent Expansion Act160 had greatly accelerated the
Navy’s shipbuilding program, and the Bureau of Yards and Docks was urging shipyards

158 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 28 Dec 1939 to Bureau Construction & Repair
and Bureau o f Engineering. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence,
Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.”
159 Portsmouth Navy Yard had made remarkable progress in submarine building techniques and
processes between 1934 and 1940. The time from the laying o f the keel to completion had been reduced
from twenty-six months on the Porpoise to sixteen months on the Seawolf. Most o f that schedule
improvement had been gained on the building ways prior to launching, where Porpoise had spent nineteen
months as compared to ten months for the Seawolf. The submarine must remain on the building ways until
it is watertight and all the exterior hull and ballast tank construction work is completed, as those areas are
inaccessible once the submarine is waterborne. The yard’s continuous improvement in the construction,
preassembly and joining o f pressure hull cylinders during the late 1930s permitted the significant reduction
in the time needed on the building ways. See Bureau Construction & Repair and Bureau o f Engineering
joint letter o f 16 Mar 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 27 Sep 1932 to 29 May 1940.” On
16 March 1940, Portsmouth was assigned three submarines under the 1941 appropriation act. All o f this is
to highlight the fact that, immediately prior to the war, Portsmouth Navy Yard had been a two-submarine-a
year yard since 1934 and consideration was being given at the highest levels o f the navy to increasing
production to three or four submarines a year - certainly nothing like 32 in ’44.
160 The Naval Expansion Act o f 19 July 1940 (also known as the 70 Percent Act or Two Ocean
Navy Act) authorized increasing the fleet by 1,325,000 tons, including aircraft carriers (200,000 tons),
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to pull out all the stops to accelerate the completion of public works projects needed to
support that accelerated building program. At the same time, there was debate within the
Navy as to whether the construction of new ships and submarines should be concentrated
in public or private shipyards. As a general rule, the Secretary of the Navy and the
technical bureaus, since 1920, had moved in the direction of increasing support for
submarine construction in public yards so as to regain the production and technical
control o f submarine construction that private industry had assumed during World War I.
With war on the horizon, the Chief of Naval Operations became increasingly concerned
about the maintenance of the rapidly expanding fleet, which he considered to be the
primary responsibility of the navy yards. In April 1941, the fleet overhaul plan of the
Chief of Naval Operations included the requirement to “Assign submarines in the
Atlantic for overhaul at the Navy Yards Portsmouth and Philadelphia.”161 The Chief of
Naval Operations, in a letter to the newly formed Bureau of Ships, made his position
clear that maintenance and overhauls should have precedence in navy yards and new
construction should have precedence in private yards.162 Rigid adherence to such a policy
for submarines would have scuttled many of the new construction initiatives and
organization that had been put in place at Portsmouth between 1935 and 1940. Despite
the concerns of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy continued to

cruisers (420,000 tons), destroyers (250,000 tons), submarines (70,000 tons), and capital ships (385,000
tons). See http://www.historv.naw.mil/faqs/faq59-21 .htm.
161 Chief o f Naval Operations letter o f 8 Apr 1941 to Commandants Navy Yards, etc., Subject:
Schedule o f Proposed Availability for Ships at Navy Yards. NARA College Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval
Personnel General Correspondence 1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY 166-176.
162 Chief o f Naval Operations letter o f 10 Oct 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 1941-1943.”
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assign the shipyard unprecedented numbers of contracts for new submarines that required
the continued development of Portsmouth’s new construction capabilities.

1

On the eve of entry into the war, in the summer of 1941, the shipyard remained
protective of its position as a new construction shipyard.164 But British submarines had
begun to find their way to the shipyard for overhauls, with priorities assigned by the
Chief of Naval Operations that were ahead of new construction. In September, after
having experienced a few British submarine visits and while in the throes of a much
larger work package than expected on the Free French submarine Surcouf, Portsmouth
prompted the Bureau of Ships to advise the Chief of Naval Operations that “new
construction is being hurt by maintenance work.” 165 The yard took a big step towards the
new construction specialization it desired, in early 1942, when the last of the British
submarines left Portsmouth and the United States Navy began deferring submarine
overhauls to maximize the number of submarines on war patrols. As the result of its own

163 During the early stages o f the war when Portsmouth was completing Dry Dock #1 as quickly as
possible with intentions to build two or three submarines simultaneously from that dock, the Chief o f Naval
Operations expressed concern about the lack o f availability o f the dry dock should it be needed for
emergency submarine repairs. It was not until the dock was nearing completion in December 1942 that the
Chief o f Naval Operations approved the dock’s use for new construction. See Commandant Portsmouth
Navy Yard letter o f 7 Dec 1942 to Vice Chief ofN aval Operations. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 1941-1943.”
164 The shipyard was even more convinced o f the desirability o f new construction work over the
repair o f older submarines after recommissioning three old V-type submarines, Bass, Barracuda, and
Bonita, in September 1940. The submarines had been towed from the moth ball fleet in Philadelphia to the
shipyard in June 1940. According to the shipyard’s self-history, “These ships were o f an obsolete design
and preservation methods at the time o f their decommissioning did not meet present standards.
Consequently, an exorbitant amount o f time and money was used in an attempt to repair and modernize
them.” Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard during World War II, 1. Needless to say, this
type o f work was not consistent with management’s vision o f streamlined shipyard operations for the
production o f new submarines. Indeed, the nation’s interests, and the shipyard’s efforts, would be better
served by building new submarines than attempting to refurbish and modernize the outdated V-type
submarines. That said, some V-type submarines were deployed early in the war.
165 Bureau o f Ships letter to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard o f 11 Sep 1941. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 43, Folder
EF13/L9-3, “British Empire - Alterations, Repairs, Overhauls, 1926-42.”
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self-advertising campaigns and the fortunes of war, the U.S. Navy gave Portsmouth Navy
Yard large orders for new submarines and the yard acquired the new submarine
construction specialization that it had long desired.
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CHAPTER III

RAMP-UP

“We have drawn the sword, that sword will not be returned to its
scabbard until our enemy who would destroy liberty, have been
themselves destroyed. Under these grim conditions which call forth our
resolution, our outrage, and our spirit of self-sacrifice we face unafraid
those dangers that lie ahead.”
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox
Washington D.C. ALNAV 1
I January 1942

This is a “nuts and bolts” chapter that accounts for most of the infrastructure
construction that occurred at the yard during the war. It fits well, chronologically,
between the prewar issues presented in the last chapter and the next two chapters that
analyze the shipyard operations during the war because almost all the construction of
facilities took place immediately prior to, or at the start of, the war. The shipyard’s rampup of facilities was steep and successful. The shipyard could not have performed as it did
without the critical upgrades described in this chapter.
The need for the steep ramp-up of facilities can be traced back to the nation’s
reluctance to shed its strong stance on neutrality during the late 1930s and a general
belief that preparations for war might, in fact, precipitate war. Historian Robert Dallek
wrote that “Roosevelt [in late 1939] resisted pressure for substantial increases in national
defense forces and rapid industrial mobilization... fearful that these actions would
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agitate suspicions about his peaceful intentions and make any neutrality change appear as
a step towards war” 1. In January 1940, when President Roosevelt did seek to increase the
total national defense appropriation from $1.5 billion to $1.8 billion for the 1941 fiscal
year, Congress “whittled away, even at that modest sum.”2 In addition, historian David
M. Kennedy wrote that, “The Nye Committee’s sensational accusations of World War I
profiteering left many corporations gun-shy [as late as January 1940] about accepting
-2

orders for armaments.” Five months later, the fall of France and the Dunkirk evacuation
motivated the passage of the first o f the naval expansion acts that signaled an end to
Congressional whittling of defense budgets and corporate reluctance to accept armament
orders.
When pleading for passage of the increased naval appropriation bills in 1940,
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark warned Congressmen that “Dollars
cannot buy yesterday.”4 Yet, that is exactly what the nation’s shipyards did during the
eighteen months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. In an unprecedented burst of
industrial activity, the shipyards bought back two decades of fiscal neglect with the
expeditious completion of facilities needed to launch previously unimagined numbers of
ships and submarines.
Twenty-one million dollars of infrastructure upgrades were authorized for
Portsmouth Navy Yard between June 1940 and December 1941, and another $1 million
was authorized for upgrades in January 1942. O f the twenty construction contracts that
1 .” Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and America Foreign Policy, 1932-1945,224.
2 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 431.
3 Ibid.
4 Quoted in Samuel Eliot Morrison, History o f U.S. Naval Operations in World War II (Boston:
Little Brown, 15 v o ls, 1947-1962), 30.
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totaled $22.23 million, only one contract of $32,000 dollars was awarded after December
1942. After two decades of neglect, the shipyard infrastructure was transformed almost
instantaneously as the funding flood gates were opened and contracting rules were greatly
relaxed to accelerate mobilization.
The ramp-up in facilities at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the eighteen months
preceding Pearl Harbor was by no means unique. According to the Bureau of Yards and
Docks World War II Administrative History:
The public works programs at these yards [navy yards], during the last eighteen
months of peace was concentrated on providing, with the utmost dispatch, the vast
expansion of facilities for the effective accomplishment of this Herculean task
[building the two-ocean navy].. . . When the war came, substantial progress had
been made by the Bureau and its field forces in the execution of this work, for
which $350,000,000 had been made available. Many individual projects were
already complete by December 7,1941, well ahead of schedule. Their early
availability contributed significantly to the rapid mobilization of the fleet and the
speedy conversion of merchant vessels taken over by the Navy.5
Large facility upgrades were underway at all navy yards and many private shipyards at
the same time that Portsmouth Navy Yard was undergoing a tremendous expansion of
facilities.6
At Mare Island, the other navy yard building submarines, a large dry dock was
under construction that would give the yard a total of four dry docks, as well as four
additional building ways, increasing the total to eight. More remarkably, the shipyard’s
acreage would increase from 635 acres to 1500 acres, including much reclaimed land,

5 United States Naval Administration in World War II Bureau o f Yards and Docks Volume I, 172.
Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
6 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory: A History o f Shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime
Commission in World War II is a classic summary o f commercial shipbuilding during World War II that
includes considerable discussion o f the mobilization o f private shipyards. Other mobilization sources
include Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II and Keith E. Eiler,
Mobilizing America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort 1940-1945.
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during the war years.7 At the only private submarine shipyard, Electric Boat, expansion
was also the order of the day. In early 1942, the North and South Yards of the Electric
Boat plant were expanded and a total of eleven building ways were installed at a cost of
nearly $5,000,000. A little later, the Groton Iron Works was purchased for the company
by the Navy and ten more ways were set up. The Navy appropriated $9,500,000 for this
construction. This new yard, the Victory Yard, was opened July 22,1942.8
Thus, the building boom that Portsmouth Navy Yard experienced in 1941 and
1942 was duplicated at numerous shipyards on both coasts. As compared to 1933, when
only six private yards and eight navy yards remained in operation, “By December 1941,
the number of yards engaged in new construction has expanded to 156 and those
concerned with conversion and repair had expanded to 76.”9 The story of the Portsmouth
ramp-up that follows must be multiplied dozens of times to get a sense of the nation’s
rush to build the long-neglected shipyard facilities that were going to be needed to build
the fleet that would be needed to win the war.

The national ramp-up escalated with each passing German advance in Europe.
The President declared a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939, when
Germany began aggressive actions in Eastern Europe, an unlimited emergency on 27

1 Ibid, 178.
8 John D. Horn, “Submarines and the Electric Boat Company,” Navy Department Library, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.,
92.
9 United States Naval Administration in World War 11, Bureau o f Ships, Navy Department Library,
Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center,
Washington, D.C., 132.
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May 1941 as events in Europe heated up even more, and, of course, war began on 7
December 1941. This twenty-seven month period was a time of great turmoil and
transition as the nation turned, somewhat reluctantly, from neutrality and hopes for world
peace, to full mobilization for war. It was also a time of great change and adjustment in
the Navy Department and the navy yards.
The fall of France in June 1940 accelerated the move towards naval rearmament.
The 11 per cent Naval Expansion Act was signed on 14 June 1940 and a month later the
70 per cent Naval Expansion Act was signed on 19 July 1940.10 To further complicate
matters, the leadership of the Navy transitioned midway between the two Naval
Expansion Acts. On 11 July 1940, Frank Knox became the Secretary of the Navy and, a
month later, James Forrestal became Under Secretary of the Navy.11 Thus, this period
brought new naval leadership and a surge of new contracts for naval ships and facilities
unlike anything ever seen before. Historian Robert Connery wrote:
In the pre-war years of peace the Navy’s chief problem was to obtain dollars
with which to purchase manpower, munitions, ships, and bases. . . When the
war came, and even to some extent before December 7, 1941, Congress voted
huge sums of money without question. The House of Representatives, in one
instance during the war, passed a 32 billion dollar appropriation bill in twenty
minutes without debate and without a single question from the floor.12
10 The Naval Expansion Act o f 14 June 1940 (11 Percent Act) authorized increasing the fleet by
242.000 tons. See http://www.navalhistorv.netAyW2USN194006.htm. The Naval Expansion Act o f 19 July
1940 (also known as the 70 Percent Act or Two Ocean Navy Act) authorized increasing the fleet by
1.325.000 tons including aircraft carriers (200,000 tons), cruisers (420,000 tons), destroyers (250,000 tons),
submarines (70,000 tons), and capital ships (385,000 tons). See http://www.historv.naw.mil/facis/faq5921.htm.
11 Robert Dallek says that President Roosevelt “brought Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, two o f
the country’s most pro-Allied Republicans, into his Cabinet as Secretary o f War and Secretary o f the Navy,
respectively. Replacing the two most isolationist members o f his Cabinet, Harry Woodring and Charles
Edison, the appointments were not only a fresh demonstration to London o f Roosevelt’s intentions, but also
an attempt to create a bipartisan consensus for all aid to Britain short o f war and strengthen his bid for
another presidential term.” Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and America Foreign Policy, 1932-1945,
232.
12 Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 293.
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The accelerating pace of naval mobilization continued in 1941 as the nation’s
shipbuilding and other industries were flooded with orders for armaments. According to
Connery:
The year 1941, opening with the Battle of Britain, proved to be a challenging
one for the United States Navy. Hundreds of millions of dollars had been
voted by Congress in 1940 for a vast Naval expansion program.. . The new
year was to test whether the Navy’s administration organization would be
able to turn these dollars into weapons of defense.13
Understanding how Portsmouth Navy Yard coped with this challenge, and ramped up so
quickly to turn dollars into submarines, requires an understanding of how the shipyard
analyzed its needs and turned the sudden funding bonanza into the facility and personnel
resources needed for increased production.14
The ramp-up of facilities and employment started seriously in the summer of 1940
and continued well into 1942. After 7 December 1941, a fear of enemy attack
accompanied the increased activity and building at the yard. On the day before Christmas
1941, the Industrial Officer, Captain H.F.D. Davis, reminded his employees that any
attack would most likely come on a Sunday or holiday so workers should be especially

13 Ibid.
14 Gary Weir notes in “Mobilization, Expansion, Integration Building American Submarines 194043,” Naval Historical Center’s http://www.historv.naw.mil/colloquia/cch5d.htm that “The same summer
[1940], the Navy Department responded to increased demand by building upon the foundation o f vast
experience available at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Electric Boat. To amplify the N avy’s effort at
Portsmouth, the Bureau o f Ships (BUSHIPS) expanded the services at Mare Island Naval Shipyard and
reintroduced Cramp Shipbuilding o f Philadelphia to submarine construction. Both o f these yards would
take technical direction from Portsmouth.” Becoming the lead Design Yard for Mare Island and Cramp
Shipbuilding during the war entailed another ramp-up o f design and technical resources that is beyond the
scope o f this study.
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vigilant on those days.15 The Commandant likewise reminded his managers in February
1942 that, “The Axis Governments have used bombs ranging from 100 to 3000 pounds in
their attacks on England,” and, consequently, “vessels in the yard should be berthed
singly if possible, and as widely dispersed as feasible, commensurate with dock space
available and repair facilities along the docks.”16 In the early months of the war, it was
uncertain at best if the rapidly expanding war in Europe could be contained to that
continent and the Atlantic Ocean. It was in this highly charged and threatening
environment that Portsmouth Navy Yard set out to achieve unprecedented submarine
production.
Facilities Ramp-up
In December 1939, just two years prior to Pearl Harbor, the Bureau of
Construction and Repair asked Portsmouth Navy Yard to identify what additional
facilities, if any, would be needed for the yard to build three or four submarines annually,
•

•

for a total of eighteen, finishing in 1946.

17

Portsmouth’s response cited the need for a

fourth building way, a vastly upgraded machine shop, and other miscellaneous needs,
including the continuation of the conversion of the shipyard from DC to AC power.18
Until 1940, the shipyard was supplied with direct current electrical power only. The
15 Industrial Officer memo o f 24 December 1941 to Shop Masters. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC Pkg #6, “Orders
to Shop Foremen.”
16 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard John D. Wainwright memo o f 5 Feb 1942 to Manager and
Captain o f the Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 18,
Folder S-7, “Docking - General.”
17 Chief o f Bureau o f Construction and Repair letter o f 28 Nov 1939 to Commandant Portsmouth
Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files),
Box 1, Folder A1/Y1, PKG 1, “Local Development Boards.”
18 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 28 Dec 1939 to Chief Bureau o f Construction and
Repair. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1,
Folder A l/Y l, PKG 1, “Local Development Boards.”
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conversion to AC was needed to more efficiently supply the greatly increased electrical
loads that accompanied the increased facilities. Funding was quickly provided to get
started on these upgrades and, in June 1940, Portsmouth was authorized to construct eight
submarines with building periods ranging from 21 to 38 lA months. The activity at
Portsmouth Navy Yard increased in the summer of 1940, but production expectations for
the yard remained low compared to the building rates that would be achieved just two
years later.
The increased activity at the yard in the summer of 1940 was highlighted by a
presidential visit on Saturday, 10 August 1940. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox were escorted by 10 motorcycle officers of the New
Hampshire State Police, and a dozen others of the Maine State Police, in a parade of 31
cars from the Portsmouth train station to the shipyard, where the presidential party met

Figure 7: President Roosevelt Touring Yard (August 1940). Courtesy of
Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
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briefly with the commandant, department heads, and others, followed by a short tour of
the yard. During the tour, several stops were made to inspect work, ships, and shops, but
the President did not leave his car. The President is shown greeting his son upon his
arrival at the shipyard in Figure 7. At the completion of the tour, the President boarded
his barge Potomac, which had docked at the yard the previous evening, and sailed for the
Boston Navy Yard. The President boarded his yacht just 55 minutes after he had arrived
at the train station and just 40 minutes after passing through the shipyard main gate. The
President did not see much shipyard activity during the expedited visit because the yard
had been closed at 7:30 am that Saturday morning to all but selected employees and
visitors.19 As short as it was, the visit was an important reminder to shipyard employees
that the Navy’s expectations of them were on the rise. In August 1940, the Portsmouth
Navy Yard was the recent recipient of orders for eight submarines, millions of dollars for
facility upgrades, and a visit from President Roosevelt. The ramp-up had started, but few
at the time appreciated where it would lead them.
In October 1940, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks urged the navy
yards to take all measures possible to accelerate the completion of the public works
projects in view o f “the recent developments in the international situation.”20 With the
fall of France, it looked like it was only a matter o f time until Great Britain was invaded.
Navy yards were told, “Even if those facilities are only partially completed or if the
design and construction are not to the usual Bureau standards, it is more important to
19 The details o f the President’s visit are from the Portsmouth Herald, 10 August 1940, “Crowds
Line Streets to Greet Chief Executive,” 1, and an untitled one page summary o f the visit held at NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 20, Folder EE “President’s
Visit, 1940.”
20 Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f 7 Oct 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction 1930-1950.”
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have them available than it is to spend the additional time which might have to be
expended in order to achieve a strived for, but impossible, perfection.”21 Contractors
were to be given “considerable latitude for the exercise of their judgment” and permitted
to “proceed without the detail of inspection which the Bureau ordinarily exercises.”
Empowerment of contractors and a willingness to sacrifice quality of product for timely
project completion were critical to Portsmouth Navy Yard’s ability to undertake and
complete massive upgrades to facilities while simultaneously increasing the rate of
submarine production.
By the spring of 1941, Congressman Carl Vinson of Georgia, and other national
leaders who recognized the inevitability of war, moved to appropriate funds to increase
shipyard employment and upgrade shipyard facilities. Vinson, Chairman of the Naval
Affairs Committee, queried the yard in March 1941 about its capabilities, problems with
material deliveries, and needs, in order to accelerate delivery dates by twenty percent.
Industrial Manager Captain H.F.D. Davis wrote, in response, that material deliveries were
under control, a third building way had been completed in August 1940, and the fourth
building way was nearing completion.

9“}

Furthermore, Davis reported that the yard had

studied “the possibility of laying down one or two more temporary ground ways between

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Industrial Manager H.F.D. Davis letter o f 15 Mar 1941 to Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman
o f Committee on Naval Affairs. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3, “General Building Program, PKG # 3.” The yard first
identified a need for additional building ways shortly after the Franklin Shiphouse had burned to the ground
with its two building ways on March 10, 1936. See Manager memo o f 9 Nov 1936. NARA Waltham, RG
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box l,JFolder A l/Y l, “Local
Development Boards PKG #1.” The fact that these two building ways were not replaced until the spring o f
1941 is a good example o f the minimal investment in needed facilities that characterized Portsmouth Navy
Yard during the 1930s, prior to the prewar appropriation windfalls.
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the present ways” should they become necessary. Congress wanted to accelerate
submarine building rates and Portsmouth Navy Yard was already looking for ways
(pardon the pun) to exceed expectations.
The First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, approved August
25, 1941, appropriated $160 million for equipment and facilities for the repair and
conversion o f ships and increased the appropriations for the construction of new ships
from $5,000 million to $8,000 million.24 The next month, the Secretary of the Navy
approved Portsmouth Navy Yard’s request for $7,662 million for facility upgrades that
included a new fitting out pier ($1.5 million) and power plant upgrades ($1.5 million).
The approval process that brought the $7.6 million to Portsmouth was the height of
bureaucratic efficiency as the necessary approvals that normally took weeks, if not
months, to obtain were gotten from the Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Secretary of
the Navy, and Secretary o f the Navy in four days. There appeared to be no end to the
Congressional commitment to fund upgrades to shipyard facilities or the Navy’s
commitment to expedite those funds to the yards. Both the commitment and funding
would moderate greatly a year later when an urgent need developed to funnel critical
materials and other resources directly to weapons and armament rather than facilities. By
that time, however, Portsmouth Navy Yard was well on its way to becoming a
transformed shipyard.
The power plant upgrades authorized in the fall o f 1941 accelerated the
conversion of the shipyard from DC to the much more efficient AC power. The increased

24 Senior Member, Shore Station Development Board letter o f 19 Sep 1941. NARA Waltham,,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A1/Y1, Pkg 1,
“Local Development Boards.”
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electrical loads, as the result of all the added new facilities, made it absolutely necessary
that the electrical conversion be given high priority. This conversion started before the
war, continued during the war, and remained incomplete in some areas at the end of the
war.25 The second major project, the fitting-out pier, involved reclamation of 12 acres of
shoal water and wetlands on the corner of the shipyard directly across the river from
Strawbery Banke. This project would become a critical piece of the plan that permitted
the remarkable increase in building rates during the war.26

Figure 8: New Fitting Pier Under Construction (1942). Courtesy of the Milne
Special Collections, University of New Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.

25 Public Works Officer memo o f 19 May 1947 to Commandant Portsmouth Naval Base. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder L-5, “Inspection
Naval Yard, 1945-48.”
26 Bureau o f Yards and Docks Administrative History o f World War II Operations, Navy
Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D .C ., 175.
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The new fitting out pier was an enormous undertaking right in the middle of the
increased activity needed to accelerate production. Figure 8 and a comparison of Figures
A-l and A-2 in the appendix, maps of the yard in 1939 and 1945 respectively, gives one
an appreciation of the size of the new fitting out pier. Neither the fitting out pier nor the
land on which it was built appears in Figure A-l (1939). The twelve acre pier can be seen
jutting out in the lower left hand corner of Figure A-2 (1945). The portion of the pier
closest to the Portsmouth side of the river was created by filling in Pumpkin Island Shoal.
Without the new fitting out pier, there would have been Vastly insufficient pier space to
complete the post-launch work required on the increased numbers of submarines that
were being forced off the ways to make room for the next submarine keel to be laid. The
new pier accommodated up to a half dozen submarines in various stages of construction
as they stepped through the completion process from launch, to dock trials, to
completion.
Prior to the construction of the new fitting-out pier, the submarines were
completed at a much smaller pier, known as the “flatiron pier,” near Dry Dock #2. In
October 1941, about the time that the new pier was authorized, the superintendent of the
flatiron pier was alarmed because the submarines at the pier had increased from two to
four and work was not getting done for lack of manpower. He proposed that the pier
workforce be doubled to 1,010 men and that the submarines remain on the building ways
longer to minimize the work that had to be done at the pier.27 This, of course, was just the
opposite of the “push ‘em off the ways” strategy that carried the yard to production
records a few years later. But, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, the four building ways were
27 Ship Hull Superintendent, Flatiron Pier memo o f 22 October 1941. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A 1-3, “General
Building Program, PKG # 3.”
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launching submarine hulls faster than the flatiron pier space and workforce could handle
them. Had it not been for the new spacious fitting-out pier, and the capability to more
efficiently sequence the post-launch to completion process, the yard would never have
been able to achieve the building rates it did.

Robert Connery notes that “In the dark days that followed Pearl Harbor many
Americans must have realized how fortunate was the decision to begin the expansion of
78

the fleet in 1940.” Portsmouth Navy Yard certainly shared in that good fortune.
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the shipyard, with many facility upgrades already in
progress, sought further improvements to increase building rates. A month after Pearl
Harbor, the shipyard requested, and subsequently received, an additional $2 million in
projects that included the construction of a shallow shipbuilding basin in which two
submarines at a time could be constructed, the fifth building way, a Sub-Assembly
Erection Shop extension at the shipbuilding ways, and a Utility Building at the new
fitting-out pier.29 All of this shipyard activity, and more to follow in 1942, was greatly
facilitated by the First War Powers Act of December 1941 that permitted contracts to be
negotiated rather than awarded through the time consuming competitive bidding process.
In January 1942, the shipyard began work on the fifth building way in the
building shed and a 50 feet extension of the roof and crane runways to accommodate a

28 Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II. 135.
29 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 29 Jan 1942 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1,
Folder A l/Y l, Pkg 1, “Local Development Boards.”
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sub-assembly erection shop.30 The first was a relatively inexpensive $75,000 project, but
the second was a $1,100,000 major construction project designed to further refine
Portsmouth’s sectional construction process that had first been used on the NIRA
submarines in 1934. Fred White, Master of the Rigger and Laborer Shop during the war,
recalled working on submarine keels on the building ways while engulfed in sparks from
*3 1

the welding on the roof of the building shed.

It is a credit to the shipyard that such large

projects were successfully and expeditiously completed in conjunction with a greatly
increased submarine construction rate.
By December 1942, the shipyard had created a number of opportunities for
increased production. The five building ways were launching submarines at an
unprecedented rate, the new fitting out pier and increased workforce had progressed far
enough to keep up with the submarines being launched, and the new building basin was
in operation. With plans to launch submarines after only four months on a building way,
the existing seven ways could produce an annual building rate of twenty-one submarines
per year. However, shipyard management had bigger plans:
Our goal is 30 ships per year; this rate is to be reached by July or August
1943. Our obvious requirement is more building ways. At least 2 and
preferably 3 ways will be needed by April [1942] in order to come any where
near meeting the schedule.32

30 The Senior Member Shore Station Development Board letter o f 11 Jan 1942 to Secretary o f the
Navy and Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 14 Jan 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N 15-8, “Slips and Basins.”
31 Oral interview with Fred White on 3 April 2006 at his home in New Castle, N.H.
32

Portsmouth Navy Yard Memo (unsigned) o f 1 Dec 1942, Subject: Use o f Dry Dock #1 for
Building Submarines. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence
(Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 , “Building Program, Pkg #4.”
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The shipyard had two options to obtain the additional building ways. Two side launching
ways could be built at one of the berths in four or five months for about $90,000, or the
new dry dock that had been designated by the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of Naval
Operations for use in case of emergencies could be used, instead, for construction of two,
or possibly three, submarines at the same time.

The yard had started planning locally for

the building of multiple submarines in Dry Dock #1 shortly after Pearl Harbor.34 This
local plan, presented in detail in the next chapter, was somewhat controversial because
the new dry dock was authorized by the Navy Department for other purposes. Suffice it
to say, at this point, that the yard’s performance during the war would have been average,
at best, if this new dry dock had not been used for construction of submarines. In the next
chapter, these efforts are presented as a case study to illustrate the shipyard’s aggressive
management style and willingness to assume risk for the sake of production and
increased contribution to the war effort.
***
In June 1942, the need to direct all available funds and critical materials to the
fleet caused Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to require increased control and scrutiny
of requests for shipyard facility upgrades.

if

In November 1942, Secretary Knox further

shut down facility construction by establishing firm guidelines that permitted
consideration of only the most urgent needs. According to Knox:
331bid.
34 Ltjg Arnold memo o f 12 December 1941 to Hull Superintendent. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 ,” General
Building Program, Pkg # 3.”
35 Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 25 Jun 1942 to All Shore Activities. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N23-5, “Acetylene
and Oxyacetylene.”
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The rapid diminution in available and prospective supplies of raw materials
and equipment and the vital need for conserving these and our critical
manpower, dictate a drastic reduction of new facilities, both in prospect and
in process, so that the maximum of men, material, equipment, and
transportation resources may be utilized for the more important instruments
ofr- war. 36
In December 1942, the Secretary of the Navy sent his special representative, Admiral
Claude C. Bloch, to all continental naval districts with the message that “we are scraping
the bottom of the bucket” and that drastic conservation measures were needed to support
the war effort. The Admiral specifically highlighted the need to limit facility construction
to only that absolutely necessary so that more of the navy’s funds could be channeled to
fleet production:
The increased demand for construction on shore by all departments, both
military and civilian, as well as by the states, counties, municipalities, and
private parties, has gone on apace. Recently, statistical data has been
prepared which shows that the construction program desired for the calendar
year of 1943 amounts to thirty-two billion dollars. The entire production
capacity of this country for war implements is only estimated to be seventyfive billion dollars. Therefore it can readily be seen what a tremendous
burden the construction program would impose on our war implement
production. Drastic measures are in order to reduce the construction so that
production of our war implements may proceed unimpaired.37
By the end of 1942, when the navy moved to drastically cut back on facility projects,
Portsmouth Navy Yard had already received the infusion of facility improvement
appropriations it needed to transform itself into a modem shipyard.

36 Secretary o f the Navy Frank Knox letter o f 4 Nov 1942 to All Naval Activities. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder
N23-5, “Acetylene and Oxyacetylene.”
37

Commandant First Naval District letter o f 4 Nov 1942 to All Activities, First Naval District.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13,
Folder A3-2 “General Management 1932-1940.”
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As noted earlier, the facility boom at Portsmouth Navy Yard in 1942 was not
unlike what was happening at many shipyards across the country. According to maritime
historian Frederick C. Lane, “Before 1942, in spite of some temporary steel shortages,
shipbuilding was limited mainly by shipyard facilities. But by June or July of 1942,
in

facilities got ahead of steel.” Facilities had also gotten ahead of steel and other
contractor supplied material and components at Portsmouth Navy Yard by late 1942.
Facilities were being completed, employment was increasing, and, most importantly,
quality submarines were being delivered to the United States Navy. On Christmas eve,
1942, Commandant Rear Admiral Withers announced with considerable pride to his
management team that, “A Portsmouth boat has just reported operating 210 days out of
245 since completion... inflicting damage on the enemy just 492 days after the keel was
laid.”

Portsmouth employees could indeed reflect with considerable pride on their

accomplishments during the first year of the war.
Off-Yard Growth
Despite the massive ramp-up in facilities, the physically constrained island
shipyard was left with an urgent need for more industrial space to fulfill its mission. The
acquisition of 12 additional acres of industrial space, with the creation of the new fitting
out pier, has already been described. Another 12 acres were claimed when the shipyard
was joined to Jamaica Island to create an ordnance storage facility.40 A discussion of the

38 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 343.
39 Commandant T. Withers memo o f 24 Dec 1942 to Heads o f Division, Masters, Senior Office
Supervisors. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central
Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 , “Building Program, Pkg #4.”
40 Portsmouth Navy Yard’s expansion during the war pales in comparison to Mare Island Navy
Yard’s growth from 635 acres in 1940 to 1500 acres in 1945, primarily through wetlands reclamation.
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Jamaica Island acquisition, the creation of an electrical shop in Somersworth, N.H. that at
its peak employed as many people as the shipyard did in 1939, the use of a large gypsum
plant in Portsmouth as an extension of the shipyard’s machine shops, and various other
off-yard endeavors will complete the discussion of the ramp-up of facilities at Portsmouth
Navy Yard.
In early 1941, the Bureau of Ordnance directed Commandant Wainwright to
investigate the possibility of purchasing Jamaica Island for the purpose of ammunition
storage. The twelve acre island was a stone’s throw from the northeast corner of the
shipyard island, across a shallow inlet. The island is not even shown on Figure A -l, the
1939 map of the yard, but is shown with considerable development on the upper right
comer of Figure A-2, the 1945 map.
Commandant Wainwright contacted the owner, Dr. W.B. Johnston, in January
1941 to inquire if he was interested in selling the island.41 Negotiations took place over
most of that year. Things had progressed far enough by October 1941 for Wainwright to
provide the Bureau of Ordnance an estimated price of $327,000 for the ordnance storage
facilities that included $30,000 to purchase the island.42 Negotiations continued until the
Judge Advocate General’s message of 7 December 1941 announced “Johnston option
[$25,000] Jamaica Island accepted today.”43 The deal for the purchase of Jamaica Island

41 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 14 Jan 1941 to Dr. W.B. Johnston. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13, “Lands.”
42 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 10 Oct 1941 to Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-1 3 ,
“Lands.”
43 US. Naval Message from the Judge Advocate General Washington D.C. o f 7 Dec 1941 at 0013
to Navy Yard Portsmouth N.H. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General
Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13, “Lands.”
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had been completed just a few hours before the Japanese dropped bombs on Pearl
Harbor.
Post-purchase developments associated with Jamaica Island will be covered later
in this study. The landfills and shoal water reclamation projects that tied the island to the
shipyard, and extended the shoreline on the back channel, were major contributors to the
contamination problems that plagued the yard in the 1980s and ultimately caused the yard
to be declared a Superfund site.
The rapid, and extremely successful, relocation of the shipyard’s Electrical
Manufacturing Shop in early 1942 to a vacated plant in Somersworth, N.H. is one of the
more impressive shipyard accomplishments during the war. The need for the facility was
dictated by the expansion of naval orders for electrical fittings44 from $175,000 per
month in 1940 to $1,900,000 per month in 1943. Accordingly, shop employment
expanded from a prewar average of 400 to a peak o f 3,600 in the winter of 1943 45
During the 1930s, Portsmouth Navy Yard had gradually been assigned most of
the navy’s workload for the manufacture of ship and submarine electrical hull fittings. As
this workload grew, the shipyard was forced to farm out some portions of the work to
local contractors. Immediately prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bureau o f Ships
proposed a 100% increase in Portsmouth’s workload to keep up with the rapidly

44 Electrical fittings are the mechanical connectors that accommodate the passage o f electrical
cables through watertight bulkheads and tanks. Needless to say, they find widespread application on
submarines.
45 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 43.
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expanding shipbuilding programs authorized by Congress.46 Convinced that the shipyard
would have to find accommodations off-yard to meet the greatly increased demands for
electrical fittings, the Commandant wrote the management of Nashua Manufacturing
Company in January 1942:
This Navy Yard is confronted with the necessity of obtaining additional shop
space in which to carry on its program of manufacture for National Defense..
. An inspection has been made of the Great Falls Manufacturing Company’s
Mill Plant at Somersworth, NH, which it is understood is owned by your
company... The reinforced concrete building of flat slab construction,
known as No. 2 Cement M ill,.. .which forms part of the above property
seems well adapted for our purpose. .. Will you lease or sell the building?47
The shipyard quickly negotiated terms with the Nashua Manufacturing Company, and
with the approval of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy received funding from the
Bureau of Ships on 30 January to proceed with the purchase of the building.48 Once
again, there was no bureaucratic delay. The shipyard had advanced from initial problem
definition to problem solution in less than two months.
Portsmouth Navy Yard records indicate that the move of the shipyard’s Electrical
Manufacturing Shop to the plant at Somersworth was accomplished so efficiently that
“no machine was out of production for more than an 8-hour shift.”49 According to the

AA

Bureau o f Ships letter o f 29 Nov 1941 to The Division o f Contract Distribution, Office of
Production Management. NARA. Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence
(Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-1 , “Developments.”
47

Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter to Nashua Manufacturing Company o f 10 Jan 1942.
NARA. Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2,
Folder A l-1 , “Developments.”
48 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 23 Jan 1942 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard
and Bureau o f Ships U.S. Navy Dispatch o f 30 Jan 1942. NARA. Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-1, “Developments.”
49 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 20.

126

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

shipyard’s self-history, operators cleaned their machines at the end of a shift and each
machine was then transported the eighteen miles to Somersworth where it was located on
a prearranged spot, complete with temporary electrical power, and made ready for use
one shift after having been unplugged in the shipyard. By all accounts, the transfer
occurred with minimum disruption to production.
The number of employees at the new plant quickly climbed to 3,750 men and
women, more than double the original 1,546 men in the shipyard. The one hundred
percent increase in workload forecast by the Bureau of Ships was more than realized.50
The facility performed with impressive results during the war until 1945 when, having
served its purpose, it was made available for disposal by 30 June 1946.51
In order to further relieve overcrowded conditions in the shipyard shops, the
shipyard leased buildings owned by the Atlantic Gypsum Products Company in
Portsmouth, in December 1943, for the manufacture of machined parts and assemblies.
Without the gypsum plant, the yard would have been forced to do considerable assembly
work in areas outside the shops, with minimal protection from the weather. The plant
consisted of 60 acres, 13 buildings, and numerous docks for nine railroad spurs.52 Used as
a shipyard during World War I, this complex also served the nation and Portsmouth Navy
Yard well during World War II. The Navy released control of the plant in late 1945 so
that the National Gypsum Company could receive its first shipload of gypsum rock from

50 Ibid.
51 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 9 Apr 1946 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder N l-13,
“Lands Somersworth.”
52 Portsmouth Herald, 3 Dec 1943, “Navy Takes Over Gypsum Plant to Make Sub Parts,” 1.
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Nova Scotia, in late October 1945, in preparation for reopening the plant a few months
later.53
By the summer of 1940, it was obvious that Kittery needed to greatly increase
available housing for the thousands o f new workers at the yard. In August 1940,
Commandant Rear Admiral Wainwright wrote to the Board of Selectmen, Kittery, Maine,
to inquire about the availability of land to accommodate the building of defense housing.
Wainwright explained that “The Navy Department has authorized the construction of
four hundred units to house married and enlisted men and civilian employees attached to
this Navy Yard.”54 Land was made available on the outskirts of Kittery just outside the
new shipyard entrance, Gate #2. The project, known as Admiralty Village, was nearing
completion when the war started. In fact, on 8 December 1941, the shipyard reported that,
“The construction work at the Naval Housing Project now being done under lump sum
contracts is nearing completion.”55 Also, in December 1941, the Federal Works Agency
authorized $125,000 for a sewage disposal plant for Admiralty Village.56 Other federal
housing projects that followed later in the war, on the Portsmouth side of the river, will
be discussed later when analyzing the transformation of Portsmouth.

53 Portsmouth Herald, 18 Oct 1945, First Shipload o f Gypsum Rock in Over 2 Years Arrives at
Local Plant,” 1.
54 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter to Board o f Selectmen, Kittery, Me o f 16 August
1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13,
“Lands.”
55 Commander Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 8 Dec 1941 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder L24, “Housing
Development.”
56 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 10 Dec 1941 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Folder L24, “Housing
Development.”
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Finally, at the same time that the shipyard officials were negotiating for the
purchase of Jamaica Island, negotiations were also taking place for the purchase of the
land necessary to provide another entry point, and bridge access, to the yard from
Kittery.57 In May 1941, Commandant Wainwright recommended that the land be
purchased for $15,000 and construction started shortly thereafter on the second access
gate for the shipyard.58
Employment Ramp-up
At the same time that the shipyard was being transformed geographically and
structurally, thousands of new employees were being hired. It began slowly in October
1939 when navy yard ceilings were eliminated.59 Prior to that time, the shipyard was
obligated to obtain the authorization of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy to exceed
3600 employees. On 2 August 1940, as the funding flood gates were being opened, the
shipyard reported that employment levels had increased to 5,843, with plans to further
increase to the 6,440 employees required to complete the assigned workload of eight
submarines. Always looking for ways to do better, the yard volunteered that a building
rate of six submarines a year could be sustained, without additional facility upgrades,
with a further increase to 8,400 employees and by taking advantage of local commercial

57 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 30 Dec 1940.to Chief Bureau o f Yards and
Docks. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13,
“Lands.”
58 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter to Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks o f 17 May
1941. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder N l-13,
“Lands.”
59 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 2 Oct 1939 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy
(Shore Establishment Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A1-2/NY, “Government Policies.”
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firms for selective farm-out work. Figure 3 shows the employment ramp-up that peaked
at 20,465 in November 1943.
The rapid growth in employment was not without problems. In February 1941,
Hull Superintendent F.A. Tusler made the following observation regarding the recent
rapid increase in employment:
During the past year or more the Yard has taken on a large number of new
men, the training of whom differs widely. It is believed that these men can be
adequately trained if placed with older men who are familiar with the w ork..
. It is recognized that old men with a large amount of submarine experience
are more valuable than green men, even though competent mechanics. ..
Helpers and helper-trainees who have been rated up to mechanic must
necessarily be placed on tasks with which they are familiar.60
Tusler’s comments, about the value of older men with submarine experience, illustrate
well the importance of having been able to maintain a satisfactory workload and a core
workforce during the late 1930s.
The increasing numbers of employees, and pace of work, left some wondering
where events were leading the shipyard. Hull Superintendent Tusler, suspicious that the
boom in employment might be short lived, expressed concern that employment levels and
work hours would quickly return to previous levels after the existing emergency had
passed:
There seems to be little question that until the present program is completed,
there will be little difficulty in maintaining steady employment in the Yard.
However, when this emergency is over, there is no question that the Yard will
be unable to maintain its present degree of employment and very drastic
reductions in force will be necessary.61
60 Hull Superintendent F.A. Tusler memo to Production Officer o f 3 Feb 1941. NARAWaltham,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 26, Folder A 19,
“Conferences, Congresses, and Conventions.” Tusler’s memo was in response to the Industrial Manager’s
request for items in preparation for his appearance before the Naval Subcommittee o f the House
Appropriations Committees concerning navy yard work.
61 Ibid.
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Hull Superintendent Tusler’s prediction concerning drastic reductions in employment,
after the crisis had subsided, was indeed accurate. However, he need not have concerned
himself about post-crisis unemployment in February 1941. Employment would more than
double in a few years and the crisis would last for the next four and one half years. In
February 1941, Tusler and his fellow shipyard workers had little appreciation of what the
next several years held in store for them.
Ramp-up of Submarine Orders
Starting in the summer of 1940, orders for new submarines also started to increase
rapidly. On 26 August 1940, the shipyard was told by superiors to, “Increase new
construction activity until a maximum output of six submarines a year is attained.”62 One
year prior to Pearl Harbor, the shipyard was increasing its building rate from two to six
submarines a year, still very modest indeed when compared to the building rates that
would be achieved a few years later.
In the spring of 1941, Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the Naval Affairs
Committee, queried the yard about the possibility of accelerating the completion dates for
the submarines, then under contract, by twenty percent. Industrial Manager Captain
H.F.D. Davis responded with a schedule of accelerated delivery dates for 14 submarines;
9 to complete in 1942 and 5 to complete through 1 August 1943.

The yard would

ultimately complete 21 submarines in the same time frame. The accelerated ramp-up in
production, planned in the spring of 1941, bore little resemblance to what actually

62 War Plans Officer memo o f 26 August 1940. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 24, Folder A16-11, “National Defense.”
63 Industrial Manager H.F.D. Davis letter o f 15 Mar 1941 to Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman
o f Committee on Naval Affairs. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General
Correspondence, Box 2, Folder A 1-3, “General Building Program, Pkg # 3.”
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happened in the first year and a half of the war. It is a credit to management and
employees of the navy yard that they could adjust so rapidly to changing conditions.
In January 1942, the shipyard’s ramp-up was in full gear. While the yard was
moving rapidly towards acquiring the infrastructure needed to increase production, much
was left to be completed before dramatic increases in production could be realized. In
addition, the yard was heavily burdened with miscellaneous work, including overhauls of
British submarines which detracted from the increased building of submarines. On 2
January 1942, Commandant Wainwright reported to his superiors that one British
submarine had been completed on 1 January 1942 and another was scheduled to be
completed on 22 January 1942. In addition, newly constructed submarines USS Drum
(SS228) had been completed on 24 December 1941, USS Grayback (SS 208) was on sea
trials, and USS Flying Fish (SS229) was on dock trials.64 The three submarines under
construction were progressing toward completion on comfortable schedules that
minimized mutual interference, and competition, for shipyard resources.
Maximum building rates would require the assumption of more schedule risk and
the multiple processing o f submarines on other than a single file basis. A reduction of
repair work, both foreign and domestic, and sufficient new construction facilities to
permit simultaneous, and parallel, construction processes would also be necessary if
Portsmouth Navy Yard was to achieve greatly accelerated production rates. And this is
exactly what happened as the year unfolded.

64

Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 2 Jan 1942 to Chief o f Naval Operations. NARA
College Park, Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence o f the CNO / Secretary o f the Navy
1940-1947, RG 80, Box 442, File L9-3/NY— L9-3/NY1.
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Portsmouth Navy Yard’s “can-do” attitude, and demonstrated performance,
during the early stages of the war quickly led to increased Navy Department orders for
submarines that continued through June 1943. Table 3 shows submarine orders between
June 1940 and June 1943. The fourteen submarines ordered in 1940 were the direct result
of the 11 % Naval Expansion Act passed in June 1940 and the 70% Naval Expansion Act
passed in late July 1940.
Table 3: Portsmouth Navy Yard Submarine Orders (1940-1943)65
Submarines

Order Ouantitv

SS228-235
SS275-280
SS285-291
SS308-312
SS381-410
SS417-424
SS298-299

8
6
7
5
30
8
2

SS475-515

40
106

Date of Order
June 1940
Sept 1940
Dec 1941
Apr 1942
June 1942
Feb 1943
Started at Cramp Shipbldg,
completed at PNY
June 1943

The next forty-two submarines ordered were part of the flood of contracts issued during
the first six months o f the war, in a frantic effort to further accelerate war production.
During the three months prior to Pearl Harbor, the Navy awarded 1,625 contracts
for purchases that exceeded $50,000 each that totaled $1.47 billion dollars. During the
three months after Pearl Harbor, 2,917 similar contracts were issued that totaled $5,327
billion.66 Portsmouth Navy Yard shared in this ordering frenzy. The large number of
advance orders for submarines permitted the bulk ordering of material, and the

65 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 1.
66 Robert Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 269.
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development of disciplined repetitive work procedures, that would be critical to the mass
production of submarines.

Between the summers of 1940 and 1942, Portsmouth Navy Yard ramped-up for
war. Portsmouth’s situation was not unlike that at the other navy yards and private
shipyards. The increased naval construction bills during the late 1930s had revitalized the
yards with work and increased employment, but it was not until the summer of 1940 that
the naval expansion legislation provided the funding needed for the urgently needed
shipyard infrastructure upgrades. The navy yard infrastructure building bonanza occurred
simultaneously with massive increases to employment and previously unimagined orders
for large numbers of new ships and submarines. At Portsmouth Navy Yard, the
successful integration of these new facilities and personnel resources into the day-to-day
shipyard operations, with minimal interference to production schedules, was an extreme
challenge to the mettle of management and employees.
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CHAPTER IV

MANAGEMENT & EMPLOYEES

“Admiral Withers was a man whom everybody liked because he let everyone do
their job.”1
Fred White
Portsmouth Navy Yard Master Rigger and
Laborer during World War II
3 April 2006
“The workforce at Portsmouth is especially high grade. Top civilian supervisors are
alert, intelligent, and obviously proud of their Yard.”2
Booz-Allen Industrial Survey
6 November 1944

The performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war will be analyzed under
the four categories shown in the titles of the next two chapters, Management, Employees,
Methods, and Measurables. At this point, it is well to revisit a question posed earlier.
What part of the shipyard’s success was due purely to the stimulation of war, and what
part was due to other factors? That unanswerable question recognizes the special
environment that existed at the yard during the war, an environment that inspired and
focused all towards the common goal of increased production. While that environment
1 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
2 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy Ralph A. Bard letter o f 6 Nov 1944, Subject: Survey o f
Industrial Department, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. - Report No. 2 o f Industrial Survey Division, 8.
NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence (1940-45), Box 785, Folder
NY1/A3. Emphasis added.
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may have contributed to heightened performances and an increased willingness to
embrace organizational change and innovative production methods, favorable
environments alone do not increase production. However, innovative management
working with a skilled workforce in an environment ripe for change and cooperation can
lead to impressive results. And that is what happened at Portsmouth Navy Yard during
World War II.
Shipyard management, of course, includes military and civilian management.
However, this management study is skewed towards the naval officers’ management of
the yard as the senior positions were all held by naval officers and as they were the
decision makers. However, as those who have served in navy yards know so well, the
military leadership turns over every few years and it is the civilian management that
provides the long-term leadership continuity, as well as the industrial and technical
expertise that defines the yard. Civilian management is given much credit in this study,
but the fact remains that the preponderance of archival information available about
shipyard management during the war reflects the decisions, actions, and personalities of
the senior naval officers.
That said, it should also be noted that the study includes the personal recollections
of Fred White, a 96 year old shipyard retiree, who held a senior civilian management
position during the war. White was the Master Rigger and Laborer, and, in that capacity,
he supervised hundreds of employees and was heavily involved in important waterfront
industrial events such as keel layings, launchings, dockings, undockings, and submarine
movements. His testimony is an invaluable contribution to this study. In addition, the
family papers of a shipyard naval architect, Harold Sweetser, who worked at the yard
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from 1917 until 1958, and articles from the shipyard’s newspaper, the Portsmouth
Periscope, provide some insight into civilian management at the yard during the war.
However, there is no escaping the fact that this dissertation deals primarily with the naval
officer management of the shipyard during the war.

The next two chapters draw heavily from four World War II industrial studies.
Two of the studies were conducted by independent management consulting firms, under
the sponsorship of the office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the other two were selfassessments by a Portsmouth Navy Yard industrial survey team. Because of their
importance to this dissertation, a discussion follows providing background and context
for the studies.3
The first independent survey was a September 1942 survey o f four navy yards
(New York, Philadelphia, Bremerton, and Mare Island) by the firm Industrial Relations
Counselors Inc. as directed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard.4 The study
evaluated each yard’s production efficiency and needs. While Portsmouth was not
included in the survey, the results permit comparisons of Portsmouth to the yards
surveyed. The second independent study, also directed by the Secretary of the Navy, was
an assessment of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s Industrial Department completed in late 1944

3

For purposes o f clarification, the four industrial studies will be referred to throughout the rest of
this study in abbreviated terms as Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (December 1941), Portsmouth Industrial
Survey II (June 1942), Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942), and the Booz-Allen Survey (1944).
4 Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. letter o f 8 September 1942 to Assistant Secretary o f the
Navy Ralph A. Bard. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence, 1940-1945,
Box 151, Folder NY1, 1 Jul 1942-30 Jun 1943. Hereafter Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942).
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by the firm Booz-Allen Inc.5 The results of the Booz-Allen study provide an independent
assessment of the industrial operations of Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war that
provides balance to the wealth of archival shipyard self-appraisals cited throughout this
study.
The two above surveys had different purposes. The Industrial Relations
Counselors Survey of September 1942 was a cursory survey of four navy yards to
provide feedback to Secretary o f the Navy Knox regarding the effectiveness of the
millions of dollars that had been spent on facility upgrades over the previous two years.
The nation was in the early stage of a war whose outcome was still in doubt and the
pressure was on to maximize the capabilities of the navy yards. While the auditors were
careful not to overly criticize or condemn the efforts of the mobilizing yards, they were
also quick to point out areas needing improvement to maximize production at each yard.
On the other hand, the Booz-Allen Survey of 1944 was pointed more towards postwar
operations than maximizing production to win the war. This survey took the opportunity
to congratulate Portsmouth Navy Yard for its war record while emphasizing changes
needed to adjust to the fast approaching reduction in workload and workforce. Of
paramount concern was a desire to end the crisis management modus operandi that had
characterized wartime operations and return to more structured and disciplined
management with emphasis on cost monitoring and control.
The third and fourth studies are Portsmouth Navy Yard Industrial Department
self-assessments that were issued on 8 December 1941 and 6 June 1942. The 8 December
5 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy Ralph A. Bard ltr o f 6 N ov 1944, Subject: Survey o f Industrial
Department, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. - Report No. 2 o f Industrial Survey Division. NARA College
Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence, 1940-1945, Box 785, Folder NY 1/A3 .Hereafter
Booz-Allen Survey (1944).

138
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1941 report provides an extensive analysis of the yard’s production status and needs to
achieve increased building rates.6 The 6 June 1942 report provides extensive analysis of
the yard’s first six months of operations after Pearl Harbor.7 It is a much more refined
assessment of the yard’s capabilities with a confident prognosis for future success. These
Portsmouth Navy Yard self-assessments are important keys to understanding much of
management’s thinking and actions during the war. For this reason, a detailed explanation
of these two studies follows.
In conjunction with an accelerated shipbuilding program, the Secretary of the
Navy announced, in September 1941, the inauguration of a shipbuilding competition to
commence 1 October to evaluate the efficiency of the nation’s commercial and
government shipyards. Five categories were to be evaluated; work progress, work quality,
yard improvement, yard spirit, and the overall opinion of the evaluating board of
officers.8 The first three categories relied on the typical indicators of shipyard
performance as measured by schedule adherence, inspection records, and test results.
The last two, yard spirit and overall opinion of the board, addressed the intangibles that
were needed to build mobilization momentum.

6 Board o f Shipbuilding Construction Report o f 8 Dec 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard, Subject: New Construction - Progress and Administration to Expedite Work. NARA Waltham, RG
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l/3 , “Building
Program, PKG4.” Hereafter Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (December 1941).
7 Board o f Shipbuilding Construction Report o f 6 Jun 1942 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard, Subject: New Construction - Progress and Administration to Expedite Work. NARA Waltham, RG
181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A 1, “Construction June 1940 to Dec
1943 .’’Hereafter Portsmouth Industrial Survey II (June 1942).
8 Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 24 Sep 1941. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3, “General Building Program, PKG #
4.”
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The board, with Rear Admiral H. E. Yarnell as the senior member, visited
Portsmouth Navy Yard on 5 November to kick off the competition.9 Each yard was to be
evaluated quarterly with awards given quarterly, semi-annually, and annually. The annual
award for the best shipyard of each group was to be known as the “Victory” award.
Private shipyards were assigned to one of four regions and all navy yards were grouped
together for evaluation purposes. The competition, obviously designed to motivate all
shipyards to review internal capabilities and processes to eliminate waste and improve
efficiency of operations, had exactly the desired effect at Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Commandant John D. Wainwright established a well qualified local review board to
recommend improvements to new construction processes and practices. The board was in
the final steps of its review on the day Pearl Harbor was attacked and published its initial
findings the next day, 8 December 1942.10
The board continued to function after the war started and issued an updated report
in June 1942. The board consisted of six officers under the leadership of the shipyard’s
Planning Officer, Captain A.I. McKee. The board showed a clear understanding of
shipyard industrial management and the needs of Portsmouth Navy Yard in particular.
The 8 December 1941 and 6 June 1942 reports are comprehensive reports of fifteen pages
each that provide a convenient firsthand summary of activity at Portsmouth Navy Yard at
the start, and during the first six months, of the war. In addition to valuable facts and
figures, the studies are rich in analysis of the shipyard’s needs and opportunities. The two

9 Portsmouth Herald, 5 Nov 1941, “Adm. H.E. Yarnell Here to Inspect Local Navy Yard,” 1.
10 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral John D. Wainwright memo o f 7 N ov 1941.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2,
Folder A l-3 , “General Building Program, PKG # 4.”
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reports served the intended purpose of kick-starting greatly increased wartime production
at the yard. While no follow-on reports are extant in the archives, it is obvious that the
shipyard continued to aggressively pursue and improve upon the recommendations
contained in these two reports.
A comparison of the tone of the two studies, six months apart, suggests an attitude
change on the part of the board and shipyard management. The first study (December
1941) reflects confidence in the yard’s abilities to make the necessary changes to rampup production to meet expectations, but expresses concerns about the details of that
transition. The second report (June 1942) takes considerable pride in the yard’s
demonstrated performance during the first six months of the war and aggressively
proposes opportunities to not just meet, but exceed, expectations. The first report focused
on potential production limitations due to local restraints. The second report reflects
great self-confidence that the shipyard’s performance can be limited only by external
factors, especially contractors’ abilities to provide timely delivery of components to
support the yard’s accelerated schedules. However, the board refused to accept schedule
delays for any reason and recommended ways to work around delinquent contractor
support.
These two internal shipyard self-assessments of December 1941 and June 1942
are not self-congratulatory or self-serving. The immediate threat o f war, in the first case,
and the early stages of war, in the second case, had cut through any ulterior motives or
conclusions. The teams consisted of representatives from various shipyard departments
who had the same objective, to define those actions needed to enable their shipyard to do
its part to win the war. While they were advertised as industrial surveys, the teams were
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headed by the Planning Officer, Captain A.I. McKee, who had held that position since
March 1938. Consequently, he was very knowledgeable of the yard’s practices and
capabilities. If anything, the reports are more critical of the support departments than the
Industrial Department, calling for better planning, provisioning of material, and closer
liaison of the support departments with the industrial scheduling department. In effect,
the team called for maximum streamlining of all shipyard functions towards submarine
construction. And that is exactly what happened in the months that followed.
Finally, the next two chapters often refer to various Navy Department bureaus and
commands to which Portsmouth Navy Yard was responsible, and deals considerably with
a power struggle within the Navy Department for control of navy yards that can be
confusing to the reader unfamiliar with naval matters and organization. Figure 9 is a

I

Figure 9: Navy Department WWII Organizational Chart. United States Naval
Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Chart 5, “Flow Chart World War II.”
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chart showing the chain of command and organizational flow of responsibilities and
authority from the Secretary of the Navy to the navy yard commandants and shipyard
departments that existed during World War II. This chart will be referred to frequently to
provide context and a clearer understanding of the complex and, sometimes, confusing
organizational structure in which the navy yards were required to operate during the war.
At this point, it is sufficient to note that the leadership of the Navy Department for most
of the war was provided by Secretary o f the Navy Frank Knox from 11 July 1940 until
his sudden death on 28 April 1944. Knox was succeeded by his Under Secretary and
assistant for procurement and production, James Forrestal (19 May 1944 to 17 September
1947). Two officers held the position of Chief of Naval Operations during the war,
Admiral Harold R. Stark (1 August 1939 to 2 March 1942) and Fleet Admiral Ernest J.
King (26 March 1942 to 15 December 1945).
Historian Robert H. Connery notes that, on the eve of World War II, Navy
Department responsibilities for the planning the Navy’s industrial mobilization were
ambiguous and ill defined. According to Connery:
The Chief of Naval Operations, the material bureaus, and the Secretary’s office all
had some part in planning but their various roles were never clearly defined.
The most serious consequence was lack o f aggressive leadership in the industrial
planning field. There were jurisdictional conflicts to be sure, but theses were not
nearly as serious as lack o f interest arising from divided responsibility.11
Things began to change for the better in August 1940 when James V. Forrestal took
office as the first Under Secretary o f the Navy with responsibilities for all material
procurement. Forrestal, in time, did provide the industrial mobilization leadership,
structure, and clarification that the Navy needed. Early in the war, however, the Under

11 Robert H. Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 31.
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Secretary was still organizing his new office at the same time that the newly formed
Bureau o f Ships was struggling to get its act together.
Figure 9 shows two primary flow paths of authority to the navy yard
commandants. In the case of Portsmouth Navy Yard, the first path, through the Chief of
Naval Operations, primarily concerned the maintenance of the existing submarine fleet
and the care and administration of the sailors and officers who manned those submarines.
The Chief of Naval Operations set priorities and schedules. The second path, through the
Under Secretary of the Navy for Procurement and Production, primarily concerned
matters pertaining to the construction of new submarines, including the oversight of the
management of the navy yards through the Bureau of Ships. The tension between policies
for the construction o f new submarines and policies for the maintenance and overhaul of
existing submarines was an essential element of operations at Portsmouth Navy Yard
during the war. This tension frequently left the yard managers trying to please two
masters. Management’s ability to walk this political tightrope to the satisfaction of both is
critical to understanding the yard’s performance during the war.
Management
By the summer of 1942, the success that United States submarines were having in
the Pacific sinking Japanese shipping received considerable press coverage, much of it
advocating increased and accelerated production of submarines. Journalist David
Lawrence urged that emphasis be placed on the building of submarines to close the gap
that the Germans enjoyed in numbers. Lawrence wrote:
Why has the submarine been neglected in public discussions? . . .
Authoritative figures show that on Oct. 10, 1941, Japan had 71 submarines
and seven building for a total of 78. Germany had 120 in service and 180
building for a total of 300. The United States had 113 in service and 73
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building for a total of 1 86 ... It takes about 11 months to build a large
submarine nowadays. Can this time be cut by the various speedup formulas
that have helped us to turn out planes and cargo ships at record production?
Very little is known by the public of submarine construction. There has been
a great deal of secrecy about it but, with the splendid work being done by
American submarines in the Pacific, the opportunity for stimulating the
whole submarine program would seem to be increased by disclosing more
and more about our offensive operations with the submarine.12
Portsmouth Navy Yard management was in the process of doing much as David
Lawrence was suggesting, speeding up the traditional production rate of submarines by
employing new and innovative techniques. However, it was one thing to casually suggest
the speedup of submarine production and quite another thing to do it.
The transformation of the Portsmouth Navy Yard, from the custom shop operation
that built two submarines a year in the 1930s to a mass producer o f dozens of submarines
a year by 1944, required a unique industrial environment. This section argues that the
yard’s success was the result of innovative management directing the efforts of a
dedicated and empowered workforce in a relatively small shipyard with a sharply focused
and well defined mission. All of these factors enabled the yard to operate very efficiently
and thrive in an industrial environment that was characterized by loose corporate
oversight of navy yards by the Bureau of Ships, leaving the yards free to manage their
own affairs. In that environment, Portsmouth management developed production
methods, tailored to the yard’s strengths, that included employee empowerment, special
teams, risk management, and submarine construction procedures that employed mass
production techniques to the extent that it was possible to do so at the time. Prior to a
detailed analysis of industrial methods and practices, it is important to understand the

12 David Lawrence article with Washington date line, undated. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction June 1940December 1943.”
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context of the times, beginning with the situation at the Bureau of Ships and working
down through the shipyard leadership and management to the waterfront industrial
operations.
Loose Corporate Oversight of Navy Yards
In comparison to the detailed supervision and guidance imposed by the Naval Sea
Systems Command on the naval shipyards today, Portsmouth Navy Yard received
relatively little direction from higher authority during the war. The navy yard’s
immediate supervisor during World War II was the Bureau of Ships, newly created in
June 1940. The Bureau of Ships (BuShips) spent a good part of the war in a crisis
management mode that left little opportunity for the new organization to oversee shipyard
operations. To a large extent, each navy yard was an entrepreneurial operation whose
success, or failure, depended on local management decisions and initiative.
According to the Bureau of Ships self-history of operations during the war, “The
role of the Bureau of Ships in management and supervision of the work in the naval
industrial establishments had been restricted, in spite of its predominant interest, and had
been subject to qualifications and limitations.”13 The result was “decentralized,
independent organizational growth”14 with each navy yard having different
responsibilities and a variety of procedures to fulfill those responsibilities. The Industrial
Relations Counselors Survey (1942) commented on the lack of coordination,
communication, cross-training, and sharing of experiences between navy yards.15 The

13 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 135.
14 Ibid
15 Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942), 1.
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Bureau of Ships should have coordinated activities between navy yards and, apparently,
did not. In essence, each navy yard was left to independently develop and tailor processes
and procedures to their own individual needs. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s ability to develop
processes and procedures that took advantage of existing facility and workforce attributes
proved to be quite exceptional.
The organizational change that left the navy yards lacking in organizational
oversight during World War II had its roots in a long and tortured history of indecision
about how best to manage and administer the navy yards. A 1945 survey of current navy
yard operations, conducted by the Navy’s Organization Planning and Procedures Unit,
traced that volatile history to over a century of debate about the proper relationship
between the Secretary of the Navy and the yards, the most efficient relationship between
the Navy Department Bureaus and the yards, and the optimum internal organization of
navy yards.16 According to the Bureau of Ships self-history, the genesis of the problem
can be traced to the post-Civil War alignment of internal navy yard departments to Navy
Department Bureaus that left a lack of cooperation and a division of loyalties in the navy
yards:
The origin o f many of the difficulties in defining the Bureau of Ships’ role in
Naval Yards goes back to 1 July 1868 when Secretary Welles extended the
Bureau system [established in 1842] to the individual yards. In this action
each bureau [Bureau of Construction and Repair, Bureau of Steam
Engineering, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and
Bureau of Navigation] was assigned its own department in each yard and was
permitted to handle its own supplies and materials. Each bureau dealt directly
with its own department, with the result that cooperation often proved to be

16 Organization Planning and Procedures letter o f 13 July 1945 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy
Ralph A. Bard forwarding “Review o f the Organization and Administration o f Navy Yards and U.S.Naval
Drydocks.” This survey provides a summary o f the history o f navy yard organization and administration
with recommendations for improvements. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General
Correspondence 1940-45, Box 785, Folder NY1/A3.
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completely lacking. Although a Commandant commanded each yard, primary
allegiance of department heads gravitated towards their bureau.17
Each navy bureau received annual Congressional appropriations and, thus, commanded
great allegiance from its corresponding navy yard department upon which it was
dependent for funds. The consequence was navy yard internal departments that were
more loyal to their parent navy bureaus in Washington D.C. than to their commandant at
the navy yard.
The inefficient bureau system continued to be a major problem until a 1938 audit
report by the firm Booz, Fry, Allen, and Hamilton noted that, “In the gradual evolution of
the two bureaus [Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering] the
distinction between ‘hull’ and ‘machinery’ became increasingly obscure.. . This resulted
in overlapping and duplication of work, inefficiency, and confusion.”18 The inefficiencies
became so bad that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt intervened and, in a letter of 16
March 1938 to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison, complained of excessive
delays in the cases of three cruisers under construction at the Philadelphia and New York
Navy Yards. FDR did note that “The record on submarines is not so bad.” However, FDR
wrote, “In the case of the cruisers, the Philadelphia Navy Yard and, to a less degree, the
New York Navy Yard need to be told that the Commander-in-Chief is much
dissatisfied.”19 Congress became involved and, on 20 June 1940, the 76th Congress
passed Public Law 644 abolishing the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau

17

United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 135.
18 Ibid, 25.
19 Quoted in Ibid., 29-30.
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of Engineering and establishing the Bureau of Ships to consolidate navy yard operations
under one bureau.20
Figure 9 shows the Navy Department organizational structure after the
establishment of the Bureau of Ships. While the technical and management responsibility
for all naval ships and navy yards resided in the Bureau of Ships instead of being split
between the two feuding bureaus, it should be noted that the Bureau of Yards and Docks,
Bureau of Ordnance, and Bureau of Supplies and Accounts continued to provide
direction to the navy yards during the war. However, unlike the earlier, and faulty,
“bureau system” that undermined the commandant’s authority, there were fewer bureaus
and they were required to function through the navy yard commandant. The
establishment o f the Bureau of Ships solved some, but certainly not all, of the navy yard
problems. As late as December 1944, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who
continued to be frustrated with the inefficient administration of the navy yards, wrote,
“What I want is some man whose sole job is to examine the functions, to compare
operations and handle difficulties [at navy yards]. We should have one man to go to.”

91

Organizational revisions immediately after the war further consolidated these other
bureau functions under the Bureau of Ships.
The consolidation of navy yard shipbuilding operations under one bureau in 1940
was a step in the right direction. However, the timing was bad as the new bureau rapidly
grew from 1,000 to 6,000 employees during the war and never had a chance to organize

20 Ibid., 42.
21 Quoted in Organization Planning and Procedures letter o f 13 July 1945 to Assistant Secretary o f
the Navy Ralph A. Bard, Enclosure A, 3c. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General
Correspondence 1940-45, Box 785, Folder N Y 1/A3.
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itself, let alone the navy yards, before it was inundated with overwhelming wartime
responsibilities.22 The Congressional Hearings on further naval expansion, held during
the spring o f 1940, almost simultaneously with the birth of the Bureau of Ships,
continued the mobilization of shipbuilding that had begun with the outbreak of the war in
Europe in 1939. The fall of France stirred up demands for further increase in the strength
of the U.S. Navy and, by July 1940, with the Bureau o f Ships celebrating its one month
anniversary, the 70% Naval Expansion Act was passed, greatly expanding the workload
of the new bureau:
This rapid increase in the size of the shipbuilding program created a host of
problems in the administration of the new Bureau’s work. The Shipbuilding
Program on the books on September 1,1939 was 360,000,000 man-hours; it
had risen to about 2,250,000,000 man-hours on January 1,1942 and
3,000,000,000 man-hours by 1 September 1942. Daily emergencies being the
rule, little time could be devoted to the sort of work that would pay dividends
only in the long-run.
As noted, the Bureau of Ships did little or no long range planning. Rather, it fought dayto-day emergencies and settled into a crisis management mode that left the navy yards to
fend for themselves. Concerning the Bureau of Ships inability to function effectively
during this period, industrial mobilization historian Robert Connery wrote, “The Bureau
of Ships was going through a period of indigestion caused by the amalgamation of the
Bureau of Steam Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair and its
administrative processes were confused.”24 The bad case of indigestion at the Bureau of
Ships had been the result of an unprecedented glut of shipbuilding contracts.

22 United States N aval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., Table 5, “Personnel On-board by Months, 1933-45.”
23 Ibid, 201-202.
24 Robert H. Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 74.
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Table 4, which places the establishment of the Bureau o f Ships chronologically
with annual naval appropriations for ship engineering, gives one a sense of the
overwhelming workload that the newly created Bureau faced.
Table 4 - Bureau of Ships Naval Appropriations (1935-1944)25
(Bureau of Construction & Repair before 1940)
1935
$29,204,200
1936
$39,490,233
1937
$40,550,000
1938
$41,559,300
1939
$59,681,590
1940
$84,072,000
BUREAU OF SHIPS ESTABLISHED 20 JUNE 1940
1941
$228,898,180
1942
$1,497,470,000
1943
$1,708,979,935
1944
$1,733,880,000
The Bureau of Ships quickly found that it was responsible for managing budgets that
were twenty to thirty times larger than the Bureau of Construction and Repair managed
just a few years earlier.
Recognizing that the Bureau of Ships was overwhelmed with the nation’s
revitalized shipbuilding program, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, in January 1941,
directed the navy yard commandants to operate independently of the Bureau of Ships to
the maximum extent possible:
During the present emergency, it is directed that Commandants of all Navy
Yards act with the full authority of the Bureau of Ships taking final local
action to the greatest extent possible.26

25 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., Table 2, “Decline and Renaissance o f the Navy.”
26 Secretary o f the Navy Frank Knox letter o f 15 Jan 1941 to Chief Bureau o f Ships and
Commandants All Navy Yards, Subject: National Defense Shipbuilding Program - Expedition and
Prosecution o f Work. NARA College Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence,
1941-45, NY1 (66-176) toN Y 2 (551-661), Box 1601, Folder NY 166-176.
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Knox further directed that the only technical issues to be forwarded to the Bureau of
Ships for concurrence, prior to shipyard action, were those deemed necessary by the
shipyard commandant. This policy, which Knox promulgated to enable the navy yards to
accelerate production to achieve the ambitious naval shipbuilding programs passed in the
summer of 1940, became the modus operandi for the duration of the war.
Not only were the orders for new ships growing at an unprecedented rate, but
changes to those orders were frequently necessary to accommodate changing war plans.
On one hand, America’s success during World War II was the direct result of an
industrial flexibility that was able to shift production quickly from one goal to another.
On the other hand, the shifting of workload priorities amongst shipbuilding orders created
an unmanageable situation for the fledgling Bureau of Ships. According to a Bureau of
Ships report, “Not one month of the twenty-four under consideration [Jan 1942-Jan 1944]
passed without the Bureau of Ships receiving at least one directive either ordering a ship
to be built or canceling others previously ordered.” Chief of the Office of Procurement
and Material Rear Admiral S.M. Robinson told the Under Secretary of the Navy in July
1942, “Since the beginning of 1942, the Navy Shipbuilding Program has been in almost
continuous turmoil.”28 There can be little doubt that, in the summer of 1942, when
Portsmouth Navy Yard was ramping-up facilities and employment to meet accelerated
production schedules, it could expect little help from the Bureau of Ships.

21 Ibid.,327.
28

Chief o f the Office o f Procurement and Material Admiral S.M. Robinson’s memo o f 31 July
1942 to the Under Secretary o f the Navy. Quoted in full in United States N aval Administration in World
War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946,201-202. Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
D.C.
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In July 1942, “at a time when the production and scheduling of the Bureau of
Ships was, for the first time, beginning to assume some semblance of order, following the
initial wartime adjustment period,”29 the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to launch the
North Africa offensive as soon as possible and shipbuilding priorities had to be
resttuctured to insure the landing craft and support ships would be available to support
the operation.

The Chief of Naval Operations shifted ship construction priorities

frequently, depending upon the progress of the war, leaving the Bureau of Ships
struggling to restructure and reassign shipyard workloads.31
War, by its very nature, requires constant reassessments and revisions to plans.
The Bureau o f Ships self-history of World War II, however, attributed the chaotic
conditions in which it was required to operate to a lack of coordinated advance planning
between the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Bureau also
believed that President Roosevelt’s personal involvement in naval matters further added
to the confusion, “The personal handling of many matters by President Roosevelt was

29 Ibid, 331.
30 Ibid, 333.
31

World War II shipbuilding priorities were assigned on a basis o f A, B, C for the highest priority
projects and then numerically for the others o f lower priority. For example, landing craft enjoyed an “A”
priority in the summer o f 1942 in preparation for the North Africa campaign discussed above. Submarines,
despite their obvious important contributions to the war effort, never enjoyed a high industrial priority
during the war. On a priority system ranking o f 1 to 10, submarines were most often ranked 7th with the
priorities 8 to 10 not used or assigned to “all other vessels.” According to the Bureau o f Ships self-history,
“Submarines in view o f our comparative strength in the class, received seventh priority and all other vessels
following.” Perhaps the low assignment o f priorities to submarine construction was also done with the
belief that the submarine community would produce satisfactory results no matter what priorities were
assigned, as was certainly the case. One can argue that the national shipbuilding priority system contributed
to Portsmouth Navy Yard’s independence and stability during the war in that constantly changing priorities
kept the Bureau o f Ships fully occupied with little time to devote to navy yard operations. At the same time,
the ever changing priorities kept the non-submarine shipyards in constant turmoil while Portsmouth, in
comparison, was little affected by changes to priority or workload. See United States Naval Administration
in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946,Navy Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington,
D.C. 593, Table 40, 599.
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well known and tended to give advantage to the individual who could get to him with his
case.”32 The end result was a failure to plan in advance that “led to haphazard
development of requirements” that “made the job of the Bureau much more difficult than
#

it would have been if greater stability had prevailed.”

- jo

The need for the newly created Bureau of Ships to come to grips with a vast array
o f material procurement issues also distracted the bureau’s attention from the
management of navy yards. The logistics problems associated with the mobilization of
private industry, to provide basic components and equipment for shipbuilding, were
especially taxing to the Bureau of Ships:
Although the most obvious interest of the Bureau of Ships was in the
expansion o f shipyards... its greatest headache centered on the problem of
upland facilities capable of manufacturing the components and materials
necessary to keep the shipyards supplied. It is not unreasonable to state that
the Bureau devoted as much effort to the increase of production capacity in
supporting industries as to the increase in shipbuilding facilities.34
Again, the Bureau of Ships had pressing needs in several areas of responsibility that kept
it from devoting sufficient attention to the navy yards.
Ineffective leadership also plagued the Bureau of Ships during the hectic summer
o f 1942. The first chief o f the new bureau, Rear Admiral Samuel Robinson, was widely
respected and especially enjoyed the confidence of Assistant Secretary o f the Navy James
Forrestal. Historian Robert Albion described Robinson as “wise, shrewd, and technically

32 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 324.
33 Ibid., 326.
34 Ibid., 162.
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competent.”35 Forrestal promoted Robinson to head procurement operations for the entire
Navy in February 1942. According to Albion, “His [Robinson’s] successor [Rear
Admiral Alexender H. VanKeuren] proved unable to hold in check the disruptive forces
and ambitions within the Bureau of Ships and it was drifting into ineffectiveness.”
Forrestal replaced VanKeuren after only eight months in the job, in November 1942, with
Rear Admiral Edward L. Cochrane. Cochrane proved much more capable and remained
in the job throughout the war until November 1946.
Looking up the corporate ladder from the vantage point of Portsmouth Navy Yard
in December 1942, one year after Pearl Harbor, it must have been obvious to shipyard
management that they were pretty much on their own. The overwhelmed bureau to which
they reported, and from which they should have received support and guidance, had only
been in existence for eighteen months and the admiral in charge had just been removed
for ineffective performance. In would be a while longer before the Bureau of Ships could
assume any semblance of control over navy yard operations. In the meantime,
Portsmouth Navy Yard had dozens of orders for new submarines and had to get on with
the measures necessary to meet those production goals.
Throughout 1943 and 1944, Portsmouth Navy Yard not only met, but greatly
exceeded, production goals. This was not the case for many shipyards, as evidenced by a
September 1943 Bureau of Ships letter that noted, “ 110 of the 342 [ships] actually

35 Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the Navy (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962), 61.
36 Ibid.
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17

scheduled for delivery in August did not meet their date.” The letter highlighted the
need for the bureau to receive more accurate progress reports from the shipyards. Not
only was the Bureau of Ships unable to actively manage the shipyards, it was also having
difficulty keeping up to date on the progress of ships under construction at the yards. In
late 1943, the Bureau of Ships continued in a crisis management mode with many
shipyards adding to that crisis by failing to meet scheduled completion dates. What little
attention the bureau could give to shipyards was better directed at the deficient yards and
not at the better performing yards like Portsmouth Navy Yard.
An exponentially growing and constantly changing shipbuilding program,
massive material procurement issues, ineffective leadership, and the internal
administrative burdens o f organizing and managing the newly created and rapidly
growing Bureau o f Ships left little time or opportunity for the bureau to effectively
oversee navy yard operations. For the most part, navy yards were left to their own
devices to manage their own affairs. Fortunately, in Portsmouth’s case, those devices
were considerable and well managed.
A Relatively Small Navy Yard
The Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942) noted that, “The expanse of
the waterfront at all Yards [New York, Boston, Puget Sound, and Mare Island] tends to
retard the transfer of gangs between ships and makes for a more rigid operating situation
than is normally found in commercial yards.”38 In comparison, Portsmouth Navy Yard
had a rather limited and compact waterfront area that lent itself to the efficient transfer of
37 Chief Bureau o f Ships Confidential letter o f 18 Sep 1943. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Shipyard
Formerly Confidential Correspondence 1930-50, Box 3, Folder L6-3, “Progress Reports.”
38 Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942), 2.
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teams from submarine to submarine, and a high degree of flexibility not found in the
other navy yards. Left to its own devices to manage its own workload, the smaller yard
with the more homogeneous workload would have a much better chance of developing
successful practices and processes than a larger shipyard with a complex workload. At
peak wartime employments, Portsmouth was the smallest navy yard and the only one able
to specialize in the construction of a single type of ship.
The Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942) also noted that the industrial
departments in all navy yards had increased three to four fold in less than two years. The
three to four fold employment increases would pale in comparison to the peak
employments reached at each yard later in the war. Table 5 compares civilian
employment levels at each navy yard on 1 July 1938 with the peak employment reached
during the war.39
Table 5: Navy Yards Employment (1938 - WWII Peak)
N aw Yard

7/1/1938

Portsmouth
Boston
New York
Philadelphia
Norfolk
Mare Island
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Terminal Island
San Francisco
Total

3273
2860
6876
5636
5739
4756
3469
1974

Peak During WWII

Multiple Increase

20461
50128
69128
46454
42372
39736
32643
24916
15971 (temporary)
17174 (temporary)
384997

35655

39

6.25
17.52
10.05
8.24
7.88
8.35
9.41
10.69

10.80

United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 145.
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The table shows that Portsmouth, one of the smaller navy yards in 1938, experienced
considerably less growth during the war than the other navy yards. Portsmouth increased
by a factor of 6.25 while all navy yards increased by an average factor o f 10.8. Relative
to the other yards, Portsmouth’s smaller, specialized, and concentrated workforce had
better opportunities to optimize production than the other yards. 40
Well Defined Mission
Earlier it was argued that Portsmouth Navy Yard enjoyed a distinct workload
advantage over the other navy yards, at the start of World War II, because the U.S. Navy
had decided to develop the submarine design and new construction capabilities at the
yard during the 1920s and 1930s. The shipyard exploited that opportunity to the fullest
through continued outstanding performance. The success of Portsmouth Navy Yard
during World War II was the direct result of an even more focused and specialized
workload during the war.
The Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942) noted great disorganization
and confusion in other navy yards and highlighted the production control and scheduling
advantages that private shipyards, engaged only in the new construction of ships, enjoyed
over the navy yards surveyed. Those navy yards serviced the fleet with ship repairs and
overhauls, often of an emergency nature.41 The study reported that the private shipyards
could build a more orderly and disciplined work environment, whereas the navy yards
surveyed might have “thousands of employees thrown aboard a single ship to expedite

40 Electric Boat, a relatively small private shipyard, enjoyed advantages similar to those o f
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. It grew from 2900 employees in August 1940 to a peak o f 12, 466
employees during the war, a multiple o f only 4.3. Electric Boat also specialized in submarine construction
like Portsmouth Navy Yard. See Horn, Submarines and the Electric Boat Company, Page V-3 - V-5.
41 Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942), 1-2.
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the work by having men available when and where they are needed, [and] gangs are
constantly forced to stand by waiting for other crafts to finish up or for servicemen to
bring up necessary material or equipment.”42 In this regard, Portsmouth Navy Yard
enjoyed the same advantages as the private shipyards and, for the most part, did not have
to deal with the chaotic repair and overhaul work environment that characterized the
inefficient operations at other navy yards.
The Booz-Allen Survey (1944) heaped credit on the yard for its ability to focus
resources and streamline work practices towards a single objective, the construction of
submarines. According to the survey, “Any present judgment of the organization,
administration, and control procedures of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. must give
great weight to the development of the Yard, subordinating all other considerations to the
demands of the war effort, into a specialized construction activity for submarines only.
All operating units have been streamlined for this sole purpose.”43 The U.S. Navy’s goal
to develop the submarine design and production capabilities of the yard between the
wars, and the yard’s local strategy of the mid and late-1930s to shed all other work,
except submarine new construction, had been a resounding success. This strategy, which
served the shipyard’s interests so well, served the war effort even more. The U.S. Navy
would have had far fewer submarines than were ultimately needed to win the war in the
Pacific had Portsmouth Navy Yard not been able to perform as it did early in the war.

42 Ibid.
43 Booz-Allen Survey (1944), 3.
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Table 6 shows the yard’s transition from a preponderance of overhaul work in the
early 1930s to specialized submarine construction during World War II.44
Table 6: Portsmouth Navy Yard Workload Mix (1931-1945)

Subs Building
Yard Craft Built
Overhauled Subs
Ships Overhauled
Yard Craft Repaired
Subs Ovhld/ Built
Yard Employment

1931
1
2
7

7
1552

1932
2
8
2

7

4

3.5
1595

1477

1941
4

1933
2

1942
12
1
5
2

1943
19
2
2
4
1
3
.5
.42
.21
11,142 18,326 20,466

1944 A ug1945
32
12
7
10
19
6
16
1
.31
1.58
17,102
10,133

During the early 1930s, the shipyard overhauled many more submarines than it built and
built surface ships and yard craft as well. Although not shown on this table, the shipyard
built its last surface ship, U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Hudson, in 1934.45 During the boom
submarine construction years 1942-44, when employment levels were ten times higher
than the early 1930s, the shipyard overhauled far fewer submarines annually than it did in
the early 1930s. The ratio of Subs Overhauled / Built clearly shows the streamlining for
new construction during the war years to which the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944)
referred. With most of the United Sates submarine fleet deployed to the Pacific theater,
the West Coast shipyards assumed a disproportionate share of the submarine repair and
overhaul workload, leaving Portsmouth Navy Yard relatively free to concentrate on the
construction of new submarines.

441930 ’ s data is from the Industrial Manager’s Annual Reports. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 22, Folder A9-1/Y1 “Annual
Reports Commandant First Naval District 1925-34.” The 1930s data is a fiscal year summary ending on 30
June. 1940’s data is from “Portsmouth Naval Shipyard During World War II,” Official Administrative
History, Portsmouth Navy Yard, Kittery, Maine, 3.
45 Cradle o f American Shipbuilding. The USS Hudson is listed near the back o f the booklet as the
last surface ship built at Portsmouth Navy Yard.
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Figure A-3 in the appendix, Portsmouth Navy Yard Manpower Curves by Work
Category (1940-1945),46 shows even more conclusively the streamlining for new
construction. The Manpower Curves show the phasing out of the repair workload (shaded
on Figure A-3) between early 1940 and early 1942. In the second quarter of 1940 the
1,500 men per day expended on repairs approximated that on new construction. By
January 1942, only a few hundred men per day were assigned to repair/overhaul work
and over 6,000 men a day were working on new construction. As can be seen in Figure
A-3, the shipyard’s workload continued to reflect negligible repair work in comparison to
new construction work until the end of 1944. There is no doubt that the shipyard’s
workload was streamlined towards new construction during the shipyard’s glory years
from early 1942 through the end of 1944.
Not only could the shipyard concentrate on one type of work, it was protected
from external changes in priorities for the scheduling of that work. Those shipyards that
handled a mix of ship types and work packages, including repairs and overhauls, were
subject to ever shifting priorities that resulted in the need for frequent short-notice
internal shipyard scheduling revisions. For example, Jeffery M. Dorwart, discussing the
shifting wartime priorities at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, described how that yard’s
workload shifted from the construction of battleships, to destroyer escorts, to amphibious
ships, to heavy cruisers, to aircraft carriers:
In 1942, the Navy Department changed building priorities from battleships to
destroyer escorts for an anti-submarine war in the Atlantic... FDR announced an
emergency program in April 1942 to build landing craft for North African,
European, and later Pacific amphibious operations... With victory in Europe
becoming more certain by 1944, League Island [Philadelphia Navy Yard] turned
46 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., Chapter Ic, Production Graphs.
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to construction of heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers to fight the Pacific War
against Japan.47
Philadelphia Navy Yard found it difficult to plan for a moving target while Portsmouth
Navy Yard could continuously improve upon its planning for a stationary target,
submarines, for the duration of the war.
The Chief o f Naval Operations priority system for navy yard work, in order of
precedence, was overriding priority, first priority, second priority, and new construction
priority.48 The first three priorities were all related to war damage and urgent repairs with
each priority subcategorized according to urgency by ship type. Under the new
construction priority, submarines were generally low on the ship-type list, with landing
craft, transport ships, and other surface ships often high on the list to support the next
invasion or coordinated assault. As a result, submarine new construction enjoyed a low
priority - on paper. However, the ability of Portsmouth Navy Yard to bulk order material
more than neutralized any disadvantages of a low priority. While other shipyards were
whipsawed back and forth with waves of changing priorities, according to the fortunes of
war, the priorities of Portsmouth Navy Yard never wavered. The shipyard’s charge for
the entire war remained constant; to build as many submarines as possible as fast as
possible. The ability to specialize in one line of work was, unquestionably, one of the
keys to the shipyard’s success during the war.

47 Jeffrey M. Dorwart, The Philadelphia Navy Yard: From the Birth o f the U.S. Navy to the
NuclearAge (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 186.
AO

Vice Chief o f Naval Operations F.J. Home letter o f 12 Jul 1943, NARA College Park, RG 80,
Records o f the Navy Department 1798-1947. Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence o f the
CNO / Secretary o f the Navy 1940-1947, Box 897, File L9-3/NY-NY1.
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Once Portsmouth Navy Yard started to deliver new submarines at record rates,
there was never any serious attempt by the Navy Department to direct other types of
work to Portsmouth until the end of the war. The U.S. Navy had many material
procurement problems but getting submarines out of Portsmouth Navy Yard was
certainly not one of those problems. Rather than attempt to fix what was not broken, the
Navy left Portsmouth free to continue to do its thing. The Navy did, however, tap the
shipyard’s expertise and resources to assist Mare Island Navy Yard and Cramp
Shipbuilding in Philadelphia in their efforts to build submarines. Portsmouth Navy Yard
was a CEO’s dream. The facility consistently achieved great production and quality with
little or no investment of time or effort on the part of corporate management.
Effective Leadership
Outstanding leadership is critical to the successful management of any industrial
operation and Portsmouth Navy Yard was blessed with one of the most respected leaders
of the submarine community during the war. Rear Admiral Thomas Withers relieved
Rear Admiral J.D. Wainwright as Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard on 10 June 1942.
Withers remained in charge of the shipyard until late 1945. His immediate assignment,
prior to coming to Portsmouth, was as Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet, where
he had witnessed the attack on Pearl Harbor and directed the first deployment of United
States submarines in response to the attack.
As an eye witness to the very first minutes of the war, Withers reportedly
witnessed the first Japanese “sinking” by a US submarine when, on the morning of 7
December 1941, during the attack on Battleship Row, a machine gunner on USS Tautog
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downed a Japanese plane.49 As Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral
Withers rallied the twenty-one fleet submarines under his command and sent them to sea
to “commence unrestricted submarine warfare against all Japanese merchant and military
units.”50 In an inspirational message to the men of his command shortly after the attack,
Withers wished them, “Good luck and good hunting, hit ’em hard.”51
Prior to his assignment at Pearl Harbor, Withers had enjoyed a long and illustrious
career in submarines. After his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1906,
Withers assumed his first submarine command, the USS E-l, in 1914. During World War
I, he was awarded the Navy Cross for meritorious service and the Cuban and Santo
Domingo campaign medals for his participation in those operations. After the war, he
progressed through operational commands of ever greater responsibility including
Commandant of the New London Submarine Base and Commander Submarine Force
Pacific Fleet in January 1941.52
In 1928, as Commander Division 4, Withers had advanced the concept that U.S.
submarines should be used as independent commerce raiders, much as the Germans had
done in World War I, rather than scouting units in conjunction with fleet or coastal
defense. As a consequence, he is credited with helping to change the direction of the
submarine policy of the United States. His concept of independent submarine operations
required submarine designs with longer ranges, better sea-keeping ability, and improved
49 Theodore Roscoe, U nited States Submarine O perations in W orld War II, 10.
50 COMSUBPAC message dated December 1941, Subject: Mission Orders,
www.subsowespac.org/ptc4/cvcle 1.htm.

51 Ibid.
52 Withers was assigned as Commander Submarine Scouting Force from January 1941 to May
1942. This command became Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet at the outbreak o f World War II.
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habitability.53 United States submarines, designed and operated as Commander Withers
envisioned in the late 1920’s, would go on to sink massive amounts of Japanese tonnage
and play a key role in winning World War II. It was only logical that the Navy would
assign one of its most innovative thinkers, and an expert in submarine design, to head up
the expanding submarine design organization at Portsmouth Navy Yard. It was an added
benefit that Withers’ trusting, low-key management style was just what the shipyard
needed to fully develop its production potential.
In the summer of 1939, Captain Withers had been a member of the Court of
Inquiry that convened at Portsmouth Navy Yard to investigate the sinking of the USS
Squalus.54 This investigation carried on for several months and gave him ample
opportunity to become familiar with the shipyard. By the time he assumed command of
the yard in June 1942, Withers had a good understanding of the shipyard and its
operations. In its coverage of Withers’ change of command ceremony, the Portsmouth
Herald reported:
A man who has been associated with submarines during the better part of his
career in the navy, it is expected that the new commandant will create new and
powerful factors in production at the Portsmouth Navy Yard.55
Indeed, under Withers, the yard would create new and powerful production factors.
Rarely had a newspaper more accurately predicted the future.

53 Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet website, www.csp.navv.mil/admirals/withers.htm.
54 Portsmouth Herald, 19 Jun 1939, front page has a picture o f the Board o f Inquiry that includes
Captain Withers.
55 Portsmouth Herald, 11 Jun 1942, “Withers Takes Command o f Portsmouth Navy Yard,” 1.
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Figure 10: Rear Admiral Thomas Withers Greeting Managers, Change of
Command (10 June 1942). Courtesy of Milne Special Collections University
of University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
According to a U.S. Navy press release, Withers apparently possessed what later
management schools described as good people skills:
A kindly, soft-spoken officer, Radm Withers gained unlimited support and
praise from his sailors after leasing the Honolulu Royal Hawaiian Hotel for
permanent use as a rest Camp deluxe for submarine sailors in port.56
Gary Weir described Withers as “always quiet, and amiable - but perceptive and
precise.”57 Fred White fondly remembered Withers and confirmed his popularity with
shipyard workers. White said that “Admiral Withers was a much respected man whom
everybody liked because he let everyone do their job.”58
Withers fits the description of a transformational leader as conceived by James
MacGregor Bums in his seminal work, Leadership, and developed extensively in followon works by Bums, Bernard M. Bass, and others. .According to Burns, a transformational

56 Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet website, www.csp.navv.mil/admirals/withers.htm.
57 Gary Weir, Building American Submarines 1914-1940,40.
58 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
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leader satisfies higher needs, and the needs of the follower, by engaging the full person of
the follower to create “a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts
followers into leaders.”59 Bass adds that transformational leadership is more likely to
emerge in time of stress and disorganization, and in organizations more open to growth
and change” during which transformational leaders “delegate as much as they can to their
subordinates” while providing subordinates “a vision of what they might be able to
accomplish with extra effort.”60 Indeed, Withers was a visionary leader who satisfied the
higher need o f dramatically increased wartime production, and his subordinates need to
maximize their individual contributions to the war effort, by creating an environment of
mutual trust and respect, characterized by extensive delegation of responsibility.
It is not a stretch to assume that Withers exhibited the same trust and confidence
in his shipyard managers and workers that he had in the submarine officers and crews
that he sent to war after the attack on Pearl Harbor. With little fanfare, he encouraged
both to do their jobs independently and aggressively. Rear Admiral Withers’
inspirational, low-key leadership and confidence in his managers and employees was
important to the yard’s success. Under his leadership, managers and employees were
empowered and encouraged to work more independently than they would have been
under a more authorative shipyard commander.
Complimentary Leadership Styles
There is a school of thought that teaches that effective organizations often have
executives with different, but complimentary leadership styles. One crude example is the

59 James MacGregor Bums, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 4.
60 Bernard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (New York: The Free
Press, 1985, xiv.
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“good cop - bad cop” police interrogator team that might question criminal suspects.
Onboard naval ships, some think that the Commanding Officer and the second in
command, the Executive Officer, team best when one is a disciplinarian and the other a
humanitarian. The top two executives at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war,
Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas Withers and Industrial Manager Captain H.F.D.
Davis, had contrasting and complimentary leadership styles.
Prior to discussing leadership attributes, it is important to note that the
Commandant and the Industrial Manager were members of two different naval officer
communities. Rear Admiral Withers was an unrestricted line officer and, as such, had
spent a naval career operating and commanding submarines and submariners. Captain
Davis, on the other hand, was a restricted naval officer, meaning that he was a specialist
in a selected field. Davis’s specialty was ship construction. In this capacity, he had spent
most o f his naval career in the shipbuilding industry in charge of industrial shops and
large numbers of civilian employees. Under the rules at the time, Captain Davis, as a
restricted officer, could never be promoted to command a ship, submarine, or navy yard.
Prior to reporting to Portsmouth in June 1940, Davis had been the Planning Officer at
Philadelphia Navy Yard and, when detached from Portsmouth in June 1944, Davis
became the Supervisor of Shipbuilding at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation at Quincy,
MA. While Withers was responsible for all facets of operations at the Portsmouth Navy
Yard, Davis was responsible for the Industrial Department and to him goes much of the
credit for the yard’s successful expansion and outstanding productive performance. At the
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same time, Commandant Withers deserves much credit for giving Davis the freedom to,
as Fred White put it, “Do his job.”61
Figure 9 shows the three major department heads, all naval captains, which
reported to the commandant during the war; the Captain of the Yard, the Supply Officer,
and the Industrial Manager.

The Captain of the Yard was primarily responsible for the

naval personnel attached to the yard and various administrative matters. The Supply
Officer was primarily responsible for purchasing and managing material. The Industrial
Officer was responsible for all the shops and industrial operations on the yard. In that
capacity, he had two other senior naval captains reporting to him; Captain Andrew I.
McKee, the Planning Officer, and Captain Sidney E. Dudley, the Production Officer.63
While the Industrial Manager appears to share equal billing with the other two major
department heads shown on Figure 9, such was not the case in the day to day business of
the shipyard. On 15 November 1943, when the shipyard employment peaked at 20,445
employees, roughly 18,000 of those employees worked for the Industrial Manager and
the remainder were split among the other shipyard departments. The shipyard’s mission
during the war, to build as many submarines as possible as fast as possible, rested
squarely on the shoulders o f Captain H.F.D. Davis.
Withers was a widely respected, self-assured, unassuming man of few words who
inspired trust and confidence in his followers. Withers managed with a soft hand, always
61 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
62 Other officers reporting to the commandant included the Medical Officer, the Officer-in-charge
o f the Prison, the Officer-in-Charge o f the Marines, and the Communications Officer.
63 At the start o f the war, the Public Works Officer and the Disbursing Officer also reported to the
Industrial Manager. “Industrial Department Organizational C hart- 1940.” NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 10, Folder A3/NY1,
“Organizational Charts for Officer Personnel Under Manager, 1934-43.”
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quick to offer praise for a job well done. Employee morale was always close to the top of
his priority list. For example, in an August 1943 memo to all shipyard supervisors that
emphasized the need for efficient use of resources, Withers concluded, “Finally, that the
‘human relations - the morale factors’ be made and kept as good as possible.”64 Davis, on
the other hand, was more of a problem solver than a morale booster. On one occasion,
when Commander Spiller suggested that employee morale was the Industrial
Department’s most important problem, Davis suggested that they first confine their
attention to “concrete management problems” for which they were primarily
responsible.65 Concrete management problems included the improvement of working
conditions and the clarification of assignments and priorities. Clearly, Davis was not a
“touchy, feely” manager. Withers, however, was always sensitive to employee concerns
and quick to address and resolve any personnel issues. Their management styles were a
study in contrasts.
Withers’ directives were typically brief, clear, and to the point. He was a big
picture type of manager, in the style of Ronald Reagan, who set the tone and objectives
for the organization but left the management of details to subordinates. Industrial
Manager Captain Davis, on the other hand, was a hands-on manager who reveled in the
details of his responsibilities. His directives were typically long, if not verbose, with
considerable explanation and detail to back up his position. Davis kept the waterfront

64 Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas Withers memo o f 28 Aug 1943, Subject: Economy in
Naval Expenditures. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence
(Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC PKG 8.
65 Report o f Manager’s Conference o f 21 Jun 1943, Subject: General Programs, Purpose, and
Specific Problems for Next Meeting. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2 “Genera Management.”
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supervisors on edge with his incessant suggestions and demands for improved
performance.
Captain Davis’ effort in July, 1943 to stress welding as the critical path to
successful completion o f the scheduled twenty-eight submarine program is an excellent
example of the attention to detail that he typically applied to his work. In a memo to the
shipyard managers, Davis led the readers through an analysis that started with the fact
that 71,148 pounds of welding rod had been used on the recently completed SS285 and
concluded that 2,000,000 pounds of welding rod would have to be laid to complete 28
submarines in the next year. Following an analysis of sixteen months of personnel gains
and losses in the Welding Shop, Davis determined that the welders then available would
have to reduce non-work days and weld at an average rate of 7,126 pounds per day to
meet the schedule. Noting that this rate was only possible with the full cooperation of all
the other shops, Davis solicited that support. Such was Captain Davis’ delight in details.66
Another example of Captain Davis’ attention to detail and thoroughness of
planning involved his efforts to bring order to the personnel disruptions caused by the
Selective Service process. Those efforts resulted in a precedent setting arrangement with
the Selective Service, that set a long term release schedule for employees with special
skills, so that Captain Davis and his managers could anticipate manpower needs and train
replacements accordingly.67 Davis thrived on such detailed and orderly planning.
Fred White’s assessment of the two leaders, as the result of personal experiences
with both during the war, highlights their contrasting management styles. While Withers
66 Manager memo o f 13 Jun 1943. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N5 14, “Welding Shop.”
67 See the Selective Service section under Employees in this chapter for further details on the
Selective Service agreement.
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was respected and well liked, White remembers Captain Davis as “a meddler and a man
of many ideas that seldom worked.” When pushed for an example of one such idea,
White told the story of a scheme Davis concocted to minimize inefficient use of riggers.
In fairness to Captain Davis, time lost when needing a rigger and not having one, or
having riggers stand-by waiting to accomplish a job that ran late, resulted in great
inefficiency in a shipyard. According to White, Davis sought to minimize that
inefficiency by having all the riggers assigned to the fitting-out pier assembled in a shack,
at a central location, to wait for a call for their services that would be made by the
hoisting o f a flag on specially constructed poles alongside each of a half dozen submarine
berths. While Davis’ idea sounds quite reasonable, White and others were convinced that
the daily informal communications on the waterfront were more than adequate to
anticipate the need for riggers. As White recalled, the shack was built, but [lacking the
enthusiastic support of the riggers] the idea was abandoned before the flagpoles were
erected.68
While Captain Davis may have been somewhat of an irritant to Fred White and
the other Shop Masters, there is little doubt that he was a presence and a force on the
waterfront that kept the industrial pot stirring. If he was a man of ideas that did not
always work, he was also a man constantly looking for another approach, a novel way to
get the job done. Imagination and innovation thrive in an organization where the leader
practices and encourages such thinking. As this study shows throughout, Portsmouth
Navy Yard had an abundance of both during the war.

68 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
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Senior Management Continuity
Both Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas A. Withers and the Industrial Manager,
Captain H.F.D. Davis, held their shipyard leadership positions for most of the war years.
Withers held command from 10 June 1942 until November 1945 and Davis served in his
position from 28 June 1940 until 25 May 1944. As Table 7 shows, the other senior
managers in critical industrial positions enjoyed similar longevity in their jobs.69
Table 7: W W II Leadership Continuity at Portsmouth Navy Yard
Position

Person

Commandant
Industrial Mgr
Production Officer
Planning Officer
Hull Supt
Machinery Supt

Radm T. Withers
Capt. Davis
Capt. Dudley
Capt. McKee
Capt. Spiller
Capt. Ambrose

Reported
10 Jun 1942
28 Jun
Aug
Mar
3 Sep
7 Dec

Detached

1940
1941
1938
1941
1939

N ov 1945
25 May 1944
25 May 1944
20 Jan 1945
Jul 1945+
25 May 1944

Duration (inos.)
41
47
34
82
46+
53

The average tour length for the senior officers who served in the six critical industrial
management positions in the shipyard was over fifty months. And the officer who held
his position for the shortest time, Captain Dudley, was promoted within the yard from
Production Officer to Industrial Manager, replacing Captain Davis on 25 May 1944.
Likewise, Captain Ambrose was promoted from Machinery Superintendent to Production
Officer, replacing Captain Dudley on the same date. Such in-house promotions suggest
that both officers had performed well in their previous assignments and proven
themselves competent and capable of handling additional responsibilities.
Captain Andrew I. McKee headed up the local team that produced Portsmouth
Industrial Surveys I (December 1941) and II (June 1942), that set in motion many o f the
concepts that later contributed to the shipyard’s outstanding performance. McKee had

69 U.S. Navy, “Portsmouth Naval Shipyard during World War II,” Official Administrative History,
Portsmouth Navy Yard, Kittery, Maine, 66-68. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me.
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already served as Planning Officer for 44 months prior to leading that team. With that
extensive background and experience, he obviously knew the shipyard well and was fully
qualified to assess its needs and capabilities. Moreover, Captain McKee continued in his
assignment at the shipyard for another 48 months, during which he was able to monitor
and implement the changes his team had recommended.
Hardly overshadowed by Rear Admiral Withers and Captain Davis, Captain A.I.
McKee enjoyed a well deserved reputation as an expert in submarine design. In 1945,
when the Society o f Naval Architects and Marine Engineers published a special 50th
anniversary edition entitled Historical Transactions, McKee was selected to author an
article on the history of submarine design.

70

Furthermore, in recognition of his career

accomplishments, the A.I. McKee award for academic excellence is presented to the most
deserving officer in each graduating class of the Navy’s Nuclear Power Training Course.
Rear Admiral Withers was surrounded with a core of competent and experienced
managers.
As can be seen from Table 7, during the first two years of Rear Admiral Withers’
tour as commandant, not a single one of the critical management positions turned over.
The rock solid stability o f a competent management team during the early stages of the
war, when the shipyard was being transformed from a custom shop to a mass producer of
submarines, was a significant reason for the shipyard’s ultimate success.
Another critical factor in the yard’s success was the contribution of a dedicated
and talented cadre o f civilian designers and managers. Having highlighted the lengthy

70 A.I. McKee, Captain, U.S.N., “Development o f Submarines in the United States,” Historical
Transactions 1893-1943 (New York: The Society o f Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1945).
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Figure 11: Shipyard Civilian Shop Managers during World War II. Fred
White, the Master Rigger and Laborer interviewed for this dissertation is
shown in the upper left corner. Courtesy of Milne Special Collections,
University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
tours of duty of the senior naval officers in the yard during the war, it is appropriate to
note that the naval officer continuity paled in comparison to the civilian management
continuity. While forty months was a long tour of duty for a naval officer, it was not
unusual for senior civilian managers to complete forty years of service at the yard before
retiring. Indeed, pictures of shipyard employees being presented forty year pins during
the war and postwar periods were common occurrences in the shipyard newspaper, the
Portsmouth Periscope. For example, on 16 February 1945, no less than twenty shipyard
employees were presented forty year pins by Rear Admiral Withers.

71
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Robert Whittaker, Portsmouth-Kittery Naval Shipyard in O ld Photographs, (Stroud,
Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton, 1993), 108.
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Harold Sweetser hired on at the yard in May 1917, progressed through various
draftsman jobs, and retired after forty years of service in 1958 as the Supervisory Naval
Architect. Likewise, Sweetser’s compatriot, Chief Draftsman Robert Boyd, retired in
October 1945 after 49 years of service. Another of Sweetser’s friends, Carl Galle,
promoted to the position of Head Engineer o f the yard in October 1951, began his navy
yard career as a draftsman in 1918 and was promoted to Senior Naval Architect during
World War II. The shipyard was blessed with many experienced and competent civilian
employees during the war.

79

The shipyard would have not had the benefit of the extensive submarine design
experience of employees like Sweetser, Boyd, and Galle had the Navy not decided to
develop the submarine design capabilities of Portsmouth Navy Yard after World War I.
Likewise, had the construction of new submarines at the yard been discontinued for any
period of time between the wars, these naval architects would probably have been forced
to seek employment elsewhere. As was noted earlier, all navy yards except Portsmouth
experienced a hiatus in new ship construction at one time or another after World War I
and before the rebirth of naval shipbuilding in the early 1930s.
It was no accident that Portsmouth Navy Yard acquired a reputation for high
quality submarines. Also, it was no accident that the yard was able to incorporate wartime
feedback into the designs of their new submarines in a timely manner. Navy Department
industrial strategy created the opportunity to develop submarine design capabilities at
Portsmouth and naval officer leadership set the objectives during the war. However, most
of the credit for the yard’s outstanding production accomplishments must go to the yard’s
72 Papers o f Harold Caswell Sweetser, Portsmouth Navy Yard Supervisory Naval Architect, 19171958, Sweetser Family Papers, Milne Special Collections, University o f New Hampshire Library, Durham,
N.H. including Portsmouth Periscopes o f 13 Oct 1945, 8 and 20 Oct 1951,4.
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experienced core of talented civilian designers and skilled shop employees. It was they
who put drafting pen to paper, welding rods to steel plates, and wrenches to valves.

During the war, Commandant Rear Admiral Thomas Withers and the Industrial
Manager, Captain H.F.D.Davis, provided strong leadership for an experienced group of
naval and civilian managers who enjoyed long and successful tours of duty at the
shipyard. This stable and well qualified management team led an exceptionally motivated
team of experienced designers and shop tradesmen to tremendous production
achievements. Portsmouth had the additional advantages of being a relatively small
shipyard with a sharply focused and well defined mission. This vital, but very specific,
mission protected the yard from external forces and shifting priorities. As a result, the
yard’s industrial operations could proceed without interruption, and with no need to
deviate from the streamlined new construction processes that had been in development
since the mid-1930s. All of these factors combined to enable the yard to flourish in a
corporate environment that was characterized by lax oversight when the newly created
Bureau of Ships was overwhelmed with other responsibilities. Portsmouth Navy Yard
could not have written a more successful script for success.
Employees
The shipyard’s workforce grew to over 20,000 employees, including over 3,800
women, during the war. The assimilation of thousands of new employees into the shops
and offices, and the training of those employees, was an extreme challenge that was
further complicated by the loss of younger and often more talented employees to the
Selective Service. Prior to any discussion of innovative management methods that led to
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the yard’s success, it is appropriate to highlight the high quality of the shipyard’s
workforce, the women’s contribution to the yard’s success, worker training programs,
and the impact of the Selective Service program. Innovative production methods would
have been for naught had the shipyard employees not been up to the task.
**=1=
It was obvious, from the earliest days of the war, that Portsmouth Navy Yard had
an unusually patriotic and dedicated workforce. In mid-December 1941, all the

Figure 12: Shipyard Rally at Start of the War (15 December 1941). Courtesy
of Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.
employees at the yard signified their intention to work Sunday, 21 December without
pay. The idea for a payless workday had originated with a few workers after a war rally at
the shipyard on Monday, 15 December and, within a few days, every employee had
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signed up for the “Gift Day.”

‘I'X

•

Later that week, much to the chagrin of the employees,

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox vetoed the idea because it would violate existing work
statutes.74 Even though Navy officials would not go along with the idea, the gesture
spoke volumes about the dedication and unity of Portsmouth Navy Yard employees.
An incident involving a change in shift work hours in April 1942 further
illustrates the cooperative nature of the yard’s employees while, at the same time,
showing that those same employees were willing to exercise the power o f labor to affect
management decisions, given management’s need for increased productivity. Shift work
hours had been changed in the spring of 1942 to have the first shift start at 4:00 am
instead o f 6:00 am and the other eight hour shifts were staggered accordingly.
Management believed that the new shifts were more productive. However, members of
Ranger Lodge 836, International Association of Machinists, believed that there was no
production improvement, but great inconvenience to workers and families. The
machinists’ aggressive effort to have management reverse the decision was balanced with
a reaffirmation of their support for yard management that appeared on the front page of
the Portsmouth Herald:
We have the utmost confidence in the officers who have been designated by
the Navy department to administer the policies at this yard and we pledge our
utmost cooperation with their efforts to build our submarine navy quickly and
efficiently, but we reserve our inalienable rights to protest any local orders
that to us seem unnecessary to our country’s war program.75

73 The Portsmouth Herald, 16 Dec 1941, “Navy Yard Workers Give a Day to Aid National
Defense,” 1.
74 Ibid.
75 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Apr 1942, “Ranger Lodge Machinists Hit Navy Yard Hours,” 1.
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Shortly after the machinists had voiced their displeasure with the new shifts, a shipyard
wide poll confirmed that a decisive majority of the rest of the employees felt the same
way. To management’s credit, the old shift hours were restored and the controversy was
settled.76 Mutual respect and open communications were a hallmark of managementemployee relations at Portsmouth Navy Yard at that time.
Another example of unusual patriotism and employee-management cooperation
was the record setting war bond participation of the yard. In November 1942, the yard
established a national record for war bond participation when 100% of the yard’s more
than 17,000 employees pledged an average of 13.1% of their gross pay. The previous
record had been held by Philadelphia Navy Yard at 98% participation and 12.1% of gross
pay.77 Management had solicited maximum employee support for the war bond campaign
and the employees responded beyond all expectations. Once the employees realized that
100% participation was possible, peer pressure and pride drove the final record setting
results.
Portsmouth Herald coverage of a union banquet in January 1946 offers further
evidence that labor-management cooperation at the shipyard continued at a high level
throughout the war. According to the paper:
Accenting the fine cooperation between labor and management at the
Portsmouth naval base, more than 300 members of the Ranger Lodge No.
836, International Order of Machinists, and high ranking officials attended an
installation banquet and program held Saturday at the American Legion
hall.78

76 Ibid, “Navy Yard Shift Goes into Effect,” 6.
77 Ibid, 9 Nov 1942, “Portsmouth Navy Yard Bond-Buying Record Set as Goal for Hub Drive,” 1.
78 Portsmouth Herald, 14 Jan 1946, “Admiral Lauds Cooperation o f Labor, Management Here, 1.
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Rear Admiral John H. Brown, who had relieved Rear Admiral Withers as commandant a
few months before, told the gathering that “He could plainly see that the cooperation in
the yard during the war years was the reason for the success in production and other
records.”

70

There is also much evidence that speaks to the quality of the workforce. For
example, the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) emphasized the high quality of the
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s workforce and supervision:
The working force at Portsmouth is especially high grade. Top civilian
supervisors are alert, intelligent and obviously proud of their Yard.
Intermediate supervision of high quality is in general evidence... Most of the
mechanical employees have been recruited from nearby areas, normally non
industrial. The result is an average of unusually high type of personnel among
this group.80
Percy Whitney, hired in June 1940 to be a trainee in the shipyard’s apprentice program, is
a good example of the high quality worker to which the industrial survey refers. Percy
applied for the apprentice program after attending Bates College for two and one half
years. Even with two and one half years of college education, Percy recalled that the
apprentice program entrance exams and classroom training were quite challenging.81
Eileen Dondero Foley, a painter’s helper at the yard during the war, had graduated from
Syracuse University with honors prior to seeking employment at the yard.82 With
intelligent, motivated young men and women like Percy Whitney and Eileen Dondero
Foley working their way through the shops and training programs at the yard, there is

19 Ibid.

80 Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 8.
81 Oral interview with Percy Whitney, 23 Mar 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
82 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 August 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
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little wonder that the Booz-Allen industrial survey team would be highly impressed with
the workforce.
The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) also noted that, “The supervisory ratio
is below the prewar standard of one to twelve, which is the exception rather than the rule
in shipyards.”83 Portsmouth, unlike the other navy yards, did not increase the ratio of
supervisors to workers to compensate for the addition of large numbers of inexperienced
employees during the war. Several factors contributed to the low supervisory ratios at
Portsmouth Navy Yard. The intelligent and self-motivated workforce required less direct
supervision, specialized training created a pool of independent workers and teams, and
managers trusted and empowered employees to do their jobs. An intelligent, capable, and
trusted workforce has less need for supervision.
Minimal supervision is one indicator of worker independence and empowerment,
but there were others. According to the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), “There has
been a notable simplification of paperwork and of routine reports. A minimum of
management and shop conferences are held for coordination of work and dissemination
o f information.”84 The trained, trusted, and empowered workforce had little need for
paperwork and meetings.
The reduction of paperwork and administrative burdens were standard shipyard
goals from the earliest stages of the war. Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (December
1941) noted that:

83Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 8. Furthermore, it was noted that Portsmouth had the
lowest percentage o f Group IV (b) [salaried] employees o f all navy yards. In April 1945, Portsmouth’s
complement o f salaried employees was still the lowest o f all navy yards at 8.8%, while the average for all
Yards was 11.8%.
84 Ibid, 4.
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The practice of holding a shop accountable for over expenditures of estimates
on a job order practically requires each shop to set up a small accounting
system and requires a leadingman either to keep cost records or to furnish
information to a shop clerk for such records. The effort now devoted to cost
keeping could be better devoted to the supervision of men. It is recommended
that this practice be discontinued and that all shops be informed that they will
not in the future be held accountable for the expenditures on any job.85
In effect, shipyard management was saying that the actual accomplishment of work was
far more important than accounting for the cost of doing that work. The decision to free
the supervisors of administrative burdens that distracted from the direct accomplishment
of work can be found throughout all of the local board’s recommendations for production
improvements at the start of the war. A few years later, the Booz-Allen Survey (1944)
critically confirmed the yard’s success in this regard by observing that, “Practically no
regular records are kept of production, whether of individual workers, of shops, or by
jobs.”86 Paperwork reduction and worker independence, both increasingly emphasized as
keys to successful industrial management in the latter half of the twentieth century, were
facts-of-life at the Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II.
Teamwork, another attribute coveted by today’s industrial managers, was also
much in evidence at the shipyard during the war. Noting that “A spirit of teamwork and
of harmonious cooperation was evident at all levels,” the Booz-Allen Survey (1944) also
observed that the Portsmouth Navy Yard was “unusually free from labor or other
on

personnel difficulties.”

The inspectors noted a very positive and healthy relationship

between Portsmouth Navy Yard management and employees.

85 Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (1941), 11.
86 Booz-Allen Survey (1944), 11-12.
87 Ibid, 10.
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Orderly and harmonious management-employee relationships were not the case at
many shipyards. The Industrial Counselors Survey (1942) noted extensive confusion and
disorganization at other navy yards:
This rapid expansion has given rise to problems of recruitment, development
of new sources of labor supply, and training, and these difficulties have been
intensified by the fact that supervision has been thinly spread, inexperienced,
and perhaps not sufficiently informed as to policies and procedures. Under
these circumstances, the ordinary management controls in matters of
discipline have been increasingly difficult to maintain.88
Portsmouth faced these same challenges of recruitment, training, and supervision. In all
three instances, the challenges were not only successfully resolved, but turned into
strengths.
Labor-management relations were more contentious at private shipyards than the
navy yards. According to Maritime Historian Frederick C. Lane, the percentage of time
lost due to strikes during the war years in the U.S. merchant shipbuilding industry versus
all U.S. industries was as shown in Table 8:

OQ

Table 8: Time Lost Due to Strikes during World War II

1941
1942
1943
1944
1945

U.S. Merchant Shipbuilding
1.26%
.07 %
.07 %
.09 %
.15 %

All Industry
.32 %
.05 %
.15%
.09 %
.47 %

After an initial onslaught o f serious shipyard strikes in 1941, during which nearly
250,000 man-days of production were lost, time lost due to strikes in the merchant
shipbuilding industry was approximately the same or less than all of U.S. industry during

88 Industrial Relations Counselors Industrial Survey (1942), 1.
89 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 305.
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the remainder of the war years. Not to be minimized is the fact that, during the war years,
merchant shipyards experienced a total 148 strikes that cost the nation 735,000 man-days
o f production.90 In comparison, the “no-strike pledge” that had to be signed as a condition
o f employment at navy yards helped to keep those yards strike free.91
Ninety percent of the more than 11,000 production workers at Electric Boat
Company, Portsmouth’s prime competitor in submarine construction, went on strike on
15 August 1944 for several days for higher wages.

09

The union presented a list of 34

grievances that it claimed had been originally presented to company officials the previous
December. The company’s president, L.Y. Spear, insisted that “the strike was brought
about by a small group of union officers in an attempt to hide the real issue - the two-day
suspension of the union president for being away from his job without permission.”93
Portsmouth was essentially free of the haggling and contentiousness between
management and employees that existed at Electric Boat Company and other shipyards.
Why was that the case? When interviewed, Eileen Foley repeatedly emphasized the
exceptional patriotism and respect for authority that she and her fellow workers had
during the war.94 William Tebo expressed similar thoughts about the shipyard
managers.95 One might be quick to dismiss such idealism in today’s skeptical world but

90 Ibid.
91 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum. Shortly
after the attack on Pearl Harbor major union leaders announced “no-strike” pledges. However, the pledge
meant little as “some two million workers staged more than four thousand strikes in 1941, many o f them
over organizational issues.” David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 638.
92 Portsmouth Herald., 15 Aug 1944, “Groton Strikers Deadlocked with Company,” 1.
93 Portsmouth Herald, 16 Aug 1944, “7,500 Strike at Sub Yard in Groton,” 1.
94 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 Aug 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
95 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
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there is no doubt in Foley’s mind that respect for authority and patriotism were powerful
forces at the yard during the war.
Also to be considered is that the increase in yard employees included few
minorities and other workers relocating from distant parts of the country with different
values and attitudes that might have caused tensions among locals with biases. Chapter
VI of this dissertation will discuss the migration of great numbers of workers, including
many African-Americans, who moved to the West Coast and Puget Sound area looking
for shipyard employment. According to Lorraine McConaghy, who studied shipyard
boomtown Kirkland, Washington, residents often complained of “the ignorance of
Tarheels, Arkies, and Oakies” and “traded stories about the arrogance of Texans and the
streetwise savy o f Chicago city slickers.”96 Portsmouth residents and shipyard workers
were not exposed to such a variety of strangers and, consequently, never developed
similar feelings, attitudes, and prejudices towards the newcomers.
This is not to say that Portsmouth was not without ethnic diversity. Indeed, the
city and the mill towns of New Hampshire experienced much immigration during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century that populated the state with many nationalities,
including Italians, Irish, Greeks, Poles, and French-Canadian Catholics. However, by the
late 1930s, the immigration wave had subsided and many of the immigrants had become
American citizens, if not Americanized.

07

Consider the following table of births showing

96 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, a Small Town during
World War II,” 45.
97 According to David M. Kennedy, in 1924, “Congress choked the immigrant stream to a trickle,
closing the era o f virtually unlimited entry to the United States. The ethnic neighborhoods that had
mushroomed in the preceding generations would grow no more through further inflows from abroad.”
Kennedy notes that “o f the 123 million Americans recorded in the census o f 1930, one in ten was foreign
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American or foreign parentage and marriages showing American or foreign nationality in
the city of Portsmouth between 1938 and 1945.
Table 9: Portsmouth Births and Marriages98
(American vs Foreign) 1938-1945

1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946

Births
Parents
Parents
American Foreign
4
261
246
8
298
7
385
10
620
6
663
5
Not Provided
Not Provided
Not Provided

Parents
Mixed
36
37
38
43
47
52

Marriaees
Both
Both
American Foreign
549
14
252
6
267
6
350
8
3
369
312
8
304
6
6
407
Not Provided

Mixed
87
30
47
45
53
37
36
32

As can be seen, the preponderance of newborns had American parents, few had foreign
parents, and about 9 % had mixed parents. Similarly, for marriages, a preponderance of
both partners were American citizens, few were both foreign, and about 11% were mixed.
While there were pockets of ethnic enclaves in the city and ethnic diversity was strong, it
is also true that considerable mixing and intermarriage of immigrants had occurred prior
to the start of the war. This relative stability was not challenged by the “outsiders,”
predominantly other New Englanders, who moved to the area during the war.
At Electric Boat, in the early days of the expansion, new workers came from local
communities, but as production increased the company recruited from as far away as

bom and, an additional 20 percent had at least one parent bom abroad.” David M. Kennedy, Freedom from
Fear, 15-16.
98 N ew Hampshire Department o f Vital Statistics Reports for the Years 1938-1946. Concord, N.H.
University o f New Hampshire Milne Collection, Durham, N.H. The Vital Statistics Reports provide annual
data on births, marriages, divorces, and deaths. No minority statistics are given for the years shown and the
American versus foreign breakdowns for births and marriages ceased in 1944 for births and 1946 for
marriages.
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Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Minnesota." Portsmouth, on the other hand, attracted
other New Englanders. It will be shown that many of the new residents of the Portsmouth
area merely relocated from other nearby towns and states. In fact, many relocated from
the more distant parts of the same county, Rockingham County. When asked about new
shipyard employees who had not grown up in the local area, William Tebo responded,
“There were a lot from towns in Down East Maine.” Folks from Millinocket and
Damariscotta share many o f the same values and agendas as folks from Kittery and
Portsmouth.
Loafing was also observed to be much too prevalent in the shipbuilding industry.
Admiral Emory Land, the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, was outspoken in his
criticism of loafing in the shipbuilding industry during the initial months of the war.100 A
March 1942 Maritime Commission investigation found eight yards rated satisfactory,
seven rated fair, and eleven to be “unsatisfactory” or “downright disgraceful.”101 The
Industrial Relations Counselors Survey (1942) noted a high prevalence of inefficient
standby time in some navy yards caused by the nature of short lead time and unplanned
ship repair work. Much less tolerable were the unethical work practices that included
sleeping during working hours, leaving work places before quitting time, and loafing.
The survey recommended firm supervisory control of work sites and timely discipline of
offenders. According to the survey, shipyard workers that were short on work ethics
could find ample opportunity to stand by, waiting for other support trades or supervision

99 “History o f Electric Boat, 1899-1949,” Navy Department Library, author unknown, Naval
Historical Center, Washington, D.C., V-9.
100Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 301.
101 Ibid.
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to provide direction. Worse yet, slackers could escape detection in ship compartments
and tanks and other out of the way work sites. As late in the war as January 1945, a
Senate War Investigating committee reported an alarming condition of wasted labor at
Norfolk Navy Yard with the conclusion that the yard’s supervisory system required
improvements.102
Portsmouth’s World War II history is remarkably free of any need to discipline
workers for unethical work practices. In fact, Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (December
1941) reported that, “The Board does not believe that loafing exists at this Yard to such a
degree as to constitute a serious problem.”

1OT

However, the board did recommend a

number of changes to reduce the temptation for workers to loaf, including reduced hours
for the shipyard restaurant and mobile lunch carts, and improved staffing for both to
avoid lines and time lost from the job. The same task force considered the established
practice of monitoring shipboard job sites by checklist, to insure assigned workers are on
the job, to be inefficient and not commensurate with the administrative burden it entailed.
It was recommended that the practice be discontinued. All evidence points towards an
uncommon level of mutual trust and confidence between managers and employees that
started at the top with the commandant and extended down through the independent and
specialized workers that roamed the waterfront routinely doing their jobs as needed to
deliver submarines at record setting rates.
Eileen Dondero Foley, a painter’s helper during the war, who later served as the
mayor of Portsmouth for a total of 16 years, was most emphatic, when interviewed, about
the mutual respect that existed between management and employees during the war. She
102 Portsmouth Herald, 23 Jan 1945, “May Inspect More Yards.” 1.
103 Portsmouth Industrial Survey I (1941), 5.
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remembered the civilian managers as being ever-present in the industrial areas,
monitoring the progress of work sites, but seldom criticizing or interfering with the
workers. Attired in coat, tie, and felt hat, their dress was a symbol of their authority,
which Foley remembered as being exercised in a firm, but fair, manner. During an
interview with the Master of the Paint Shop, on her first day of work in 1942, she and
another girl were told, “This is dirty work. You are here to paint the boats and not your
faces.”104 Such was the no-nonsense approach of shipyard management to the increased
hiring of women on the yard. Foley reported to work at the Paint Shop the next morning
but she never saw the other girl again.
While Eileen Dondero Foley may have been directed by her shop master to
deemphasize her personal appearance for the sake of the job and production, Alice
Kessler-Harris claims the opposite was often the case during the war. She argues that
women often “found themselves facing male pressure to be feminine” and personnel
managers preferred “the girls to be neat ands trim and well put together,” claiming that it
helped the women’s morale and brought prestige to the workplace. Another less
welcomed consequence of the maintenance of a feminine appearance in the workplace
was that “catcalls, whistles, and hisses faced women who walked onto production floors
for the first time.”105 Neither Foley nor any of the other retired shipyard employees
interviewed for this study alluded to the type of male behavior in the workplace described
by Kessler-Harris. Rather, Foley’s example with the Master of the Paint Shop suggests
the other extreme. One cannot draw conclusions from such a limited sampling; however,

104 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 2 Sep 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
105 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work, 268..
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it can be noted that the interviews for this study did find evidence to support the
observations presented by Kessler-Harris.
Shipyard employees apparently were not as dedicated to safety regulations as they
were to the quality o f their work and the timely completion of their job responsibilities.
The Booz-Allen Survey (1944) found that, “The Yard has a creditable safety record
although its ratio of lost time to all accidents has been high.”106 The survey added that,
“Safety hats were noticeable by their absence,” and “There was a noticeable neglect of
i r \n

using goggles on grinding operations.”

William Tebo, who worked at the yard about

the time of the survey, was issued a pair of safety glasses. However, he never wore a hard
hat and does not recall any being made available. Tebo also recalled that ear plugs were
not available until late 1944 when, he suspects, authorities began to make an association
between growing hearing losses and the intolerable noise that resulted from banging and
chipping on a submarine pressure hull. Tebo also had a friend lose a few toes in a shop
1 AO

accident for lack o f safety shoes.

The wartime environment at the shipyard, like most

of society, was filled with hazards that were simply classified as the cost of doing
business.
The Booz-Allen Survey (1944) also observed that, “There seemed to be a feeling
in some shops that all action in accident prevention is the sole responsibility of the Safety
Engineer and his staff.”109 Without too much imagination, one can conjure up an image

106 Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 10.
107 Ibid.
108 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
109 Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 10.
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of an employee, confident in his ability to get the job done, free of rules and restrictions,
wanting to extend that same independence of choice to the observance of safety rules.
In summary, Portsmouth Navy Yard employees were intelligent, cooperative,
independent, trusted, well-trained, and able to accomplish their jobs with minimal
supervision. Cooperative and self-motivated employees enabled managers to employ
worker empowerment and other team oriented concepts. There were no strikes or
slowdowns at Portsmouth Navy Yard, employee disciplinary actions were infrequent
when compared to other navy yards, and loafing, prevalent at some shipyards, was not an
issue at Portsmouth. The harmonious management-employee environment at Portsmouth
Navy Yard during the war was the exception in the shipbuilding industry rather than the
rule. There is little doubt that the cooperative environment at Portsmouth Navy Yard was
a significant factor in the yard’s success.
Women Employees
The mass industrial mobilization of women during the war to fill jobs vacated by
men joining the armed services was slow to develop. According to Alice Kessler-Harris,
As government programs began early in 1942 to “warm up” the unemployed to
heavy industry, twenty men were offered places to every woman. Some workers
received training in industrial skills in the last half of 1941. Only 1 percent of
those were female. Employers believed women were not suited to most jobs and
declared themselves unwilling to hire women for 81 percent of available
production jo b s... Attitudes began to change after Pearl H arbor... For the first
time employers sought out women for nontraditional jobs. By mid-1942, it was
clear that this [the rate that women were entering the industrial workforce] was
not enough... The government lowered the age limit for employment of women
from eighteen to sixteen years... And in July 1943, the War Production Board
declared itself in need of a million and a half more women.110

110 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History o f Wage-Earning Women in the United States
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 275-276.
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The discussion that follows will show that the progress made by women employees in
filling industrial jobs at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war, as Kessler-Harris
described on a national level, was initially resisted by management and, consequently,
was slow in developing. In addition, Portsmouth and the other east coast navy yards
lagged their west coast counterparts in hiring women to fill shipyard employment needs.
Maritime historian Frederick C. Lane says that, “The female invasion began in the
fall of 1942” and reached its maximum in 1944 and 1945 when “female workers formed
10 to 20 percent in most yards.”111 According to Lane, female employment during the
war was lowest in the Northeast and the Gulf and highest on the West Coast. For
example, the percentage of females employed at the Richmond Shipyard outside San
Francisco was 20 to 23 percent in 1944 and the Oregon Shipyard peaked at 33 percent in
1945.112 These, o f course, were both private shipyards.
West Coast government navy yards also had a higher percentage of female
employees than other navy yards. The top two navy yards for female employment in
March 1943 were Mare Island, California (19.6%) and Puget Sound, Washington
(16.8%).113At that time, Portsmouth Navy Yard had a workforce composed of only 8.5 %
female employees, the second lowest of the navy yards. New York Navy Yard was
lowest at 8.0%. In September 1942, the Industrial Manager, Captain Davis, urged his
department to “more aggressively pursue training programs for women - as the West

111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113

Navy Department, (Industrial Manpower Section) letter o f 1 May 1943 to Distribution
including All Navy Yards, Subject: Employment o f Women-Continental Navy Yards. NARA College Park,
RG 38, Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 151, Folder NY1, 1 July 1942 to 30 Jun 1943.
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Coast shipyards have done so effectively.”114 At the high point for shipyard employment,
20,445 employees in November 1943, 3,832 women were employed, almost 18.7 percent
of the workforce. Near the end of the war, in July 1945, women comprised about 18
percent of the total workforce of 15,078.115 Even though Portsmouth Navy Yard got off
to a slow start, by the end of the war the yard employed women at about the same
percentages as other navy yards.
In general, there was reluctance on the part of New England society to utilize
women employees to the fullest extent of their capabilities early in the war. Perhaps, in
the case of shipyards, it reflected a sincere desire on the part of the managers to keep
females safe and protected from the rigors and unsavory aspects of shipyard industrial
work. A directive issued by the Commandant of the Boston Navy Yard in January 1942
illustrating concern about the safety of female employees reads:
The Commandant considers that most clerical positions in the yard can be
filled by female employees, except stockman in the storehouse, clerks
assigned to night shifts in the shops or in shops where a single clerk is
employed, and messengers required to go in the shops or on the ships.116
In short, women were not to be hired for jobs where they might have to interact with men
in out-of-the-way job sites without other women present, especially at night. Without a
doubt, shipyard managers were concerned about the introduction of sexuality and its
potential repercussions to the workplace.

114 Manager memo o f 30 Sep 1942.NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 8, Folder A2-11/NY2, “Circular Letter Navy Yard.”
115 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 33.
116 Boston Navy Yard Commandant’s Circular No. 398 o f 13 Janl942. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 2, Folder A2-11/NY2, “Circular
Letter Navy Yard - Boston.”
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Captain Davis encouraged the recruitment of women employees, but he too
expressed guarded optimism about their limitations and potential contributions. In
September 1942, Davis wrote:
In view o f the increasing demands on the available manpower of the country
for defense work and military duty, it is apparent that the services of women
must be utilized in every type of work for which they can be trained and for
which physically qualified. 17
Implicit in the memo is the understanding that women could not be expected to replace
certain male employees because of their inherent inferior physical qualifications and
training limitations. Specifically, Captain Davis emphasized that women were not to be
1 1Q

employed onboard ships or as security guards.
Eileen Dondero Foley, who worked as a painter’s helper in 1942 and 1943, recalls
that she was permitted to work topside on submarines, but, “Never, never, never, in the
compartments or tanks.”119 Foley added, “They [the shipyard managers] were very strict
about that.” The prohibiting of women workers onboard submarines did not last the entire
war. William Tebo and Dan Maclssac both remembered women working alongside men
in submarine compartments and tanks towards the end of the war.

19ft

Jeffery M. Dorwart found a similar initial reluctance to assign women to
worksites onboard ships at Philadelphia Navy Yard that decreased as the war went on:

117 Manager memo o f 15 Sep 1942 NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 8, Folder A2-11/NY2, “Circular Letter Navy Yard,”
(emphasis added).
118 Manager memo o f 30 Sep 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2LC Pkg #7, “Orders to Shop Foremen.”
119 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 Aug 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
120 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum.
Oral interview with Dan Maclssac, 9 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum.
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The Philadelphia Navy Yard never appeared entirely comfortable with female
employees during World War I I ... supervisors would not allow women to work
on board the battleship New Jersey for nearly a year.. .Approximately 70 percent
o f the Navy Yard’s female employees held clerical, office, or inside shop work. ..
The war drain on male employees [eventually] opened nearly every job except
191
riggers to females.
Female employees at Portsmouth Navy Yard also found improved employment
opportunities as the war progressed.
Another Captain Davis memo of 30 September 1942 gives more insight into his
sympathies regarding women employees. Reacting to a Secretary of the Navy directive of
1 September 1942 that alerted the navy yards to hire women because all eligible males
would soon be called by the Selective Service, Davis wrote:
Seeing the trend o f the movement [towards the hiring of women], it would
behoove Portsmouth to take action to obtain the pick of women available as
to avoid the serious dislocations which may occur if action is delayed and
later forced [to hire women] upon the Yard in larger numbers and
suddenly.122
At the risk of paraphrasing Captain Davis, he appears to be suggesting that it would be
best to follow the Secretary of the Navy’s direction and expeditiously hire women for two
reasons: by hiring women quickly the shipyard can get the pick of the limited female
talent available, and if the yard can increase the number of female employees, it may
avoid being forced to hire women en masse at a later date and inundating the yard with
great numbers o f unqualified and untrained employees.

121 Jeffery M. Dorwart, The Philadelphia Navy Yard: From the Birth o f the U.S. Navy to the
NuclearAge. (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 178.
122 Manager memo o f 30 Sep 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
General Correspondence (Central Files), Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central
Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2LC Pkg #7, “Orders to Shop Foremen.”
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Captain Davis’ worst fears came true, in May 1943, when Assistant Secretary of
the Navy Ralph Bard directed Portsmouth and the other east coast navy yards to increase
their employment of women, especially skilled women. According to Bard:
During the past ten months, continental Navy yards have shown a definite
increase in the employment of women, particularly in the semi-skilled Group
II. Greater efforts must be made immediately to increase this upward trend in
Group II, and the employment of women in the skilled Group III by
upgrading or direct employment must be materially increased in the very near
future... The Navy yards at Portsmouth, N.H., Boston, Mass., New York,
N. Y., Philadelphia, Pa., and Norfolk, Va., especially should increase their
employment of women to at least the average for all yards. The acceptance of
women in private industry indicates that the continental Navy yards are not
utilizing women on a comparable scale, particularly in the skilled Group
III.123
Bard’s observation about the shortage of skilled female workers in navy yards was
especially true for Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Most women at the yard were employed as clerks or administrative assistants in
offices, mechanics’ helpers in the shops, shop cleaners, or operators of pieces of shop
equipment on which they had been specially trained. Hazel Sinclair, an AfricanAmerican woman, worked as a woodworker’s helper for over two years during the war.
Sinclair reported that “They didn’t let women work on the machines”124 and,
consequently, she stacked wood during the period of her employment. Rosary Cooper,
another African-American woman, first found wartime employment at the shipyard as a
file clerk and eventually qualified as a crane operator.

Anna Jones, also African-

123

Assistant Secretary o f the Navy Ralph A. Bard letter o f 25 May 1943 to Commandants All
Continental Navy Yard. NARA College Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence,
1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY Jan 11, 1943.
124

Valerie Cunningham and Mark J. Sammons, Black Portsmouth: Three Centuries o f AfricanAmerican Heritage (Durham: University o f N ew Hampshire Press, 2004), 168.
125Ibid., 170-171.
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American, began at the yard as a messenger and was in training to be a draftsman when
the war ended. Ambitious and opportunistic, these women took advantage of a window
of employment opportunity that opened for African-American women during the war.
Unlike most of the new employees at the shipyard during the war, who came from
nearby towns and states, Rosary Cooper “had come to the area from her native Florida as
a children’s nurse” before taking a job at the shipyard. Likewise, Anna Jones had
graduated from High School in Seneca Falls, in 1940, and served in the WAC in
Washington D.C. before moving to the area to find employment at the yard, where her
father had been hired earlier in the war as a refrigeration specialist. Based on these few
examples, it appears that African-Americans may have traveled further to find
employment at the yard during the war than most other employees.
Nationwide, many African-American women took advantage of a reduction in
discrimination to enter well-paying jobs. According to Alice Kessler-Harris:
For black women, the change was dramatic. For generations they had been denied
access to good, skilled jobs that now opened to them ... But black women took
advantage of their previous work experience to move into more desirable jobs.
About 20 percent of those who had been domestic servants found work in areas
that had previously snubbed them. By war’s end the position of black women had
improved substantially. They never got the best paying jobs . . . But the numbers
involved in low-paid and low-status domestic work dropped by 15 percent while
the number o f factory operatives more than doubled.. .Their movement into
better jobs reflects not changed attitudes but their ability to take timely advantage
of enlarged opportunities.12
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s Hazel Sinclair and Rosary Cooper were part of a national
movement that saw African-American women seize unprecedented opportunities to
improve their social status by moving into better paying jobs.

126 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work, 278-279.
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Women hired into industrial shops most often found employment as helpers for
welders,

1 T ”7

sheet metal workers, or foundry molders.

1 ”7 S

According to Fred White, the

women employees at Portsmouth Navy Yard were more likely to be assigned to
secondary operations, such as punching holes for fasteners or grinding metal for welds,
leaving the primary operation for the male mechanic.129 In her capacity as a painter’s
helper, Eileen Foley remembers being allowed to apply the primer or first coat of paint
topside on a submarine, but the finishing coats were always left to the more experienced
male painters.

1TO

Rosie the Riveter did not work at Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War II.
First and foremost, rivets were nearing extinction at the yard as submarines had moved
towards all welded pressure hulls immediately prior to the war. Secondly, Portsmouth
Rosie would not have actually driven the infrequently used rivets, but, rather, would have
punched the holes for the rivets. The assignment of women to secondary jobs at
Portsmouth Navy Yard was typical of all wartime industry where “women held just 4.4%
of war jobs classified as skilled and a far smaller percentage of management

127 The shop distribution o f female workers at Portsmouth was very similar to that at a private yard
in South Portland, Maine where half o f the women employed were welders and the rest were assigned to
trades that included shipfitting, pipefitting, burners, crane operators, etc. Lane, 257.
128 While not a scientific approach, a review o f the Public Works record o f upgraded women’s
toilet facilities gives indications o f where the women were working in the shipyard in September 1942. The
Industrial Manager had authorized toilet facility upgrades in the following buildings to accommodate the
number o f female workers indicated; Building #96 for 25 female core and molding workers, Building #55
for 50 female welders, Building #2 for another 50 female welders, Building #74 for 50 female sheet metal
workers, and Building #75 for 50 female sheet metal workers. See Manager memo to Public Works Officer
o f 2 Sep 1942, Subject; Toilet Facilities for Women in Shops and Shop Offices. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Box 36, Folder N4-14, “Latrines.”
129 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006 at his home in New Castle, H.H.
130 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 Aug 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
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positions.”131 Historian David M. Kennedy claims that the emblem of Rosie the Riveter
as a “denim-clad, tool-wielding, can-do figure” actually typified very few wartime
women employees. Kennedy suggests that Wendy the Welder, Sally the Secretary, or
Molly the Mom might have been more appropriate labels for the typical wartime women
employee.132
Other industries in the city of Portsmouth were also slow to hire women. A
Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey (August 1943) reported that, in June 1942, of the
three Portsmouth industrial plants engaged in defense work, only one, the Morley
Company, employed any women. Morley Company employed 93 women, 3 of whom
were married. At the time, the navy yard employed 430 women, 10 of whom were
married.133 Thus, during the early stages of the war, a limited number of women were
employed in an industrial environment and almost all of them were unmarried. The
Portsmouth Defense Area Health and Welfare Survey concluded from a survey
completed in June 1942 that “There has been no significant increase in the number of
mothers employed since the inception of defense work.” Also, “Because the Portsmouth
Navy Yard is the major industry [in the area], and the only large one, it seems there will
be no appreciable increase in numbers of employed women unless, and until, the Navy

131 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 779.
132 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 776-779.
133 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area, August 1943,” 35. Cumings
Library, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., Box 2, Folder 14, “S.C.D. Survey o f Health and
Welfare in Portsmouth.” Hereafter “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area.” A
later survey, between June 1942 and August 1943, found 470 female clerical workers at the yard and 400
women employees at the Somersworth plant. “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense
Area,” 67.
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Yard employs women in large numbers.”134 Women did find employment as taxi drivers
early in the war in Portsmouth as the male drivers went to war and the demand for taxis
increased with the overall shortage of automobiles, tires, and gasoline. In the summer of
1942, Rosie was driving a taxi, not rivets, in Portsmouth.

Despite the slow initial progress in hiring women to replace men at the yard, the
Portsmouth Herald periodically featured front page articles and pictures that highlighted
any progress that was made by women. For example, on 18 May 1942, the paper
gleefully reported the advancement of women to positions of taxi cab and bus drivers:
No wonder people are beginning to wonder if it really is a man’s world. First
Portsmouth had a woman cleaning company driver, then a taxi driver, and
now the Hill Transportation company has hired from the government
employment agency two women for duty behind its wheels.
l i e

Thus, six months after Pearl Harbor, the hiring o f local women as replacements for men
had progressed to the dubious distinction of finding employment as taxi cab and bus
drivers. And this was front page news.
While not a particularly glamorous or lucrative beginning, taxi cab driving paid
better than house cleaning and other jobs available to women at the time. Over the next
year and a half, the Portsmouth Herald frequently carried pictures of women in training
•?

for, or assuming, traditional, and even better paying, men’s jobs at the shipyard. The
Herald’’s coverage provides a chronological summary of the incremental progress women
made towards more meaningful industrial employment. On 18 June 1942, one finds a
picture of several Exeter girls “amid gears and belts of steel lathes,” who were among the
134 Ibid, 36.
135 Portsmouth Herald, 18 May 1942, “Feminine Detail Takes Over Bus Service to Navy Yard,” 1.
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first women to enroll in defense mechanical training classes with hopes of gaining
employment at the shipyard. The 22 March 1943 paper has a picture of the first female
navy yard machinist to apply for membership in the Ranger Lodge, International
Association o f Machinists. The article notes that she is currently a “checker o f machines
and other supplies,” but her number one ambition is to become a “full fledged machinist.”
The 12 May 1943 edition contains an article entitled “School Aids Production o f Navy
Submarines” that heaps credit on the local Federal Vocational Training School and notes
that 125 o f the 322 students enrolled in the school are women. On 11 November 1943,
four shipyard “welderettes” are pictured with their supervisor. According to the Herald,
the four women had patriotically completed 150 hours of electric welding training and:
They have swapped the duties of housekeeping and the tapping typewriter for
the glow of a blow torch and the clang of steel. They’re laboring, sweating,
amid steel beams and plates to build fighting submarines for America’s
safety.136
Finally, in May 1944, a very important milestone was reached when the first women
graduated from the yard’s supervisory training program. Four o f the 195 graduates were
women. Rear Admiral Thomas Withers’ graduation address praised not just the women,
but also the class:
Your class is different from any other class in that it is coeducational. I am proud
that this navy yard recognizes the fact that women are capable of becoming
supervisors and I cannot understand why other navy yards do not take advantage
o f the capable women employees they must have.137

136 Portsmouth Herald, 11 Nov 1943, caption under the picture reads, “And More are Needed,” 1.
137 .

Quoted in the Portsmouth Herald, 10 May 1944, “Yard Graduates Largest Group; Four

Women,” 1.
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Withers’ remarks imply that the other navy yards had not yet trained any women for
supervisory positions. Portsmouth Navy Yard, after a slow start, had made up a lot of
ground on the other navy yards.
Women had progressed from housewives at the start of the war to bus and taxi
cab drivers by May 1942, through machine operator training programs in the early part of
1943, to fully qualified sweaty welders by November 1943, and finally to trained shop
supervisors by May 1944. Elsewhere on the yard, military women were also breaking
new ground. In May 1943, the first class of fifty “WAVES” arrived at the Portsmouth
Navy Yard Hospital for four weeks of basic training. The first female doctor at the
shipyard reported for duty on 22 February 1945.138
Mary C. Dondero, who had been a clerical helper in the Portsmouth Navy Yard
Supply Department early in the war,

1OQ

progressed further than any of the other women

employed at the yard during the war when she was elected Mayor of Portsmouth in
November 1944. Dondero was the first female mayor ever in the state of New Hampshire
and one of the first in the nation.140 Her story will be covered in more detail later when
discussing the transformation of the city of Portsmouth during the war. Before one gets
too carried away with the progress made by New Hampshire women during the war, it is
well to note that, a little over a month after Mary Dondero became mayor of Portsmouth,
the New Hampshire House of Representatives rejected a bill to allow women jurists by a

138 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 89.
139 Oral interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, daughter o f Mary C. Dondero, 30 Aug 2006, at her
home in Portsmouth, N.H.
140 Portsmouth Herald, 1 Jan 1945, 1.
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vote of 181 to 174. 141 Thus, in early 1945, women could hold responsible positions at the
Portsmouth Navy Yard and govern the city of Portsmouth, but they could not sit on juries
in the state of New Hampshire.
Late in 1945, Fred White was faced with the need to terminate about sixty women
working in the sail loft of his shop making various torpedo straps, mattress covers,
cushions, and other leather products for the submarines. All the women fell into the
category o f wartime employees without rights to continued employment after the war.
After careful consideration, and with the women’s encouragement, White decided to
forego the normal practice of terminating employees individually, according to hiring
date, and release all sixty of the women on the same day. The decision was met with
universal approval by the women who did not want to experience individual firings and
possible disputes about who should go next. According to White, the women celebrated
together as they walked out of the shop after the last day of their employment.142
Nationwide, women were quick to quit their jobs when war production ended.
Alice Kessler-Harris wrote that “The rate at which women chose to leave jobs was at
least double, and sometimes triple the rate at which they were discharged. And it was
consistently higher than quit rates for men.”143 Many of the women who had found
employment in the shipyard’s industrial shops during the war, like millions of women in
comparable positions across the United States, were more than willing to abandon their
wartime jobs, in favor of returning veterans, and to return to their homes and other
occupations.
141 Ibid., 10 Feb 1045, “Women Juror Bill to Get New Action,” 1.
142 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 Apr 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
143 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work, 286.

204

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Selective Service
One of the yard’s most serious employment problems during the war was that the
younger, more physically fit, and more trainable, employees were routinely drafted or
volunteered for military service. The nation’s first peacetime draft bill was passed on 16
September 1940. One month later, more than sixteen million men between the ages of
twenty-one and thirty-five were registered on the draft rolls.144 To further complicate
matters, the Navy’s well advertised “choose while you can” program enticed a large
number o f patriotic young men of the seacoast area to volunteer for the Navy and Marine
Corps during the early years of the war.145 Thus, fifteen months prior to the start of the
war, at about the same time that the shipyard ramp-up was gathering momentum, the best
and the brightest of the yard’s employees began to be siphoned from the shipyard’s rolls.
The shipyard’s apprentice program was especially devastated by the loss of men
to military service. The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) reported that, “Just before
the war the Yard employed some 400 apprentices. The present number is about 80. Some
240 former apprentices are in the armed forces on military furlough.”146 At the end o f the
war, in the summer of 1945, the shipyard reported “approximately 450 on military
furlough, leaving less than 50 apprentices now employed.”147 The loss of skilled and

144 Amendments over the next two years extended the age limits from eighteen to sixty-five.
However, the military wanted no men over forty-five and strongly preferred only those under the age o f
twenty-six. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 459 and 632.
145 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 635. William Tebo, interviewed for this dissertation,
was one o f those who enlisted in the Navy rather than wait to be drafted.

146

Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 10.

147 Administrative History, Portsmouth Navy Yard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum Archives,
Kittery, Me., 36.
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experienced employees to military service was a never-ending problem throughout the
war.
Percy Whitney was one of the skilled shipyard employees lost to the draft in
1943. Percy entered the apprentice program in June 1940 and graduated three years later.
He attributes his good fortune of being employed for three years at the shipyard, prior to
being drafted, to the critical nature of the work he was doing in the foundry, his married
status, and a low lottery draft number.

1 AQ

Even then, he joined the long list of former

apprentices and valuable shipyard employees on military furlough when he was drafted
into the Marine Corps in 1943.
Selective Service attrition in the shipyard welding shop was particularly acute at
the start of the war. First established in November 1939, the shop grew quickly in
numbers and importance as submarine construction increasingly moved to welded
pressure hulls to replace riveted hulls.149 By April of 1942, the shop employed nearly
one thousand people with a pressing need to hire many more welders.150 In early 1942,
the shop was scheduled to lose twenty five to thirty qualified welders per month. Welders
were being lost faster than replacements could be trained and certified.151
Selective Service was a particularly difficult challenge for the shipyard because
management’s efforts to schedule the orderly release of employees with critical skills,

148 Oral interview with Percy Whitney, 23 Mar 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
149

Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 2 Nov 1939 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy
(Shore Establishment Division). NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N5-14, “Welding Shop.”
150 Manager memo to Production Officer o f 22 Apr 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N5-14, “Welding Shop.”
151 Ibid
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such as welders, had to be coordinated with numerous local boards in all three of the
states from which the yard drew employees. In February 1943, the shipyard, under the
leadership of Captain H.F.D. Davis, brought some order to this chaotic situation when it
reached a precedent setting agreement with the Selective Service to release workers in
accordance with a long range predetermined plan, with New Hampshire deferment rules
applying to all yard employees subject to being drafted. According to the Portsmouth
Herald of 5 February 1943, “This establishes the yard as the first employer in New
Hampshire, and, it is believed to be the first navy yard in the United States to reach
•

[such] an agreement with the Selective Service System.”

i ct

Explaining the advantages of

the agreement, the Herald reported:
The naval authorities will no longer be required to deal with many local
boards in several states in the cases of individual employees whose services
they desire to retain for occupational reasons. The date of release in all such
cases has been decided definitely as the result of studies and conferences
which have been in progress for the past three months between General
Bowen [Selective Service Director for the state of New Hampshire] and
Captain Davis, the yard manager. A single deferment policy, that which
prevails in the state of New Hampshire, will be applied to all employees at
the yard who are vulnerable to the Selective Service and Training Act.153
Captain Davis, always meticulous in his planning, had reduced the shipyard’s Selective
Service problem to manageable proportions.
In July 1945 the Portsmouth Periscope reported that “As of 30 June, 5,033
workmen had shifted from war work to the fighting front” and “85 men from this Yard
have died in action.”154 During the peak war years, when the shipyard average

152 Portsmouth Herald, 5 Feb 1943, “They Agreed on Navy Yard Employee Induction Plan,” 1.
153 Ibid.
154 Portsmouth Periscope, 10 July 1945, 1, 6. Papers o f Harold Caswell Sweeter, Portsmouth
Navy Yard Supervisory Naval Architect, 1917-1958, Sweetser Family Papers, Milne Special Collections,
University o f New Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.
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employment was about 18,000, the shipyard’s average loss to the selective service was
well over 1,000 employees a year. However, knowing well in advance what critical skills
would be lost, and when, the shipyard could schedule training for replacements and work
them into production schedules in an orderly manner.

In summary, Portsmouth Navy Yard was blessed with an intelligent and
motivated workforce during the war that gave patriotism and teamwork very high
priority. Employee-management relations were characterized by a cooperative spirit that
was based on mutual respect and trust. The result was harmony in the workplace and few
disciplinary actions. Women played an increasingly important role in the yard as they
gradually gained access to training programs that qualified them for more responsible
positions. Their progress was impressive and their contributions were significant.
Because of the personnel disruptions caused by employees leaving the yard for military
service, the yard arranged a precedent setting agreement with the Selective Service that
allowed for orderly release of employees in accordance with a long range plan that
permitted the yard to train replacements in a timely manner. The employees, in short,
were the keystone upon which the shipyard built its remarkable success.
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CHAPTER V

METHODS & MEASURABLES

“Any present judgment of the organization, administration, and control
procedures of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. must give great weight
to the development of the Yard, subordinating all other considerations to
the demands of the war effort, into a specialized construction activity for
submarines only. All operating units have been streamlined for this sole
purpose.”1
Booz-Allen Industrial Survey Report
6 November 1944

By early 1942, several building blocks were in place upon which Portsmouth
Navy Yard would build a remarkable production record over the next few years. An
impressive team o f naval and civilian managers had been assembled, massive facility
upgrades were in progress, orders had been received for dozens of new submarines,
employees were being hired at unprecedented rates and, organizationally, the yard had a
free hand to manage its own growth and development. The final piece of the puzzle
would be the implementation of well designed processes and practices that were tailored
to take maximum advantage o f the shipyard’s strengths, growing workforce, and
expanding facilities. Those production methods included well-designed training
programs, special teams, assembly line, risk management, innovation, open
communications, control systems, farm-out programs, and lean manufacturing.
1 Secretary o f the Navy Ralph A. Bard letter o f 6 Nov 1944, Subject: Survey o f Industrial
Department, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. - Report No. 2 o f Industrial Survey Division. NARA College
Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence (1940-45), Box 785, Folder NY1/A3, 3. Emphasis
added.
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The effectiveness of those methods will then be evaluated under the section
entitled Measurables. The word “measurables” cannot be found in most dictionaries, but
it is common manufacturing terminology. For manufacturing processes, quantifiable
results, things that can be measured, are usually the most meaningful indicators of
success or failure. Measurables might include total numbers produced, production rates
achieved, or manhours expended per widget. It was the eye-catching production
measurables, in terms of submarine delivery rates, that motivated this study. In the
interest of consistency, the yard’s production numbers will be revisited and examined in
more detail in this section. Two other indicators of success, cost savings and quality, will
also be reviewed. In today’s world of industry and shipbuilding, both of these are true
measurables in every sense of the word, able to be quantified and analyzed in great detail
for performance trends. Such was not the case at the yard during the war. Records for
cost and quality were often abbreviated or eliminated in the interest of production
efficiency. However, other evidence is available to gain some indication as to how the
yard performed in both of these areas. Remarkable production numbers lose much of
their luster if costs are out of sight or quality is poor. As it turns out, cost and quality
were as much a part o f the Portsmouth success story as was production.
Methods
This section argues that the yard’s outstanding performance was the result of well
designed processes and practices that were tailored to take maximum advantage of the
shipyard’s resources. In the case of the most critically needed shipbuilding resource,
building ways, Portsmouth Navy Yard was grossly under capacity immediately prior to
the war and remained challenged for building sites throughout the war. Necessity was
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very much the mother of invention as the yard made the most of what it had. The
innovative management techniques and processes that were developed to maximize the
shipyard resources available were, in some cases, years ahead of their time.
It was previously noted that shipyards were encouraged by higher authority to
accept facilities constructed to less than optimum technical specifications during the
ramp-up in order to expedite completion of urgently needed shipyard infrastructure.
While quality of workmanship was a high priority at the Portsmouth Navy Yard during
the war, it was time and production efficiency that drove the yard, not perfection of
product. It was the sacrifice of absolute quality for time that led to the production miracle
at Portsmouth Navy Yard and other American shipyards during the war.2 This was in
sharp contrast to the German approach to production which was more geared towards
optimum designs and technical excellence than efficient production. Historian David
Kennedy says that:
In the inescapable trade-off between quality and quantity, the Germans
characteristically chose the former, the Americans the latter... Though the
Americans also ultimately proved capable of some epochal scientific and
technical breakthroughs, they innovated most characteristically in plant layout,
production organization, economies of scale, and process engineering. If Germany
aimed for the perfection of many things, America aspired to the commodification
of virtually every th ing... [The United States placed] a premium on organizing
production around simple repetitive tasks that did not demand technical adeptness
or extensive training.3
A common theme throughout this chapter will be the streamlining of work at Portsmouth
Navy Yard to enable the repetitive accomplishment of the same jobs on numerous

2 Liberty Ships were prime examples o f the sacrifice o f quality for the mass production o f product
during the war. “At least one Liberty Ship foundered at the pier before sailing, and seamen lived in dread
that the welded hulls would split open in heavy seas, as some tragically did.” There is little doubt that
numbers were traded for performance as twenty-seven hundred Liberty Ships were built during the war.
David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 652-653.
3 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 648-649.
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successive submarines. It will also be shown that the shipyard excelled in those attributes
highlighted by David Kennedy that separated American industry from that of the enemy;
plant layout, production organization, process engineering, and economies of scale. Not
specifically cited by Kennedy, but also critical to Portsmouth’s successful submarine
construction programs, were well designed and implemented training programs.
Training
The increase in shipyard employment required a vast upgrade to the skilled labor
base in the area. Prior to the war, the area had a shortage of skilled workers and,
consequently, Portsmouth had not been able to attract much industry.4 It was absolutely
essential that the shipyard have a large skilled labor pool from which to draw if it was to
achieve expected production. This upgrade was achieved through three primary means of
training. First, the Shipyard Apprentice Training Program was run by the Shop Masters
for advancement to the next class or to journeyman. Second, free supplementary and pre
employment vocational training courses were given at off-yard locations with the
cooperation of the Federal War Production Training Program through the State
Department of Education. Finally, the Engineering Science Management War Training
Program at the University of New Hampshire (UNH) conducted more advanced technical
and engineering courses.
The Apprentice Program was a well-established shipyard tradition by the late
1930’s. Immediately prior to World War II, the program was functioning near full
capacity and successfully providing the skilled mechanics that the shops needed at the
time. For example, the program had 346 students enrolled in August 1941, 342 students
4 The huge increase in skilled labor in the seacoast area as the result o f the shipyard and defense
training programs during the war is discussed in detail in Chapter VIII, “Community Consequences.”
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on 1 December 1941, 336 students on 5 January 1942, and 391 students on 2 March
1942.5 There was no need to create a new in-yard apprentice training program to meet the
increased skilled tradesmen needs. One only had to continue the current program and
expand it as necessary to meet the rapidly growing need for skilled employees.
The existing apprentice program consisted of approximately eighteen classes of
about twenty students each that met for two hours a day, three days a week, taking
advantage o f shift turnovers and mid-day breaks for classes during the work day. A high
school diploma was required for entry to the program. A minimum credit of 1,816 school
hours or selective shop training was required before a candidate could take the
promotional exam that was routinely given twice a year prior to the war. However, by
October 1941, the exam was being given more often because of the increased numbers in
the apprentice program.6 Percy Whitney, who had hired into the apprentice program after
two and one half years at Bates College, remembered the apprentice program as being
quite demanding academically. In particular, he recalled having to pass classroom
metallurgy, trigonometry, and other challenging technical courses while working as an
apprentice in the shipyard foundry.7
The War Department Training Program was run by the states, with machines and
equipment provided by the federal government. It provided supplemental trade and
technical instruction required to be employed at the shipyard, or to become better
qualified in one’s trade once employed. There were fourteen similar training programs
5 Shop Superintendent memos o f 26 Aug, 27 Nov, 30 Dec 1941 & 25 Feb 1942. NARA Waltham,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC,
PKG #6, “Orders to Shop Foremen.”
6 Ibid.
7 Oral interview with Percy Whitney, 23 Mar 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
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run throughout the state of New Hampshire. The Portsmouth program, however, was
“praised by the navy vocational officers as one of the finest in the country.”
By early 1941, a coordinated federal, state, and local effort had established
machine operator classes at Portsmouth High School. In March 1941, the high school
program was expanded to include a three-shift defense school for welders.9 The machine
shop classes underway at the time added an extra session from 10 pm to 7am. The
training program was subsequently expanded to include gas and electric welding classes
at a local industrial firm, the Morley Company, to meet an urgent need for welders at the
navy yard. As noted earlier, the yard’s Industrial Manager, Captain Davis, had identified
a shortage of welders to be the most critical obstacle to increased production in early
1942. Classes at Morley Company grew to include training 24 hours a day for welders,
sheet metal workers, pipe fitters, ship fitters, machinists, electricians, machine operators,
blueprint machine operators, and copyist draftsmen. In 1943, the program trained nearly
1,000 workers for positions at the navy yard.10 During the three years of operations, the
school employed as many as eighty instructors who trained over 7,000 people.
William Tebo was a fifteen year old high school junior when he took 400 hours of
machine operator defense training at Portsmouth High School to gain employment at the
shipyard. Once hired, he was further trained as an electrician in order to perform limited,
but important, shipboard wiring jobs. According to Tebo, there were hundreds o f fifteen
and sixteen year old high school students employed by the shipyard during the war. They

8 Portsmouth Herald, 12 Mar 1944, “Free Training Courses Offer Top Opportunities,” 1.
9 Ibid, 20 Mar 1941, “Start School for Welders Next Week,” 1.
10 Ibid.
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would go to school during the day and then work the 3:00 pm - 11:00 pm shift at the
shipyard. Like Tebo, most of them just passed through the shipyard for less than a year
on their way to military service once they turned 17 years of age.11 Tebo was at the yard
for about six months, beginning in early 1944. By maintaining good grades, he and other
teenagers could be excused from the last two periods of the day at the high school which
gave them enough time to get to the yard in time for the shift start.12
Employment at the shipyard in 1942 was more than just a job to young people
like William Tebo and Eileen Dondero. During interviews, both conveyed the fact that a
sense of duty and patriotism had as much, or more, to do with their motivation for
seeking employment at the yard as wages. Employment at the shipyard was seen as a way
that they could contribute to the war effort until they could join friends and family
members in the armed services. Tebo became a submariner13 and Dondero joined the
Women’s Army Corps.
Patriotism and personal sacrifice were strong forces in the seacoast area during
the war. Barbara McLean Ward’s Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square: The
Grocer and the Consumer on the Home-Front Battlefield during World War II is filled
with stories of similar sacrifices made by Portsmouth residents:
Housewives, USO hostesses, Y.M.C.A. “girls,” and “office girls,” after their
regular workday was completed, turned up in large numbers to work at
Morley [Company] when a government contract was due . . . Portsmouth
residents turned out in large numbers to staff the wartime committees ..
11 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
12 Ibid.
13 Tebo knew o f at least two other friends who worked at the yard and became submariners during
the war. While prior employment at the yard did not help them get into the submarine force, the knowledge
o f submarines gained at the yard was o f great benefit at Submarine School in New London, Ct. Oral
interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
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Thousands of others did their part by participating in scrap drives, rubber
drives, and numerous other salvage efforts.1
William Tebo volunteered for high school sponsored scrap drives, rag drives, and
clothing drives for which he received no compensation.15 He and others on the
Portsmouth home-front were quick to do whatever was required for the war effort.
Employment at the shipyard, volunteering for scrap drives, and participation in the many
training programs being offered were all seen as ways to help win the war.
The University of New Hanpshire Engineering Science Management War
Training Program provided the more technical and professional training required by
shipyard technicians, engineers, and managers. This curriculum included courses in
Mechanics, Strengths of Materials, Metallurgy, Welding Theory, and so forth. Over five
thousand employees took advantage of the free training offered by the state and the
university.16 The shipyard benefited greatly from the nearby availability of a state
university, just ten miles distant.
Some industries had avoided the seacoast area prior to the war because of a lack
of skilled workers. The programs discussed above produced thousands of skilled workers
during the war and turned the shortage of skilled labor into an abundance of the same in a
few years. In addition, the conversion of the federal defense training program to a state
14 G. Colati and Ryan H. Madden, “Victory Begins at Home: Portsmouth and Puddle Dock during
World War II,” in Barbara McLean Ward, ed., Produce & Conserve, Share & Play Square: The Grocer
and the Consumer on the Home-Front Battlefield during World War II (Portsmouth: Strawbery Banke
Museum, 1994), 59, 68.
15 Tebo also volunteered for a high school program that had students make model German
airplanes for use by coastal lookouts as identification aids. In return for their work, the students received
points towards honorary military titles that advanced in seniority and importance according to the number
o f models they built. Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard
Museum.
16Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 47.
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vocational training school, immediately after the war, went a long way towards insuring
that the area had a long-term supply of skilled labor.
Special Teams
A well trained and self-motivated workforce with a homogeneous and repetitious
workload, coupled with management concerns about the gradual loss of employees to the
military services, was an environment rife for the use of special teams. A worker
specially trained to accomplish the same job on submarine after submarine was highly
productive, as well as an expert, in that task. In addition, if he were drafted into the
military, his replacement could be quickly trained for the limited task with minimal
disruption to the building process.17 For all of these reasons, Portsmouth Navy Yard
made maximum use of special teams.
The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) noted the shipyard’s widespread use of
special teams and reported that, “Although the quality of the working force is at a high
standard, there are many employees who have developed only specialized skills.”18
Pointing towards the need for a more uniformly trained workforce during reduced post
war operations, the survey report recommended that the specialists who were to be
retained as shipyard employees after the war should receive more formal and extensive
training. It was no accident that Portsmouth Navy Yard had a large number of employees
17 It became routine shipyard practice to periodically schedule meetings for eligible employees to
accommodate their registration for Selective Service. For example, on 7 February 1942, the Manager
reminded all Shop Masters and Supervisors that, on 14 -16 February 1942, those men must register for
Selective Service who reached age 20 prior to 1/1/42 and will not be older than 45 on 2/16/42. Manager
memo o f 7 Feb 1942 to All Shop Masters and Supervisors, Subject: Registration for Selective Service.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14,
Folder A3-2/LC, PKG #6, “Orders to Shop Foremen.” The shipyard began to experience losses to the
Selective Service as early as February 1942. The early loses included 12 welders in February, 11 in March,
and 8 in April 1942. Manager memo o f 22 Apr 1942 to the Production Officer. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC, PKG #6,
“Orders to Shop Foremen.”
18 Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944), 10.
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with specialized skills. Shipyard management recognized early-on that specialized
training and specialized teams should be an integral part of the shipyard’s industrial
operation.
The team that Commandant Wainwright had assembled in November 1941 to
study work practices and make recommendations for improvements highlighted the need
for specialization. Recognizing the difficulty that the shipyard faced in obtaining the
numbers of skilled and trained mechanics that would be needed to quickly ramp up
production, the team reported:
While it is not possible to train skilled mechanics in short enough time to
make them available in the near future, it is possible to train unskilled men
who have suitable adaptability in a few of the operations of the various trades
in short time. By assignment of these men to operations which they have
been trained to perform and by placing them under the supervision of skilled
mechanics, it is possible to get work done which could not be accomplished
if only skilled men were used.19
Similarly, the team recommended that the existing practice of some shops, to assign a
group of men to custom build a single ship through completion, be discontinued in favor
of using the same men to perform the same operations on different submarines.
According to the team report:
It is obvious that a man or a group of men is better able to perform a task
after having done it on another similar ship than is a different man or group
o f men. Since the interval between keel layings, launchings, and completion
of successive ships is approximately six weeks, it is recommended that each
man or group of men be assigned to such jobs or parts of jobs on a ship as
will require approximately six weeks to complete and that, after they have
completed this work on one ship, they be moved to the next ship and assigned
the same work. This recommendation applies not only to mechanics, but also
to shop supervisors and to ship superintendents.20

19 Portsmouth Industrial Survey #1 (December 1941), 3.
20 Ib id , 9.
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From 8 December 1941, the shipyard was dedicated to specialized training and a high
degree of repetitive tasking.
The Production Officer, Captain S.E. Dudley, reinforced and formalized the
recommendations of Portsmouth Industrial Survey #1 (1941) when he advised the Shop
Supervisors that the new work methods needed to achieve expected production increases
should include a high degree of specialization:
We have 18 hulls to lay dow n... Our previous methods produced good ships,
but each vessel was a custom built job. Such methods will not meet the
problem that we are now facing.. . . You can’t run Subs down an assembly
line, but for “outside work” you can do the next best thing, that is, move men
along from ship to ship to do the same work on each.21
Similarly, in mid-January 1942, the Industrial Manager reminded the shops to use “repeat
work teams for assembly, installation, erection, and test jobs in shops.”22 It was believed
that completion dates on some ships might suffer from the effort to maximize
specialization, but in the aggregate, the result would be an optimum performance
overall.23 Production results proved this belief to be true beyond a shadow of a doubt.
Job specialization was by no means unique to Portsmouth Navy Yard. The
practice was widespread in the shipyards that mass produced Liberty ships for the same
reasons that it appealed to Portsmouth. According to historian Frederick C. Lane, “When
the work was planned so that the same crew had the same task every day, there was no

21 Production Officers memo o f 23 December 1941 to Masters, all Shops. NARA Waltham, RG
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC PKG
#7, “Orders to Shop Foremen.”
22 Manager memo o f 16 Jan 1942 to Shop Masters, NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC PKG #6, “Orders to Shop
Foremen.”
23 Production Officer memo o f 23 Dec 1942 to Masters, all Shops. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 14, Folder A3-2/LC PKG #7,
“Orders to Shop Foremen.”
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need of teaching the new workmen the 40 or 70 operations which had formed part of the
craft learned by an apprentice at Newport News. Instead, a man who had only one skill
could be kept busy doing that one thing.”24 The one task, to be performed on a Liberty
ship by a worker with limited skills, was much simpler than the specialized submarine
tasks assigned workers at Portsmouth, but the same concept applied.
William Tebo, the high school teenager employed at the navy yard in 1944,
recalled how he traveled from submarine to submarine on the building ways performing
the few electrical jobs for which he was the “expert installer” with minimal supervision.
According to Tebo, he was a member of a small team of electricians assigned to a
specific submarine compartment. One of his jobs was to wire the electrical distribution
panel for the newly installed, and highly secretive, shipboard radar. With the radar
consoles and equipment concealed under wrappings and coverings, Tebo dutifully wired
the radar electrical panels on submarine after submarine.25 Thus, with limited electrical
training, and minimal supervision, Tebo was able to provide a most useful and productive
service to the yard during his six months of employment, prior to leaving for military
service. Tebo was one o f hundreds of specialists on small teams scattered throughout all
the trades. It is clear that specialized training, and the formation of specialized work
teams, were part of the shipyard’s mobilization agenda from the start of the war.
An Assembly Line of Sorts
Contrary to the opinion of the Production Officer in December 1941, Fred White
remembers that the shipyard did manage to achieve an assembly line of sorts. Submarine
sections, or modules, constructed in various buildings, were moved to the building sites
24 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 238.
25 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
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to be welded together and, after launching, the submarines were moved from berth to
berth for the completion of berth-specific tasks leading to machinery trials and
completion. Granted, there was no assembly line as such, but the process did bear some
resemblance to the automotive industry’s conveyor belt that received subassemblies at
various stations and moved on until a completed car was produced at the end of the line.
At any rate, the submarine building process at the yard during the war was far removed
from the custom building practices of the 1920s and early 1930s.
Portsmouth Navy Yard started modular construction of submarines in 1934 on the
NIRA submarines, Porpoise and Pike. Prior to that, flat steel plates were rolled to the
desired cylindrical shapes in the structural shop and moved to the building site where
they were riveted together. Each submarine constructed was custom built at the building
site. A Local Shore Station Development Board letter dated 30 July 1934 noted that, “A
n/r

new method has been developed for the construction of submarines.” The letter
explained that:
The submarines Porpoise and Pike are being constructed in sections. A
section of the boat weighing approximately twenty tons is constructed at
Building 96 and after it has been riveted and welded the section is moved by
crane and railroad cars and placed on the building ways in Building 115. This
method of constructing a large section and moving it as one piece to the ways
has proven economical and more rapid than the method which was formerly
used.27
The shipyard wanted approval for the continued use of Building 96 as a submarine
section erection site instead of converting it to a storehouse as previously planned. This

26 Local Shore Station Development Board letter to Senior Member o f the Departmental Shore
Station Development Board o f 30 Jul 1934. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l/Y l, “Local Development Boards Package 1.”
27 Ibid.
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request, and others that followed, sought to continuously improve the sectional
construction concept.
The fact that sectional construction began on the NIRA submarines in 1934
illustrates the point made earlier that Portsmouth Navy Yard benefited greatly from a
very limited, but nevertheless steady, stream of submarine construction orders during the
1920s and early 1930s. By directing new submarine orders to Portsmouth when Electric
Boat and other yards were getting no submarine orders, the Navy allowed Portsmouth to
maintain a relatively stable and trained workforce that could develop new submarine
construction techniques. The shipyard would further develop and refine sectional
construction during the latter half of the 1930s by creating other independent erection
sites in various buildings as convenient to the building sites as possible. For example, the
shipyard’s 1937 plan for facilities development contained numerous features to
accommodate sectional construction, including a large addition and alteration to the ship
fitters shop, additional building ways, and larger capacity cranes.

98

Thus, Portsmouth

planned for facilities conducive to sectional construction, developed those facilities to the
extent that limited funding was available, and acquired experience in this production
technique. When orders skyrocketed and mass production became the order of the day,
Portsmouth Navy Yard was poised to capitalize on the revitalized naval rebuilding
program when other shipyards were thankful to go back to work.

28 Commandant First Naval District letter o f 10 Dec 1936 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1,
Folder A l-Y l, “Local Development Boards.”
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Portsmouth Industrial Survey #2 (June 1942) concluded that more work should be
done on the structural hull assemblies before they were placed in position on the ways.29
The board recommended the installation of more equipment foundations, bulkhead
valves, stuffing tubes, small structural bulkheads, and other miscellaneous components.
Increasing the completeness of the hull sections prior to delivery to the building ways
accelerated the overall assembly schedule by reducing the time needed on the critically
few building ways. Also, it reduced the number of workers needed in the confined spaces
of submarine tanks and compartments after launch. Shipyard management recognized
early on that the maximization of sectional content was critical to increased production.
The formula that Portsmouth Industrial Survey #2 (June 1942) outlined to
increase submarine production was the same formula that other shipyards would use to
deliver thousands o f Liberty ships in record times a few years later. According to
maritime historian Frederick C. Lane:
The phenomenal speed attained in [Liberty] shipbuilding during World War
II consisted above all in reducing the length of time between keel layings and
launchings. If the work of putting together the steel plates and shapes which
formed the hull was all performed on the ways or building berths, then each
building berth was occupied by one ship for a relatively long time. If, in
contrast, the pieces were joined into large sections elsewhere than on the
shipway, the time on the shipway could be reduced.30
Working with much simpler systems and much roomier spaces, the builders of Liberty
ships were able to accomplish more prefabrication and preassembly than was Portsmouth
Navy Yard for the submarines it built. Nevertheless, throughout the war, Portsmouth
sought to increase the number of components, primarily foundations, hull fittings,

29 Portsmouth Industrial Survey #2 (June 1942), 14.
30 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 207.
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bulkheads, and other structural components that were installed in submarine sections
prior to delivery to the building ways.
This is not to imply that Portsmouth Navy Yard was the only submarine yard
employing the sectional construction of submarines. The other submarine building yards
used some form of the sectional assembly process. In fact, Electric Boat’s version of the
process included an “upside down” feature that rotated the pressure hull sections so that
welders could “work upright instead of standing on their heads inside a rigid hull.”31
Portsmouth’s advantage was that, having been first with the process in 1934, the yard had
more experience in perfecting the process and adding content to the cylinders.
Portsmouth, with fewer building sites than other yards, had great motivation to perfect
the sectional construction process to accelerate the turnover of submarine hulls on the
limited number of building sites. Without this concept, Portsmouth would have been an
average shipyard. With it, the yard was something special.
According to Fred White, the thirteen steel cylinders that were welded together to
form a pressure hull were manufactured at various sites in the shipyard, and staged at the
building ways, ready to be lowered by crane into the dock or basin as soon as a launching
occurred and the dock was free. Figure 13 shows two submarine pressure hull sections on
the blocks in Dry Dock #1. On at least one occasion, White recalled, a launching
occurred in the morning, the dock was pumped down during the day, and the thirteen
pressure hull cylinders were lowered into place on the blocks on the dock floor by the end
of the same day.32 Fred White and his crew of riggers were well aware of the shipyard’s

31 Portsmouth Herald, 16 May 1942, “New Method Puts Subs Into Mass Production,” 1.
32 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 April 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
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critical need to maximize the use of the building sites in order to achieve maximum
production.

Figure 13: Submarine Pressure Hull Sections in Dry Dock #1.
Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, University of New
Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.
If the sectional construction process was Part #1 of the pseudo-assembly line at
the yard, Part #2 was the stepping o f the submarines through various berths for the
completion o f berth-specific jobs, many of which were accomplished by special teams.
Referring to Figure 14, White recalled that newly launched submarines were first berthed
at Berth 11 A, to have the sail and topside superstructure finished, after undocking from
Dry Dock #1. White’s men then moved the submarine to Berth 1IB for the installation of
periscopes and masts, then on to Berth 11C where the bow torpedo tubes were completed,
including the firing o f water slugs with the bow pointed out into the Piscataqua River.
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Figure 14: World War II Berthing Arrangements. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Base Central Files, Box 18, Folder S-6, “Launching-General.”
The submarines were then moved around the comer to Berth 13 where the stem tubes
could be completed and fired, and then on up the berth for the completion of work and
preparations for dock trials. Other work, of course, took place at each successive berth in
the process. The end result was an assembly line of sorts, where the submarine stepped
from berth to berth and Portsmouth’s work specialization teams reported to the same
berth over and over again to accomplish repetitive tasks.

1Ibid.
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Risk Management
The shipyard management team was aggressive and willing to assume reasonable
risks to increase production. Portsmouth Navy Yard faced two major obstacles to
increased production at the start of the war. The first, insufficient building ways, was
satisfactorily resolved locally through aggressive and innovative management. The
second, late deliveries of components supplied by contractors, was more difficult and
frustrating for management to deal with because the solution required the support of
external contractors and agencies. The yard could control its own fate on the first but
much less so on the second. As the war progressed, it was found that many contractorsupplied components were not only late but unreliable. This section looks at how the
shipyard, through risk management techniques, was able to resolve its dilemma with
building ways and contractor’s components.
By December 1942, the shipyard had created a number of opportunities for
increased production. One possibility was the use of the new Dry Dock #1 for
construction of two or three submarines at a time, instead of the repair o f submarines as
originally intended by the Chief of Naval Operations. At the start of the war, the Chief of
Naval Operations placed the highest priority on the repair and maintenance of the
existing fleet over new construction. Consequently, the Chief of Naval Operations
considered it an urgent matter to insure shipyard facilities and dry docks were available
for that purpose. The discussion that follows shows how Portsmouth Navy Yard
successfully challenged the original intent for the dock in the interest of maximizing
production at the yard. The tension that existed between the interests of the Chief of
Naval Operations, in the maintenance of the existing fleet, and the interests of the
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Assistant Secretary o f the Navy, in the construction of new ships, met in Dry Dock #1 at
Portsmouth Navy Yard.
By way o f background, the Greenslade Report on the Adequacy and Future
Development of Naval Shore Establishments, dated 6 January 1941, concluded that
Portsmouth Navy Yard should “handle 6% of the repair load of the entire U.S. Fleet.”34
The Greenslade Board recommended that “a Twin Destroyer Dock [able to accommodate
two destroyers at the same time] be built to enable the shipyard to carry its portion of the
work level.” The Bureau of Ships authorized the shipyard to construct such a dock in
March 1941.36 The Portsmouth Herald of 20 March 1941 reported that the dock “will be
big enough to handle destroyers as well as subs.” At no point in the article did it say that
the dry dock, at this early stage, would be dedicated to the construction of two or three
submarines simultaneously, which was its ultimate fate.
In January 1941, it was part of the U.S. Navy’s mobilization plan to assign
Portsmouth Navy Yard a significant fleet repair workload that was not necessarily limited
to submarine repair work. That intent was the Navy Department’s basis for authorizing
the new dock. Portsmouth management, however, wanted to shed as much repair work as
possible in order to streamline its operation for submarine new construction work.
Shipyard management could kill two birds with one stone if it could get the Bureau of
Ships and the Chief o f Naval Operations to authorize the building of submarines in the
new dry dock. The yard would gain two, possibly three, additional building ways for
34 Chief Bureau o f Ships letter o f 30 Dec 1942 to Chief ofNaval Operations. NARA College Park,
RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 18, Folder P2-4 (vol.3).
35 Ibid
36 Bureau o f Ships letter o f 14 Mar 1941. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General
Correspondence 1940-45, Box 18, Folder P2-4 (vol.3).
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increased submarine construction and, at the same time, discourage the assignment of
excessive repair work to the yard.
Commandant Withers presented two options to Washington to obtain the
additional building ways needed for increased production. Two side launching ways
could be built at Berth 6 in four or five months for about $90,000, or the new dry dock
could be used for new construction.

The shipyard argued that the use of the new dry

dock was far more efficient, more economical, and less risky than the side launching
ways. The dock was the more efficient option, because it was more centrally located to
the shops, and the more economical option, because the cost of preparation and launching
would require less timber and other materials than side launching ways. Finally,
launchings would be less risky because launching from the dry dock was merely an
undocking evolution while “the side launching scheme required the second vessel to be
•10

skidded up into launching position.”
The management of Portsmouth Navy Yard had ulterior motives for the dry dock
from the time construction started. Internal studies in December 1941 by Lieutenant
Junior Grade Arnold and Hull Superintendent Captain Spiller proposed the use of the
upper end of the new dry dock as a building basin for the construction of two submarines
simultaneously with the completion of the caisson and dry dock machinery. It was
thought that the dry dock would be far enough along to start construction o f two
submarines in May 1942.

The study concluded that, “By this method two vessels could

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ltjg H.A. Arnold memo o f 12 Dec 1941 to the Hull Superintendent. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box2, Folder A l-3, “Building
Program, PKG #4.”
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be sufficiently far advanced to permit floating them near the same time that the dock is
ready to go into operation [December 1942].” In other words, in December 1941, some
shipyard managers were considering the option of starting construction of two
submarines in a hole in the ground with no means of getting them waterborne unless the
remainder of the dry dock was completed as scheduled. This proposal was never
advanced to higher authorities for approval, but it does illustrate the aggressive thinking,
and the willingness to accept risk, that came to characterize the management of
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. From the start of the war, there appeared to be
little doubt in the minds of shipyard managers that they would eventually use the new dry
dock for construction of submarines. They merely needed to pick the right time to tell
their superiors of their plans. In the meantime, construction moved forward on the dock,
still officially intended for repairs and overhauls, through the summer and fall of 1942.
With the dock nearing completion, the yard moved to realize its objective. On 27
November 1942, Commandant Rear Admiral Withers wrote a personal letter to Rear
Admiral W.B. Farber, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, to gain support for
the yard’s plan to build submarines in the dock. Withers wrote, “The new twin dock is
fitted for shipbuilding, and it is located just outside our Shipfitters’ Shop, which is ideal
for shipbuilding.”40 Withers noted further that approval would result in a $100,000
savings over the other option of building two side-launch ways alongside one of the piers.
Withers then asked his friend to assist in gaining quick approval for his official request
that would soon follow.

40 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Radm Thomas Withers personal letter to Radm W.B.
Farber o f 27 N ov 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence
(Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 , “Building Program, PKG #4.”
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In December 1942, the yard pushed its proposal to a successful conclusion. Key
to gaining the necessary approval was the shipyard’s argument that the other dry dock
(Dry Dock #2) would be sufficient capacity for emergency repairs and that it would be a
waste of a valuable resource to not use the new dry dock for submarine construction.41
Utilizing the new dry dock with two building ways increased the number of building
ways to nine, giving a potential minimum annual building rate of twenty-seven
submarines. Higher building rates were possible if the time on the building ways could be
shortened to less than four months or more submarines could be squeezed into the new
dry dock.42 Both were eventually realized and the shipyard went on to achieve a building
rate of over thirty submarines a year.
How valid was the shipyard’s argument that Dry Dock #2 could handle all the
anticipated submarine repair work? In retrospect, it was probably a stretch of an
argument and somewhat of a risk to make such a case. An analysis of the 1943 weekly
dry dock usage reports shows that the dock was rarely without a submarine and
frequently there were two submarines in the dock.43 As it turned out, when building
dozens of submarines a year, a fair number of those required docking for repairs or
inspections. That workload alone kept Dry Dock #1 busy. The new dry dock, despite the

41 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Radm. Thomas Withers letter o f 7 Dec 1942 to Vice Chief
o f Naval Operations. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence
(Central Files), Box 2, Folder A l-3 , “Building Program, PKG #4.”
42Back-up memo for above letter, o f 1 Dec 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box2, Folder A l-3 , Building Program, PKG #4.
43 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral Thomas Withers letter o f 30 Mar 1943 to
Chief o f Naval Operations. NARA College Park, RG 80, Records o f the Navy Department 1798-1947.
Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence o f the CNO / Secretary o f the Navy 1940-1947, Box
897, File L9-3/NY-NY1.
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approval to use it for new construction, was first used for repairs to the US S Marlin in
March 1943. After that, the dock was dedicated to new construction for the remainder

Figure 15: Two Submarines Nearing Launch in Dry Dock #1.
Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, University of New
Hampshire Library, Durham, N.H.

of the war. The heavy use o f Dry Dock #2 suggests that it may have been a marginal
decision as to whether or not that dock could comfortably handle the repair workload. It
appears that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Bureau of Ships were content to let
Portsmouth Navy Yard run its own show as long as new submarines were being delivered
at record rates.
The risk management of Dry Dock #1 did not stop with the authorization to use it
for new construction of submarines. The first two submarine keels, for USS Bang (SS
385) and USS Pilotfish (SS 386), were laid in the dock on 30 April and 15 May 1943
respectively and those submarines were launched simultaneously on 20 August 1943.
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Determined to maximize the use of the dock, a few weeks later, on 9 September 1943, the
yard laid three keels in the dock for USS Razorback (SS394), USS Redfish (SS 395), and
USS Ronquil (SS 396). The launching of these submarines together on 27 January 1944
was described in the vignette that opened this dissertation.
The experiences with Dry Dock #1 illustrate well the aggressiveness of the
shipyard management team and a willingness to assume risks to achieve production
increases. At the same time, the decision to limit submarine construction in Dry Dock #1
to two at a time, after building three at a time only once, shows that the shipyard was also
quick to balance reason and risk. Recalling that the triple simultaneous launching
occurred in January 1944, had the shipyard continued to successfully build three at a time
in Dry Dock #1, the title of this dissertation might have been 36 in ’44 instead of 32 in
’44.
jfk -k

The emphasis of Portsmouth Industrial Survey #1 (December 1941) was on
facility and personnel upgrades. By the time of the team’s second report in June 1942, the
personnel issue was o f secondary importance, facility improvements were well underway,
and the emphasis had shifted to material procurement and scheduling. The board’s June
1942 report opened with an enthusiastic endorsement of the yard’s exceptional
performance during the first six months of the war:
The increase in the rate of building submarines has far exceeded not only the
schedule but even the most optimistic hopes of everyone connected with i t . ..
This [greatly reduced] length of time on the building ways seems phenomenal
when compared to the best performances reached by other yards.4

44 Portsmouth Industrial Survey II (June 1942), 1.
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The report then turned to the problem of material procurement:
The greatly accelerated rate of construction of submarines has brought to
light certain additional factors which adversely affect the building program in
various degrees... Procurement under present conditions [a lack of orders far
into the future] is one of the most critical factors in submarine construction.. .
A system has been formed and the method of scheduling has been changed
radically... the system offers promise of more orderly construction and
shorter building periods.45
It was the team’s opinion that “the acquiring o f a long-range construction program is of
prime and critical importance” because it would allow bulk ordering and “lessen the
difficulties of procurement which in itself would eliminate or minimize many other
problems of management.”46 In other words, if the shipyard could order material for five
or six submarines at a time, the first submarine on the schedule might suffer late
deliveries but the others would probably have a large percentage of ordered material
sooner than needed.
Unfortunately, the shipyard’s plans to bulk order material further aggravated a
military procurement system that, according to historian David M. Kennedy, by the
summer of 1942, had “abandoned any vestige of military discipline” as “Military
purchase orders became hunting licenses, unleashing a jostling frenzy of competition for
materials and labor in the jungle of the marketplace.”47 In time, more disciplined priority
systems would better integrate and coordinate interservice and civilian needs. However,
at the start of the war each service and industrial community was looking out for itself
and Portsmouth Navy Yard was certainly no exception.

45 Ibid., 5.
46Ibid:
47 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 626-627.
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In late 1942, the shipyard reported that the only scheduling delays being
experienced at the yard were associated with late component and material deliveries. In a
12 December 1942 letter to the Bureau of Ships, Portsmouth reported with confidence
that it could build submarines in 150 days, but necessarily continued scheduling
construction for 210 days because of problems with material deliveries, especially steel
and main engines. Industrial Manager Captain Davis wrote:
The steel situation calls for special comments. At the start, the [SS]285 Class
submarines were handicapped due to late receipts of high tensile steel and
heavy plates for bulkheads. This same situation exists now for the [SSJ308
Class, and serious delays are being encountered. 48
Late steel deliveries were a widespread problem in the shipbuilding industry. In Ships fo r
Victory, maritime historian Frederick C. Lane concluded that, by late 1942, “Facilities
were adequate so that deliveries [of completed merchant ships] would have been higher
in the last quarter o f 1942 and throughout 1943 if more steel had been allocated to the
yards.”49 The bulk ordering o f steel for many submarines of the same class permitted
Portsmouth Navy Yard to build 32 submarines in 1944, very close to the maximum
capability o f its facilities. Unfortunately, bulk ordering, such as employed by Portsmouth
Navy Yard, further exaggerated steel shortages at other shipyards. Lane noted, “It should
be made clear that the limit to merchant ship production was set not by the nation’s steel
capacity alone, but by it in conjunction with the allocation of steel to Army, Navy, and
other users.”50 Implied by Lane is that the excessive ordering of steel throughout the

48 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 12 Dec 1942 to Bureau o f Ships. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1, Folder A l,
“New Construction 1941-1943.”
49 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 343-344.
50Ib id , 301.
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armed services, which enjoyed much higher priorities than the U.S. Maritime
Commission, contributed to the detriment of merchant shipbuilding. Portsmouth Navy
Yard stands guilty as charged.
Late deliveries were not limited to steel. In April 1942, the yard reminded the
Bureau of Ships that the delivery schedule for the submarine building program in
progress depended on delivery of main propelling machinery for which the Bureau was
responsible. Worse yet, the shipyard had received no information from the Bureau as to
when the equipment would be available.51 In August 1943, the shipyard reported
schedule delays due to late receipt of main power electrical control cubicles and motors
for auxiliary equipments.

The next month the yard reported that delivery dates for

auxiliary and main engines and generators were 4 to 8 weeks late for orderly progress.

Cl

Delivery dates for radars, sound gear, and batteries were reported to be 2-3 weeks late. As
noted earlier, the delivery dates for the first submarine of an order were often in jeopardy
but the remainder of the submarines on that order usually had the needed equipment on
hand well before the scheduled installation dates.
The problem with late contractor components was highlighted at a conference at
the Bureau of Ships on 13 and 14 August 1943 that had been called in response to Under
Secretary o f the Navy James ForrestaTs request to see what could be done to speed up

51 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 6 Apr 1942 to Bureau o f Ships. NARA College
Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence 1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY/P-16-1
January 1944.
52 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 11 Aug 1943 to Bureau o f Ships, NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New
Construction.”
53 Portsmouth Navy Yard Progress Report for Month o f September 1943 NARA at College Park,
RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence 1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY1.
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submarine construction. Portsmouth Navy Yard was represented at the conference by the
Production Officer, Captain Dudley. Dudley’s conference report shows that
representatives from Portsmouth, Electric Boat, Manitowic, Cramp, and Boston were
“unanimous in their comments that the present difficulty was largely due to late delivery
of component parts and that the situation was getting no better.”54 Each yard identified
other needs that might lead to improved production, but all else paled in comparison to
late material deliveries. It was suggested by the Bureau of Ships that perhaps a central
procurement agent, like Electric Boat, might better coordinate deliveries to each shipyard.
The Electric Boat representative responded that E.B. did not want the job, but “they
would do it if it was decided upon.”55 The yards agreed that it would be better to continue
with the present system than try to initiate a new ordering system that might further
compound their problems.
At the conference, the shipyards were asked to predict annual submarine
production capacities assuming the completion of necessary plant improvements and the
assumption of satisfactory material deliveries. The following responses were given by the
representative of each yard:56

Portsmouth
Electric Boat
Manitowoc
Cramp
Boston

1944

1945

30
32
13
18

35
42
15
18
14

54 Capain Dudley’s conference report o f 17 Aug 1943 on BuShips Conference o f 13 & 14 Aug
1943. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 1,
Folder A l, “New Construction Jan 1940 to Dec 1943.”
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
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Indicative of the comprehensive understanding that Portsmouth had of its capabilities and
processes, the yard came close to achieving its predicted maximum production the next
year when 32 submarines were actually delivered in 1944, two more than predicted. All
the other yards fell short of their predictions. A major reason for Portsmouth’s success
was its ability to manage and work around late and unreliable contractor components.
In addition to late deliveries, Portsmouth Navy Yard and the other yards had to
deal with the receipt of poor quality and unreliable components. The shipyard determined
early on that certain pieces of critical equipment were too unreliable to install shipboard
as received from the contractor. To do so was to jeopardize completion schedules, if the
equipment failed later and had to be removed from the tight confines of the submarine for
overhaul. Worse yet, premature failure after leaving the yard could jeopardize lives. Not
having the time and resources to satisfactorily engage and resolve all contractor issues in
a timely manner, the shipyard routinely reworked critical components, at its own
expense, prior to installation. The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) highlighted this
practice:
Certain items of submarine equipment such as electric driven pumps and air
compressors are invariably broken down after delivery from the
manufacturer, and given a complete overhaul. This is justified by the Yard as
economical in the long run since, earlier in the building program, defects
developed after installation so that units had to be removed for overhaul.57
By assuming extra work up front in the schedule, the shipyard hoped to avoid late and
disruptive work that might jeopardize completion. Risk management was well integrated
into the routine shipyard planning, procurement, and production processes during the
war.

57 Booz-Allen Industrial Study (1944), 8.
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The production scheduling system developed at Portsmouth Navy Yard early in
the war became a valuable tool for managing and working around material procurement
problems. Faced with a rapidly expanding workload, it soon became obvious that the
work scheduling practices, which had produced one or two custom-built submarines a
year in the past, were outdated. In addition, the expected increased production required
much closer coordination between designers, material procurers, schedulers, and those
executing the work.58
Prior to any description of Portsmouth’s scheduling system, it is important to
appreciate the advantage that Portsmouth and Electric Boat enjoyed as the principal
designers of the submarines they were building. During the war, each new order for a
group, or class,59 of submarines brought the requirement to incorporate the latest
technical improvements, frequently determined by feedback from battle tested
submarines. As a principal design agent, Portsmouth could incorporate the necessary
changes, freeze the design, and promptly feed the changes to the yard’s scheduling
system for advance bulk ordering of material and job order preparation for the next group

58 Industrial Manager Report o f Manager’s Conference o f 22 Jun 1943. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Yard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General
Management 1932-1940.”
59 Accounting for the classes o f submarines built during World War II can be a confusing subject.
Gary Weir, F orged in War, 16, note 30 explains that “Although the three principal classes o f fleet
submarines during World War II were Gato, Balao, and Tench, technical variations within each class often
prompted submariners and BUSHIPS to refer to particular groups o f submarines by more specific class
names, like Gunnel or Drum,” According to Cdr. John D. Alden, “Victorious Submarines o f World War
II,” United States Submarines, 116, Gato was the basic World War II fleet submarine design. B alao’s
primary technical variation was an increased test depth and Tench’s primary technical variation was
increased torpedo stowage. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s Administrative History o f World War II, 1 notes that
between June 1940 and June 1943 the yard received contracts for no less than 8 different classes totaling
106 submarines. Thus, Portsmouth Navy Yard considered each new order for a group o f submarines to be
a new class o f submarine.
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of submarines to be built. This was all part of the streamlining of the design and
production processes for new construction.
The improved scheduling system, the Portsmouth Material Control System,
revolved around the yard’s continual efforts to maximize hull section content in the shops
prior to delivery to the building sites. This more formal system of subassembly, work
scheduling, and material control was implemented in July 1942 with the express purpose
of “providing a better means of building more submarines in less time.”60 The basic
building block of the system was a control unit, termed a “group,” that was essentially the
largest subassembly that could be efficiently put together, usually off-site, prior to
shipboard installation. Based on the shipyard’s experience, the completion of groups was
scheduled no more precisely than the specific week that the assembly was needed after
the laying of the keel. For example, a group that was required two weeks before the
laying of the keel would be labeled 2B [for Before] and a tank required four weeks after
keel laying would be identified as 4A [for After]. This was a major advance over
previous scheduling attempts at the yard. The scheduling system, designed and
implemented in 1942, reflected eight years of experience with submarine sectional
construction that had started in 1934 with the NIRA submarines.
Under the new Portsmouth Material Control System, the start date for
construction or assembly of each group then dictated need dates for all the other support
activities that were required in advance of that event, including material deliveries, the
issuance o f drawings and plans, and shop manpower assignments. A key step in the
process was the verification that all material and support documentation were on hand
60 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 23.
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prior to the start of the job. The group schedule could be easily transferred from hull to
hull for all submarines of the same class, permitting the bulk ordering of material for
similar ships o f the same class far in advance of actual need dates. Thus the Portsmouth
Material Control System became the prime tool that enabled the yard to circumvent the
inefficiencies o f the procurement system.
Portsmouth’s Material Control system was a first step towards critical path
scheduling. Portsmouth’s locally designed and implemented scheduling system was
critical to the shipyard’s ability to accelerate construction from mid-1942 through the end
of the war. The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) acknowledged the value of the
Portsmouth Material Control System and recommended further enhancements to the
system for improved integration of material ordering with planned work schedules.61
Innovation
Much of what shipyard management did to increase production during the war,
and much of what has been presented in this chapter thus far, can be grouped under the
generic heading of innovative management. However, a few additional examples will
make the argument for innovative management even more convincing. For a starter,
innovation was obviously present in August 1941 when the shipyard convinced the
Bureau of Ordnance to permit the use of twenty obsolete muzzle loading guns of the
Civil War period, then in storage at the yard, as bollards on the new extension of
Berth 6 62

61 Booz-Allen Industrial Study (1944), 11.
62 The Chief o f the Bureau o f Ordnance letter o f 2 Aug 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files, Box
36, Folder N20-5, “Bollards Mooring.”
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Two other examples, much less pragmatic, were far more important to the
shipyard’s mission. The first involved the need to find transportation to and from the
shipyard for thousands of new employees. The second involved delaying the arrival of
submarine crews at the shipyard to minimize mutual interference between crews and
shipyard workers during the final stages of construction. The latter was not as simple a
matter as it may first appear as it required that the Chief of Naval Operations be
convinced that the war effort would benefit by having the crews spend less time at the
shipyard becoming familiar with their new submarines. As with the shipyard’s plan to use
Dry Dock #1 for new construction, Commandant Withers did not hesitate to challenge the
decisions and policies of his superiors when needed to improve his shipyard’s
productivity. Similarly, Portsmouth Navy Yard’s recommendations were usually well
received in Washington because of the yard’s recognized position of excellence in
submarine technology and construction.

The rapid increase in employment required some means to get thousands of new
employees to work at the shipyard at a time when automobiles were in short supply and
gasoline was rationed. In March 1942, the yard contracted with Hill Transportation
Company of Portland, Maine to provide bus service within a 60 mile radius of the yard.
The service continued until November 1944 when the yard began to run its own fleet of
buses. Hill’s fleet of over 100 buses brought employees to work from as far away as
Lowell, MA., Portland, ME., and Manchester, N.H.

The shipyard estimated in a 1946

63 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 38.
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report that, during the peak employment period of the war, 10,000 employees arrived for
work daily in 2,500 vehicles (averaging 4 occupants per vehicle), 8,000 by bus, and 2,500
walked to work. Vehicles and buses were filled to capacity to conserve gas and tires for
the war effort.64
Mass bus transport for shipyard workers contributed to a significant reduction in
local traffic during the war years, despite a doubling of the local population and a
quadrupling of shipyard employees. Undoubtedly, the rationing of automobiles, tires and
gasoline also contributed significantly to traffic reduction. At any rate, traffic surveys of
vehicles crossing the interstate bridge connecting Portsmouth and Kittery showed the
following:65
Period

Total Vehicle Count

12/1/41-8/1/42
12/1/42-8/1/43
12/1/43-8/1/44
12/1/44-8/1/45
12/1/45-8/1/46

785,870
520,925
316,327
498,429
830,860

It is interesting to note about the time that the Portsmouth Navy Yard employment
peaked at 20,465, in late 1943, the traffic crossing the bridge was less than half what it
was at the start of the war. Employees were walking to work from nearby housing
projects, sharing a ride with several other employees, or taking the bus. The innovative
and far-reaching bus system was critical to the local communities’ conservation efforts,
as well as the shipyard’s success.
***

64

Ibid.

65 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area” Cumings Library and
Archives, Strawbery Bank Museum, Portsmouth, N.H.
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Innovation was also evident when Commandant Withers approached the Chief of
Naval Operations in January 1943 with a request to delay submarine commissioning
dates and, thus, the arrival of submarine crews at the shipyard, so as to minimize the
mutual interference between crews and shipyard workers as the submarine approached
completion.66 Prior to the spring of 1943, this period of mutual interference varied from
submarine to submarine but was typically between six and eight weeks. For example, the
USS Balao (SS 285) was commissioned at Portsmouth Navy Yard two months before
completion on 4 April 1943.
The Chief of Naval Operations approved Wither’s request and the next submarine
completed at Portsmouth, the USS Billfish (SS SS286), was commissioned just 15 days
prior to completion. Thereafter, during the war, submarines at Portsmouth Navy Yard
were routinely commissioned between two and three weeks prior to completion.
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s record of success and recognized expertise in submarine
construction had paved the way for the fleet support that was needed to promote further
success. Confident in the quality of Portsmouth-built submarines, and the leadership of
Commandant Withers, the Chief of Naval Operations agreed to reduce the time that his
submarine crews had to inspect and familiarize themselves with their submarines prior to
departure from the shipyard. This action proved to be less controversial than one might
think because, as the war progressed, the submarine commissioning crews included
increased numbers of battle experienced submarine sailors who required less time to
familiarize themselves with a new submarine.

66

Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 16 Jan 1943 to Vice Chief o f Naval Operations.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Shipyard Formerly Confidential Correspondence 1930-50, Box 4, Folder SS/S8
Trials.
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Communications and Control
Earlier it was established that Commandant Withers had great “people skills” as a
leader. He was a personable leader with a bent towards congeniality and open
communications with his subordinates and employees. Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Ralph A. Bard held similar views about the importance of open communication. In June
1943, Bard urged navy yard commandants to promote open lines of communication
between management and employees. Bard believed that:
Any team whether in sport, industry, or war, to be effective must have a
common understanding of the game. To secure the highest degree of
efficiency, each member of the team must at least understand the signals, the
objective, the rules, and the part he is to play.67
Bard saw the process of open communication to be a win-win situation for both
management and employees, “The process of taking employees into the confidence of
management creates far greater respect for management and usually saves much time and
energy for both groups.”68 Commandant Withers and his managers could not have agreed
more.
There was no need to establish open lines of communication at Portsmouth Navy
Yard, as the Secretary of the Navy was suggesting, because it already existed in spades.
From Rear Admiral Withers’ open leadership style, to the civilian managers that Eileen
Dondero observed roaming the industrial areas interacting with the employees, open
communication was a way of life in the yard. As the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey
(1944) had observed, despite a minimum amount of paperwork and written instructions
67

Assistant Secretary o f the Navy Ralph A. Bard letter o f 5 Jun 1943 to Commandants and
Commanding Officers Concerned. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General
Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General Management 1932-1940.”
68 Ibid

245

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and few meetings, the work got done. William Tebo never saw a job order during the six
months that he worked at the yard in 1944.69 He was well trained for the jobs he was
assigned and performed them well as did, apparently, most shipyard employees. Open
and efficient communications were byproducts of the yards’ “walk around” style of
management. Furthermore, management tried to take advantage of the latest technology
to facilitate communications and information transfer.
***
The state of communication and information transfer systems that existed in 1940,
when mass production arrived at Portsmouth Navy Yard, was inadequate for the task. If,
as this study suggests, the shipyard employed management techniques well ahead of their
time, the yard did so with rudimentary communication tools, making the shipyard’s
success even more remarkable. Management’s efforts to upgrade the yard’s technical
capabilities for efficient information transfer and communication can be taken as an
indicator of the importance that was given these subjects. Unfortunately, shipyard
management struggled throughout the war to gain the approvals needed from higher
authority to upgrade internal communication and control systems to the extent that they
believed necessary to effectively coordinate the greatly increased activity in the yard.
At the start o f the war, Portsmouth Navy Yard lacked internal systems of
communication and control that existed in other shipyards. These shortcomings included
a grossly inadequate phone system, ineffective means to transmit messages and work
instructions throughout the yard, no “clock system” for the accounting of employee
hours, and no “check system” for employee payment. In fact, the shipyard did not begin

69 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
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paying by check until 13 May 1942.70 In essence, Portsmouth was still a manual yard
whereas other yards had taken the first steps towards the automation of various
administrative tasks. Portsmouth, favored with workload prior to the war, had not been
favored with any degree of automation. The custom building of a submarine or two a year
was primarily based on experience and acquired skills, not state of the art communication
and automation.
The yard’s telephone system was outdated and greatly under the required capacity
at the start of the war. In 1936, it was reported that the shipyard manual phone system
had a capacity of 200 lines, 150 of which were then in service, with some 13 pay stations.
As the shipyard began to ramp up production in response to ever increasing orders in
1940 and 1941, shipyard management quickly realized that the shipyard’s phone system
was not equipped to handle the increasing workload. Telephone upgrades were installed
on a piecemeal basis, but complaints of poor service persisted throughout the war.
The late 1930s saw the development of several technological developments in the
telephone that greatly increased the capacity and efficiency of phone systems. Coaxial
cable was introduced in 1937, as well as multiplexing techniques that allowed numerous
calls to be carried over one cable simultaneously. Switching technology also advanced in
the late 1930s, becoming more rugged and reliable. More mundane improvements
included the combined handset and spiral cord, both introduced in 1938. Transistor
circuitry and electronic switching, developed for military applications during the war,
found widespread civilian application immediately after the war. At any rate,

70 Portsmouth Herald, 14 Mar 1942, “Portsmouth Navy Yard Makes First Payment by Check”, 1.
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telecommunications technology had made great strides by 1940 but the shipyard had
benefited little from those advances.

71

Rear Admiral Withers issued a shipyard notice on 10 December 1942 that urged
employees to make as few calls as possible, because “The large expansion in personnel
and work of the Yard has increased the volume of telephone business to the point where
the present capacity of the Yard Telephone Exchange is overtaxed during certain hours of
the day.”72 The Industrial Manager also believed, as late as January 1943, that “The
Yard’s steadily expanding building program, combined with the increasingly difficult
problems of material procurement, has developed to a point where the existing telephonic
communication between the material Planning Superintendent’s desk and the Supply
Department. . . is totally inadequate.”

7T

Davis wanted the shipyard to purchase one of the

many inter-office communication systems that were appearing on the market about that
time.74
The state of communications technology in the early 1940s is a study unto itself.
Systems that the shipyard considered buying at the time were quite rudimentary. Those
systems included SELECT-O-PHONE (an automatic telephone service that eliminated
the need for an operator and provided for “hands free” speaker communication), an
exclusive Exec-U-Phone, a system for recording conversations on vinyl 78 RPM records,
71 Susan E. McMaster, The Telecommunications Industry (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 2002),
68-71.
72 Portsmouth Navy Yard Notice o f 10 December 1942, NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General Management
1932-1940.”
73 Manager memo o f 14 Jan 1943 to Public Works Officer. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General Management
1932-1940.”
74 Ibid.
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a TelAutograph Telescriber (an inter-department communication system to eliminate
phone calls between shipyard departments and provide for the efficient movement of
material and supporting paper between departments), an RCA Paging and Public Address
System, and an audible and visual call system for the shops. In the spring of 1943, the
shipyard was attempting to get approval to install an announcing system that would
enable the commandant to readily communicate in a broadcast manner to many important
buildings and worksites, and also enable industrial managers to better communicate
within their buildings.75 The request was denied by the Bureau of Ships.
The manual methods of transfer of technical specifications and work instructions
between the Supply and Industrial Departments that worked when the yard built one or
two submarines a year could not work efficiently when it built one or two dozen
submarines a year. In 1941, Portsmouth requested approval from the Bureau of Ships for
the purchase of three teletype machines to improve the internal “handling of dispatches
and other paper.”

If

Again, the request was denied. According to the Bureau of Ships,

teletype machines were not cost effective when compared to telephone rates and other
means to transmit production instructions throughout the yard.77 Clearly, the Bureau of
Ships was out of touch with the needs of the navy yards.

75 Industrial Manager Capt. H.F.D. Davis memo o f 1 Apr 1943 and Portsmouth Navy Yard letter
o f 18 May 1943 to the Chief o f Yards and Docks. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 13, Folder A3-2, “General Management 1932-1940.”
76 Navy Yard Portsmouth Dispatch 261600 o f 26 Jun 1941 to Bureau o f Ships. NARA College
Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 791, NY1/L11-3 vol.2 to CNY1/N6, Folder NY1/N36.
77 Chief Bureau o f Ships letter to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard o f 25 Aug 1941. NARA
College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 791, N Y 1/L11-3 vol.2 to
C-NY1/N6, Folder NY1/N36.
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Portsmouth Navy Yard’s outdated systems were not limited to communication
and information transmittal systems. The Industrial Officer, Captain Davis was surprised
to find, upon reporting to the shipyard in 1941, that “Unlike probably all Navy Yards,
Supervisors of Shipbuilding [at private shipyards], Commercial Companies, and
70

Government Offices, Portsmouth does not have a clock system.” Instead, employee
time and attendance records were kept manually. Worse yet, the shipyard did not have a
check payment system in place, as most other shipyards had, and employees lined up
every Friday for a cash payday that was the height of inefficiency and disorder.79
Hull Superintendent Tusler deplored the chaotic conditions that existed in the
yard on Fridays when large numbers of employees lined up to be paid in cash for their
weekly hours. He recommended that the shipyard “adopt a check method of paying Yard
employees in order to eliminate the delays now encountered on Friday.” Tusler also
recommended that the yard “Adopt a time-clock system of checking employees in and
out, and require employees to check in and out four times a day as is customary in other
Yards.” The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts authorized the shipyard to install an
OA

employee clock system in June 1941, but it would be nearly a year later, 13 May 1942,
before the shipyard would have the time-clock system completely installed and be able to

78 H.F.D. Davis letter o f 24 May 1941 to Capt. Claude A. Jones, Bureau o f Ships. NARA College
Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 791, NY1/L11-3 vol.2 to CNY1/N6, Folder NY1/N36.
79 Hull Superintendent (F.A. Tusler) memo to Production Officer o f 3 Feb 1941. NARA Waltham,
RG 19, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), Box 26, Folder A 19,
“Conferences, Congresses, and Conventions.”
80 Bureau Supplies and Accounts 1 letter o f 19 Jun 1941. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f
Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, NY1/L11 3 vol.2 to C NY1/N6, Folder NY1/P18-2.
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begin to pay by check and alleviate the inefficiencies caused by cash paydays.

81

Cash

paydays may have made sense when the yard employment was a few thousand, but by
May 1942 employment was about 15,000 and chaos reigned on Friday afternoons. It was
estimated in May 1942 that the check payment system would save 7,000 man-hours per
week.82
The yard started the war with insufficient and inefficient systems that were
inferior to many of the other yards. Worse yet, even though the yard recognized the need
for significant upgrades to those systems that were commensurate with the production
improvements expected of the yard, support for those upgrades was not forthcoming. As
the yard management did with other obstacles, be it building ways, unreliable contractor
components, or antiquated communications and control systems, it found a way to get the
job done with what it had available.
Farm-Out Programs
The shipyard could not have achieved its production records without an extensive
farm-out program. This program involved a network of local shops able to accomplish
the machining, welding, and electrical work that exceeded the capacity of the shipyard’s
shops. Prior to September 1941, the machining of aluminum containers for electrical
fixtures was the only work farmed-out by the shipyard. With increased orders for
submarines, the capacity of the Inside Machine Shop was quickly exceeded and, in late
1941, the Industrial Development Company of Portland, Maine was contracted to
manufacture air compressor and pump parts. In March 1942, additional Machine Shop

81 Portsmouth Naval Base Order No. 15-42 o f 5 May 1942. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 8, Folder “Navy Yard Orders 1942.”
82 Portsmouth Herald, 14 May 1942, “Portsmouth Navy Yard Makes First Payment by Check,” 8.
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work was farmed-out to Kidder Press Company of Dover, N.H. Kidder Press eventually
accumulated $4.7 million of Portsmouth Navy Yard contracts and performed so well
against those contracts that, based on the shipyard’s recommendations, received several
government awards for excellence. Local welding companies were also used to relieve
the overloaded shipyard welding shop.
Figure A-4 in the appendix, Portsmouth Navy Yard Man Hour Curve per
no

Submarine (1940-1945)

shows how the shipyard greatly increased farm-out work

(shaded on Figure A-4), beginning in late 1942 and continuing until mid-1945. Most
noteworthy is the fact that when the yard achieved its maximum efficiency of 665,000
manhours per submarine in mid-1944, approximately 100,000 of those man-hours were
attributed to farm-out work. Farm-out work was extensive through mid-1945, when
shipyard orders declined and greatly reduced the need to export work. Shipyard records
for 1943-44 indicate that, “The total value of contracts farmed out amounted to
approximately $13,190,409. This represents a value greater than the entire Yard output
during the fiscal years of 1939 and 1940.” In other words, the annual farm-out program
during the two peak war years, 1943 and 1944, approximated the annual shipyard
production for the two years immediately prior to the war.
The magnitude of the farm-out programs highlights even more the importance of
the Portsmouth Material Scheduling System. The shipyard needed to coordinate a farmout program that approximated the workload of another entire shipyard, as well as late
and unreliable contractor supplied material and components, with accelerating production

83 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 31.
84 Ibid.
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schedules. Fortunately, most of the farm-out program involved reliable local vendors that
were essentially an extension of the shipyard.
Lean Manufacturing
Lean manufacturing, the elimination of frills and waste from manufacturing
processes, was not a household phrase in the early 1940s. One might think that lean
manufacturing would be a natural by-product of war time production. This is true to a
large extent and, in fact, the submarines delivered by Portsmouth Navy Yard during the
war had few frills and crew comfort features compared to today’s standards. However, it
is also true that, during the war, shipyards had to be reminded of the need to direct
resources to essential work only. The following example illustrates the seriousness with
which the senior German submarine officer, Admiral Karl Donitz, viewed the subject of
lean manufacturing and how the Bureau of Ships used an intercepted Donitz communique
to make the same point to navy yards.
In January 1942, the Bureau of Ships directed navy yard commandants to restrict
the use o f shipyard resources for crew amenities in order to support more critical
shipboard work and timely deliveries of ships under construction. The Bureau noted that
the enemy had taken extreme measures in that regard, as evidenced by a 16 April 1941
communication from Admiral Donitz to his subordinates that the Office of Naval
Intelligence had intercepted with the capture of a U-570 Class submarine in August 1941.
Donitz wrote:
I have noticed that too much time has of late been spent on finishing work
and repairs... I absolutely forbid the issue of orders which merely contribute
to the comfort of the boat’s complement. . . The kind of finishing work that
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is being carried out at present can no longer be tolerated, because it retards
active service and puts too great a strain on the dockyards.85
The Bureau of Ships suggested that, “The conditions which led to the issuance of
this order in Germany in the spring of 1941 apply with even greater force in the
United Nations in the spring of 1942.”86
The Bureau o f Ships had little need to caution Portsmouth Navy Yard about
excessive finishing work and accommodating requests from the crews for comfort items.
Portsmouth was delivering submarines rapidly in cookie cutter fashion, where all came
from the same mold, with little opportunity for variation. In addition, the crews, after
Commandant Withers’ move to shorten their time in the yard to a few weeks prior to
completion had little time to solicit extra work from the shipyard.

In summary, the methods employed by Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war
contained many o f the same elements taught in management schools and seminars forty
years later, especially employee empowerment and special teams. In addition, welldesigned training programs, assembly lines, risk management, innovation, open
communications, farm-out programs, and lean manufacturing were all in evidence at the
yard during the war. Moreover, the methods were implemented by a competent
management staff and an intelligent, self-motivated workforce. The combination proved
to be a powerful force that produced submarines at unprecedented rates.

oc
Chief Bureau o f Ships E.S. Confidential letter o f 4 Mar 1942 to Commandant Navy Yards.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Shipyard Formerly Confidential Correspondence 1930-50 - Declassified by
NARS per NCD Project #745085 and by the Navy Department, Box 3, Folder E.F. 30, “ German,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, May 1929-August 1945.”
86 Ibid
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Measurables
No matter how competent the management, how dedicated the workforce and
how well conceived the industrial tactics and strategy, it is results that count. This section
analyzes the results of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s performance during the war in terms of
production, quality, and cost.
Production
As noted at the beginning of this study, the Portsmouth Navy Yard completed
seventy-nine submarines between 1 July 1940 and 1 July 1945 after averaging the
•

completion o f less than two submarines a year in the 1930s.

87

Electric Boat completed

seventy-eight submarines during the same period. Portsmouth built 81% of the 98
submarines built in navy yards and Electric Boat built 70% of the submarines built in
private yards. At the risk of being slightly repetitious, the discussion that follows restates
a few of the production records presented earlier in this study, along with additional
noteworthy achievements.

QO

87 Portsmouth Herald, “Yard Tops in Sub Production,” 1.
88 With much o f the discussion that follows focused on the large numbers o f submarines built by
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war and the remarkably short building periods between the laying o f the
keels and completion for many o f those submarines, it is appropriate to highlight a December 1941 change
to the completion trials agenda that shortened subsequent building periods by several weeks to a month. On
18 December 1941, the Chief o f Naval Operations eliminated builder’s underway trials and substituted
main propulsion and auxiliary machinery trials alongside the pier, subject to the acceptance o f the Board o f
Inspection and Survey (Insurv Board). Underway trials were eliminated to accelerate completions and
avoid any possibility o f o ff shore enemy attacks. The process for acceptance trials o f submarines was
simplified even more in October 1942, when the President o f the Board o f Inspection and Survey requested
shipyards to establish their own sub-boards to perform acceptance trials and inspections in those cases
where workload prevented the participation o f an Insurv Board team. As the result o f this abbreviated
wartime acceptance procedure, any comparisons between World War II submarine building durations and
prior building durations must take this change into account. Comparisons o f building durations between
competing submarine building yards during the war are legitimate as they all complied with the same
completion requirements.
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The yard’s remarkable string of “firsts” began with the first double launching of
United States submarines when the Scamp and Scorpion slid down their building ways on
20 June 1942.89 Another first for the yard was the double launching of Picuda and
Pampanito from the new building basin on 12 July 1943, marking the first time that
submarines had been fabricated below water level at Portsmouth Navy Yard. This
practice, o f course, would become the key to Portsmouth’s success once Dry Dock #1
was put into use for the construction of new submarines. The construction of multiple
submarines below the waterline in the building basin and Dry Dock #1 would enable the
shipyard to dramatically increase production, despite the severe limitation in traditional
building ways. The yard improved upon its dual launchings with the first triple submarine
launching on 28 October 1943 when the Sterlet and Pomfret were floated in the new
building basin and the Piranha was launched in the traditional manner from the building
ways.90 On 27 January 1944, the shipyard went one better and set another world’s record
by launching four submarines on the same day. Razorback, Redfish, and Ronquil were
floated in Drydock #1 and Scabbardfish slid down a building way.91 A fifth submarine,
the Segundo, was launched from a building way ten days later making it five launchings
in eleven days.92

89 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Jun 1942, “Marks Yard’s 6th, 7th Sub o f 1942,” 1.

90 Portsm outh H erald, 25 Oct. 1943, “Three-Sub Launching Wednesday,” 1.
91 Portsmouth Herald, 27 Jan. 1944, “4 New Subs Launched for World’s Record,” 1. To keep the
record straight and acknowledge that other shipyards were also achieving remarkable production during the
war, it should be noted that the front page o f the Portsmouth Herald, o f 2 Mar 1943 has a picture o f four
new destroyers being launched in fourteen minutes at the Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company at
Kearny, N.J. earlier that year.
92 Portsmouth Herald, 5 Feb. 1944, “5th Sub Here in Ten Days,” 1.
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The time from the laying of the keel until completion of a submarine was cut
more than in half between November 1941, when USS Drum (SS 228) was delivered in
469 days, and December 1942, when USS Steelhead (SS 280) was delivered in 222 days.
Portsmouth would eventually reduce submarine building time to 173 days and set another
record by launching USS Cisco (SS290) just 56 days after laying the keel.93 The
production numbers leave little doubt that Portsmouth was a superior shipyard.

Figure 16: Rear Admiral Withers and Managers Displaying “E” Award.
Courtesy of Milne Special Collections, University of New Hampshire,
Durham, N.H.

Those numbers led to six Army-Navy Production “E” Awards between 10 August 1942
and 18 July 1945. Portsmouth Navy Yard had the distinction of being the first naval

93 Administrative History: Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 69.
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establishment to receive the award.94 The initial award was presented by Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard at a ceremony with two governors, two Senators, a
Congressman and 10,000 shipyard employees in attendance. The five renewals of the
semi-annual award that followed meant that the yard was continuously recognized
throughout the war for superior production performance.95 The yard won the award
every time it was eligible for the award.
Table 10 compares the World War II performance o f Portsmouth Navy Yard
against its primary competitors, Electric Boat, Groton, Ct. and Mare Island Navy Yard,
Vallejo, C a:96
Table 10 - Submarine Shipyard Schedule Performance (World War II)

Shipyard
Portsmouth
Electric Boat97
Mare Island98

Subs Built
1940-45
79
78
17

No. Bldg Ways
1941 1945
5 9
11 21
2 8

Shortest
Bids Pd
173 days
317 days
273 days

Shortest Time
on Bids Wavs
56 days
est. 8 mos.
192 days

Compared to its competitors, Portsmouth submarines spent remarkably less time on
the building ways and were completed many months sooner. With only nine
building ways at Portsmouth, compared to twenty-one ways at Electric Boat,
94 Portsmouth Herald, 8 August 1942, ‘Navy Yard Hailed for ‘Practical Patriotism;’ Gets E Award
Monday,” 1.
95 Administrative History, Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 73.
96 David Randall Hinkle, Editor-in-Chief, United States Submarines (Annandale: Navy Submarine
League, 2002), 114-115.
97 John D. Horn, Submarines and the Electric Boat Company, Page V-3, Electric Boat had 11
building ways in 1940. Page V-5, Ten building ways were added with the Victory Yard in 1941. Navy
Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
98 United States Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Ships, 1946, Navy Department
Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 635-637.
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Portsmouth-built submarines were launched at a rate that was over four times faster
than those at Electric Boat. As has been repeatedly emphasized throughout this
study, it was this unusually high launch rate that was critical to the success of
Portsmouth Navy Yard.
A comparison to the average time on the building ways for Liberty ships,
which were simply designed for rapid construction by the hundreds, sheds even
more light on Portsmouth’s remarkable achievement. After averaging about 150
days on the ways in January 1942, Liberty ships were routinely launched in 40 days
by late 1942, and that performance remained typical for the remainder of the w ar."
As noted earlier, the submarine USS Cisco was launched at Portsmouth in late
1942 after just 56 days on the ways. By late 1942, private shipyards had progressed
well down the learning curve for Liberty ships and the yards were mass producing
the vital shipping needed to replace that being sunk at record rates by German Uboats. Portsmouth was making comparable progress towards the mass production
o f submarines that would eventually return the favor.
The shipyard’s record of consistent, outstanding production performance was well
recognized during the war. In April 1944, the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged
the fleet’s appreciation o f Portsmouth Navy Yard’s performance:
The Chief o f Naval Operations desires to extend his congratulations to the
Commandant, to the officers and men under him, and to the civilian
employees who have contributed a part to the submarine building program.
Their wholehearted cooperation and thorough workmanship, characteristic of

99 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 174.
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all Portsmouth boats, is a factor that has contributed in no small part to our
Navy’s success in the submarine war to date.100
Portsmouth Navy Yard’s remarkable production and the quality of Portsmouthbuilt submarines as well, were recognized and appreciated at the highest levels of
the U.S. Navy.
Costs
It was not that Portsmouth Navy Yard management did not care about costs.
Rather, early on, they had decided that the importance of costs paled in comparison to
time when building submarines for national defense. The report issued by Captain
Andrew.I. McKee’s industrial review team on 8 December 1941 concluded with a
statement emphasizing the importance of time versus costs:
Time which is lost now can not later be made up no matter how great the
effort. In comparison with time, cost is now of so little importance that it
must be completely disregarded if thereby a loss of time can be avoided.101
Thus, from the day the war started, it was the shipyard’s strategy to essentially disregard
costs for the sake of production and accelerated submarine completions. The analysis that
follows will show that this management strategy that placed extreme emphasis on
production efficiency also produced excellent cost performance as a byproduct.
Any cost analysis of operations at Portsmouth Navy Yard during war suffers
because o f abbreviated and incomplete accounting records. However, there is sufficient
information available to evaluate the cost performance of Portsmouth relative to other
navy yards in selected areas. In addition, local records are available that show dramatic

100 Chief o f Naval Operations letter o f 26 Apr 1944 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard.
NARA College Park, RG 38, Chief o f Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 1182, Folder NY1,
1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jun 1944.
101 Portsmouth Industrial Survey #1 (December 1941), 15.
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reductions in the number of labor manhours (labor costs) required to build a submarine as
the war progressed.
Table 11 shows the average manday costs of productive labor and the indirect
overhead expense as a percentage of productive labor for all navy yards for FY 1942.102
Table 11 - Navy Yard Costs Performance (1 July 1942 to 30 June 1943)
Ave. man-day Cost of
Productive Labor f$)

Portsmouth
Boston
New York
Philadelphia
Washington
Norfolk
Charleston
Mare Island
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Average All Yards

Indirect Ovhd
Expense % P.L.

8.32
8.41
8.74
8.48
8.15
7.65
7.67
8.64
8.77
9.10
8.38

39.8
37.7
46.1
42.7
83.0
43.7
38.0
42.2
54.9
65.2
47.2

For comparison purposes, it can be seen that the average cost per labor manday at
Portsmouth Navy Yard was slightly above the average at all navy yards, while the
overhead expense was considerably less than the average at all navy yards. The labor
costs are more geographically influenced than indicators of individual yard efficiency;
the West Coast yards being the highest, the southern yards the lowest, and the East Coast
yards in the middle. However, overhead expenses, the indirect costs and support required
for productive labor to accomplish its work, is an indicator of shipyard efficiency and
Portsmouth is among the leaders in this category, far below the average of all navy yards.

102 Chart entitled, “Comparative Statement — Expense Trends at Navy Yards - Percentages o f
Productive Labor.” NARA College Park, RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence
1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY Jan 1, 1943.
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Streamlining shipyard operations for submarine new construction, especially independent
small teams that required little support, would have contributed to low overhead rates.
On a macro scale, the above analysis indicates that Portsmouth Navy Yard was
very competitive with other navy yards as far as labor and overhead costs were
concerned. However, that cost competitiveness would only result in cost reduction and
cost savings if the yard was able to improve its performance on each successive
submarine.
It was not a simple matter to determine the cost of a submarine built at
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. Part of the streamlining of processes for new
construction was the issuance of job orders by classes of submarines and not for
individual submarines, because the same jobs were accomplished on all submarines of
the same class. Consequently, costs were not collected on individual submarines but
rather on the entire order of a group of submarines. Thus, return costs were not available
until the last submarine o f the order was completed and, even then, much prorating of
costs was involved. This practice prevented the use of return costs as a management tool.
However, a popular maxim of the shipyard industry is that “time is money,” meaning that
ships require expenditures as long as they remain at the shipyard. At a minimum, ships
require services and utilities, and, being the complicated piece of machinery that they are,
something always requires maintenance or repair. Thus, while Portsmouth was not
monitoring and managing costs on an individual ship basis, the shipyard was certainly
keeping costs under control by delivering a submarine to the fleet every few weeks
during the height of the war.
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In March 1945, responding to the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) that noted
a lack of production and cost control records, Commandant Rear Admiral Withers
emphasized that the shipyard’s first priority during the war had been production, but cost
reduction had also been a by-product of that priority:
During the war and until recently the Yard’s principal business has been the
construction of submarines. The Yard completed 12 submarines in 1942, 19
in 1943, and 32 in 1944. Production records covering man hours required to
build those vessels and most of their important components during the three
years are available and clearly indicate that costs were reduced progressively
as the volume of production increased.103
Figure A-4, Portsmouth Navy Yard Man Hour Curve per Submarine (1940-1945),
illustrates well the cost reduction to which Commandant Withers was referring. Note on
Figure A-4 that the manhours required to build a submarine decreased from close to
2,000,000 on 7 December 1941 to 665,000 during the second quarter of 1944. It can be
concluded that the labor cost per submarine delivered in 1944 was about one third the
labor cost per submarine delivered in late 1941.
Portsmouth’s ability to deliver submarines at the end of the war, at 33 percent of
the manhour cost required at the start of the war, compares favorably with the manhour
cost reductions experienced on Liberty ships. At the start of 1942, the first Liberty ships
delivered required about 1,250,000 manhours to construct. By mid-1945, the manhours
had dropped to about 400,000 per ship, 32 percent of the initial cost.104 One can conclude
that Portsmouth Navy Yard achieved cost reductions on submarines during the war that
were almost identical to those achieved on Liberty ships, a product that was much less
j(V 2

Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 23 Mar 1945 to Bureau o f Ships. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder L-5, “Inspection
Naval Yard, 1945-48.”
104 Frederick C. Lane, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, 231, Figure 19.
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complicated than submarines and specifically designed for ease of construction.105 When
examined in light of the well documented efficiencies of Liberty ship construction,
Portsmouth’s war record is all the more impressive.

But how did Portsmouth cost performance compare to its prime competitor,
Electric Boat? Naval historian Gary Weir says that, “Of the five building yards
producing the Navy’s submarines during the war, EB did the job more cheaply than the
others.”106 Citing an Electric Boat cost of $2,765,000 for SS222, Weir shows that,
“When compared by the Price Adjustment Board in the spring of 1942, EB’s unit cost on
the SS222 fell below those recorded at Portsmouth and Mare Island by about $1 million
[36% less].”

1fi7

Weir also cites a 1938 Navy Department study comparing the cost of

building ships at private versus public yards that concludes that private yards could build
ships more cheaply for reasons that included lower pay rates and less generous leave
policies. The study noted, however, that comparisons “could only be made in the most
» AO

general terms.”

t

Only general comparisons could be made because the cost accounting

practices were different between public and private yards. Weir closes his analysis of
construction costs by noting that in the spring of 1942, Electric Boat took an average of
fourteen months to complete a submarine whereas Portsmouth took only nine and one
half months, 32 % less time. The completion of a submarine in 32% less time at 36%
more cost argues against the “time is money” argument presented earlier. The analysis
105 Twenty-seven hundred Liberty Ships were built during the war. Another three thousand ships
o f all types were built, including 1,556 naval vessels. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 653.
106 Gary Weir, Forged in War, 34.
107 Ibid
108 Ibid., note 70.
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that follows will clarify this apparent discrepancy and show that, had the Price
Adjustment Board done a similar review of submarine construction costs in 1944, during
the peak production years of the war, Portsmouth’s costs would have compared much
more favorably to Electric Boat’s costs.
World War II actual cost data for submarine construction is scarce at best.
However, in early 1941, Captain Davis’s staff provided him the following cost estimates
for submarines under construction at Portsmouth; USS Marlin (SS205) - $3.6 Million,
USS Grayling (SS209) - $4.3 million, and USS Drum (SS228) and USS Runner (SS275)
- $4.5 million each.109 The last three submarines are of the same class as the Electric Boat
submarines that resulted in the average unit cost of $2,765 million reported earlier. Thus,
an apples-to-apples comparison is possible. At first blush, it appears that the average cost
differential between Portsmouth and Electric Boat was even greater than the $1 million
reported by the Price Adjustment Board.
Analyzing Figure A-4, showing the average labor manhours required per
submarine at Portsmouth, will further clarify the yard’s cost performance. The high cost
estimates provided the Industrial Manager in early 1941 were most likely based on the
yard’s recent performance in 1940, when the yard required about 1.75 million manhours
to complete a submarine. By the spring of 1942, when the Price Adjustment Board
provided its comparison figures, Portsmouth had reduced their labor per submarine to
about 1.4 million manhours. This 20% reduction in labor manhours would have reduced
actual costs on SS228 and SS275 proportionately to about $3.6 million, roughly equal to
the $1 million differential cited by the Price Adjustment Board in the spring of 1942. The
109 Memorandum for Manager o f 5 Feb 1941, Subject: Estimate o f Statistical Cost o f Submarines
Under Construction. NARA Waltham, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central
Files), Box 26, Folder A 19, “Conferences, Congresses, and Conventions.”
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question is, “Is that a fair comparison of Portsmouth and Electric Boat costs for the
reminder of the war years?” When asking that question, one should keep in mind that
almost all of the submarines built by Portsmouth (79) and Electric Boat (78) during the
war were built after the Price Adjustment Board’s report in the spring of 1942.
Another look at Figure A-4 leads one to conclude that the comparison is fair and
accurate only if Electric Boat made the same dramatic labor savings as did Portsmouth
throughout the remainder of 1942, 1943, and the first half of 1944. In other words,
Electric Boat would have had to reduce labor costs by over 50%, as did Portsmouth,
between the spring of 1942 and the summer of 1944, for the comparison to be valid in
1944.
Granted, Electric Boat probably experienced labor savings during those years.
However, this is where the “time is money” argument reenters the picture. As it turns out,
in the spring o f 1942, Portsmouth was still turning out submarines in 12 or 13 months and
not the 9 lA months reported earlier.110 By the summer of 1944, Portsmouth was routinely
completing submarines in six months or less. Thus, between the spring of 1942 and the
summer of 1944, Portsmouth reduced its average building period approximately 50%
while reducing costs by about the same 50%. Electric Boat did not experience a similar
dramatic reduction in building durations. As noted in Table 10, Electric Boat’s shortest
building period was a little over ten months. If one gives Electric Boat a seemingly

110 Administrative History, Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me. An addendum provides a chart showing dates for keel laying, launching,
and completion for all Portsmouth-built submarines between 1940 and 1945. In the spring o f 1942,
completions had been reduced to 12 or 13 months. On June 6, 1942 Portsmouth Industrial Survey I, 1
reported, “The time required to build submarines between keel laying and completion has been reduced
from 15 months for the fastest built ships at this yard before December 1, 1941 to a few days less than 12
months for the latest completed ship. To date the shortest building time at other yards has been 12 1/3
months at Groton and 14 months at Mare Island.”
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generous credit of 25% improvement in building time, it seems reasonable to conclude
that a cost comparison between the two yards in 1944, when both were operating at
maximum efficiency, would have found Portsmouth comparing much more favorably
than it did in the spring o f 1942.
There is another factor to be considered when comparing costs between
Portsmouth and Electric Boat. It will be argued later in this section that Portsmouth-built
submarines were typically more complete and better equipped with the latest design
improvements than were submarines delivered by Electric Boat. That is to say that
Portsmouth, a government shipyard, was more accommodating to contract modifications
that added work, than was Electric Boat, a private shipyard. Late work is often costly and
disruptive to other planned work. Portsmouth’s costs would have been driven up
accordingly.

In the shipyard’s response to the Booz-Allen Industrial Survey Report (1944),
Commandant Withers explained that the recent curtailment of orders for new submarines,
and the assignment of other miscellaneous work to the yard, required the shipyard to pay
closer attention to the forecasting of workload and manpower requirements. Also,
Withers explained that the yard was returning to former cost control and cost monitoring
practices that included the keeping of material usage and tonnage records of production
in the Blacksmith Shop and Foundry, the rate of use of each type of welding rod, and the
issuance o f individual ship job orders.111 Thus, in May 1945, the yard began to undo

111 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter P20-1 (8 9 2 7 -l)o f2 3 Mar 1945 to Bureau o f Ships.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 15, Folder L-5,
“Inspection Naval Yard, 1945-48.”
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much o f the streamlining for new construction that had carried it so successfully through
the war.
In highlighting the return to cost control measures with the winding down of the
war, the shipyard was confirming the assignment of secondary importance to such
measures during the war. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s emphasis was on maximum
production during the war, not keeping records. Returning to Figure A-4, it can be noted
that, with the reinstitution of record keeping and cost monitoring practices, the manhours
expended per submarine increased dramatically in 1945. Many factors contributed to this
labor cost increase, including a drop in orders for new construction, an increasing repair
and miscellaneous workload, and the efficiency disruptions that typically accompany a
dramatic reduction in workforce in an industrial environment. Even more difficult to
measure, but definitely a factor, was the psychological return to normalcy and more
relaxed work rates after working under supercharged wartime conditions for four years. If
nothing else, the inefficiencies realized in late 1945 validated the golden era of
production that Portsmouth Navy Yard had experienced during the war, when the decks
had been cleared for new construction and processes had been streamlined towards that
end.
Quality
Lacking modem quality control records, the quality of Portsmouth submarines
built during World War II is best judged by the reports of the Board of Inspection and
Survey and the testimonials of the men who sailed them to war. For example, the material
condition of the USS Trout, one of the first submarines that the yard delivered to the fleet
after Pearl Harbor, was praised by the Board of Inspection and Survey: “The Trout was in
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an unusually advanced stage of completion and excellent operation condition.
Workmanship is excellent. This vessel is an achievement that reflects credit upon the
Portsmouth yard.”

119

•

•

Portsmouth-built submarines were routinely praised by inspection

teams.
The fleet’s high regard for Portsmouth-built boats was acknowledged by the Vice
Chief of Naval Operations, in March 1945, when he sent the shipyard the following
excerpt from the war report of a recently returned U.S. submarine, “The officers and crew
of this submarine heartily endorse the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, as a
builder of rugged submarines.”

119

The choice of the adjective “rugged” to describe

Portsmouth-built submarines was most likely made by a submarine Commanding Officer
whose ship and crew had survived a depth charge attack, thanks to the skilled
workmanship of Portsmouth employees.
Between 10 January 1944 and 7 July 1945, the Commanding Officers of ten
different submarines commended the shipyard for the fine construction and workmanship
on their Portsmouth-built boats.114 Those compliments included one from Lieutenant
Commander George Street, Medal of Honor recipient as Commanding Officer of
Portsmouth-built USS Tirante. Lieutenant Commander Street thanked Portsmouth Naval
Yard “for building us such a crackerjack submarine.” He reported that the “Japs tested

112 The Portsmouth Herald, 19 Feb 1941, “Commends Navy Yard on Sub Trout," 1.
113

Chief o f Naval Operations letter o f 27 May 1944 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard.
NARA College Park, RG 38, Chief o f Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 79, Folder;
Portsmouth, 1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jun 1944.
114 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 69.
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the hull” and the “crew found it eminently satisfactory.”115 It was an accumulation of
such accolades that caused the Chief of Naval Operations to cite the “thorough
workmanship, characteristic of all Portsmouth boats”116 in an April 1944 letter to the
shipyard.
The Booz-Allen Industrial Survey (1944) confirmed what the fleet already knew
when it concluded that the result of Portsmouth’s efforts “has been an outstanding
performance, not only in numbers of vessels produced, but in the satisfactory quality and
performance o f these vessels, as evidenced by favorable comment of commanding
officers.” 117 Indeed, the best measurement of the quality of a shipyard’s workmanship is
the favorable endorsement of the Commanding Officers and sailors who sailed its ships
into harm’s way.
A submarine sailor’s perception of quality has much to do with the time and effort
required of him to make repairs. Submarines built in private yards apparently sailed from
the yard with incomplete work that was left for sailors to finish. On the other hand, a
Portsmouth-built boat left the yard a much more complete product. According to
submarine historian Commander John D. Alden:
As a government yard, Portsmouth was quick to correct problems
encountered during service, whereas the boats delivered from the private

115 Portsmouth Naval Base Notice o f 8 May 1945. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Base General Correspondence, Box 9, Folder A7-1 “Notices Navy Yard and Naval Base Jan 1 1945 - to
1950.”
116 Chief o f Naval Operations, letter o f 26 Apr 1944 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard.
NARA College Park, RG 38, Chief o f Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 1182, Folder NY1,
1 Jul 1943 - 30 Jun 1944.
117 Secretary o f the Navy letter o f 6 N ov 1944, to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA,
College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 785, Folder NY1/A3.
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yards had to have more last-minute changes made at Pearl Harbor or other
advanced bases before going on patrol.11
From this standpoint alone, one can understand the fleet’s appreciation for a Portsmouthbuilt boat.
In closing this discussion on quality, it is appropriate to highlight the fact that
Portsmouth maintained consistently high quality despite frequent first-time installations
of important new design features on its submarines. With a career background steeped in
submarine tactics and technical needs, Commandant Withers had a compelling interest in
expediting the latest design upgrades to the fleet. The designers, draftsmen, and planners
who worked for the Planning Officer, Captain A. I. McKee, were responsible for working
out the details and sending the upgrades to the production schedulers. As noted earlier,
the yard was blessed with a cadre of experienced and talented designers who were able to
expedite those upgrades. Captain McKee, who held the important Planning Officer
position from March 1938 until January 1945, brought considerable experience and
consistency to the process that hastened design changes to the fleet.
Portsmouth Navy Yard, as the primary submarine design yard during the war,
often delivered its submarines with state-of-the-art technical upgrades far in advance of
other submarine shipyards. Shipyard records note, with considerable pride, the important
technical features that the yard was able to progressively and routinely incorporate into
the basic World War II fleet-type submarine design that existed at the start of the war:
Included in these changes were: the increase of hull strength, or maximum
depth for submergence; addition of several types of radar; a change to direct
drive with slow speed motors instead of noise-producing reduction gears;
addition o f considerable sonar equipment; equipment capable of withstanding
the shock of depth-charge; sound isolation methods to minimize noise
118 Cdr. John D. Alden, USN (Ret), “Victorious Submarines in World War II,” in David Randle
Hinkle, Ed., United States Submarines (Annandale, Va.: Naval Submarine League, 2002), 115.
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transmitted through the hull by auxiliary machinery and electrical equipment,
and many others. 19
First-time installations of design changes require special attention and extra effort to
insure satisfactory performance and compatibility with other shipboard systems. They are
typically costly and not trouble-free. Portsmouth Navy Yard’s ability to routinely install
design upgrades, while achieving remarkable production rates and consistently high
quality, reflects even more credit on the shipyard management and employees. More
importantly, submarine Commanding Officers could confidently go to sea in a
Portsmouth-built submarine knowing that it was well built and technically superior to
other submarines.
Considerable evidence supports the conclusion that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s
remarkable production performance during the war was achieved with no sacrifice to cost
and quality. The well advertised production numbers speak for themselves and a closer
look at cost and quality has shown equally impressive results.

119 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 2.
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CHAPTER VI

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
“By the mid-twentieth century. . . sources responsible for air and water pollution as
well as solid waste had long since dumped their waste on the most readily available
land, into nearby streams, or into the air. Most of these argued that this strategy of
dispersion should continue.”1
Samuel P. Hayes
Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental
Politics in the United States 1955-1985

Shipbuilding and submarine construction has had an environmental impact on the
natural resources o f the seacoast area of New Hampshire and southern Maine for over
three hundred years. Shipbuilding started locally at New Castle in 1690, subsequently
moved to Badger’s Island, and the Portsmouth Navy Yard was established in 1800.
During the era of wooden sailing ships, local forests were cleared for shipbuilding timber
including, at the time, the world’s best supply of tall, large diameter pines that were ideal
for masts for ships of the Royal Navy. The 19th century also saw the shipyard land area
greatly expanded through extensive marshland reclamation and the filling of shoal waters
between islands. This shipyard tradition of land accrual continued well into the 20th
century and peaked during World War II. Diesel powered submarines were first built at
the yard in 1915 and nuclear submarines were constructed at the site between 1965 and
1972. The primary business of the yard, since 1972, has been the repair and overhaul of

1 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States
1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 72.
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nuclear submarines.2 As shipbuilding materials and technology advanced and the
construction of submarines became the primary business of the yard, the by-products of
the industrial processes took an increased toll on the environment. As it turned out, that
environmental toll had long term consequences that were little appreciated at the time. A
significant milestone in the environmental history of the yard was reached in 1994 when
the yard was declared a Superfund site as the result of the local dumping of industrial
waste, subsequently found to be hazardous, for many years. The roots of many of the
waste disposal practices that led to the Superfund status can be traced to World War II
activity at the yard.

-3

Many of the environmental events discussed in this chapter were of little concern
during the war. This is not so much a reflection on the shortcomings of Portsmouth Navy
Yard, as it is a measure o f the need to restructure priorities, whatever the cost, to support
the war effort, and an ignorance and innocence towards environmental matters typical of
the times. In particular, there was little appreciation for the long-term consequences of
unsatisfactory waste disposal practices. The shipyard dumped raw sewage and industrial
effluents directly into the Piscataqua River during the war, as did most of the
communities surrounding the yard. Not only was there little concern for this practice, but
the visible pollution occasionally reported by inspectors went, to a large degree,
unnoticed by shipyard workers. If noticed, it was quickly accepted as a cost of doing
business. That business, o f course, was to win a war. The dedication and effort needed to
2 The last submarine to be built at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the USS Sand Lance (SSN 660),
was completed in 1972. The shipyard continues to overhaul nuclear submarines, and will do so for the
foreseeable future, after surviving an attempt by the Department o f Defense to close the yard in 2005.
3 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is
an EPA national program to identify and assess past hazardous waste disposal sites posing a potential threat
to human health or the environment. Sites gaining this dubious honor are referred to as Superfund sites in
recognition o f the costs that are normally incurred to restore the sites.
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win the war overwhelmed any thoughts of moderating industrial activity to accommodate
concerns for natural resources.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) studies in the 1980s found extensive
evidence o f inadequate postwar waste disposal practices for hazardous materials, at the
shipyard, that included chromium, lead and cadmium-plating sludge, asbestos insulation,
volatile organic compounds, waste and paint solvents, mercury-contaminated materials,
and sandblasting grit containing various metal wastes. According to those studies, many
of these materials were dumped on the shipyard’s tidal flats as part of land reclamation
projects. This dumping, and other similar practices, caused the shipyard to be placed on
the National Priorities List (NPL) for Superfund projects in 1994. Recovery actions to
date have required the expenditure of millions of dollars in clean-up projects.4
The EPA studies of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard seldom extend back into the
World War II era for lack of records and evidence. As noted earlier in this study, record
keeping during the war was greatly abbreviated. This study, however, does show that the
filling of shipyard tidal flats and shoreline shoal waters occurred during the war. The
nature of the yard’s work and the associated work practices did not change appreciably
with the conclusion of the war. Consequently, waste used as fill material during the war
probably contained many of the same waste products that EPA studies attribute to
postwar practices.
EPA studies also concluded that the shipyard’s postwar operations included the
discharge of raw sewage and industrial waste into the Piscataqua River. That industrial

4 http://vosemite.eDa.gov/rl/npl pad.nsf. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Waste Site.
Cleanup & Reuse in New England.
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waste included acidic and alkaline wastes, waste battery acid and lead sludge, as well as
waste water and spent baths from electroplating. EPA studies identified three postwar
liquid discharge sites immediately off shore from the shipyard’s fitting out piers with
high levels of heavy metals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), cyanide, phenol, oils and
grease.5 This study shows that the shipyard’s sewage system was greatly overloaded
during the war and, there is reason to believe, that the wartime sewage overload included
many of the same hazardous materials that the EPA attributes to postwar operations.
Many o f the EPA’s findings deal with the use of industrial waste products as fill
material to increase the shipyard’s acreage. The use of this waste for fill material
conformed to practices and procedures that were acceptable at the time but were later
found to be inadequate. The following table shows estimates of hazardous waste
reportedly disposed of at the Jamaica Island Landfill during the postwar period from
1945 to the mid-1970s:6
Substance

Estimated Quantity

Chrome Plating Sludge
Lead Plating Sludge
Cadmium Plating Sludge
Asbestos Insulation
Waste Paints and Solvents
Sand Blasting Grit

5,000-10,000 pounds
5,000-10,000 pounds
5,000-10,000 pounds
several thousand pounds
500,000 gallons
5,000 tons/year

If these wastes were being dumped in the Jamaica Island Landfill immediately after the
war, it is reasonable to assume that even greater annual rates were dumped during the war
years when the industrial activity was several times higher than it was at any time in the

5 Frederick T. Short et at., The Ecology o f the Great Bay Estuary, New Hampshire and Maine:
an Estuarine Profile and Bibliography (Durham: University o f New Hampshire, 1992), 85, Table 6.12.
6

Ibid., 82, Table 6.11.
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postwar period. This dissertation provides evidence of inadequate processes associated
with the above waste products.
Land recovery has been so critical to the shipyard’s development that the practice
has occurred almost continuously since the shipyard’s establishment in 1800. As a result,
the shipyard’s landscape and topography have been transformed significantly over the
last 200 years. Much of that transformation occurred during World War II. Prior to
analyzing wartime land reclamation projects, it is appropriate to review the historical
importance of such projects to the growth and development the yard. This longtime
practice has obviously been a mixed blessing.
Shipyard Land Reclamation (1800 to W W II)
A current map places Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on Seavey’s Island in the
Piscataqua River in the state of Maine. As can be seen from Figure A-5 in the appendix,
the current Seavey’s Island is the result of the combining of major four islands; Dennett’s
Island, the original Seavey’s Island, Pumpkin Island, and Jamaica Island.7 Figure A-5
highlights the extensive filling of shoal waters that has been required to enable the
shipyard to reach its current size.

7 The shipyard islands experienced numerous name changes prior to 1800. According to Walter E.
H. Fentress, Centennial History o f the United States Navy Yard at Portsmouth N.H., (Portsmouth: O.M.
Knight, Publisher, 1876), 8, two o f the islands are noted in the Records o f York County (1631) as
Puddington Islands, “so called because a John Puddington used the islands for drying fish.” In 1645, the
Puddington Islands were granted to Thomas Fumell by the colonial representative o f Charles I. Early
Kittery Town Records show many land grants to the Femald family (John Sr., Nathaniel, Samuel, James,
William, and John), starting in 1660, and no Fumell entries. Early maps show the original shipyard island
as Femald Island suggesting a derivative o f the Fumell name some time after the purchase o f the island by
Thomas Furnell. In 1794, James Sheafe purchased the island destined to be the site o f the shipyard from an
heir o f Thomas Fernald and, in turn, sold it to William Dennett just three months later. Dennett purchased
the island in anticipation o f its need by the U.S. Navy. According to the York Registry o f Deeds, Book 65,
Page 87, (transcribed printed copy held at the Kittery, Me. Town Office), Dennett sold the fifty-eight acre
island to the government in 1800 for $5,500. This study will consistently refer to Dennett’s Island when
referring to the original shipyard island.
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Marshland reclamation increased the initial shipyard on Dennett’s Island from 58
acres to 64.37 acres by 1843 and the shipyard more than doubled in size again with the
U.S. Navy’s purchase of Seavey’s Island’s 105 acres for $105,000 in 1866. The accrual
of Pumpkin Island and Jamaica Island, which occurred during World War II, constitutes a
large part of the shipyard transformation described in detail later in this study. World War
II and subsequent reclamation projects have increased the shipyard acreage to a total of
287 acres.8 It is noteworthy that the 50 acres of Superfund sites identified in the 1990s
were only slightly less than the shipyard’s original 58 acres on Dennett’s Island.

With the creation of the Department of the Navy in 1798, Congress authorized the
building o f six 74-gun frigates. The frigates were to be built, one each, at navy yards to
be established at Portsmouth, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Washington
D.C. Surveys for the proposed Portsmouth yard found nearby Dennett’s Island to be a
more favorable site for long-term naval construction than Badger’s Island, which had
been the construction site for substantial colonial shipbuilding. Dennett’s Island was
much larger, fifty-eight acres as compared to Badger Island’s twenty acres, and better
suited for timber storage. In addition to a deep harbor and convenient access from the
ocean, Joshua Humphries, the Chief Naval Constructor of the United States, noted that
“There is sufficient quantity of stone [on Dennett’s Island] for any building that may be
thought necessary to be erected for the use of the navy-yard.”9 Humphries’ report goes on

8 Clarke’s Island was added to the shipyard in the 1960s when it was acquired to accommodate a
much needed sound pier.
9 Joshua Humphries’ Report, January 29, 1800. Excerpts quoted in George Henry Preble, Rear
Admiral, History o f the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N.H .(Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1892), 24.
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to note several disadvantages including “rapidity of the current” and a “hard, stony
bottom” that would complicate future wharf and pier construction. On a final note, he
added that the island is “never troubled with ice” because of the rapid currents. The rapid
river currents that prevented the accumulation of ice in 1800 were also thought to provide
adequate flushing of the yard’s sewage discharge to the river during World War II.
The Navy completed the purchase of Dennett’s Island from William and Sarah
Dennett on 12 June 1800. As can be seen from Figure A-6 in the appendix, the 1800 plan
for the proposed Portsmouth Navy Yard, the Navy purchased a sparsely populated island
with topographical limitations for future development. Much of the island was unusable,
steep, rocky highland, or lowland swamp. In the near term, limited shipyard operations
could begin on the south shore where the few houses on the island had been built. This
part of the island was also blessed with deep water and accessible waterfront. However,
full advantage could not be taken of those attributes until the highlands and rocky cliffs
were leveled and the lowlands filled to allow construction and development. The useable
southern portion of the island, near the deep water, was squeezed into the very limited
waterfront area available between the highlands and the shoreline.10 The highlands would
have to go if the shipyard was to grow.
Beginning in 1833, annual appropriations for leveling the yard, filling in low
grounds, and extending the wharves and waterfront area became routine. Most of this
activity was limited to the portion of the island directly across the river from what is now

10 Again, during World War II the shipyard was faced with the need to develop and extend the
southern portion o f the shipyard into the river to take maximum advantage o f the deep water and accessible
waterfront. The most obvious example is the reclamation and development o f Pumpkin Island Shoals,
opposite Strawbery Banke, at the start o f the war to accommodate the construction o f the five acre fittingout pier.
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Portsmouth’s Strawbery Bank. In May 1843, the commandant was able to report to the
Secretary o f the Navy that the original 58 acres of Dennett’s Island had grown to 64.37
acres, a 16% increase.11 A few months later, in July 1843, a local contractor, Mr.
Murgridge, one of many bidding on another major excavation project in the yard, wrote:
Proposal for removing Stone and earth at the Navy Yard and depositing the
Same within the Quay walls now being constructed . . . I will remove the
Ledge [by blasting] & earth in front of the Store House near the landing
place, and what may be required to finish the remainder of the contract, the
materials to be taken from the Ledge where I am now at w ork... .sixty three
19
cents per Cubic Yard.
Murgridge apparently won the contract because, a year later, the shipyard reported to the
Bureau o f Yards and Docks that Murgridge had fulfilled his contract and removed 10,000
cubic yards of ledge and earth.13 By the middle of the nineteenth century, the leveling of
the shipyard was nearing completion and marshland recovery had become a well
established practice.

In reclaiming marshlands, the navy yard was merely following the lead of many
local colonial communities. As towns like Boston and Portsmouth grew and exhausted
the immediately available real estate, the marshes became hindrances to urban prosperity.
Early Boston consisted o f 1,185 acres of dry land with 485 acres of salt marsh and 1,570
acres o f mudflats and shallow water surrounding the growing commercial and residential

11 George Henry Preble, Rear Admiral, H istory o f the U nited States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N.H.
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1892), 72.
12 Murgridge memo to Captain G.W. Storer o f 11 July 1843. NARA, Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence, Box 7, Folder “ Misc. Letters. Received.”
13 Captain G.W. Storer letter to Chief Bureau o f Yards and Docks o f 5 July 1844. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence, Box 3, Folder “Letters to Bureau
Yards & Docks.”
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development. By 1640, Boston’s population had reached 1,200 and lowlands greatly
restricted future growth. Reclamation of lowlands became a commercial necessity if
Boston was to grow and become the hub of New England. By 1647, the same year
Kittery was established, Boston had converted much of its natural salt marsh to useful
town property.14 Portsmouth experienced a similar expansion through the reclamation of
lowlands around Puddle Dock and other waterfront salt marsh areas.15 In time, urban
development at Boston and Portsmouth demanded more than just the reclamation of
lowlands. Large landmasses were added to city boundaries by filling in channels that had
previously separated nearby islands. Well before the shipyard’s founding in 1800, the
New England tradition of lowland recovery and island accrual, by filling in shoal waters,
was well established. It was only natural that the shipyard would follow a similar pattern
to acquire the real estate needed to insure its continued development.16
As discussed earlier, Dry Docks #1 and #2 were critical to the shipyard’s success
during the war. Both were constructed on sites with topographical advantages conducive
to dry dock construction and operation. A review of the historical development of those
sites will serve to illustrate important shipyard transformations leading up to World War
II. Dry Dock #1, the site o f the launching of three submarines in January 1944, evolved
from a natural cove on the original Dennett’s Island. Examining Figure A-6 (1800 map),
with an eye towards the future transformation and development of the shipyard, the cove
labeled “deep water cove most suitable for a dry dock” in the southwest corner of the
14 Ann Vileisis, Discovering the Unknown Landscape: A History o f America's Wetlands
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1997), 31-32.
15 See W. Jeffrey Bolster, ed., Cross-Grained & Wily Waters- A Guide to the Piscataqua
Maritime Region (Peter E. Randall Publisher: Portsmouth, N.H., 2002), 68-73 for an account o f the Puddle
Dock transformation.
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shipyard would evolve, by 1874, into a dock basin with a marine railway to pull ships out
of the water for hull repairs. Figure 17 below (1874 map) shows the rectangular shaped
dock basin and marine railway at the eight o’clock position on the island as part of the
post-Civil war expansion of the shipyard. The dock basin would contain the first shipyard
floating wooden dry dock, in the late 1800s, and become the site of Dry Dock #1 in 1942.
It was the use of Dry Dock #1 for submarine construction that enabled the yard to achieve
remarkable production despite a shortage of traditional building ways.

YARD

■I
Figure 17: Portsmouth Navy Yard Map of 1874. Courtesy
Of Milne Special Collections. Universtiy of New Hampshire
Library, Durham, N.H.
Figure 17 also shows the early development on Seavey Island, in the lower right
corner, after its purchase by the Navy in 1866. Dry Dock #2, the submarine repair and
overhaul dock during the war, was built between 1899 and 1906 in Jenkins Gut, the
channel separating Dennett’s Island and Seavey’s Island. A stone dry dock was
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constructed and the earth and rocks from the excavation for the dry dock,were used to fill
the remainder of the channel between the islands to accommodate building sites for
further shipyard development. Figure A-l (1939 map) shows Dry Dock #2 in the heart of
the shipyard. Dry Dock #2, and the buildings surrounding the dock, were the center of
shipyard activity until construction during World War II moved the shipyard center of
operations decidedly south and west towards the new dry dock and fitting out pier shown
on Figure A-2 (1945 map).
Thus, the dry docks that were so critical to Portsmouth Navy Yard’s performance
during World War II were historically the products of natural topographical features
transformed through dredging, extensive reclamation of wetlands, and the filling of shoal
waters throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. World War II developments at the
yard continued the topographical transformation that had been evolving over the past two
hundred years.
One final, near instantaneous, topographical transformation will complete this
pre-World War II review o f important shipyard topographical changes. With the advent
of the deeper draft steel ships at the turn of the 20th century, deeper and safer access to the
shipyard was needed. On July 22, 1905, 18,000 people crammed into wharves, islands,
and every available vantage point to watch the largest manmade explosion to that point,
when thirty-six tons of dynamite dislodged and crumpled 70,000 tons of rock at
Henderson's Point. The blast removed the most southern tip of Seavey’s Island and
widened the Piscataqua River by 400 feet at its narrowest point.

17

When dredged to 35

feet, the navigable waters leading to the shipyard were greatly increased and improved.

17 What is left o f Henderson Point is shown Figure A-2 (1945 map), the southern most tip o f the
shipyard in the center o f the map. Also see W. Jeffrey Bolster, e d Cross-Grained & Wily Waters- A Guide
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With improved access to the yard, the first half of the twentieth century saw
continued, gradual development of the shipyard. Between 1910 and 1940, the shipyard
experienced no major topographical changes. The emphasis, during this period, was on
the construction of the shops and facilities needed to accommodate the construction and
repair of steel hulled steam vessels, and then submarines, to the extent that federal
funding was available. The release of federal funds, for the ramp up for World War II,
renewed and accelerated the development and topographical transformation of the yard.
Shipyard Land Reclamation during World War II
As noted earlier, the shipyard’s land reclamation projects during the war included
the use o f industrial waste as fill material. Shop records were greatly abbreviated during
the war. Consequently, it is difficult to determine what wartime industrial waste was
dumped in which locations. With the postwar reemphasis on record keeping and material
accountability, it became easier to track waste materials. The postwar evidence was more
than sufficient to make the EPA’s case for Superfund status so there was no need to
attempt to reconstruct wartime industrial dumping. This study does resurrect evidence of
wartime dumping.
A memorandum from Commandant Rear Admiral C.W. Cole to shipyard
managers, dated 12 April 1939, indicates that inappropriate industrial waste was being
used for land fills on the eve of World War II. After a tour of the shipyard, Commandant
Cole wrote:
It is noticed that considerable burnable material (including food) is being
dumped in the Old Timber Basin adjacent to Bldg. 129. All burnable material
must be burned and the incinerator is maintained for that purpose. It is also
noted that tin cans and drums of various capacities are being disposed of
Guide to the Piscataqua Maritime Region (Peter E. Randall Publisher: Portsmouth, N.H., 2002), 193-197
for a series o f photographs showing Henderson Point before, during, and after the explosion..
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without any effort being made to crush these containers. This practice not
only causes the area to be unsightly but will result in a very unstable fill. All
containers must be crushed before disposal in any fill.18
It is highly probable that the cans and drums were petroleum containers with
environmental consequences that were unappreciated at the time. Commandant Cole was
not objecting to the routine use of cans and drums for fill material, or expressing any
concerns about the original contents of the containers. Rather, his prime concern was that
the drums be crushed to promote the long-term stability of the fill. The reclaimed timber
basin was to be transformed into building sites for an expanding shipyard, following the
shipyard’s well established practice of lowland reclamation. With this example of the
shipyard’s industrial dumping practices immediately prior to the war, one can only
imagine the extent of dumping activity that must have accompanied the great increase in
production during the war. The few records available show evidence of no special
handling of waste that must have included lead based paints, petroleum products,
asbestos, lead celled batteries, and mercury filled instruments.
The purchase of Jamaica Island early in the war, for ammunition storage,
eventually required extensive landfill to permit efficient access to the island. Shortly after
purchase a causeway was built to provide that access. Additional fill in the area o f the
causeway started late in the war and continued after the war with the bulk of the Jamaica
Island landfill occurring in the post war era. Jamaica Island is not even shown on Figure
A -1 (1939 map) and it is shown, fully developed, with a substantial land connection to
the shipyard proper, on the upper right hand comer, of Figure A-2 (1945 map). Figures
A-7 (1941 map enlarged) and A-8 (1945 map enlarged) show in more detail the
18 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral C.W. Cole letter o f 12 April 1939, Subject:
Grounds, and refuse material - care of. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Files, Box 15,
Folder N l-1 , “Grounds 1925-39.”
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development of this portion of the shipyard. It is obvious that much fill material was
needed to connect the islands and it appears logical that the practice used to reclaim the
nearby timber basin in 1939, the dumping of drums and other industrial waste, would
have provided much of that fill.19 A 1950 report, discussing the disposal of shipyard
waste, confirms the continuation of the practice observed by Commandant Cole in 1939.
According to that 1950 report, large items and cans were sent to a burning dump and
what did not burn was “carried to fill area near Jamaica Island.”20 It is not surprising that
the Jamaica landfill was one of the most troublesome of the Superfund sites and that
millions o f dollars would be required to clean up the area fifty years later.
The war also saw extensive reclamation of shoal waters on the northern shorelines
of Seavey Island. Figure A-8, an enclosure to the shipyard’s five year development plan,
submitted in June 1946, shows these areas annotated “FILL” with arrows pointing to the
filled areas. The annotation done in June 1946, on a shipyard map dated 30 June 1945,
appears to indicate that there was considerable dumping activity in these areas during the
final year of the war. These areas were also revisited and reworked as Superfund Sites in
the 1990s.
The largest reclamation project during the war was the dredging and filling of
Pumpkin Island shoal that reclaimed over four aces of land for the construction and
development o f the new fitting out pier. This area is highlighted on Figure A-2 (1945
map) that shows the new fitting out pier in the lower left hand comer jutting out into the

19 The timber basin is shown on Figure A -l (1939 map) just south o f the northern shoreline at the
12 o ’clock position on the map.
20 Portsmouth Navy Yard Medical Officer’s Semi-Annual Report for 1950 o f 4 Jan 1950 to the
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder “A9-1
Sanitary Reports.”
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river. This project extended the shipyard real estate well out into the Piscataqua River
towards Strawbery Banke and provided 1100 feet of additional pier space and berths for
submarines. The filling of Pumpkin Island Shoal was reminiscent of the process that
began in the early 19 century, when highlands in the same general area were leveled and
marshlands filled to develop those portions of the shipyard nearest the deepest channels
of the river. The Pumpkin Shoal reclamation did not become a Superfund Site. Much of
the fill for this reclamation was brought in from off the yard.21 Nearby dredging
operations that deepened the river access to the new fitting out piers also provided clean
uncontaminated fill.
Dr. C.F. Jackson’s Biological Survey o f Great Bay New Hampshire (1944) gives
some indication of the probable environmental consequences of the shipyard’s land
reclamation projects during the war. According to Jackson, “The mid-channel of the
lower Piscataqua and that of Little Bay have probably changed but little in the last several
hundred years. They are rock strewn and little erosion of sedimentation could have
occurred.”22 The river tidal flats, however, provided a protected “nursery for young fish
and a refuge for an abundance of fish food.” Historically, an abundance of eel grass
provided a protective carpet that prevented erosion of the tidal flats and efficiently
strained the heavy silt that otherwise would have covered clam beds and fish spawning
grounds. About 1931, “a disease attacked the eel grass along the Atlantic coast causing its
virtual disappearance.” Consequently, silting of mud flats had become a problem of
21 According to James Dolph, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard historian, much o f the fill material
for the new fitting out pier was trucked in from off-yard because the Jamaica Island fill was consuming all
the shipyard generated waste then believed suitable for fill material. Telephone interview with James Dolph
o f 16 March 2007.
22 All quotes in this paragraph are from Jackson, A Biological Survey o f Great Bay New
Hampshire, 24.
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increasing proportions in the 1930s. During the war, Dr. Jackson and others were still
experimenting with various “disease-resistant strain[s] of eel grass” with hopes of
rejuvenating the mud flats. Thus, the Pumpkin Island, Jamaica Island, and other shipyard
land reclamation projects during the war that filled in tidal flats must have further
reduced a shrinking fish and marine life food supply. And the shipyard’s uncontrolled
sewage and industrial waste discharges into the river would have compounded the
problem.
The reclamation of wetlands for shipyard expansion during the war was by no
means limited to Portsmouth Navy Yard. During the first few years of the war, Mare
Island Navy Yard more than doubled in size, expanding from 635 to 1500 acres, and
much of that expansion involved the reclamation of wetlands.

Describing the

environmental consequences of accelerated shipbuilding in the Bay Area, Wayne Bonnet
says:
At the time, unavoidable physical degradation of the land and shoreline was
an acceptable cost. To accommodate new shipyards, hills and rocks were
dynamited, channels dredged, wetlands diked and filled.24
Shipyard construction, or expansion, required an accommodation between the sea
accesses and the land and facilities where the work was to be done. It was inevitable that
real estate would have to be rearranged and shore lines adjusted. Portsmouth Navy yard
was no exception.

23 U.S. Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau o f Yards and Docks, Vol. 1. Navy
Department Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 196.
24 http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/travel/wwHbavarea/shipbuilding.htm. “World War II Shipbuilding in
the San Francisco Bay Area,” 3.
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Industrial Sewage
Portsmouth Navy Yard discharged sewage and other shop effluents directly into
the Piscataqua River prior to, and during, World War II. The shipyard was not unlike the
rest of the country in this regard. According to Samuel P. Hays, urban sewage treatment
“did not receive much attention until the New Deal public-works programs in the 1930s,
and was not taken up by most cities until massive federal funding became available
beginning in the 1960s.”25 Hays notes that it was not until after World War II that
industrial discharges began to arouse as much interest as did municipal sewage.26 Until
about 1950, a strategy of pollution dispersion prevailed whereby the dumping of wastes
into nearby streams was accepted practice.

97

What little environmental conscience the

shipyard possessed during the war can be summed up in the belief that the disposal of
sewage and industrial waste to the swift flowing Piscataqua River was an acceptable and
effective practice.
Limited pre-World War II efforts by state agencies to get the Portsmouth Navy
Yard, and other federal shore establishments, to comply with suggested state policies for
sewage treatment had no substantial legal basis for enforcement. Consequently, the
attempts were treated, for the most part, with benign neglect by the Navy and Portsmouth
Navy Yard. Once the war started, attention was focused on more urgent matters.28

25 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United
States1955-1985, 77.
26 Ibid.
21 Ib id ,12.
28 Portsmouth Navy Yard did not get a sewage waste treatment facility until 1975. However,
Admiralty Village, the housing project built in 1941 for naval personnel and shipyard employees did
include a waste treatment facility.
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The origins of the legal argument that prevented states from enforcing waste
discharge policies on federal navy yards can be traced back to Chief Justice John
Marshall and the McCullough v. Maryland (1819) Supreme Court decision. This decision
established the supremacy clause of the Constitution and thus made federal facilities
immune from state and local regulation.

This federal immunity gradually eroded after

World War II with the passage of legislation that included the Fresh Water Quality
Assurance Act (1948), the Clean Water Restoration Act (1966), subsequent Clean Water
Acts and amendments, and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency
(1970). Slowly but surely, federal shore facilities were held to increasingly demanding
environmental regulations administered through the EPA. However, prior to that time, the
Navy and its shore facilities treated attempts at regulation with a definite lack of
enthusiasm, as evidenced by events at Portsmouth Navy Yard in the mid-1930’s and early
1940’s.
The dumping of raw sewage by local communities, including the Portsmouth
Navy Yard, into the Piscataqua River, was a long-time practice that began to come under
increased scrutiny in the mid-193 Os as the result of growing national concerns about such
practices. Prompted by Congress, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks in
September 1935 advised the shipyard that, “A resolution adopted by the House of
Representatives on 7 August 1935 requested the President to inform the House of the
number and distribution o f Federal institutions and establishments of every kind and
character, which are depositing untreated sewage into the navigable or non-navigable

29 Commander Charles W. Tucker, JAGC, USN, “Compliance by Federal Facilities with State and
Local Environmental Regulations,” in The Naval Law Review, Spring 1986, 87-112.
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•5 A

waters of the United States.” The supremacy clause of the Constitution was evident in
the dismissive nature of the resolution that merely requested that the executive side of the
government inform the House of Representatives of the extent of dumping of untreated
sewage by federal shore facilities.
The Bureau of Yards and Docks, not having concerned itself with such matters in
the past, surveyed its shore facilities in September 1935, to determine what each was
doing with raw sewage, so that it could report back to the House of Representatives. In
response, Portsmouth Navy Yard reported that a shipyard population of about 2800
people (380 residents and 2400 employees) produced an estimated 18,000 cubic feet of
raw, untreated sewage daily that was dumped directly into the Piscataqua River through
A 1

several sewers.

The shipyard made no apologies for the dumping, or noted any plans for

future treatment of the sewage.
Jumping ahead to the World War II years of this study, it is an interesting exercise
to scale the estimated 18,000 cubic feet of raw sewage per day for 2800 people in 1935 to
the high activity periods of the World War II years, when the shipyard employment
reached greater than 20,000 people. At that time, the daily population of the yard
probably approached 25,000 including residents, prisoners, submarine crews, hospital
staff and patients, and contractors. That estimate equates, proportionately, to roughly
160,000 cubic feet of shipyard waste dumped daily into the Piscataqua River during the
peak years of World War II. That volume represents about four acres (1 acre = 43,560

30 Chief o f Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f 16 Sep 1935 to Commandant, Navy Yard,
Portsmouth, N.H., Subject: Disposal o f Untreated Sewage into Waters o f the United States. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, PNSY Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
31 Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. letter o f 20 Sep 1935 to Chief o f Bureau o f Yards
and Docks, Subject: Disposal o f Untreated Sewage into Waters o f the United States. NARA Waltham, RG
181, PNSY Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
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square feet) of raw sewage at a depth of one foot. If anything, this estimate is probably on
the low side, when one considers the greatly increased pace of industrial operations
during the war and the increased shop industrial waste that must have been generated.
Illustrating an innocence, and lack of awareness, of the dangers of environmental
pollution typical of the times, the shipyard’s 1937 annual sanitary report described the
shipyard’s sewage system as “excellent” with “no open drains,” and flowing “directly
into the Piscataqua River, either into the main channel or back channel” and “carried to
the ocean by the river current or tide.”

Great confidence was placed in the ability of the

river to flush itself clean and carry the waste out of sight to a safe place.
In 1940, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks received another prompting
about the discharge of raw sewage. This time it was from the Surgeon General of the
United States. The Bureau advised the naval shore establishments, in December 1940,
that it had met with state health officials and the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service in Washington on 16 and 17 September 1940, relative to the discharge of
domestic and industrial sewage at industrial plants essential to the national defense. The
meeting resulted in a resolution that it be “brought to the attention of the heads of defense
agencies” that naval shore establishments “should conform to the standards of the
Department of Health of the State in which such facilities may be located.” The Bureau
further advised, “If there is any question as to the adequacy of the methods proposed or
now in use, it is suggested that conferences be arranged with local or state health
departments to determine any additional steps in the protection of water supply and

32 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for 1937 - 1939 to the Commandant.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary
Reports.”
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disposal of wastes which may be required, and that, where necessary, suitable
recommendations be forwarded to the Bureau.” Here again, the recommendation that
federal facilities comply with state policies for sewage discharge was respectful of the
federal government’s superior legal position. The request was couched in terms of
suggestions of what should be done as opposed to mandated compliance.
The Bureau of Yards and Docks felt no obligation to commit resources towards
compliance but, rather, directed the navy yards to study the problem some more. The
yards were tasked to establish liaison with the appropriate states, regarding sewage
discharge, and report the findings back to the Bureau of Yards and Docks. Indicative of
the lack o f priority given environmental issues at the time, a year went by before the
Bureau of Yards and Docks next addressed the dumping of raw sewage. One week prior
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bureau advised the shipyards that it had “moderate
funds” budgeted for “rectifying those faulty conditions [of sewage discharge] of a minor
nature” and sought details for larger projects needed to comply with state policies. The
Bureau stated its plans to attempt to obtain the needed funding through future legislation
and then pursue those projects “if funds become available.” The Bureau’s intentions
were good, if not aggressive, but the timing was bad, as the nation’s need for submarines
quickly overwhelmed concerns about industrial sewage discharge.34

33 Chief o f Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f 5 Dec 1940 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard, Subject: Water Supply and Discharge o f Domestic Sewage at Training Areas and Industrial Plants
essential to the National Defense. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files,
Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
34 Chief o f Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f 28 Nov 1941 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy
Yard, Subject: Water Supply and Discharge o f Domestic Sewage - Navy Yard Portsmouth, N.H. Waltham,
RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
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Despite the start of the war, Portsmouth Navy Yard pursued the matter with its
two border states and learned, first, from the Department of Health and Welfare of the
state of Maine on December 24, 1941 that:
The policy of this Department concerning the discharge of sewage into the
Piscataqua River near the Navy Yard at Kittery and Eliot is the same as we
have had for a number of years relating to the discharge of sewage along the
seashore in that vicinity. We have recommended*5 to the various towns that
no raw sewage be emptied into such waters and as a result of this, primary
settling tanks have been installed at Oqunquit, York, York Beach, and other
communities along the shore. We believe that at least this degree of treatment
should be supplied for any sewage disposal projects emptying into the
Piscataqua River or nearby tributaries.36
Here again, the state of Maine could merely recommend that the federal shipyard should
comply with its long-standing policy.
New Hampshire’s response, of December 16, 1941, was even more revealing of
the times. Responding to the shipyard’s request for the state’s policy and laws regarding
discharge of sewage into the Piscataqua River, the state said:
As applicable to a case of this kind, the latter [laws] are nil, except in so fa r
as ground fo r a charge o f nuisance could be found, and this would scarcely
be possible here. That is, there is no legal action this department could take
respecting the existent sewage disposals at Dover, Portsmouth, and the Navy
Yard.37
In other words, the state was powerless to regulate shipyard sewage discharges except
under conditions of a nuisance complaint. Unstated, but implied, is that a national defense

35 The italics in this quote, and on the remainder o f this page, are the author’s, to emphasize the
weak position o f the states relative to that o f the federal government.
36 Department o f Health and Welfare, Bureau o f Health, State House, Augusta letter o f 24 Dec
1941 to Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
37 The State o f New Hampshire, State Board o f Health letter o f 16 Dec 1941 to Commandant, U.S.
Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box
36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage” (emphasis added).
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facility, such as the shipyard, would never be subject to nuisance laws. New Hampshire’s
response, dated a week after Pearl Harbor, recognized that the shipyard had more
important matters on its agenda than sewage discharge.
Dutifully wrapping things up, despite the outbreak of World War II, Portsmouth
Navy Yard advised the Bureau of Yards and Docks on December 28,1941 that “The
present number of sewer outlets at the Yard is the same as has been in existence for a
number of years and the raw sewage is emptied into the Piscataqua River.”38 Indicative
o f the sewage change that was in the air [pardon the pun], the shipyard’s report added
that, “At the Navy Yard Housing Development at Kittery, Maine, raw sewage is [at
present] emptied into Spruce C reek. . . A Federal Grant has been issued for a sewage
treatment plant and garbage incinerator for the Housing Development.”39 The shipyard
neglected to provide any cost estimates for sewage treatment facilities it might need and
turned its attention to the multi-million dollar facility upgrades that were then underway
in the yard to increase submarine production.
A year later, in December 1942, the Bureau of Yards and Docks provided further
direction on sewage discharges. At that time, it merely restated its intentions to “comply
with legitimate requests from local health officials in regard to the treatment of the
sewage from naval shore establishments.” However, those intentions had to be weighed
relative to “the current shortage in steel, copper, and mechanical equipment.”
Furthermore, the Bureau added, “It is requested that the apparent necessity for sewage

38 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 30 Dec 1941 to Bureau o f Yards and Docks,
Subject: Water Supply and Disposal o f Domestic Sewage - Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
39 Ibid
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treatment at any station be investigated thoroughly before arrangements are made to
install sewage treatment structures since there are conditions where, by a reasonable
extension of the outfall sewer, the immediate need for sewer treatment may be removed
and the treatment plant may be omitted for the present.”40 The treatment plant was
omitted not only for the present, but for the next thirty years, as Portsmouth Navy Yard
did not get a sewage and industrial waste treatment plant until 1975.
The tone of the correspondence between the navy and state health officials,
regarding the potential compliance with state policies for sewage discharge, illustrates
well the positions of the state versus the federal government regarding environmental
protection in 1940-41. First, the states were in no position to dictate sewage discharge
requirements to federal facilities involved in national defense. They could merely bring
the matter to the attention of the Navy and note that naval facilities should comply with
local and state requirements. Second, the Bureau of Yards and Docks had no intention of
mandating, across the board, that all its facilities immediately comply with local
requirements. Instead, the facilities were repeatedly told to investigate local requirements,
and communicate those requirements back to the Bureau where any costs involved would
be weighed relative to other and probably more urgent priorities.
As estimated earlier, the increased activity at the shipyard in the early 1940s must
have greatly overloaded the sewage system. This speculation is confirmed by the
shipyard medical officer’s annual report for 1942:

40 Chief o f the Bureau o f Yards and Docks letter o f 18 Dec 1942 to Officer-in-Charge o f
Construction Bureau Yards & Docks Contracts, U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H., Subject: Sewerage and
Sewage Treatment Facilities at Naval Stations. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Central Files, Box 36, Folder 26-7, “Sewers and Sewage.”
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With all the new toilet fixtures and with an increase in personnel several
times the former figures, the amount of sewage now emptying into the river
is great. There have been several complaints about the odor. Some of it has a
tendency to lodge about piers and has to be cleaned away.41
Raw stinking sewage sloughing around underneath the piers was apparently a cost of
doing business, when that business was mounting the industrial effort needed to build the
large number of submarines needed to win the war. The medical officer’s report went on
to say that “Consultation with Public Works resulted in conclusion that it would be a
major task to extend the sewer down the river [as recommended by the Bureau o f Yards
and Docks].”42 And finally it was suggested that, “Since there is apparently no health
hazard such an undertaking is not recommended for the duration of the war.”43 Many
projects and lives were put on hold during the war.
The above examples highlight the relative unimportance assigned open and
unsanitary sewage disposal by health officials during the war. Not to be overlooked is the
tolerance of shipyard employees who routinely accepted the unhealthy situation as a cost
of doing business. It is also obvious that the Navy lacked any serious commitment to the
expenditure o f funds for sewage treatment upgrades when faced with more urgent
wartime priorities. Finally, states were unable to push federal facilities to comply with
state policies and regulations because of their inferior legal position. All of this would
change dramatically with time but, in the early 1940s, the Navy and Portsmouth Navy
Yard were focused on other matters.

41 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for 1942 to the Commandant. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1,” Sanitary Reports.”
42 Ibid
43 Ibid.
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The communities surrounding the navy yard were no more responsible with
sewage discharge than was the yard. According to the 1943 Portsmouth Health and
Welfare Survey:
All of the sewage from the community is discharged raw into the Piscataqua
River with the exception of sewage from the Wentworth Acres section...
The sewage system has grown gradually as the city increased in population.
However, as in many instances, little attention has been given to the
engineering phases. For this reason, some of the mains are undersized and,
under proper tidal conditions, back flooding in the low areas occurs. Also,
some of the sewer outlets are not submerged, or have not been extended
sufficiently, at times giving rise to localized odor nuisances.44
Conditions along the waterfront in Portsmouth were not unlike the odiferous and fouled
waters around the piers at the navy yard. The Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey
(1944) noted that the raw sewage being dumped did “add materially to the pollution of
Great Bay, thereby having a direct effect on the shellfish and recreational potentialities of
the areas.”45 Local leaders took some satisfaction from the fact that “there are several
other towns and cities bordering on streams discharging into the Bay and they also
contribute to the pollution.”46 At least there was some recognition of the long term effects
of the continued dumping of raw sewage into the river. However, as with the navy yard,
the focus of the local communities was elsewhere and, besides, everyone was dumping
sewage into the river.
In 1944, however, the focus of University of New Hampshire’s Dr. C.F. Jackson
was on the increasing pollution of Great Bay. His report in conjunction with the Marine
Fisheries Commission, A Biological Survey o f Great Bay New Hampshire, introduced a
44 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” Cumings Library, Strawbery
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H. MS 96, Box 2, Folder 14,” 56.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.

298

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

new era of concern for the increasing pollution of local streams. Jackson’s survey of
microbial contamination showed a coliform bactria count of 2,400 per 100 milliliters of
water for the lower Piscataqua River. The U.S. Public Health Service Standard for
shellfish waters at the time was 70 coliform bacteria per 100 milliliters of water. There
can be little doubt that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s untreated sewage discharges endangered
Piscataqua River shellfish. Before one is overly critical of the shipyard, it is appropriate
to note that the coliform bacteria levels reported in the Cocheco and Exeter Rivers were
10,634 and 9,020 respectively.47 The shipyard was but one of many activities, including
riverside textile mills, that were guilty of polluting the local rivers..
William Tebo remembers the local rivers turning colors, in the early 1940s, when
the textile mills changed dye colors. Worse yet, he remembers swimming in the
Technicolored rivers.

48

Tebo’s recollections are validated in Jackson’s report. By

lowering a simple instrument known as a Secchi disc, “a disc ten inches in diameter, the
alternative quarters of which are painted black and white,”49 into local streams until the
disc disappeared from sight, Jackson gained an appreciation of stream pollution.
According to Jackson, “Much of the material coming from the print mills is colored, and
the use of the disc gave a fair idea of the amount of this type of pollution [chemical] that
was present.”50 Of course, any other suspended matter [physical pollution] in the water
would also affect the clarity of the water. At any rate, test results showed that the disc
disappeared at a depth of about three feet in rivers with a high density of mills such as the
47 C.F. Jackson, A Biological Survey o f Great Bay New Hampshire, 35-37 and Table IV.
48 Oral interview with William Tebo, 3 Nov 2006, at the Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum.
49 C.F. Jackson, A Biological Survey o f Great Bay New Hampshire, 32-33.
50 Ibid.
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Salmon Falls, Cocheco, and Bellamy Rivers. On the other hand, the disc disappeared at a
depth of six feet one inch in the Piscataqua River.51 Thus, at first glance, the navy yard
did not appear to contribute to the pollution of local waters as much as the textile mills.
Jackson was working towards an eventual evaluation of the effect of pollution on
all local marine life including clams, oysters, lobsters, and fish. However, the 1944 report
addressed only the status of clam flats by specific river locations. For the Lower
Piscataqua River, it was concluded that “The clam flats of the Lower Piscataqua are in
better shape than most of the other rivers. A reasonably swift current keeps silt removed
S')

and brings food organisms to the growing clams.” Thus, from the standpoint of
chemical, physical, and bacterial pollution, as well as the quality of the clam flats, the
lower Piscataqua River was judged to be less polluted than other local rivers. That is not
to say that pollution in the Piscataqua River was not increasing. Indeed, the noted
decrease in marine life and their foodstuffs suggested otherwise and that was the
motivation for Jackson’s survey.
As noted by Samuel P. Hays, up until the mid-twentieth century “Sources
responsible for air and water pollution as well as solid waste had long since dumped their
waste on the most readily available land, into nearby streams, or into the air.”53 Jackson’s
study had shown that the shipyard and local communities should be counted among those
polluters who dumped their waste in the most readily available streams, the Piscataqua
and other local rivers.

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 40.
53 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States
1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 72.
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The report o f the shipyard medical officer for 1947 noted another consequence of
the discharge of extensive waste products to the Piscataqua River; heavy silting in the
waters around the shipyard. According to the report, “The silting at Dry Dock #2 was
reported to be so bad that it interfered with docking operations.”54 Had the war continued
past 1945, it is highly possible that operations in Dry Dock #2 would have had to be
suspended for the period of time necessary to dredge the river of shipyard waste.
Subsequent reports in 1950 noted as many as thirty-two shipyard sewage
discharges into the river.55 Later, EPA studies of the 1980s identified six shoreline areas
for cleanup that had contained sewage and industrial waste outfalls to the river, prior to
the building of the waste treatment plant in 1975.56 The discharge of industrial waste
directly to the river was obviously a large problem during the war years, which went
relatively unnoticed by local authorities.

The sewage situation at the shipyard and surrounding communities was not unlike
other shipyard boomtowns and, in some respects, it was much better. Lorraine
McConaghy’s study of another wartime shipyard boomtown, Kirkland, Washington, is a

54 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports to the Commandant, 1946 report.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary
Reports.”
55 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Semi-Annual Report for 1950 o f 14 July 1950 to the
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1,
“Sanitary Reports.”
56 Revised OU3 Risk Assessment, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine, Northern Division,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Contract Task Order 0166 o f May 2000, 2-6,7.
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horror story in comparison.57 Kirkland, located on the eastern shore of Lake Washington,
doubled in population to about 15,000 during the war when employment at its shipyard
grew from a few hundred to 8,000. Not blessed with the natural hydraulic current and
tidal flushing of the Piscataqua River, the uncontrolled sewage dumped into Lake
Washington caused a public health catastrophe. In the spring of 1943, shipyard workers
became ill when drinking from fountains in the yard and beaches were closed because
they were unsafe for swimming. In the summer of 1944, Kirkland’s water supply was
declared unfit for human consumption due to sewage leaking into the drinking water
supply and raising E coli bacteria to five times the permissible level. A portable
chlorinator alleviated the problem, but drinking water had to be boiled for a period of
time. Portsmouth’s sewage problems, while not as severe as those of Kirkland,
Washington, were nevertheless a growing concern for Dr. C. Floyd Jackson and others
who were becoming more and more aware of the increased pollution of local waters.
Pickling Tanks
Pickling of steel plates to remove oxide scale, prior to form-rolling for pressure
hull sections, was another under-appreciated environmental hazard prior to, and during,
the war. Pickling required large tanks, of approximately 2000 cubic feet in volume,
typically filled with a 10% sulfuric acid at about 200 degrees Fahrenheit, into which the
steel plates were submerged for long periods of time, to loosen and dislodge the scale,
forming sludge in the bottom of the tank. At the Portsmouth Navy Yard, the tanks were
installed in underground pits conveniently close enough to the river to periodically flush
the tanks to the river. To further complicate the problem, up into the 1940s, many of the
57 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, a Small Town during
World War II,” 42-51.
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tanks were o f a wooden construction, which required constant attention to the seams, and
tightening of fasteners, to avoid leakage.
In 1936, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy forwarded an article about the
design, construction, and maintenance of wooden pickling tanks to all the navy yards for
their information and compliance.

;o

The article explained that wood selection was

critical to well-designed tanks, with yellow pine being the preferred wood. The pitch
(resin) of well-seasoned yellow pine increased the resistance of the lumber to corrosives
and the wood also experienced less shrinkage than other woods over time. The article
elaborates: “Water, either hot or cold, will swell any tank; but hot sulfuric acid, even at
low concentrations . . . has a dehydrating effect on the lumber, and it will shrink the wood
with which it comes in contact.” Repeated expansion and contraction of wooden tanks
often resulted in excessive leakage of the acidic pickling bath. Another design
consideration was the potential for accelerated electrolytic action that the sulfuric acid
would accommodate between dissimilar metals of fasteners or tie rods, leading to even
more leakage. The article concludes with a discussion of the importance of observing the
tank closely, when in operation, and consistently and sequentially tightening fasteners to
prevent leakage. Pickling tanks were accidents waiting to happen.
In 1938, the Bureau of Construction and Repair assigned Portsmouth Navy Yard
the task o f running a side-by-side evaluation of a wooden and a new steel tank as
replacements for two badly deteriorated wooden tanks. Portsmouth Navy Yard
subsequently reported that, “On 10 October a steel rubber lined pickling tank
manufactured by B.F. Goodrich Company,. . . and a long leaf yellow pine wooden
58 Assistant Secretary o f the Navy (Shore Establishment Division) letter o f 9 Jan 1936 with
enclosure “Wooden Pickling Tanks,” from Steel o f December 2, 1935. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Central Files), Box 36, Folder N5-15, “Pickling Plant.”
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pickling tank were installed in the galvanizing plant.”59 The letter also cites the
advantages of the steel tank that was lined with rubber and further sheathed with acid
proof brick. Regarding the wooden tank, the commandant noted the difficulty of
acquiring suitable lumber for the new tank, as well as the unsatisfactory performance of
the new and previous wooden pickling tanks:
The securing of lumber for this tank was very difficult, and extended over a
period of three years, including three rejections of lumber, before suitable
material could be found.. .. Every effort was made to make this wooden tank
the very best that could be constructed... .Up to this time it has been
impossible to make this tank absolutely tight... The leakage of the acid from
the wooden tank is particularly undesirable, as the leakage from the two
original wooden tanks so destroyed the concrete foundations of the pickling
plant, that a new floor and foundations had to be installed after the old tanks
were removed, and prior to installation of the two subject tanks.60
Such gross leakage, and resultant damage, from a carefully constructed state-of-the-art
wooden pickling tank in 1938, leaves one with questions about other long-term material
and human health consequences of the shipyard’s pickling operations. Pickling
operations at the yard began in the early twentieth century when steel hulled ship
construction began at the shipyard. Surely the sulfuric acid solution leakage that ate
concrete floors must have caused other unreported damage.
The story o f Portsmouth Navy Yard pickling tanks becomes even more intriguing,
one year after the side-by-side evaluation of the steel and wooden tanks, when the
shipyard made plans for the installation of a large steel pickling tank (Length - 3 1 'A feet,
Depth - 12 feet, Width - 6 feet at top and 8 feet at bottom) and a vertical lime tank of

59 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 27 Oct 1938 to Bureau o f Construction and
Repair, Subject: Pickling Tanks - Report on. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
(Central Files), Box 36, Folder 15-5, “Pickling Plant.”
60 Ibid.
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similar dimensions in a new storage area. The tanks were to be sunk to a depth of 6 lA
feet to 7 feet below the existing ground level within a concrete lined pit. The Production
Officer explained the need that the tank be designed to accommodate flushing to the
river:
It is further desired that a drain pipe and valve be installed leading from the
pit through the adjacent sea wall. It is realized that the bottom of the pit will
be below high tide level. The valve will prevent flooding of the pit at high
tide and will permit drainage and washing down of the pit at low tide.61
Thus, the shipyard planned to avoid the type of concrete deterioration experienced earlier
with the wooden tanks by periodically flushing the concrete pit for the new steel tanks
into the river, a practice totally consistent with the wide-spread flushing of other shop
industrial waste through the sewer drains. The pickling tanks, approved and installed as
designed adjacent to the plate yard, were in operation in 1942.

The extent of tank

flushing that occurred during the war is unknown.
Galvanizing Plant
Galvanizing is a process that increases the corrosive resistance of steel
components, by applying a protective coating of zinc, acquired through an immersion or
electrolytic process. The process requires a thorough cleaning of the steel components in
acid tanks, not unlike the pickling operation. Portsmouth Navy Yard constructed a
galvanizing plant in Building 184 in 1943. The plant’s pit, containing the acid cleaning
tanks, was filled in and covered with a concrete floor in the 1960s, when the building was

61 Production Officer memo o f 22 Dec 1939 to the Public Works Officer, Subject: Pit for Vertical
Pickling Tank. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 36, Folder 15-5,
“Pickling Plant.”
62 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral Withers letter o f 10 Nov 1942 to Bureau of
Ships, Subject: Building for Metal Cleaning Equipment at Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College
Park, Record Group 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, Folder NY1/N5.
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converted to use as a welding school. An acidic crystalline growth on the walls of the
building caused it to be designated a Superfund site in 1994.

As recently as October

2006, a letter printed in the Portsmouth Herald reported, “The curious crystals growing
along the bottom of the walls in the Welding School building have been cleaned once
again and the affected areas covered with protective plastic sheets. The basic problem
remains unresolved but the building is now much safer for welder training.”64 The
periodic reappearance of acidic crystals in Building 184 continues the legacy of the
shipyard’s World War II galvanizing operations.
In 1939, Portsmouth Navy Yard management was not interested in a proposed in
yard galvanizing plant, as long as the yard could continue to efficiently and economically
contract for outside galvanizing as it had done for many years.65 This position changed, in
late 1942, when wartime needs caused a dramatic increase to the shipyard’s need for
galvanizing services. Faced with the need to clean 500,000 pounds of metal in calendar
year 1943, the shipyard anticipated contractor shortages and sought a new galvanizing
facility and building. The new facility was to include “a tank for Oakite solution, cold
spray tank, sulfuric acid tank, hot dip tank, and a sandblasting machine with drying racks

63 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Installation Restoration Program Site 30 EE/CA Fact Sheet
contained in Feasibility Study Report for Operable Unit 3 Volume I o f II Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Kittery, Maine, November 2000, prepared by Northern Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Contract Number N62472-90-D-1298, Contract Task Order 0166.
64 Portsmouth Herald, 13 Oct 2006, A12, “PNS cleanup is Paying Off,” James O. Horrigan, RAB
member, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League.
65 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard letter o f 11 Jun 1941 to Lcdr. Philip Lemler, Bureau o f
Ships. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Central Files, Box 2,_Folder A l-1 ,
“Developments.”
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and storage space.”66 When the facility was initially rejected by the Bureau of Ships,
Portsmouth Navy Yard quickly requested reconsideration because of the excessive costs
and inefficiencies of contracting for galvanizing services.

The Bureau of Ships

subsequently approved the facility.
The new galvanizing plant was built and performed even better that anticipated.
In early 1944, the shipyard reported the galvanizing of large quantities of material at
remarkable savings and predicted a quick return of investment:
The galvanizing plant. . . has now been put into very successful operation. It
is therefore taking care of all the present needs of the Yard, approximately
426,909 pounds of material galvanized per month. The current cost is
estimated at approximately $.015 per pound, compared with the recent
contract cost of $.035 per pound. It is estimated, therefore, that the first cost
o f the plant, $175,000, will be saved in twenty months. The plant is operating
one eight hour shift. In addition to the sandblasting and pickling required for
the above galvanizing, approximately 300,000 pounds of pickling and 50,000
pounds of sandblasting have been done preparatory to painting or treatment
other than galvanizing. It is further estimated that 500,000 pounds can be
galvanized per month, operating single shift, at a cost o f $.015 per pound.68
The capacity of the plant had exceeded all expectations and things got even better the
next year. In April 1945, Lieutenant Junior Grade William P. Gregory reported to the
Bureau of Ships that:
It is worth noting in the year 1944, this shop produced 3,680,881 pounds of
finished material at a cost of $.02 per pound . . . For the first quarter of 1945,

66 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard T. Withers letter o f 2 Oct 1942 to Bureau o f Ships,
Subject: Building for Metal Cleaning Equipment at Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College Park,
RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, Folder NY1/N5.
67

Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard H.F.D. Davis letter by direction o f 25 Nov 1942 to
Bureau o f Ships, Subject: Construction o f Galvanizing Plant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, 1930-1950,
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 1, Folder A l, “New Construction June 1940 to Dec
1943.”
68 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard T. Withers, letter o f 18 Feb 1944 to Bureau o f Ships,
Subject: Galvanizing Plant. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 194045, Box 791, Folder NY1/N5.
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the shop produced 1,029,596 pounds of finished material at a cost of $.0205
per pound.69
The initially predicted annual cleaning rate of one half million pounds of metal in 1943
had increased to over four million pounds of metal per year by the first quarter of 1945.
There is every reason to believe that the eight fold increase in galvanizing operations was
typical of the increased demand of many operations and processes throughout the yard.
Similarly, one might expect an eight fold increase in waste products, with essentially no
increase in the means or efficiency of disposal.
The financial success story of Portsmouth Navy Yard’s World War II galvanizing
plant is tempered somewhat by the EPA’s findings, reported in November 2000:
The pit was closed for the last time in the 1960s. At that time the pit was
filled in and covered over with a concrete floor. And since then the building
has been used as a welding school.. . . At various times since the pit was
filled, a crystalline substance has been noted to form on the inside wall of
the building near the former pit. The crystalline growth was found to be
acidic based o f a low p H . .. .Investigation at the site indicated that there is a
potential risk to people working in the building who come in direct contact
(skin contact) with the acidic crystals. The investigation showed that the fill
material (including water in the pit) is the likely source of the crystalline
growth. In addition, there is a concern that if there were a release from the
pit, the high metals concentrations in the pit water could potentially
adversely impact ground water under the site.70
The pit was subsequently uncovered, the pit fill material excavated, the site cleaned, and
the concrete floor restored. If the site was judged to be a potential health risk to people

69 Ltjg USNR William P. Gregory (PNY) letter to Cdr. William Spowers (BuShips) o f 21 Apr
1945. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, Folder
NY1/N5.
70 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Installation Restoration Program Site 30 EE/CA Fact Sheet,
contained in Feasibility Study Report for Operable Unit 3 Volume I o f II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Kittery, Maine, November 2000. Prepared by Northern Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Contract Number N62472-90-D-1298, Contract Task Order 0166.
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forty years after it was last used, what must the potential risks have been in 1944, when
3,680,881 pounds of material were processed through the tanks of the galvanizing plant.
A photograph in Nelson H. Lawry’s Portsmouth Harbor’s Military and Naval
Heritage which shows metal piping being cleaned in the shipyard’s sulfuric acid and
trisodium phosphate baths gives some indication of the risks involved. With heavy fumes
rising from the baths, the picture caption reads, “Although one of these men is wearing
rubber gloves, they are little protected from fumes as they lower a section of piping into
the TSP tank in the 1940s.”71 Indeed, the two workers are shown standing in the fumes
with no breathing or body protection except for the rubber gloves mentioned. Industrial
risks were little appreciated in the yard’s shops during the war. However, the acid that
continues to seep through, and crystallize on, the walls of Building 184 serves as a
constant reminder o f those unappreciated risks.
Painting Operations
Correspondence, detailing the need for a galvanizing plant in late 1942, describes
the existing shipyard sandblasting operation to prepare components for galvanizing.
According to that correspondence, the sandblasting that took place in Building 63, a
former unheated and unventilated wagon shed, was unsatisfactory because it created a
“large amount of dust dangerous to personnel and machines with which it comes in
contact.”

77

•

•

•

•

Airborne dust and dirt in the sandblasting shop was another condition

tolerated as a cost of doing business.

71 Nelson H. Lawry, Glen M. Williford, and Leo K. Polaski., Portsmouth H arbor’s Military and
Naval Heritage (Portsmouth, N.H.: Arcadia Publishing, 2004), 100.
72 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard T. Withers letter o f 10 Nov 1942 to Bureau o f Ships,
Subject: Building for Metal Cleaning Equipment at Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College Park,
RG19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 791, Folder NY1/N5.
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The scraping and cleaning of marine growth and loose paint from submarine
hulls, in the dry dock, produced equally hazardous airborne dust and debris. This
operation was especially hazardous in that the resulting airborne contamination contained
chemicals designed to kill marine growth that also caused health problems for workers.
Copper based anti-foulant coatings had been in use for over two hundred years to kill
marine growth. Other, more effective metal bases, like lead, were being investigated
during World War II. While the hazards of such paints are well known today, one can not
help but wonder how many health-damaging incidents occurred during the frantic efforts
to overhaul and repair war damaged ships and submarines.
Hand scraping, and brushing rather than sand blasting, was routinely employed to
remove antifoulant paint systems from submarine hulls at Portsmouth Navy Yard. That
scraping and brushing produced considerable airborne contamination. Worse yet, it was
often impossible to know the composition of paint systems that had been applied to
foreign submarines that visited the shipyard during the war. One particularly noteworthy
incident of dry dock airborne contamination occurred at Portsmouth Navy Yard in
September 1941. The incident involved the visiting French-built submarine Surcouf, the
largest submarine in the world at the time. During the brushing of the Surcouf’s
underwater hull, in preparation for renewing the preservation and anti-foulant coatings,
workers experienced unusual skin and eye irritation that they believed to be caused by the
unusual amount of dust generated by their cleaning of the hull. The medical officer’s
report shows that the problem was so severe that seventeen o f the men working in the dry
dock reported to the dispensary complaining of burning eyes, nose, and face. The
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medical officer suspected some unknown pollutant in the paint to be the cause. Further
investigation showed that:
The ship had been in dry dock over a week and the bottom was thoroughly
dry. There had been no rain for several days and there was practically no
wind yesterday so that the workmen were in a cloud of dust raised by the
brushes. A Frenchman reported that the bottom was last painted in England
with English paint. There was no difficulty when the bottom of the English
ships were scraped [Portsmouth had overhauled a couple English submarines
earlier that year] but it so happened that they were scraped during rainy
weather which prevented dust. Four men developed skin irritation on August
2nd while working in a ballast tank on an English ship and six men had the
same experience on August 19th while working in the battery compartment of
a French ship. It has not been possible to determine the composition o f the
English paint, but it is certain that there is some ingredient in their paint that
is not present in ours as we have not had previous similar experiences.
The men with the burning symptoms were treated and released, but no attempt was made
to determine the composition of the paint. This is an example of the hazards of working
on foreign submarines, as well as another example of the casual acceptance of work
related injuries.
Further examples of this casual acceptance of risk, associated with painting
operations, can be found in a 1942 study, done by the U.S. Public Health Service, to
evaluate the toxicity o f a new fireproof paint containing antimony oxide. The new paint
was developed by the U. S. Navy to replace more flammable paint systems that were then
being used to paint ship interior compartments and living spaces. The study concluded
that “the new antimony paint is no more hazardous than the control [existing] paint,”74

73

Medical Officer Portsmouth Navy Yard H. F. Lawrence memo o f 10 Sep 1941 to Commandant,
Subject: Special report o f injuries o f Yard employees investigated by Ltjg J.L. Hatch. NARA Waltham, RG
181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Industrial General Correspondence, Box 43, Folder EP13/L9-3 (161)
“British Empire Surcouf 1941-42.”
74 U.S. Public Health Service memo from Principal Industrial Toxicologist L.T. Fairhill and
Surgeon Paul A. Neal to the Commander N.A. Ingram o f 1 October 1942. NARA College Park, RG 80
General Records o f the Department o f the Navy 1798-1947, Formerly Security Classified General
Correspondence o f the CNO / Secretary o f the Navy, 1940-1947, Box 18, Folder P2-4 (vol 3).
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implying that some level of risk was inevitable and acceptable. The study explained that
guinea pig mortality rates were high when exposed to the burning fumes of both paints.
The animals experienced mortality rates of 75% to 100% when exposed for one hour to
fumes emanating from the paints heated to 650 degrees Fahrenheit. As the deaths were
due to lung irritation and damage rather than toxic poisoning, the study concluded that
“the usual precautions (such as respiratory apparatus, etc.) necessary for the application
o f paints in general, must be taken in the use of antimony paints.” While it is somewhat
reassuring to know that the potential for toxic poisoning was considered in the
development of shipboard interior paint systems in 1942, it is also clear that flammable
interior paints had found widespread use on ships of the U.S. Navy.
Industrial Scrap and Rubbish Disposal
Industrial scrap and routine rubbish, that found its way to the river and shipyard
dump sites, produced another set of problems. A memorandum, written in 1926 by
Shipyard Manager Captain H.W. Osterhaus, indicates that the shipyard routinely dumped
industrial scrap in the harbor. In the memorandum, Captain Osterhaus chastised shop
managers for the cluttered and untidy appearance of their spaces and encouraged them to
collect excess junk and dispose of it in the river. Referring to some boilers that were
rusting in the industrial area, he wrote, “The boilers, if of no value, and if they cannot be
sold as junk, could be put on the lighter and dumped overboard as is done at regular
intervals when a load has been accumulated.”75 In 1926, it had apparently been a long

75

Manager Captain. H.W. Osterhaus memo o f 12 Apr 1926, Subject: General Appearance in the
vicinity o f shops. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Files, Box 15, Folder N l-1 , “Grounds
1925-39.”
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time practice to periodically clean up the shipyard by dumping barge loads of useless
junk in the harbor.
It is not clear how long the practice of dumping industrial scrap in the harbor
continued. However, a report in the Portsmouth Herald of 1 September 1942 raised
questions about the yard’s handling of industrial scrap. Reporting on a local salvage
drive, the paper reported that the navy yard had contributed 2,555 tons of scrap during the
eight weeks of the drive. The shipyard’s contribution to the scrap drive was more than the
average displacement of a typical Portsmouth-built submarine during the war. With the
yard’s help, the final total of 3,526 tons had almost tripled the original goal for the drive.
Rear Admiral Withers was quoted as saying that the report of the scrap drive “will
materially assist in putting a stop to the vicious rumors that have sprung up about the
7 ft

scrap salvage program at the yard.” Unfortunately, there were no amplifying remarks
about the vicious rumors, leaving one to speculate about what might have happened to
2,555 tons of shipyard scrap had it not been contributed to the scrap drive.

Exhibiting the same naivete towards the dumping of trash and rubbish, annual
reports by the shipyard medical officer, from the mid-1920s through the 1930s,
considered the shipyard’s handling o f rubbish to be entirely satisfactory, if not excellent.
The 1932 report noted satisfactory conditions as the result of on-station incineration,77

76 Portsmouth Herald, 1 Sep 1942, “Navy Yard Ups City Total,” 1 & 5.
77 According to James Dolph, Portmouth Naval Shipyard historian, the yard began incinerating
trash in the 1890s. Over the years, it became the practice to bum as much industrial waste as possible and
use for landfill that waste which would not burn. The residue and ash remaining after burning was then
bulldozed as fill material for nearby lowlands. Telephone interview with James Dolph o f 26 March 2007.
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contract removal services, and well-managed dumps.

78

Throughout the 1930s and the

early war years, the reports were, for the most part, free of criticism of the yard’s waste
and scrap handling practices.
In 1930, however, the shipyard was critical of its neighbors in Kittery, who were
guilty o f routinely dumping trash in the waters between the mainland and the shipyard.
Unlike the shipyard’s dumping of waste products and junk in the middle of the river
where it was out of sight and out o f mind, the town’s trash cluttered the shoreline and
entrance to the shipyard. In 1930, Commandant Rear Admiral W.W. Phelps complained
to the Kittery Board o f Selectmen that the properties bordering the approach to the bridge
7Q

to the shipyard were “unsanitary and unsightly.” The Board’s response was to build a
high board fence across the inner end of the old navy yard bridge to “prevent some of the
dumping of rubbish that makes the Southwest shore of the Yard approach unsightly.”80 In
1930, concerns about the pollution of shorelines and harbors had more to do with
appearance and tidiness than concern for disease.
Benign annual sanitary reports continued until 1944 when, with the war winding
down, and without previous warning, it was noted that, “The presence of rats and

78 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for 1932 o f 18 January 1931 to the
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1,
“Sanitary Reports.”
79

Portsmouth Navy Yard Commandant Rear Admiral W.W. Phelps letter o f 7 May 1930 to the
Kittery Selectmen. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence Box 20,
Folder EM “Kittery 1925-47.”
80 Kittery Selectmen letter o f 13 May 1930 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, 1930-1950, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence Box 20, Folder EM
“Kittery 1925-47.”

314

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

O 1

cockroaches presents a problem in maintaining good sanitation in the yard.”

The

overloaded wartime shipyard conditions that contributed to sewage sloshing around the
piers were also apparently contributing to an infestation of rats and roaches.
The shipyard’s postwar efforts to bring the infestation problem under control were
of limited success. Rat infestation became such an unbearable problem by 1950 that the
district medical officer was called in to conduct a rat infestation survey and recommend
methods to be taken to bring the problem under control. In the process, the shipyard
handling o f waste was described in considerable detail. “Refuse, very often mixed with
food and scrap material is picked up from all sources, such as submarine barracks,
cafeteria, shops, and quarters,” and sent, first, to the incinerator in Building 46, where it
is sorted by hand for burning. The area around the incinerator was found to be “unclean
and large chunks of meat scraps were scattered over the ground, attracting sea gulls, and
89

being a source of food supply to rats and flies.” As terrible as it sounds, this description
probably fits the conditions found at most town dumps across the United States in 1950.
Granted, a rat infestation of an island community such as the shipyard was a more serious
problem.
There is no reason to believe that the shipyard’s waste disposal and dump
practices were any better or any worse than those of other industries. And there is
certainly no reason to believe that the yard’s practices during, or prior to, the war were
any better than they were in 1950. Indeed, the shipyard had been struggling with the rat

81 Portsmouth Navy Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for 1944 o f 15 Jan 1945 to the
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 191, Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1,
“Sanitary Reports.”
82 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Semi-Annual Report for 1950 o f 17 Jan 1950 to the
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 191, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1,
“Sanitary Reports.”
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infestation problem since first identified in 1944 and had probably improved conditions
to those reported in 1950. The conditions reported in 1950 had more than likely existed
for a long time and simply were never judged to be unusual or important enough to merit
discussion in previous reports. One is left to speculate about what sanitary conditions
must have been like in 1944 with an employment of over 20,000 if an employment under
5,000 in 1950 produced an infestation of rats.
Water
The Medical Officer’s Annual Sanitary Reports contain evidence of periodic
concerns about the quality of the shipyard’s water supply. At various times between 1929
and 1936, the shipyard’s water, provided from local reservoirs through the Kittery
municipal water system, was reported to be muddy, taste of fish, and have a bad odor.83
At other times, the positive reports of water quality were couched in such terms as “taste
improved” or “free of disagreeable odor and taste” that hint of past problems.84
A March 1944 Sanitary Survey of the yard by an Epidemiology Unit from
Newport, R.I. found that “solids were very high for treated water” and that “the 26 ppm
of organic material could be a basis for future trouble.”

of

According to the report:

In so far as can be ascertained, there has never been on the station serious
outbreaks of diseases which have been directly attributable to the water
supply. It may be noted however, that it might have occurred as an epidemic

83 Medical Officer’s Annual Sanitary Reports for 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932 ,and 1936. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1,
“Sanitary Reports.”
84 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Reports for 1935 and 1938. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary Reports.”
85 Officer in Charge, Epidemiology Unit #11, Newport, R.I. letter o f 14 Mar 1944 to Medical
Officer, First Naval District, Boston, Mass, Subject: Sanitary Survey o f U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H.,
6. NARA College Park, RG 52, Records o f the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery General Correspondence
1842-1951, Box 134, Folder NY/A3-1 to NY2/N33.
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of gastro-intestinal upsets not severe enough to incapacitate, among the
civilian personnel of the shops w/o coming to the attention of the medical
department of the yard.86
The next year, a similar survey reported that chemical and bacteriological examinations
an

over the previous year had found “no signs of pollution.”
While pollution was not a problem in May 1944, later in the year the Medical
Officer reported that foreign organisms had been observed in the shipyard’s water:
In May and June of this year, “wigglers” were found in the water from
several of the taps in the Yard... A report was received that these
microscopic living organisms were larvae of the midge family and were nonpathogenic. The Yard Medical Officer consulted with the Superintendent of
the Kittery Water System, who stated that the condition had occurred before
and was due to the change in the water at the reservoir and these living
organisms come from the bottom layer and are carried through the pipes to
the Yard. Because there is no filtration system, he advised flushing all mains
in the Yard.88
Like so many other aspects of shipyard life during the war, many marginal sanitary
conditions were merely inconveniences to be tolerated. The Medical section of this
chapter provides a disease history of the yard that is characterized by periodic outbreaks
of fevers, sore throats, and stomach aches of vague description. It is possible that, as
alluded to in the 1944 Sanitary Report, the shipyard’s water problems caused health
issues that were misdiagnosed.

t6 Ibid., 14.
87 First Naval District Medical Officer letter o f 9 May 1945 to Commandant First Naval District,
Subject: Report o f Inspection o f Medical Department, U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College
Park, RG 52, Records o f the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery General Correspondence 1842-1951, Box
134, Folder NY/A3-1 to NY2/N33.
88 Medical Officer’s Annual Sanitary Report for 1944. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary Reports.”
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Other Environmental Issues
The diesel powered submarines of the World War II era required the shipyard to
process and store large quantities of diesel fuel oil. Fuel oil had to be offloaded from
submarines arriving at the yard for overhaul and newly constructed submarines had to be
fueled before leaving the yard. Lesser volumes of lubricating oils and gasoline were also
required to service the various pieces of shipboard and shipyard machinery. Leakage was
more an economic than environmental concern.
The Public Works Officer’s annual inspection report for 1947 indicates that
during the past year the twenty-four year old #2 fuel storage tank (150,000 barrels
capacity) had to be drained to be repaired because it leaked badly. The outside shell had
settled 6-8 inches more than the bottom and had pulled the bottom plates at their
connection to the shell plates. Repairs were also needed on #1 fuel storage tank (150,000
barrels capacity) because a similar condition existed. The smaller #5 gasoline stowage
tank (90,000 gallons capacity) was reported to be in even worse condition and not worth
the cost to repair.89 Subsequent EPA risk assessment surveys in the 1980s did not identify
the site o f these tanks for clean-up or further monitoring. The tanks were removed in
1998.90
The area that had contained two other oil tanks (Waste Oil Tanks Nos. 6 and 7),
used between 1943 and 1989 for the storage of shop waste oils prior to offsite disposal,
was designated as a Superfund site when elevated levels of lead and other contaminants
89 Public Works Officer memo o f 19 May 1947 to Commandant Portsmouth Naval Base, Subject:
Report o f Annual Inspection, Public Works and Public Utilities. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Base Files, Box 15, Folder L-5, “Inspection Naval Yard, 1945-48.”
90 Cultural Resources Survey, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, United States Department o f Defense,
Legacy Resource Management Program, April 2003. Prepared by the Louis Berger Group, Inc. for the
Engineering Field Activity Northeast Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 39.
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were found during the EPA surveys. The stored waste oils included motor oils, hydraulic
oils, transmission oils, and other oils suspected of containing various metals. The tanks
were removed in 1989, along with 332 tons of contaminated soil that were excavated and
disposed in an approved offsite facility.
***
Efforts to control mosquitoes on the yard have introduced other environmental
issues, some more serious than others. One of the less serious, almost humorous,
incidents involved an attempt to control mosquitoes through the stocking of ponds
with mosquito-eating fish. In the 1920s, the shipyard’s ponds were stocked with
goldfish that were purported to devour large populations of mosquitoes. In 1926,
further stocking of the ponds with gambusia (generic name of small freshwater fish
useful in mosquito control) was under consideration until the Department of Fisheries
recommended against it. According to the Department of Fisheries, “As the ponds at
the Navy yard have been stocked with goldfish it would be inadvisable to further
stock them with gambusia as the former would devour the latter and that furthermore,
goldfish tend to keep down mosquitoes.”91
That same year, 1926, Commandant H.W. Osterhaus led an effort to fill lowlands
09

“where water will stand after a rain and where mosquitoes breed rapidly.” The shipyard
continued to battle the mosquito problem, as evidenced by the medical officer’s annual
report of 1930 that cites the problem as a particular nuisance, since the shipyard had

91 Department o f Commerce, Dr E. A. Logan letter o f 19 Apr 1926 Subject: Stocking ponds in
Portsmouth Navy Yard. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Files, Box 15, Folder N l-1,
“Groundsl925-39.”
92 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral H.W. Osterhaus memo o f 12 Jun 1926.
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base Files, Box 15, Folder N l-1 , “Groundsl925-39.”
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discontinued the practice of spreading oil on the ponds to discourage breeding.93 What
example could better illustrate ignorance towards environmental matters than purposeful
oil contamination of ponds to discourage the breeding of mosquitoes?
Numerous mosquitoes and flies were again highlighted in the 1935 report, but the
high numbers were considered to be of minor concern because disease rates were low. As
late as 1944, a malaria control survey of the shipyard reported that the mosquito
population on the yard appeared well under control, due to the continued efforts of a large
number o f resident goldfish in the yard’s ponds:
Mosquito producing areas were not encountered during the course of the
survey. The two ponds appeared ideal for mosquito breeding but
undoubtedly the mosquitoes are destroyed by the large numbers of goldfish
existing there.94
The stocking of shipyard ponds with goldfish, which started sometime prior to 1926,
continued to be an effective mosquito control practice at the end o f World War II.
Towards the end of the war, the use of DDT as an insecticide was increasing in
popularity. A Portsmouth Herald editorial of 23 October 1945, in discussing the
drawbacks o f the use o f DDT, noted that “it kills honey bees and other good insects,”95
with no mention of any harmful effects to human beings. The editorial predicted a “bright
future as a gardener’s weapon” because it killed many insects, was effective longer than
other insecticides, and was less dangerous to handle than other compounds. One wonders

go

Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1930. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base
General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1,“Sanitary Reports.”
94 Lt (MC) J.L. Garey, Epidemiology Unit #42 letter o f 24 Sep 1944 to Commandant, First Naval
District, Subject: Malaria Control Survey at the U.S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. NARA College Park,
RG 52, Records o f the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery General Correspondence 1842-1951, Box 134,
Folder NY/A3-1 to NY2/N33.
95 Portsmouth Herald, 23 Oct 1945, “DDT in the Garden,” 4.
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how something that killed honeybees and was not safe, but merely less dangerous than
other compounds, could have a bright future in a gardener’s tool kit. In 1945, society was
beginning to appreciate the need to clean up our rivers and streams, but it would be
another fifteen or twenty years before it would begin to awaken to the dangers of
insecticides like DDT.

One last example will serve to further illustrate a prewar lack o f concern for the
environmental consequences of the mishandling of hazardous materials. The example
concerns a misplaced emphasis on the need for the careful handling o f mercury
thermometers. The breakage of mercury thermometers, like diesel oil leakage, was more
an economic than environmental concern. An innocuous internal shipyard memo of 15
November 1929 advises of an apparent cost savings as the result o f reducing the number
of thermometers broken by guards at the main gate bridge who routinely threw tethered
thermometers from the bridge to take the daily seawater temperature.
This is to bring your attention to the excessive breakage of water
thermometers in use at the main gate, where the guard takes the temperature
of the sea water. In years past it has been the practice to fill a bucket with
seawater and take the temperature of the water in the bucket. This saves
throwing the thermometer overboard from the bridge, thus eliminating danger
of breakage.96
As with a number o f other hazardous materials discussed in this section, the writer’s
primary concern was cost savings, as the result of reduced thermometer breakage, and

96 Memorandum [Believed to be from the Main Gate Security Office] to Captain o f the Yard o f 15
November 1929. NARA College Park, Waltham, RG 181, PNSY Central Files, Box 26, Folder H15,
“Seawater.”
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certainly not the reduction of mercury contamination in the back channel of the
shipyard.97

All things considered, Portsmouth Navy Yard was not an environmentally
friendly place during the peak production years of World War II. Increased production
brought industrial hazards that included acid fumes from pickling operations and airborne
dust of unknown chemical composition during the removal of hull paint from foreign
submarines. Large land reclamation projects dominated both extremes of Seavey Island,
with the incessant noise and confusion that accompany such projects. Raw sewage and
industrial waste were dumped into the river or landfills with little or no controls. Sanitary
conditions cited as unsatisfactory after the war, in 1950, must have been even worse
during peak production years of the war, when shipyard employment was four times
greater.
The war effort demanded sacrifices of the yard’s patriotic and dedicated
workforce, not the least o f which was the overlooking of marginal sanitary conditions and
occasional wigglers in the water. In retrospect, the shipyard could not have been a very
healthy or pleasant place to work during the war. Yet, all the people interviewed in the
course of this study were proud of their service at the yard during the war and none
voiced any complaints whatsoever about their work environment or any o f the conditions
described in this study, their focus and priorities being elsewhere.

97 Mercury is a toxicant that is easily absorbed through the skin, respiratory, and gastrointestinal
tissues. Mercury contaminated foodstuffs are especially harmful to humans, causing reproductive failure,
intestinal damage, stomach disruption, DNA alteration, and kidney damage. Mercury contamination can
enter the human food chain through large fish that absorb and accumulate mercury in contaminated water.
EPA Fact Sheet, EPA-823-F-01-011, June 2001, “Mercury Update on Fish Advisories.”
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CHAPTER VII

HEALTH CONSEQUENCES

“City’s Venereal Disease Record Shows Improvement. . . due to the alertness of the
local police and increased vigilance on their part, Portsmouth has not been named
as the source of venereal disease as often as it was previous to the formation of the
[Portsmouth Social Protection] committee last spring.”1
Portsmouth Herald
20 October 1944

The increased population and industrial activity at the yard during the war caused
numerous health and medical problems. Comprehensive shipyard records permit
confident analysis for some of those issues. For example, monthly shipyard reports on the
frequency and severity of accidents, and the shipyard medical officer’s monthly reports
on communicable diseases, permit analysis for accident and disease rates and trends. A
review of the medical officer’s reports quickly leads one to the conclusion that venereal
disease was a rampant problem among enlisted military men at the shipyard during the
war. The efforts to control venereal disease took on a life of its own as the shipyard
leadership sought local cooperation to eliminate the source o f the disease by ridding
Portsmouth of prostitution. At the same time, Portsmouth’s civic leaders had considerable
difficulty admitting the existence of such a vice in their fair town.

1 Portsmouth Herald, 20 Oct 1944, “City’s Venereal Disease Record Shows Improvement, Report
Says,” 1.
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Submarine industrial work has historically involved considerable handling of
hazardous materials. During World War II, the shipyard routinely processed large
quantities o f asbestos insulation, lead based paints, lead battery storage cells, mercury
gauges and thermometers, various petroleum products, and other hazardous materials.
During the war, procedures for the handling and disposal of the industrial waste from
these materials were often weak or nonexistent. In most cases, only fragmented and
anecdotal evidence exists for the health issues that can be traced to these materials.
Although fragmented, this evidence does show how lightly regarded were the long-term
effects of some industrial materials that were later determined to be extremely hazardous.
One o f the byproducts of the greatly increased industrial activity at the shipyard
was increased accident rates. For example, accident rates increased during the early and
late years o f the war, when the yard workload and workforce were in transition. The yard
experienced its highest lost time accident frequency and severity rates in late 1942 when
the hiring rate was the steepest and thousands of newly hired employees were being
introduced to the industrial hazards of a rapidly expanding shipyard. To the shipyard’s
credit, the accident rates decreased significantly in the following years as the employees
were successfully assimilated into the workforce.
The densely populated shipyard also experienced limited, but noticeably
increased, communicable disease rates. The focus of the study of communicable diseases
that follows is primarily on shipyard military personnel, as the archives contain
comprehensive and quantifiable records for only the military population on the shipyard
during the war. Within that cohort, the communicable disease rate rose and fell during the
war as dictated, most often, by the latest outbreak o f fevers, sore throats, and measles.
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The notable exception was the rate of venereal disease which rose throughout the war and
peaked dramatically in 1943 and 1944. High rates of venereal disease prompted shipyard
leaders to pressure local civic officials to rid the area of prostitutes and increase
monitoring of the establishments they frequented. Venereal disease dominated the health
concerns of shipyard officials during the war and it also, appropriately, dominates the
following study of communicable diseases.
The increased use of asbestos insulation on ships and submarines during the war
contributed to an increase of asbestosis among shipyard workers. While Portsmouth Navy
Yard was not singled out as one of the shipyards with a high incidence of asbestosis, the
yard was included in a 1945 asbestosis study of three navy yards and two private yards.
The study included atmosphere surveys of shop and shipboard conditions at each yard
that allow analysis of conditions at Portsmouth and comparisons to other yards.
Two other important medical issues, cited in shipyard medical reports during the
war, were Vincent’s Infection (trench mouth) and Brassfounder’s Ague. Trench mouth
was detected among visiting foreign submarine crews that had served under extremely
unsanitary shipboard conditions. Precautions against the disease included immediate
fumigation of foreign submarines upon arrival at the shipyard. Brassfounders ague was
an industrial respiratory disease of the era that was all too common to poorly ventilated
foundries and metal working shops. This section concludes with a discussion of these two
health issues.
Lost Time Accidents
There is little doubt that a rapidly increasing, and inexperienced, workforce
contributes to increased accident rates. However, that is by no means the only factor that
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increases the frequency of accidents. During the early years of the war, widespread new
construction and renovation of buildings and piers, increased numbers of work sites, and
the need to reinvent and abbreviate processes to meet accelerated schedules all
contributed to unusual and chaotic conditions in the yard that could cause accidents to
increase.
The following table summarizes the frequency and severity of lost-time accidents
at Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war.
Table 12 - Lost Time Accidents (1942,1943 & 1944)2
Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Frequency
1942
1943
1944

7.82
6.59

8.39
5.47

7.49
3.52

4.54
9.29

NA
NA

3.12
9.04

4.20
9.15

16.99
5.88
8.78

13.06
4.6
8.29

8.16
5.59
3.56

10.96
5.49
10.00

8.44
5.02
1.80

.10
.06

.35
.08
2.10

.27
.25
.08

.19
.74
2.06

2.19
.08
.09

2.05
7.06
2.09

Severity
1942
1943
1944

.20
.004

.15
.130

.26
.180

.12
2.11

NA
NA

.12
.14

According to the shipyard medical officer’s annual report for 1942, the number of lost
time accidents peaked at 51 in August of that year. The accident frequency (number of
lost-time accidents x 1,000,000/ number of employees) and accident severity (days lost /
thousand man-hours worked) remained high through the end of the year, as shown in
Tablel2. The severity rate peaked in November and December 1942 and then dropped
2 Table 12 is constructed from data included in the Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s
Annual Reports for the years 1942 to 1944 to the Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station
General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Annual Reports.” When reviewing these numbers for
accident frequency and severity, it is well to keep in mind that the frequency o f accidents will, in general,
be the more consistent number, with smoother transitions from month to month. On the other hand, the
severity index is more likely to jump around, from month to month, as it could be heavily influenced by a
few very serious accidents that result in many production days lost. The occasional death on the job will
spike the severity index and hardly affect the frequency index. For example, the four severity peaks greater
than 2.00 in 1944 are attributed to the four deaths due to accidents in 1944. Portsmouth Naval Yard
Medical Officer’s Annual Report for the year 1944, 5.
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dramatically in January1943. As the new workforce gained experience and became more
familiar with the hazards of the shipyard work environment, the frequency and severity of
lost-time accidents continued to decline in 1943.
For the period 1 January 1942 to 1 July 1945, the shipyard reported an average
accident frequency rate o f 8.05 per million man-hours and a severity rate of 0.468 days
•i

lost per thousand man-hours worked. The above table shows high accident rates during
the latter half of 1942 and 1944, both periods of rapidly changing shipyard employment.
Employment was increasing rapidly in late 1942 and decreasing at a similar rate in late
1944. However, as shown in Table 13, the yard’s relatively high accident frequency rates
during these peak periods (July-December 1942 and July-December 1944) were well
below the annual averages reported for Bureau of Ships activities and naval activities in
general.4
Table 13 - Accident Frequency Rates
Activity

1942

Portsmouth Peaks
BuShips Average
All Navy Average

5.13 (Jul-Dec)

1943

1944

1945

15.08
15.35

6.93 (Jul-Dec)
12.55
9.90
14.01
10.58

Despite the impressive low accident frequency rates shown in Table 13, the best that can
be said about Portsmouth Navy Yard’s safety record was that the yard was recognized as

3 Administrative History: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 42.
4 Navy Department (J.L.Bird, Acting Chief Office o f Industrial Relations) letter o f 16 Aug 1946
to Chief o f Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery. NARA College Park, RG 52, Records o f the Bureau o f
Medicine and Surgery, Headquarters Records Correspondence 1842-1951, General Correspondence 19421946, Box 140, Folder P2-4/LL 1945-1946.

327

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the third best of the nine Navy Yards in 1943 and 1944.5 The yard’s performance
continued to improve, as evidenced by a Bureau of Ships Safety Engineering Survey in
August 1945 that noted, “The yard accident frequency and severity rates are well below
the rate for all Navy Yards.”6 However, unlike the Production “E” Awards that the
shipyard earned at every opportunity, the yard was less frequently recognized for
excellent safety performance.
Venereal Disease
Early in the shipyard’s history and up until the 1920s, the annual report of the
yard medical officer gave statistical data for the entire shipyard population, including
both civilian and military employees. Disease and injury numbers and rates were based
on both populations. However, by World War II, that report comprehensively covered
only the shipyard military personnel, with occasional discussion of civilian employees on
a case basis, or to report unusual circumstances. Consequently, the discussion of disease
rates that follows, unless otherwise indicated, is necessarily restricted to the shipyard
military population.
Table 14, constructed from the annual reports of the shipyard medical officer,
provides annual communicable disease rates for the shipyard military population (enlisted

5 Administrative History: Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 42.
6 Bureau o f Ships letter o f 27 Sep 1945 to Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard, Subject: Safety
Engineering Survey o f the U.S. Navy Yard Portsmouth New Hampshire on 14 August 1945. NARA
College Park, RG 80, General Records o f the Department o f the Navy 1798-1947, Formerly Security
Classified General Correspondence o f the CNO/ Secretary o f the Navy ,1940-1947, Box 18, Folder P2-4
(vol 3).
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and officers) during the war.7 As no cases of venereal disease were reported among the
officers during the war years, the venereal disease rates shown are for the enlisted
population. The total absence of any cases of venereal disease from the officer ranks is
curious and suspect, but one must work with the data available.

o

Table 14 - Communicable Disease Rates at Portsmouth Navy Yard (1939-44)
1939
Average monthly SY population
3757
Ave. monthly enlisted military population9 219
No. cases communicable diseases (all military) 17
Venereal Disease Cases (enlisted)
5
Communicable Rate per 1000 w/VD (all) 4.76
Communicable Rate per 1000 w/o VD (all) 3.19
VD Rate per 1000 enlisted
22.83

1940 1941
5874 9309
327
850
33
64
11
16
5.61 6.88
3.75 5.16
33.6 18.82

1942 1943 1944
16934 21389 20932
1340
948
900
214
193
219
94
27
65
11.40 10.00 10.41
9.80 7.20
5.97
17.91 68.56 104.44

Referring to the boxed lines in Table 14, the communicable disease rate per thousand,
with VD included, increased from 4.76 in 1939 to 11.40 in 1942 and then held fairly
steady at that high rate through 1944. With VD excluded, the communicable disease rate
was 3.19 in 1939, peaked at 9.8 in 1943, and dropped to 5.97 in 1944. The specific
diseases that contributed to these trends will be analyzed later in this section. The real
issue is highlighted by the last row of Table 14, the high incidence of syphilis and

7 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Reports for the years 1939 to 1944 to the
Commandant. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1,
“Sanitary Reports.”
8 In way o f explanation o f Table 12, the first five rows o f the table are as presented in the annual
reports, with venereal disease included along with all the other communicable diseases. Consequently, the
fifth row labeled “Communicable Rate per 1000 w/VD (all)” is heavily skewed by the increasingly high
percentage o f VD, compared to the other communicable diseases. The last two rows are constructions by
the author to separate venereal disease rates from the other communicable diseases rates to give a more
accurate representation o f each. The total shipyard population figures that include employees, relief
workers, and military personnel are provided to show how relatively small the enlisted population was
compared to the total shipyard population.
9 The enlisted military population includes all the enlisted men serviced by the Portsmouth Navy
Yard hospital. This population consists o f the enlisted men assigned to the navy yard and the crews o f
submarines that were in the yard at the time.
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gonorrhea among enlisted men during the war. The next several pages of this study
address that issue.

The VD rates for enlisted personnel were high throughout the war years, with
huge increases in 1943 (68.56) and 1944 (104.44). Portsmouth Navy Yard’s VD rate of
104.44 per thousand late in 1944 was higher than the rates experienced navy-wide at the
close o f the war. A post-war Bureau of Medicine and Survey letter noted that, “Within
the past few months there has been a gradual lowering of the venereal disease rates [for
the overall navy] to 95.8 per thousand per annum. However, this rate is still much greater
than at the close of the war.” 10 The Navy’s venereal disease rate was apparently higher
than that of the Army. According to historian Alan M. Brandt:
Although in 1940 the venereal disease rate in the Army had risen to 42.5 per
1000, by 1943 it had fallen to 2 5 . . . In fact, Army data for rates of infection
within the military were essentially equivalent to civilian rates. For the entire
duration of the war the average incidence of venereal disease was 37 per 1000.11
Thus, the incidence of venereal disease at the Portsmouth Navy Yard during the early
years of the war was lower than the national average while the rates at the end of the war
were considerably above the national average. The shipyard’s annual medical reports
attribute the high rate of venereal disease to the prevalence o f prostitution in the
Portsmouth area. The report for 1944 notes that shipyard officials were working with

10 Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery Circular Letter No.47-88 o f 30 Jun 1947 to Commandants, All
Naval District and River Commands, Subject: Venereal Disease Control Officers and Interviewers. NARA
Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard General Correspondence (Central Files), 1925-50, Box 8,
Folder A2-11/EN10 “Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery.”
11 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History o f Venereal Disease in the United States
Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 170.
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civilian authorities to reduce the number o f prostitutes in the local area. This effort met
with limited success.
Portsmouth officials did not agree that their city was overrun with prostitutes. In
fact, they went to great lengths to dispute early rumors to that effect. In November 1942,
the chairman of the Portsmouth Board of Health, Dr. George A. Tredick, in a reply to an
attorney’s claim that Portsmouth was “overrun by vice and venereal disease,” 12 declared
that “Portsmouth has no noticeable increase in prostitution or venereal disease.”13 Dr.
Tredick added, “Portsmouth does not live up to reputation visiting speakers have recently
tried to give it of being a den of iniquity due to the influx of defense workers and men in
the armed services.”14 The high VD rates shown on the last line of Table 14 argued to the
contrary.
By June 1943, the city was more accepting of the high venereal disease rates. The
Portsmouth Herald headline of 9 June 1943 reported, “Portsmouth police act to smash
vice rackets.” The associated article noted that Army, Navy, and State Board o f Health
officials had reported that vice conditions, and the venereal disease rate, had recently
increased substantially in Portsmouth. Navy doctors had reported that “There are more
cases of venereal disease in the city now [during the first five months of 1943] than
records show for all of last year.” The smashing of vice rackets reportedly involved
routine inspections of beer parlors where the prostitutes congregated to meet enlisted
12 According to the Portsmouth Herald, 10 Nov. 1942, 1, Atty. Stanley Bums o f Dover had told
the Catholic Daughters o f America, at a 4 Oct. 1942 meeting, that prostitution is being practiced
indiscriminately in Portsmouth and that “Portsmouth police are trying to get rid o f the menace o f
professional prostitutes but the job is too great for them in view o f the tremendous increase in Portsmouth
population.”
13 Portsmouth Herald, 10 Nov. 1942, “Health Board Head Denies Portsmouth Overrun by Vice,”

1.
14 Ibid.
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men. Apparently, vice smashing also meant raiding homes and bedrooms because the
next month the Herald reported that, “Two sailors and two Portsmouth girls were found
guilty in municipal court this morning of a morals charge in the second vice case heard in
the local court in less than a month.”15 Slowly, but surely, the community was beginning
to acknowledge to the problem. The Portsmouth Herald came close to admitting a
Portsmouth prostitution problem, in June 1943, when it described some of the female
visitors to beer parlors as “women who are involved with vice rackets here and who may
be carriers of venereal disease.”16
When Army and Navy doctors continued to raise concerns about the local
prostitution problem, city officials and the local newspaper redefined the problem in
more benign terms. The venereal disease problem was attributed, not to prostitutes, but to
large numbers of young females, many local adolescents, who frequented the bars to
meet servicemen. This explanation suggested that Portsmouth’s problem was more
associated with patriotism than prostitution. Portsmouth’s “Girl Problem” will be
explored in considerable detail later in this study, under a discussion of the community
consequences of the population explosion. Suffice it to say, at this point, that the requests
of shipyard medical officers for community assistance to solve the rampant venereal
disease problem among shipyard enlisted men were met initially with a definite lack of
enthusiasm and cooperation.

15 Ibid., 7 Jul 1943, “Two Couples Found Guilty in Vice Case,” 1.
16 Portsmouth Herald, 9 Jun 1943, “Beer Parlors to Undergo Inspections,” 1.
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According to shipyard medical reports, the dramatic increase in the number of
VD cases, reported in 1943 (65) and 1944 (94), may be artificially inflated. Those reports
attribute the high numbers, in 1943 and 1944, to the increased availability and
effectiveness of penicillin as a treatment at the shipyard hospital. After experimenting
with the drug in 1943, the shipyard hospital received its first million units of penicillin on
4 January 1944.17 Prior to the advent of penicillin, treatment of VD at the shipyard
hospital required a period of hospitalization for which the men did not receive pay.
Consequently, it was suspected that the enlisted men sought treatment elsewhere to avoid
a loss of pay. This reasoning, of course, would also argue that the rates earlier in the war
were artificially lower than reported if the sailors were seeking off-yard treatment.
The shipyard hospital was one of the first medical facilities to receive penicillin
shipments. In early 1943, penicillin was being given experimentally to syphilitic rabbits.
By September 1943, the U.S. Public Health Service announced successful results with
humans and mass production of the antibiotic was underway shortly thereafter. Within a
year, more than 10,000 patients had received penicillin for treatment of early syphilis and
rates of cure were an unprecedented 90 to 97 percent. Portsmouth Navy Yard sailors were
among the first to benefit from that remarkable success rate.18
The medical officer believed that, once penicillin was available, and patients
could be treated without the need for overnight stays and lost pay, “those cases which
were formerly treated by the outside practitioner are now reporting to the naval medical

17 Administrative History: Portsmouth Navy Yard in World War II, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Museum Archives, Kittery, Me., 86.
18 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History o f Venereal D isease in the United States
Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) 170-171.
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officer for treatment.”19 The avoidance of lost pay was obviously a good reason to seek
free treatment at the shipyard hospital, but the medical officer suspected another
contributing factor. He also believed that the apparent effectiveness of penicillin created
“a false sense o f security” that caused “a lack of restraint and carelessness regarding
prompt prophylaxis,” that contributed to even more VD and the need for more penicillin.
Ironically, the cure was increasing the rate of the disease.
Some argued that the no-pay provision was an effective deterrent to the spreading
o f the disease, but other military officers increasingly argued that the no-pay provision
led to concealment of the disease, clandestine treatment, and possible serious
consequences. One report noted that “Pilots were found to be continuing to fly while
<

«

00

taking [clandestine] treatment, a considerable risk.” Congress put an end to the debate
in September 1944 by repealing the law that required loss of pay for time hospitalized for
treatment for venereal disease.

01

Venereal disease had a clandestine history in the city of Portsmouth. Despite an
1883 law that required the Board of Health to report disease statistics, it was not until
1918 that syphilis and gonorrhea were listed in the city’s reports. According to a local
medical history:
Perhaps the increased activity at the Navy Yard during the First World War had
seriously increased the incidence of those previously unmentionable diseases or

19 Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Report for 1942 o f 19 Jan 1943, to the
Commandant, 4. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1,
Sanitary Reports.”
20 Alan M. Brandt, No M agic Bullet, ” 169.
21 Ibid

334

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

perhaps the Board of Health had merely suppressed them from earlier published
reports to spare the public’s sensibilities.22
During World War II, increased activity at the shipyard would once again increase the
incidence of the unmentionable disease and challenge the public’s sensibilities.
There are a number of indicators that venereal disease was more prevalent in the
local community during the war than admitted at the time by local leaders. For example,
the Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey, dated August 1943, summarized diseases
reported in Portsmouth from September 1941 to September 1942 as communicable (174),
occupational (5), and venereal (34).

23

If one assumes that the 34 cases of venereal

disease occurred among males in the 15 to 25 years of age group and that the group
included about 2000 people in 1942,24 a venereal disease rate of 17 per thousand results.25
This rate closely approximated the VD rate in the navy yard (17.9) for the same period
(1942). This is, at best, a rough approximation, but it is an indicator that venereal disease
was probably a significant local health issue in late 1942, when it was also the most
serious health concern at the shipyard.
Another section of the Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey (1943) permits
further analysis of Portsmouth’s VD problem:

22 J. Worth Estes and David M. Goodman. The Changing Humors o f Portsmouth: The Medical
Biography o f an American Town, 1623-1983. Boston: The Francis A. Countway Library o f Medicine,
1984.
23 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area.” Cumings Library, Strawbery
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., Box 2, Folder 14, Table 9 “Diseases in Portsmouth from September
1941-September 1942.”
24 Ib id , Table 11, “Portsmouth Defense Area Population - Age.”
25 The reported 34 cases o f venereal disease are not defined by gender. The navy yard cohort was
all young males. Also, as noted earlier, some enlisted men may have sought treatment at a civilian facility
to avoid the confinement and loss o f pay that resulted when treated at the navy yard.
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For a two-year period, 1941 and 1942 (Oct. 15,1942), the syphilis rate for the
white population, on the basis of actual blood tests and not on a total population,
was 1.8 percent [18 per thousand]. None was reported for the negro population.26
Again, the rate of 18 per thousand is almost identical to the navy yard rate of 17.9 for
1942.
Penicillin was available much earlier at the navy yard than in the local civilian
community. Whereas the navy yard received its first shipments of the drug in January
1944, penicillin was first used in Portsmouth in the fall of 1944. On 24 March 1945, the
Portsmouth Herald reported that, “A total of 126 patients in 43 different disease
classifications have been treated with penicillin at Portsmouth hospital during the past 10
months, from the time when the drug first was distributed in small quantities on a quota
basis, until March 15, when it became available for general civilian use.” The article
further explained that penicillin had been a most effective medicine in treating such
diseases as pneumonia, cellulitis, and meningitis, but not others. It is interesting to note
that, across the river in the navy yard, penicillin was the miracle drug of choice for the
treatment of venereal disease, but no mention was made of penicillin being used as a
treatment for venereal disease at the Portsmouth Hospital.
Finally, the frequency of venereal disease clinics at the Portsmouth General
Hospital is further evidence of community concern. In August 1943, a venereal disease
clinic was the only weekly disease clinic held at the hospital. As a comparison, the only

26 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” 52. Cumings Library,
Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., Box 2, Folder 14, Table 9 “Diseases in Portsmouth from
September 1941-September 1942.”
27 Portsmouth Herald, 24 Mar 1945, “ 126 Patients Make Use o f Penicillin in 10 Months at
Portsmouth Hospital,” 1.
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•

•

other disease clinics were tuberculosis and cancer clinics that were held twice a month.

28

The hospital would not have held weekly venereal disease clinics without the customer
base to support such a frequency.
Other Communicable Diseases
Venereal Disease was not the only communicable disease with a strong track
record during the war. Table 15 shows that a large number of cases of irritating nose and
throat symptoms were diagnosed and treated as catarrhal fever and tonsillitis during the
war.
Table 15 - Most Common Communicable Diseases at PNY (1939-1944)
1939
14
1
0

Catarrhal Fever
Tonsillitis
German measles

1940
15
4
0

1941
40
6
0

1942
99
22
25

1943
94
36
15

19'
64
36
0

An outbreak of German measles in 1942 and 1943 also contributed to increased rates of
■JQ

communicable diseases.

It was noted earlier that Portsmouth General Hospital recorded

174 cases of communicable diseases between September 1941 and September 1942.
According to that report, “Most of these cases were measles and German measles.”30
Early in the war, when New Hampshire coastal observers were on guard for German
ships, German submarines, and a possible German invasion, it was only German measles
that managed to sweep through the area.

28 Ibid., 48.
29. Portsmouth Naval Yard Medical Officer’s Annual Report for 1942 to the Commandant o f 19
Jan 1943,4. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Naval Station General Correspondence, Box 10, Folder A9-1,
“Sanitary Reports.”
30 Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area, Table 9. Cummings Library,
Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., Box 2, Folder 14, Table 9 “Diseases in Portsmouth from
September 1941-September 1942.”
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Finally, in December 1943, the local area, and most of the nation, experienced a
flu epidemic. The Portsmouth Herald reported on 16 December 1943 that, “Portsmouth is
•

*

•

adding many of its residents to the nationwide sick list of 1,000,000 influenza victims.”

T1

It is more than likely that many of the fevers and sore throats reported at the shipyard
dispensary in 1943 and 1944 could have equally been diagnosed as flu symptoms. The
thousands o f employees that commuted daily to and from the shipyard undoubtedly
helped spread measles, flu, and other communicable diseases.
Asbestosis
In February 1945, the Bureau of Ships, responding to a Bath Iron Works report
that several shipyard workers had asbestosis symptoms, requested that the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery investigate allegations that asbestos operations in navy yards
might be an occupational hazard.

In response to that request, the Chief of the Bureau of

Medicine and Surgery, Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire, minimized the hazards of
asbestos operations at navy yards. Mclntire wrote:
Reports o f chest x-rays, which have been made of employees engaged in
handling, processing, and applying asbestos to pipe in Boston and Bremerton
Navy Yards do not indicate any diseases of the lungs from exposure to
asbestos. Repeated observations by personnel of the Yard Safety and
Industrial Health Departments indicate that the exposure of civilian
employees in U.S. Navy Yards to asbestos do not form an occupational
problem as alleged.33

31 Portsmouth Herald, 16 December 1943, “Portsmouth Hit by Flu; Many Sick,” 1.
32 Bureau o f Ships letter o f 24 Feb 1945 to the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery, Subject:
Industrial Health and Safety Survey Concerning Asbestos. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships
General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 18, Folder P2-4 (vol. 3).
33 Chief o f the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire letter o f 8 Mar
1945. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 18, Folder
P2-4 (vol. 3).
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The minimizing of the occupational hazards of exposure to asbestos by the U.S. Navy
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in 1945 appears to have been premature.
Further review of shipyard asbestos operations was conducted over the summer
of 1945 under the leadership of Dr. Philip Drinker, Chief Health Consultant, U.S.
Maritime Commission. The results of that study showed a similar disturbing lack of
knowledge about the health hazards of working with asbestos. Drinker’s study concluded
that “This work [asbestos pipe covering], as found in our Navy Yards, is most unlikely to
cause ill health.”34 The study claimed that previous asbestos studies had shown that
“Asbestosis results from breathing asbestos fibers of relatively long lengths such as 15 to
75 microns [and] it is not caused by chopped up asbestos fibers of one or two microns.”
With shop air samples showing low percentages of long asbestos fibers and only 3 of
1074 employee lung x-rays showing asbestosis markings, the study pronounced that,
“Asbestos covering is a relatively safe operation.”
In retrospect, the study obviously looked at too short an exposure period and was
too reliant on lung x-ray markings to draw valid conclusions about the dangers of
asbestos exposure. Asbestos had only been used on ships and submarines about 15 years
when the Drinker Report was published in 1945. According to the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, “The effects of long-term exposure to asbestos typically don’t
show up until 20 to 30 years after initial exposure.”36 Obviously, the Drinker Report

34 Phillip Drinker, Chief Health Consultant, U.S. Maritime Commission letter o f 21 Sep 1945 to
Bureau o f Ships forwarding enclosure (1), A Health Survey o f Pipe Covering Operations in Constructing
Naval Vessel. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-1945, Box 18,
Folder P2-4 (vol. 3).
35 Ibid.
36 http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/asbestos/index.html. U .S. Department o f Labor, OSHA website.
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detected the most severe cases of asbestosis. Had the study been done fifteen years later,
of the same workers, more asbestosis would probably have been found.

According to the Drinker Study, the use of asbestos for pipe and machinery
insulation in the shipbuilding industry grew consistently throughout the 1930s, and
peaked immediately prior to World War II with the accelerated shipbuilding programs.
Asbestos blocks and blankets to insulate steam turbines and other machinery had been in
use prior to 1930, but it was the development of asbestos felts and cements that could be
applied to valves, fittings, and piping that greatly expanded its use during the 1930s. The
material’s low thermal conductivity, strength, and light weight made it an attractive
shipbuilding material. High temperature asbestos pipe coverings, weighing 18 pounds per
cubic foot, replaced previous magnesia insulators that weighed 26 pounds per cubic foot.
Furthermore, the lower thermal conductivity of asbestos meant that less of it had to be
used than previous insulators.
Weight savings, always a critical concern in shipbuilding design for reasons of
stability and cargo carrying capacity, was even more of a concern in the 1930s because of
•37

the tonnage limitations o f the various naval treaties.

With United States naval

construction restricted to treaty tonnage limitations, the greater than thirty percent weight
savings that resulted from the use of asbestos insulation on piping systems throughout the
ship, was a significant advantage to the U.S. Navy. In addition, fire resistant asbestos
insulations proved to be a good replacement for the flammable, and sometimes vermin
infested, animal hair insulations that had been previously used on cold water pipes to

37 Ibid.
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reduce sweating. The end result was a rapid growth in the use of asbestos in the
shipbuilding industries during the latter half of the 1930s. The naval shipbuilding boom
during the mobilization for World War II greatly expanded the demand for the material,
and the potential for increased asbestosis among shipyard workers.38

The Drinker Study conclusions were based on a survey of the asbestos operations
at Boston and Brooklyn Navy Yards and two private yards, Bethlehem Fore River and
New York Shipbuilding. The survey included atmospheric sampling of shop ventilation
for dust count and chemical content, and a review of the medical records of over one
thousand workers at those yards. The survey also included a review of shop dust
exposure data provided by Portsmouth Navy Yard. No on-site visits were made to
Portsmouth and no Portsmouth employee medical records were reviewed. The study
does, however, permit comparisons of Portsmouth asbestos shop and shipboard
operations with the other yards surveyed.
The Drinker Study showed that the Portsmouth Navy Yard asbestos operation
was small in comparison to the other yards surveyed. Portsmouth had only 5 asbestos
shop workers and 35 shipboard workers, whereas Brooklyn Navy Yard had 50 shop and
700 shipboard employees and Boston Navy Yard had 34 shop and 467 shipboard
employees. Portsmouth used only 2000 cubic feet of amosite [the generic name for the
asbestos fiber] each month and Brooklyn and Boston used over 50,000 cubic feet of the
material. Similarly, Portsmouth used 120 pounds of asbestos cement monthly and the
other Brooklyn and Boston used 38,800 and 34,400 pounds respectively. Simple division
shows that the 40 Portsmouth asbestos workers were exposed to an average of 50 pounds
38 Ibid.
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of asbestos fiber per month, whereas the Brooklyn and Boston asbestos workers were
exposed to 66.7 and 99.8 pounds per month respectively. This one indicator suggests that
Portsmouth workers were less exposed to asbestos than those in other yards surveyed.
Overall dust surveys show that the Portsmouth asbestos shop and ship
atmospheres were significantly cleaner than the other two yards. However, long fiber
asbestos surveys found Brooklyn to be the most contaminated yard, Boston the least
contaminated, and Portsmouth somewhere in between the two. Table 16 shows total dust
and asbestos (long fiber) dust counts for the three navy yards included in the Drinker
Study:
Table 16 - D rinker Study Asbestos Shop Dust Counts

Shop Atmosphere
Ship Atmosphere

Boston
Brooklyn
Portsmouth
--------------- Dust Content in Parts per Million---------------------Total Asbestos
Total Asbestos
Total Asbestos
30 .26
26.9
1.0
6.9
1.0
142 .02
128
2.8
11.9 0.3

The total dust count on board ships, in the other two yards, is over ten times greater than
that at Portsmouth. Shop dust counts were about four times greater at the other two yards.
The extremely clean shipboard environment on submarines was probably more the
product of the procedures applied to the overall submarine work environment than any
special precautions for asbestos workers. Workers in the confined work spaces and tanks
of submarines could not tolerate very dusty or otherwise contaminated atmospheric
conditions.
Despite the superior overall cleanliness conditions, the prevalence o f long fiber
asbestos dust in the shops was greatest at the Portsmouth and Brooklyn Navy Yards and
lowest at Boston. Thus, the study suggests, the asbestos shop workers at Portsmouth
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Navy Yard were equally at risk for asbestosis as workers at the other yards. Knowing
that, it is discouraging to note that the study reported that, of the forty Portsmouth
asbestos workers, only the band saw operator wore a respirator. The study also noted a
lack of shop ventilation fans. One small exhaust fan was used at the cementing station
and all other ventilation was natural.39
The Drinker Study deemed the asbestos operations at all three yards to be
acceptable and safe. With such reassurances from the highest levels of the U.S. Navy,
concern at Portsmouth Navy Yard and most other shipyards, for the dangers of asbestos,
was low and precautions were few. This would change dramatically in years to come.
Other Industrial Diseases
The early visits of foreign submarines to Portsmouth Navy Yard, in the summer
of 1941, contributed a few cases of Vincent’s infection (trench mouth). Trench mouth is
a severe form of gingivitis most often found among populations with poor nutrition and
living conditions. According to the shipyard medical officer, “During the past year
[1941], several co-belligerent submarines have put in for repair... To date, the only
problems were several cases of Vincent’s Infection which were promptly isolated and
treated.”40 Vincent’s Infection was also found among the crew members of the German
U-boats that were brought to the yard in the summer of 1945.
Wartime sanitary conditions on the foreign submarines were far below the
standards of U.S. submarines. According to Fred White, those submarines had an
unusually high content of interior wood, compared to U.S. submarines, and the wood
39 Ibid.
40 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1941. Held At NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1,“Sanitary Reports.”
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often proved to be a breeding haven for roaches and occasional vermin.41 White
remembered the German submarines that were impounded at the shipyard at the
conclusion of the war as being especially unsanitary. The medical officer’s report
confirmed his observation, “During the period from 15 May 1945 to 5 June 1945, four
surrendered German U-boats were inspected and, in each case, fumigation with
carbonoxide gas was recommended [and accomplished].”42 The maintenance of
satisfactory sanitary conditions onboard a submarine is always a challenge. Under
wartime conditions, it obviously assumed an even lower priority. In this regard, the
submarines had something in common with the shipyard and local communities
bordering the Piscataqua River, which also sacrificed cleanliness for production.
***
In 1937, six cases of “brassfounder’s ague” occurred in the foundry in Building
No. 75. According to the shipyard’s annual sanitary report:
These cases were typical text book pictures (chills, considerable elevation of
temperature, and sweating with prostration). They were of moderate severity,
lasting from 12 to 24 hours. The probable cause was that brass casting had
increased six times the volume of the previous year with the necessary
increase in personnel and with insufficient ventilation to care for the furnaces
in cold weather.43
The report goes on to say that the ague problem was eliminated with the installation of
several exhaust blowers. Brassfounder’s ague appears to have been another accepted
hazard of the trade, as the report also mentioned that the problem had occurred from

41 Oral interview with Fred White, 3 April 2006, at his home in New Castle, N.H.
42 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1945. Held At NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth
Naval Base General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1,“Sanitary Reports.”
43 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1937. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base
General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary Reports.”
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“time to time” in previous years. Yet, it took another outbreak of the disease to cause the
installation of a few fans.
By 1941, the foundry had been moved to Building No. 96, which also had
ventilation problems that were noted in the Medical Officer’s annual report. He reported
that, “under certain climatic conditions, when manganese or zinc is being melted,
excessive fumes and smoke results and therefore menaces health.”44 These foundry
conditions, reported in 1941, were highly conducive to brassfounder’s ague, yet there is
no specific mention of the disease. It is highly possible that the high fevers that passed in
less than a day could have been misdiagnosed as symptoms of a more common disease.

Health and medical consequences accompanied the shipyard population
explosion, and increased pace of industrial operations, during the war. To the shipyard’s
credit, the increased accident rates that often characterize periods of extreme industrial
employment and workload transitions were quickly stabilized and brought under control.
Less successful were the efforts of shipyard medical officials to control the alarming rise
in venereal disease among shipyard enlisted men. Much of this lack of success is
attributed to reluctance on the part of Portsmouth civic leaders to take decisive action to
rid the city of prostitutes. Although not readily acknowledged at the time, the community
venereal disease rate was also high. Other communicable disease rates during the war
varied with the latest outbreak o f fevers, sore throats, or measles, and were often shared
across shipyard and local community boundaries. Asbestos was not a significant health
issue at the yard during the war. However, shop and shipboard conditions were rife for

44 Medical Officer’s Sanitary Report for 1941. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base
General Correspondence 1930-1950, Box 10, Folder A9-1, “Sanitary Reports.”
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future asbestosis problems and precautions against such problems were few. Other
medical byproducts of the increased activity at the yard during the war included trench
mouth, attributed to the unsanitary conditions found on visiting foreign submarines, and
brasssfounder’s ague due to increased foundry and metal ship operations.
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CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNITY CONSEQUENCES

“Thus what was basically a prosperous New England port [Portsmouth],
steeped in history and thriving as a summer resort, has been transformed
swiftly into a war-production area with the only newcomers being yard
workers, soldiers, and sailors. There is no one in the city whose life has not
been altered by the transformation.”1
Milton Bracker
New York Times
5 October 1942

Discussing the effects of wartime mobilization, Portsmouth Herald reporter
Franklin E. Jordan wrote, “It is no exaggeration to state that Portsmouth now has the
greatest problem in its 318 year history and that its future for the next 318 years will be
affected by the way the problem is handled.”2 One might assume that Jordan was writing
near the end of World War II, after the city had experienced a tremendous population
boom, with concerns about how the city would adjust to the postwar era. This was not the
case. Jordan wrote of the greatest problem in the city’s history in the summer of 1941,
four months before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Portsmouth’s World War I experience was fresh in the minds of Jordan and many
o f Portsmouth’s civic leaders on the eve of World War II. During and after World War I,

1 Milton Bracker, “Portsmouth Tries to Adjust to an Influx o f Men and Money,” The New York
Times, 5 Oct 1942, 1,10.
2 Franklin E. Jordan, “Portsmouth and National Defense,” 5. A series o f 13 articles that appeared
in the Portsmouth Herald in the summer o f 1941 that were compiled and published by J.D. Hartford o f the
Portsmouth H erald on 1 August 1941. Cummings Library, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H.,
MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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the city had struggled with a number of issues as the result of expanded operations at the
yard, including a postwar economic recession. The city’s infrastructure and services had
been challenged when the population had increased from 11,269 to 13,569 during the
war. At the same time, the local economy had benefited from the increased population
and industrial activity. The end of the Great War brought employment reductions at the
yard and an economic recession to the area. In the summer of 1941, when Jordan wrote
his article, the shipyard employment had grown from 5,722 to 8,500 in a year and was
still climbing rapidly. Who knew what problems the community would face if the
shipyard grew to 15,000 or 20,000 employees, which it eventually did?
Jordan’s primary concern was the aftermath of the anticipated home building,
infrastructure development, and the increase in municipal services that would accompany
the forthcoming population boom. How could the city financially support and maintain
the new Portsmouth after the war, when the inevitable shipyard cutbacks occurred and
federal funds were curtailed? Jordan conducted a comprehensive analysis of how the
approaching mobilization, and the peace to follow, would affect the city’s utilities,
schools, hospitals, police and fire protection, government, recreational facilities, and
other resources. Jordan concluded that, “Relief will be the greatest problem in a postwar
depression.”4 Thus, even before World War II began, recent memories of the Great
Depression, and the belief that another postwar recession was inevitable, caused
Portsmouth leaders to fret about the peace that would follow the war that was yet to start.

3 Ibid., Table 1.
4 Ibid, 84.
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The greatly expanded operations at the Portsmouth Navy Yard during World War
II did bring the population and economic booms that Jordan had predicted. Also, as
predicted, the area was transformed and its future was largely determined by the wartime
mobilization. The early stages of that transformation were the subject of an article in the
New York Times, dated 5 October 1942, entitled “Portsmouth Tries to Adjust to an Influx
o f Men and Money.” The article described the rapid growth in the Portsmouth Navy
Yard’s employment and payroll and the difference that both had made to Portsmouth’s
economy and quality of life:
Thus what was basically a prosperous New England port, steeped in history and
thriving as a summer resort, has been transformed swiftly into a war-production
area with the only newcomers being yard workers, soldiers, and sailors. There is
no one in the city whose life has not been altered by the transformation.5
The transformation of Portsmouth included many challenging problems and unusual
opportunities.
Population explosions, overloaded community services, deteriorated living
conditions, and environmental impact due to accelerated shipbuilding programs were by
no means unique to the Portsmouth Navy Yard and its environs during the war. Indeed,
many communities throughout the United States had similar, and often more challenging,
experiences than Portsmouth. According to historian Frederick C. Lane, “From the point
o f view of living conditions offered the workers, shipyards may be divided into two
groups: those in or near metropolitan centers equipped to handle a large population, and
those placed in what had been mere towns or very small cities.”6 As implied, living

5 Milton Bracker, “Portsmouth Tries to Adjust to an Influx o f Men and Money,” The New York
Times, 5 Oct 1942.
6 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory, 437.
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conditions were often marginal, at best, in the small towns that had exploded in
population with the construction or expansion of a nearby shipyard. Lane cites Panama
City, Florida, Pascagoula, Mississippi, and, to some extent, Mobile, Alabama as prime
examples of those situations. Portsmouth, New Hampshire also fits the definition of a
small wartime boomtown.
Pascagoula grew from 4,000 residents before the war to 30,000 in 1944. Likewise,
Panama City grew from 20,000 to 60,000 in 1943. Mobile increased population from
114,000 in 1940 to 201,369 in 1943. Describing the deteriorated living conditions that
accompanied the prefabricated housing quickly constructed in Pascagoula, Lane says,
“They formed a community without adequate sewerage, stores, or pavements. .. Garbage
stood in the streets and the town was overrun with rats.” Similarly, in Mobile:
Some couples located places with cooking facilities, but if they had children
they usually ended up in a tent, a trailer, or a shack... .Sewers were
desperately needed... The war was almost over before Mobile caught up
with itself and, in the meantime the discontent of the workers with their
living conditions had been expressed in “quits,” in absenteeism, and even in
strikes.7
The living conditions in Richmond, California were not any better:
Fire protection was woefully inadequate. There were not sufficient hospital
beds nor doctors to care for the sick. The water supply was inadequate...
Schools were overcrowded... Juvenile delinquency rose to alarming
proportions.8
Suffice it to say that the population boom (25,029 to 35,293),9 experienced by
Portsmouth, and its contiguous towns, defined for this study as Eliot, Greenland, Kittery,

7 Ibid., 431-441.
8 Ibid., 444.
9 Franklin E. Jordan, “Portsmouth and National Defense,” Table 1. The population figures are for
1940 and 1943.
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New Castle, Newington, Portsmouth, and Rye, during the war pales in comparison to the
population booms experienced by other shipyard communities. Similarly, the wartime
challenges and deteriorated living conditions experienced by Portsmouth residents, while
extreme to local standards and previous experiences, were less severe than those found in
other shipyard boomtowns.
Wayne Bonnett’s Build Ships! San Francisco Wartime Shipbuilding Photographs
tells a story not unlike much of this study. According to Bonnett, shipyards in the San
Francisco Bay area also produced ships at a remarkable rate during World War II. Mare
Island Navy Yard alone produced 17 submarines, 4 submarine tenders, 31 destroyer
escorts, 33 small craft and more than 300 landing craft.10 Here too, civic and shipyard
leaders in the San Francisco Bay area faced more serious sociological problems than their
counterparts in the Portsmouth area. According to Bonnett:
In addition to delivering ships on schedule, shipyard management had to
participate in dealing with labor unions and subcontractors, crime in shipyard
boomtown and racial and gender conflicts. Problems naturally arose,
breakdowns and accidents occurred, mistakes were made.11
Portsmouth Navy Yard managers had relatively few problems in their dealings with labor
unions and subcontractors. In addition, racial and gender conflicts were much less
noticeable and crime in boomtown Portsmouth, N.H. was pretty much limited to the vice
of prostitution and the frequent arrests of disorderly servicemen. While the criminal
activity in the Portsmouth area was apparently less serious than that found in West Coast

10 http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/travel/wwllbavarea/mar.htm. “Mare Island Naval Shipyard: World
War II in the San Francisco Bay Area.” This site is an essay excerpted from Wayne Bonnet, Build Ships!
San Francisco Wartime Shipbuilding Photographs (Windgate Press: Sausalito, C A 2000).
11 http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/travel/wwllbavarea/shipbuilding.htm. “World War II Shipbuilding in
the San Francisco Bay Area,” 3.
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boomtowns, the impact of that activity on a previously tranquil New England town was
significant.
Frederick C. Lane notes that the population of Richmond, California mushroomed
from 23,000 in 1940 to 100,000 in 1943, including an African American population that
rose from 400 to about 14,000. Lane says that, “Workers came from all over the Midwest
and Southwest - the Okies, Arkies, and Texans were most evident.”12 The wartime
workers that migrated into the Portsmouth area traveled much shorter distances and
represented much less ethnic diversity. In fact, many relocated from other New England
towns to the area, or merely commuted long distances from hometowns in New
Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts that were within the reach o f the shipyard, once
the far reaching bus service was implemented. In addition, the influx of Portsmouth
workers added relatively few minorities to an area that already had a small percentage of
minorities. Consequently, the potential for racial conflict was minimal.
Puget Sound also produced ships at a remarkable rate during the war and shared
many of the same wartime experiences as Portsmouth and the Bay Area. Puget Sound
Navy Yard built 19 major ships including 8 destroyers, 8 destroyer escorts, 5 escort
aircraft carriers, and other vessels. Puget Sound’s primary role, however, was the repair
o f battle damaged ships in the Pacific theater. According to a local history of the Puget
Sound area:
Labor shortages replaced unemployment lines and a great migration
developed as Americans moved from poorer areas, particularly in the South,
to areas with major war industries. Census takers in 1940 counted slightly

12 Frederick C. Lane, Ships fo r Victory, 437.
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more than 1.7 million Washington residents. The war effort quickly added a
quarter-million more - including thousands of African Americans. 3
The migration of workers into the Puget Sound area was also much larger and more
diverse than that experienced in and around Portsmouth Navy Yard.
The government contracts awarded industries in the Puget Sound Area were
considerably greater those assigned to the Portsmouth area. The National War Production
Board, in August 1942, revealed that, up to July 1, 1942,’’More than $1 billion in
contracts had been awarded Seattle’s aircraft industry and $709 million had been awarded
shipyards in Seattle.”14 In comparison, New Hampshire historian Phillip Guyol says that
$400 million federal dollars found their way to the Portsmouth area during the entire
war.15 Albeit, that $400 million was concentrated on a much smaller area than the federal
funding that was spread across the entire Puget Sound area. At any rate, war brought an
economic boom and prosperity to Portsmouth and southern Maine just as it did to the
Puget Sound area, and many other shipyard communities, throughout the United States.
As can be seen from the above discussion, wartime Portsmouth was a microcosm
of a nationwide phenomenon o f boomtowns that struggled to adjust to large influxes of
workers. Portsmouth’s wartime experiences, as disruptive and challenging as they were
by local standards, paled in comparison to the experiences o f other shipyard communities
across the nation. This fact makes Portsmouth no less deserving of study. In the final
analysis, Portsmouth, the city and the shipyard, stood tall in the face of a myriad of
boomtown issues and produced submarines beyond anyone’s expectations. That wartime

13 http://www.historvlink.rg/essavs/output.cfm7file id=1664. “World War II Home Front on Puget
Sound - - A Snapshot History.”
14 Ibid.
15 Phillip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 162.
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production, patriotism, and perseverance are sources of deep community pride that
deserve further exploration and recognition.
The population, and economic, booms that the Portsmouth area experienced
during World War II were all the more significant because of the twenty years of stability
that preceded the war. Prior to analyzing the wartime factors that transformed the
seacoast areas of New Hampshire and southern Maine, it is appropriate to investigate the
calm before the storm.
The Calm
Figure 18 shows the population boom that Portsmouth and the surrounding
communities experienced during World War II.16

The surrounding New Hampshire

Figure 18 - Population of Portsmouth
and Seacoast Area (1910 -1944)
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16 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area.” Graph is constructed from
figures in Table entitled “Population-Total Trend” in the Appendix and population discussion on page 18.
Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2,
Folder 1, “State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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communities include Rye, Greenland, New Castle, Newington, and Portsmouth. The
Maine communities include Kittery and Eliot. The graph also shows the calm before the
boom. After a significant increase in population during World War I, also due to
expansion of the navy yard workforce, the local population had remained fairly stable
between 1920 and 1940.17
Returning to the New York Times quote, dated 5 October 1942, that described
prewar Portsmouth as a “prosperous New England port, steeped in history and thriving as
a summer resort,” one might add that nothing much had changed in the previous twenty
years. Wallace Nutting’s New Hampshire Beautiful (1923) describes the Portsmouth of
the 1920s that tourists found so appealing:
It is not strange that this district has become the main gateway for travelers in
New England who seek the calm, the inspiration, and the beauty of its
summers... Portsmouth itself has appealed to us as the most pleasing of all
small shore cities... To those who love at once the old and picturesque
together with some signs that Americans are not dead, Portsmouth appeals
strongly... It may be as well that Portsmouth is no larger. Nevertheless, we
have often wondered why, with its strategic location, it has not developed
into a more populous center.18
In the 1920’s the Portsmouth area enjoyed a reputation as a quiet, under populated
summer resort destination.
As reported in the American Guide Series New Hampshire: A Guide to the
Granite State (1938), things had not changed much by 1938:
Apart from the Navy Yard, Portsmouth is not an industrial city . . . Popular as
a resort, the city doubles its population each summer... This influx of
summer visitors adds to the prosperity of the city, which even in winter is the

17 The shipyard employment grew from 1,450 in 1916 to 5,500 in 1918 and then fell to 2,850 in
1921. Cradle o f American Shipbuilding: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Portsmouth Naval Shipyard:
Government Printing Office, 1979), 76.
18 Wallace Nutting, New Hampshire Beautiful (Framingham: Old America Publishers, 1923), 76.
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shopping center for a large area... The p o rt. . . is occupied now only by an
occasional naval vessel, small yachts, or a barge bringing in gypsum and
taking out scrap iron. Portsmouth still hopes that it will again become a busy
harbor.19
On the eve of World War II, Portsmouth continued to attract large numbers of summer
visitors. Otherwise it was a relatively quiet city and harbor that lacked industry except for
the navy yard.
If anything, between 1930 and 1940, the local area had become more rural, with a
bent towards increased farming. Table 17 shows that, between 1930 and 1940, the local
area saw almost no increase in urbanization, a large increase in the farming community,
•

•

•

and a significant increase in the rural non-farming communities.

90

Table 17 - Local Urban vs Rural Population Distribution (1930 & 1940)

Urban (Portsmouth)
Rural Farms
Rural Non-farms

1930

1940

% Increase

14,495
1,201
9,513

14,521
1,701
11,755

1.8%
41.6%
19.1%

Immediately prior to World War II, the city of Portsmouth was not attracting large
numbers of new residents, and those that were attracted to the area were settling in rural
communities. This rural trend was generally true throughout the state of New Hampshire,
•

•

where the rural population had climbed to 42.4% in 1940 compared to 41.3% in 1930.

91

19N ew Hampshire: A Guide to the G ranite State. American Guide Series. Written by Workers o f
the Federal Writer’s Project o f the Works Progress Administration for the State o f New Hampshire.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938.
20 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense A rea” Table is constructed from
information included in Table entitled “Population - Location, 1930 - 1940” in the Appendix. Thayer
Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1,
“State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
21 Portsmouth Herald, 8 Oct 1941, “Rural N.H. Like Topsy-Still Growing,” 1.
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Also, prior to the war, industrialization had not been a high priority with local
civic leaders. The front page of the 2 September 1939 Portsmouth Herald announced the
formation of the Portsmouth Industrial Association to stimulate community interest in
bringing new industries to Portsmouth. According to the article, “The lack of diversified
industries in our city has been felt by everyone with business interests for some time.”
One week later, the paper’s editorial, discussing the lack of public support for the
Portsmouth Industrial Association, cited a “lack of cooperation and coordination and a
much too prevalent feeling of smug, complacent self satisfaction as far as community
problems are concerned.” In the fall of 1939, there was no groundswell of public support
for increased industrialization.
Another Portsmouth Herald editorial, in June 1939, entitled “The Portsmouth of
Tomorrow,” presented a vision for the city that included moderate industrialization. That
vision saw “highways with dividing strips and no left turns”, “restriction of business
development to designated sites,” increased “happiness-giving recreation,” many “small,
inexpensive, yet solid and attractively-designed homes, each with its plot of land”, and
“many small private industries, utilizing the products of nearby farms in new ways.”
Nowhere was there any mention of a behemoth industry, like the shipyard, that would
dominate the area and spark a population boom that would lead to frantic housing
construction, massive infrastructure development, and a deferral of “happiness-giving
recreation.” In 1939, given its choice, it appears that Portsmouth’s leaders would have
chosen a different path for its future than what emerged from World War II.

22 Portsmouth Herald, 24 June 1941, “The Portsmouth o f Tomorrow,” 4.
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The navy yard was a welcomed part of the economic and social fabric of the
Portsmouth area in the late 1930s. One tourist guide book for New Hampshire noted:
The United States Navy Yard, possessor of a stirring history, is the backbone
of modem Portsmouth,. . . The Navy Yard contributes much to the town,
both financially and socially. The naval families are a distinct section of the
population, and their presence adds much to the gaiety of the city. Balls and
entertainments in the best naval tradition attract many of the townspeople and
give the city a sophisticated air not common in New Hampshire. The sailors
have their moments as in any seaboard town, and occasionally too-happy
hedonists are escorted to their quarters by naval police23
Immediately prior to mobilization for the war, during the calm before the storm, the navy
yard was the backbone of the community, contributing gaiety, military balls, naval
tradition, uncommon sophistication, and an occasional too-happy hedonist to the social
scene. Things were about to change. Among other things, Portsmouth would soon be
inundated with happy hedonists.
The Portsmouth Herald’s editorial on 30 December 1939 took inventory o f events
in the seacoast area over the past year and spoke with optimism about the prognosis for
1940. The newspaper was enthused about the growing shipyard employment and
continued its push for new industry that had been met with lukewarm support a few
months earlier:
We have had a most excellent 1939 as a whole. The stores report excellent
business during the Christmas season. The prospects for work at the navy
yard are as bright if not brighter than a year ago. There are more men
working there now than at any time since the close of the World W ar... The
possibilities for new industries seem bright, and more industries mean more
people living in this city which means more business for the merchants...
Who knows what the new year may bring? We cannot tell, but we can be
ready for whatever may benefit the community as a whole.24
New Hampshire: A Guide to the Granite State. American Guide Series. Written by Workers o f
the Federal Writer’s Project o f the Works Progress Administration for the State o f New Hampshire.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938). Emphasis added.
24 Portsmouth Herald, 30 Oct 1941,4.
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Things were unraveling in Europe in December 1939, but on the local scene business was
improving, employment was up, and there was hope for attracting limited new industry
and people to the city. Things were calm and the future looked bright and good for the
new year. Assuming the city’s primary newspaper accurately reflected the mood and
attitude of the residents, neither had a clue about what the next year would bring.
Population Boom
Returning to the Figure 19 at the beginning of this section, it is obvious that 1940
brought a population boom to the area. Table 18 provides details for the population
increases for the critical period 1940 to 1944.
Table 18 - Local Population Boom (1940-1944)
Increase

1940

1944

Population Portsmouth and Contiguous Towns25
(Immediate Shopping Area)
Portsmouth
Kittery

25,039

35,294

41 %

14,821
5,374

20,029
9,475

35%
76%

Rockingham County26

58,142

60,276

3.6%

Other local towns - York, Durham, Exeter, etc.27
(Outer Shopping Area)

18,127

20,410

12%

491,524

459,250

- 6.6 %

New Hampshire28

25“Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” Table entitled “PopulationTotal Trends” in the Appendix. The contiguous towns are Eliot, Greenland, Kittery, New Castle,
Newington, and Rye.
26 Portsmouth Herald, 15 Feb 1944, “Survey Shows Trends,” 1. The 3.6% gain is based on a
comparison o f the 1940 census with ration book distribution in 1944.
27 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area, “Table entitled “PopulationTotal Trends” in the Appendix. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum,
Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
28 The estimating o f shifting populations during the war was inaccurate, at best. In this table, the
1940 figures are census based and presumably accurate. The 1944 town figures are based on ration book
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As might be expected, with the rationing of automobiles and gasoline, the communities
within walking distance of the shipyard, especially Portsmouth and Kittery, experienced
tremendous growth. On the other hand, Rockingham County, the county where
Portsmouth is located, only experienced a 3.6 % gain in population. With Portsmouth
and its contiguous towns experiencing a 41% growth, while the entire county remained
relatively stable, it appears that there was a great migration out of the southern and
western parts of the county to the Portsmouth area. This is in sharp contrast to the San
Francisco Bay and Puget Sound examples presented at the introduction to this chapter
that experienced a massive influx of workers from distant parts of the United States.
In The U.S. Economy in World War II, economist Harold G. Vatter describes the
dynamic migration westward o f workers in search of job opportunities in the aircraft,
shipbuilding, and other war related industries and the static or declining populations in
eastern regions:
The great migration wave regionally was to the Pacific Coast... the three
Pacific Coast states increasing their population by over 34% ... O f the net
national migration of about 3.5 million people between April 1940 and
November 1943, nearly 1.5 million went to California... Almost all other
regions experienced arrested population growth or losses. The New England,
Middle Atlantic, and East North Central regions containing the old
OQ
manufacturing belt barely held their own during the war.

distribution. The 1944 state figure is Guyol’s estimate, exclusive o f those in the armed services. Based on
registrations for War Rations Books for May 1942 (470,000) and October 1943 (445,000), Guyol concludes
that the decrease (25,000) reflects the loss o f population to the armed forces. Guyol, 104 and note 3. All o f
this is to say that, if one uses the October 1943 ration book figure o f 445,000, the decrease in the state’s
population could have been as high as 9.5%. I chose to keep the 6.6% because that is the figure commonly
seen in the literature.
29 Harold G. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II (New York: Columbia University Press,
1985), 114-115.
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The state o f New Hampshire did not hold its own during the war. The state experienced a
migration of population to out-of-state wartime manufacturing centers that led to the
noted 6.6 % reduction in population during the first few years of the war, not including
the losses to the military services. Over 20,000 new residents had relocated to the
seacoast of New Hampshire during the war while the state had lost 30,000 residents
overall. Clearly, the Portsmouth area was a beehive of growth and activity, as compared
to the rest of the state. There is little doubt that the center of the state’s population,
manufacturing, and economy moved sharply in the direction of Portsmouth.
The 41% increase in population of the Portsmouth Defense Area between 1940
and 1944 was characterized by a significant shift in age distribution towards the youth, as
shown in Table 19.30
Table 19 - Local Age Distribution (1940-1943)
Age

1940 Census

1943 Census

% Shift

<5
5-14
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
>65

1750
3800
4100
3950
3650
3125
2250
2325

3000
5950
5450
4825
4500
4125
2850
2450

71.4%
56.6 %
32.9 %
22.2 %
23.2 %
32.0 %
25.7 %
5.4 %

Apparently the number of young adults, many with children, rushing to the seacoast area
to find employment at the shipyard, more than compensated for those going into the
armed forces. The result was a disproportionate increase in youth and adolescents. A

30 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” Table is constructed from
graph entitled “Portsmouth Defense Area Population-Age” in the Appendix. Note: the numbers in this table
were read from the hand-drawn graph cited. Accuracy can be assumed to be within 25 people. Thayer
Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1,
“State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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consequence of the increased number of adolescents, Portsmouth’s “girl problem,” will
be discussed in considerable detail later.
As might be expected, a high percentage of the new seacoast residents worked at
the shipyard. Table 20 shows the number and percentage of shipyard employees that
resided in Portsmouth and Kittery and nearby communities.
Table 20 - Shipyard Employment Distribution by Town (1944)
Population

Population Portsmouth and Contiguous Towns31
Portsmouth
Kittery
Other local towns - York, Durham, Exeter, etc.
New Hampshire

'i'y

35,294
20,029
9,475
20,410
459,26033

Employed Percentage
by Shipyard
7,382
4,355
2,188
2,220
12,98134

20.9 %
21.7%
33.8 %
10.8 %
2.8 %

In 1944, one out of every five local residents worked at the Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Nearly 3% o f the state’s entire population, and 7% of the state’s labor force of 185,000,35
worked at the yard. Moreover, in 1944, when the state had 12,981 people working at the
shipyard, only 73,000 people were working in all the other manufacturing jobs
throughout the state that included the textile, leather, paper, machinery, lumber, and other

31 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area.,” Table 17. Thayer Cumings
Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State
Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
321bid.
33 Phillip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 104, note 3.
34 “Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce,” 1. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 1, Folder 5, “Business and Industry.”
35Phillip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights 131.

362

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

industries.36 Manufacturing had quickly overtaken farming as the chief industry of the
seacoast area.
Speaking to the local Rotary Club in January 1941, Mr. Lawrence M. Meyer,
industrial agent of the New Hampshire Planning and Development Commission, noted
that “the tremendous influx of [skilled] workers at the Portsmouth Navy Yard can be one
of Portsmouth’s greatest assets in the future.” Meyer noted that the area had in the past
“lost not one but several industrial opportunities because we did not have sufficient
skilled labor.”37 Meyer’s speech was a testimony to a shortage of industrialization in the
seacoast area before the war and an accurate prediction of the abundance of skilled labor
that would exist in the postwar era. That postwar skilled labor pool would ultimately
exceed Meyer’s wildest imagination.
Portsmouth and its environs were transformed quickly, during the early years of
the war, from an area with a rural and farm population that was growing faster than its
urban population, to an overpopulated industrial area with a decidedly younger
population. That transformation brought tremendous opportunities and serious
challenges.
Economic Opportunities
The Portsmouth area and New Hampshire did not suffer as much economically,
during the Great Depression, as most areas of the country. According to New Hampshire
historian Philip N. Guyol, at the very bottom of the depression, in 1933 and 1934, New
Hampshire stood twelfth in the United States in per capita income, and, during the lean

36 Ibid., 126, Chart II.
37 Portsmouth Herald, 30 January 1941, “Navy Yard Workers Asset for City’s Future,” 1.
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years, 1930 -1939 inclusive, the state’s income per capita was comfortably above the
TO

national average. In 1939, the state stood seventeenth in per capita income.

And, as

noted earlier, Portsmouth had an excellent year in 1939, with strong retail sales at the end
of the year and employment on the rise. In April 1940, the Portsmouth Herald reported
that the city had $8,727 million in retail sales in 1939, as compared to $8.57 million in
1938. Moreover, in 1939, with only 3.18% of the state’s buying power, the city reported
IQ

5.7% of the state’s retail sales.

The newspaper attributed the favorably disproportionate

sales to recreational and value-minded visitors to the seacoast area. By any measure, the
local area was not in dire economic straits at the start of 1940.
While the Portsmouth area experienced favorable economic conditions in mid1940, the Great Depression still lingered on in other areas across the country. Economist
Harold C. Vatter wrote:
Nevertheless, 1940 was the eleventh year of the Great Depression... 1940
GNP was still only 9 percent above 1929. This was a historically miserable
performance, particularly if one were to allow for stimulus to the 1940 GNP
from business anticipation of a forthcoming preparedness boom .. . With a
civilian unemployment rate of 14.5%, the economy was still far from
promising to absorb fully the army of unemployed.40
Historian David M. Kennedy argues that the army of nine million unemployed workers in
1940, combined with greatly underutilized industrial facilities, was an advantage when
the nation finally decided to mobilize. Unlike World War I, when the nation struggled to
recruit soldiers from a fully employed work force and convert near capacity civilian

38 Phillip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 187.
39 Portsmouth Herald, 27 April 1940, editorial, 4.
40 Harold C. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II, 1.
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production to military purposes, the start of World War II found manpower readily
available and idle factories easily adapted to military purposes.41
Unlike much of the nation, in the summer of 1940, Portsmouth’s economy was
good and about to get much better. The city was well positioned to reap huge economic
benefits from the increased activity at the shipyard. The local communities benefited
greatly from the $23 million of capital investment at the navy yard between the summer
o f 1940 and the summer of 1941. That investment, the rapidly increasing shipyard
payroll, and other federal spending for defense related projects, provided an exceptional
economic stimulus for the area. As shown on Table 21, between 15 July 1940 and 15 July
1941, the federal government authorized expenditures of $37.5 million for the following
projects:42
Table 21 - Local Federal Project Expenditures
(5 July 1940-15 July 1941)
Portsmouth Navy Yard
Portsmouth Harbor Defense
Bridges - State and Interstate
Housing - Federal and Private
City o f Portsmouth Facilities
Non-municipal Utilities
Total

$23.00M
$ 1.5 0M
$3.30M
$5.00M
$2.50M
$1.40M
$37.50M

The Portsmouth Navy Yard received most of the federal monies, but other federal
projects brought additional funds to the city.
New Hampshire’s primary industries, prior to the war, were textiles, leather, and
wood and the industrial center of the state was inland near the mill-towns. The activity at
41 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 617.
42 “Portsmouth and National Defense,” a series o f articles reprinted from the Portsmouth Herald, 1
Aug 1941. Thayer Cumings Library, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96 Box 2, Folder
1, “State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
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the shipyard during World War II moved the state’s industrial center decidedly towards
the seacoast. During his analysis of New Hampshire industry during World War II,
historian Phillip N. Guyol noted that “Perhaps the outstanding industrial phenomenon
was the surge of Portsmouth Navy Yard to the position of the largest single employer in
the state, at its peak employing about as many people [from all states] as the entire textile
industry [in New Hampshire].”43 Guyol had strong grounds for his bold statement.
Portsmouth Navy Yard invested a total of $36,000,000 in plant additions and facilities
between 1940 and 1945, much of which was directed into the local economy.44 In
addition, during the same period, shipyard payrolls and expenditures to local merchants
for products and services, excluding plant additions and facilities, generated almost
another $400,000,000 in charges. Those charges, which were a direct stimulant to the
local economy, increased annually throughout the war as shown in the Table 22 below:45
Table 22 - PNY Annual Expenditures Excluding Facilities (1940-1945)
$11 M
$23 M
$43 M
$74 M
$100 M
$141 M
$392 M

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Total

There can be no doubt that the shipyard was a tremendous economic engine for the
seacoast area.

43 Philip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 139.
44 Ibid., 162.
45 Ib id
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Fueled by federal spending, the local Chamber of Commerce claimed $15,314
million in retail sales in 1943. The strength of the local economy, midway through the
war, is revealed by Table 23, which compares Portsmouth retail sales in 1943 to the retail
sales o f the state and the nation.46
Table 23 - Portsmouth Retail Sales Compared to State and Nation (1943)
Portsmouth % of Population Portsmouth % of Retail Sales
New Hampshire
United States

4.42
.016

6.6947
.024

In way of clarification, with only 4.42% of the state’s population, Portsmouth accounted
for 6.69% of the state’s retail sales and likewise, with only .016 % of the nation’s
population, Portsmouth claimed .024% of retail sales for the nation. The high percentage
of retail sales, while an indicator of local prosperity, was also heavily influenced by the
tourist invasion that occurred every summer.
Further evidence of prosperity is provided by Table 24, which shows the average
Portsmouth resident’s annual purchasing power relative to that of residents of the state
and nation in 1943 48

46 “Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce,” 3. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 1, Folder 5, “Business and Industry.”
47 It was noted earlier in this section that the Portsmouth Herald o f 27 Apr 1940 reported that
Portsmouth had 5.7% o f the state’s retail sales in 1939. While the 1943 retail sales o f 6.69% is obviously
higher, direct comparisons suffer because the Herald did not define the towns included in the 1939 figure.
Portsmouth Herald, 27 Apr 1940, editorial, 4.
48 Ibid

367

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 24 - Local Purchasing Power (1943)
Annual Purchasing Power
Portsmouth

$1,136

1.00

$833

1.36

$1,103

1.03

New Hampshire
United States

Portsmouth Multiple

Portsmouth’s annual purchasing power was only slightly higher than the national
average, but it was 36% higher than the state average. The disparity between the annual
buying incomes of residents of Portsmouth and the rest of the state of New Hampshire
speaks to the lack of prosperity in the rest of the state.
According to Guyol, New Hampshire benefited the least economically of all the
states during the war.
Total income payments to individuals in New Hampshire rose from
$268,000,000 in 1939 to $460,000,000 in 1945, or from $548 to $971 per
capita. New Hampshire moved down from seventeenth place in 1939 to
thirty-fifth place in 1945
during the whole period of wartime prosperity
from 1940-1945 the gap between the two [state and national per capita
incomes] attaining its maximum in 1944.49
While prosperity had increased significantly in the seacoast area during the war, as shown
earlier, the area and the state were not particularly depressed prior to the war. The local
area probably remained more stable during the war than many other wartime boom towns
that were rocketed out of the Great Depression with enormous government contracts. The
picture was quite different in the rest of the New Hampshire, where incomes increased
much less than the rest of the country. The Portsmouth area was an economic anomaly in
the state o f New Hampshire. The city had quickly become an affluent community, albeit,

49 Philip N. Guyol, Democracy Fights, 187 and note 2.
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an overpopulated affluent community with challenging problems and concerns for its
future.
Challenges
While mobilization presented Portsmouth with challenging new problems, it is
also true that the town entered the war with a number of unresolved community issues.
An August 1943 study, “A Survey of Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense
Area,” organized and coordinated by the New Hampshire Planning and Development
Commission, noted that, “There are many problems of long standing in Portsmouth,
which started prior to the war. Such for example are housing, government, and pollution.
They should be distinguished from emergency problems growing out of the rapid influx
o f workers and their families into this area.”50 Existing problems with housing and
pollution were further aggravated by the rapid increase in population. The same study
noted some o f the additional problems that the Portsmouth area had inherited:
Increased health hazards of a rapidly expanding community are
overcrowding, growth in incidence of communicable diseases, rise of
venereal disease, prevalence of unsanitary conditions attendant upon
increased restaurant loads, overcrowding of hospital facilities and recreation
centers, and taxing of medical, nursing, and school personnel. Many o f these
conditions will be found in Portsmouth, Greenland, New Castle, and
Newington.51
The problems and challenges were many.

50 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” 99. Thayer Cumings Library
and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f
Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
51 Ibid., 46.
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Housing and Infrastructure
Not the least of those challenges was where the thousands of new residents would
live. The first inkling o f the housing problem was presented at a meeting, between yard
and city officials, in January 1940, where Commandant Rear Admiral Cyrus W. Cole
advised that, “An increase will practically double the civilian force at the Portsmouth
Navy Yard and its officers and men proportionately during the coming year,” and that
“the lack of reasonable rentals, apartments, and rooms within a 25 mile radius is a serious
problem.” By the summer of 1940, the Portsmouth Herald reported the results of a
shipyard survey that showed the housing shortage was preventing many shipyard
employees from bringing their families to the area. Furthermore, “A far larger number [of
employees] reported that, while their families were here, the housing secured was
extremely inadequate with many conveniences, which are today considered necessary by
most people, unavailable.”52 A local history later confirmed the shortage of and
inadequacy of housing in the Portsmouth area:
The Portsmouth City Planning Board reported that a survey of housing made
in 1941 showed that more than half of the 4021 “dwelling units” in
Portsmouth were more than 80 years old, while less than one quarter of the
units in Manchester were even 40 years old. The situation in Portsmouth was
so bad that the report only considered 28 housing units as “unfit for use” even
though 70 units had no running water, 160 had no gas or electric lights, 162
had no toilets, and 879 had no bathtubs or showers... A federal housing
survey conducted in 1940 determined that there was a need for 2200 new
housing units within a 25 mile radius of the shipyard.53

52 Portsm outh Herald, 16 July 1940, “Proposal Believed Likely to Materialize; Navy Yard Co
operating on Project,” 1.
53 Gregory C. Colati and Ryan H. Madden, “Victory Begins at Home: Portsmouth and Puddle
Dock during World War II,” in Barbara McLean Ward ed., P roduce & Conserve, Share & P la y Square:
The G rocer an d the Consum er on the H ome-front during W orld War II (Portsmouth: Strawbeiy Banke
Museum), 1994, 65.
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In August 1940, the Herald reported that Portsmouth needed more than 2,000 new homes
to accommodate the increased population in the area.54 If 2,000 new housing units were
needed in 1940, when the shipyard was at 8,000 employees, more than 4,000 new units
would be needed by 1943, when shipyard employment exceeded 20,000. Available
housing was a problem that would become progressively more severe as the shipyard
grew in employment at a rate much greater than the availability of local housing.
Ultimately, housing construction during the war fell far short of the number of new units
needed.
When it became obvious, in 1939 and 1940, that the navy yard was going to
increase several fold, the Federal Government sponsored three housing projects,
Admiralty Village (600 units) in Kittery and Pannaway Manor (200 units) and
Wentworth Acres (800 units) in Portsmouth. These projects, as urgently needed as they
were, met with a certain amount of disapproval from local civic leaders. Pannaway
Manor was believed to have a “monotony created by the unchanged proportions of the
houses.” The location, number, and construction of the units at Wentworth Acres
reportedly had been “determined against sound advice from local municipalities and
against their wishes.” In addition, “the buildings were erected with as much speed and
economy as possible and were not designed for long life.” Finally, Admiralty Village
reportedly had “neighbor trouble” because of the lack of privacy due to the thin walls
separating units, no back yards, and insufficient recreational space. From the initial
conception and construction o f the government housing projects, local authorities were

54 Portsmouth Herald, 23 Aug 1940, “Present Projects Still Would Leave Housing Shortage,” 1.
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concerned about inheriting long-term problems when the projects were turned over to the
city after the war.55
The city of Portsmouth had to expand much of its infrastructure and utilities to
accommodate the increased numbers of residents. On 10 April 1941, the Portsmouth
Herald, recapping the city’s progress during the “first year of the emergency,” noted that
it had been about a year since the President had designated Portsmouth as a defense area
for Federal Housing projects. During that year, most o f the $2 ‘A million in federal aid the
city had requested had been approved. Housing projects had been completed, bridges had
been modernized, telephone, gas, electrical, and sewage service had been expanded, the
water supply had been greatly increased and additions had been made to schools and
hospital services. While the shipyard had been ramping up facilities and services, the city
had been doing likewise. Confirming extensive local development, the local Chamber of
Commerce noted in 1944 that:
There has also been much private building. There have been tremendous
extensions of water and sewer mains, of telephone facilities and of the facilities of
other utilities. New schools have been built, [as well as] new streets and sidewalks
and roads.56
The war had obviously challenged Portsmouth’s municipal services. The city had met
that challenge and brought greatly improved services to the residents of Portsmouth.

55 All quotes in this paragraph are from “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense
Area,” 46. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96,
Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
56 “Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce,” 3. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery
Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 1, Folder 5, “Business and Industry.”
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Vice Control
The war also brought other challenges less successfully met by city officials,
primarily the control of prostitution and venereal disease. Much of the war found the U.S.
Navy on the offensive pushing Portsmouth officials to rid the city of disease carrying
prostitutes, with the city officials being much less responsive than the Navy desired. The
Navy had the upper hand in these encounters as the result of the May Act, passed in
January 1941, making “vice activities near military installations a federal offense.”57
According to Allan M. Brandt:
The May Act provided the legal power necessary for the Department of Justice to
assume the policing of areas deemed too be hazardous to the troops by the
secretary of the army or the secretary of the navy. In other words, if prostitution
persisted in a given community, federal authorities could take action. .. Although
only invoked twice during the course of the war - in Tennessee and North
Carolina- the May Act nevertheless served as a prod to local officials to “clean
up” their communities or be deposed by federal officials.58
Thus the leverage that the Navy enjoyed through the May Act compelled Portsmouth city
officials to be responsive to periodic accusations that the city should be “cleaned up” to
reduce the shipyard’s spiraling venereal disease rate. This tug-of-war between the
military and the city was characteristic of a scene that was played out in many military
communities during World War II.
The aggressive effort to root out and quarantine prostitutes was a carry over from
the military’s experience with combating venereal disease during World War I. Venereal
disease had a tremendous impact upon American forces during World War I. According
to historian Allan M. Brandt:

57 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History o f Venereal Disease in the United States
Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 162.
58 Ibid, 166.
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Almost seven million days of active duty were lost to venereal diseases, the most
common illness in the service next to influenza, which struck in epidemic
proportions. A total of 383,706 soldiers were diagnosed with either syphilis,
gonorrhea, or chancroid between April 1917 and December 1919... Some 12.7
percent of the over two million men in the Army stationed in the United States
were admitted to sick report with a diagnosed venereal disease. Indeed, soldiers
serving in the United States accounted for 76.6 percent of the venereal disease
infections in the entire Army during the war.59
Lacking any effective antibiotic to combat the disease, the American military sought to
gain control of the debilitating disease through “a combination of education, repression of
prostitution, medical treatment of the infected, and rigorous case finding and contact
tracing.”60 With World War II looming on the horizon, the United States military, not
wanting to repeat its disastrous wartime experience with venereal disease, reinstituted the
anti-venereal disease measures that had evolved during World War I. Consequently,
Portsmouth’s experience with prostitution and venereal disease during World War II
heavily reflects the local military’s ambitious prosecution of two carry over tactics from
the previous war, the repression of prostitution and rigorous contact tracing,
Prostitution was not a new problem for Portsmouth. The industry had thrived
along the notorious Water Street brothel district between 1897 and 1912 when a
combination of increased activity at the shipyard and frequent visits by fishing boat crews
flooded downtown Portsmouth with young sailors. Some claim that the city was
compelled by local organizations, apparently inspired by progressive movement, to close
down the district.61 However, local historian Ray Brighton attributes the closing of the
Water Street brothels to “the Navy’s threat to ship all its liberty parties to Boston.”
59 Ibid, 115.
60 Ibid, 162.
61 Kimberly E. Crisp, “Water Street Remembered.” History Honors Thesis, University o f New
Hampshire, 1996, 78
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According to Brighton, ”It was only after the Navy marched a liberty party through
Congress and old Vaughn Street town to the railroad station on Deer Street [to catch a
train to Boston]”62 that local leaders got religion and cleaned up Water Street.
Efforts to eradicate the city’s shady past include the renaming of Water Street to
Marcy Street about 1925 and the purchase of most of the properties by the Prescott sisters
that led to the eventual establishment of the riverfront park that bears their name today.
By the time World War II rolled around, the city’s red-light history was a distant
memory. Wartime operations at the shipyard would rekindle those memories and bring a
renewal of the Navy’s pressure on city officials to rid the city of prostitutes.
Medical officers at the navy yard attributed increased VD rates to widespread
prostitution in Portsmouth. Portsmouth’s civic leaders, on the other hand, were reluctant
to acknowledge the presence of prostitutes, but quick to redefine the problem as local
adolescent girls eager to entertain servicemen. The Portsmouth Health and Welfare
Survey of 1943 devoted considerable space to Portsmouth’s “Girl Problem.” The problem
was believed to be centered on unsupervised “opportunities for unaccompanied women
and girls to meet servicemen on leave.”64 Meeting opportunities were reportedly found
“on the street as casual meetings or pickups, at beer parlors or taverns or juke joints.”65

62 Ray Brighton, The Prescott Story (New Castle, N.H.: Portsmouth Marine Society, 1982), 59.
63 Kimberly E. Crisp, “Water Street Remembered.” History Honors Thesis, University o f New
Hampshire, 1996,2-3.
64 “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” 50. Thayer Cumings Library
and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f
Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
65 Ibid.
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While the girl problem sounds a lot like a prostitution problem, the report was quick to
add:
With respect to prostitution, there are no known “houses” existing in
Portsmouth. It was rumored that of late, in several scattered areas throughout
the city, women have allowed seduction. This matter is under investigation.
The chief problem with respect to sexual promiscuity seems to be with the
younger girls of teen ages, i.e. those who may be termed amateurs, whose
general attitude seems to be that they are working for the cause and are
providing entertainment for the servicemen. This is rather a serious problem,
and it needs to be checked - for if allowed to continue undoubtedly will lead
many of these girls to become professional prostitutes.66
The truth probably fell somewhere between the U. S. Navy’s hard stand on prostitution
and the locally defined “girl problem.” Portsmouth demographics had taken a definite
turn towards the younger set, during the early stages of the war, and increased numbers of
adolescent girls were probably available and interested in the sudden abundance of young
servicemen. The New York Times article of 5 October 1942 addressed the problem of
adolescent girls roaming the streets of Portsmouth:
For the problem of Portsmouth’s adolescent girls had become grave. Every
night the dimmed-out streets are filled with men from all branches of the
armed forces, as well as yard workers. Within a year Mrs. Dorothy Bovard,
who represents the Travelers Aid Society here, noted twenty-five cases of
girls “chasing service men to camps” and having to be brought home.67
This account suggests a far less serious problem that the rampant prostitution reported by
the military later in the war. Therein probably lays the answer to the dichotomy o f views
between the military and city officials. The evidence suggests that Portsmouth had a “girl
problem” early in the war that grew into a more serious prostitution problem later in the
war. The evidence also suggests that the extent of hard line professionals practicing in
66 Ibid., 51.
67 Milton Bracker, “Portsmouth Tries to Adjust Life to an Influx o f Men and Money.” The New
York Times, 5 October 1942, 10.
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Portsmouth was a far less serious problem than existed outside the gates of other
shipyards.
Then again the answer may not be that simple. The debate over Portsmouth’s girl
problem versus a prostitution problem was by no means unique. Similar debates took
place in hundreds of communities across the United States during the war. As the result
of aggressive military prosecution, Allan M. Brandt wrote,
More than seven hundred cities and towns closed their red-light districts during
the course o f the war. Not since World War I had prostitution been so vigorously
prosecuted in the United States. Despite the incarceration of thousands of
prostitutes, it soon became clear that that this could not in itself solve the venereal
disease problem... Increasingly army physicians reported that prostitutes
constituted only a minority o f the soldiers’ sexual contacts... .The military soon
turned its attention to the “promiscuous” girl. Women of loose morals, eager to
support the war effort, were determined to be the primary locus of the infection...
The harlot with the painted face had stepped aside for the girl-next-door.68
In light o f the evidence from the national scene, Portsmouth city officials may have been
more accurate in the assessment of the problem than officials at the navy yard who were
rattling their sabers to force the expulsion of harlots with painted faces from the local
drinking establishments.
While the extent of prostitution in Portsmouth may have been debatable, there is
no doubt that the navy yard boom had promoted increased socialization and night-life in
Portsmouth that contributed to increased VD rates at both the navy yard and the
Portsmouth Hospital. There is also no doubt that the combination of young sailors and
marines, beer, and local teenage girls was an explosive mixture that caused headaches for
the local police. Reportedly, the curfew that required all children who were under sixteen

68 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet, 167-168..
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years of age to be off the streets after 9:00pm was not enforced.69 In December 1942,
local restaurant owners complained of servicemen’s brawls that destroyed tables, chairs,
crockery, and fixtures almost nightly.70 The shipyard increased Shore Patrol officers in
response to the request of city officials and also declared trouble spots “out of bounds”
for enlisted men.71 One local restaurant owner, Andrew Jarvis, was quoted as saying that
he would rather have all navy men and marines barred from his premises than suffer
losses as he had been doing m the recent past.

77

Portsmouth had been transformed from a

quiet seacoast tourist town to a “sailor town” and some had difficulty making the
adjustment.
In the interest of balanced and fair reporting, Eileen Dondero Foley, a young
woman residing in Portsmouth during the early years of the war, saw another side of
Portsmouth social life. Eileen remembered that dances were routinely held almost every
night of the week at one of several locations where young women could meet and mingle
with servicemen. The dance sites included the US O Club on Congress Street, the
shipyard, and Camp Langdon.

70

According to Foley, the dances were extremely popular

69 “A Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area, August 1943,” 52. Thayer
Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1,
“State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”
70 Portsmouth Herald, 8 Dec 1942, “Hewitt to Seek Aid o f Yard Officials on Disorders Here,” 1.
71 Portsmouth Herald, 11 Dec 1942, “Navy Bars Enlisted Men from Some Spots,” 1.
72 Ibid.
73 According to the Portsmouth Health and Welfare Survey (1943), the Portsmouth Recreational
Committee scheduled the dances at the USO on Thursday evenings, the American Legion on Wednesdays
and Fridays, a favorite local restaurant on Saturday nights, and at Camp Langdon once a week. See page 49
o f the survey. No mention is made o f the dances at the shipyard, but Eileen Foley distinctly remembered
going to dances on the yard. Camp Langdon was located in New Castle between the town and the
Wentworth Hotel. Thayer Cumings Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H.,
MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth.”

378

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and well attended. She and her friends often attended more than one dance a week, as the
dances were scheduled so as not to interfere with each other. In addition, the military
provided convenient bus service from the downtown USO to the dances on the military
bases. The dances were chaperoned and curfews were observed.74
The social scene that Eileen Foley remembers was much more innocent and
wholesome than the sailor bar reports that frequently made the front page of the local
newspaper. When asked about the bar scene and Portsmouth’s prostitute problem, Foley
confirmed that side of the Portsmouth social scene, “Oh yes. They were there. They lined
the bridge waiting for the boys to leave the shipyard.”75 The shady side of Portsmouth’s
social life, populated by young women of questionable reputation, was balanced to some
extent by an active group o f young women like Eileen Dondero Foley, who worked hard
during the day, and socialized with servicemen under more structured and supervised
social settings in the evenings.
However, it was the rowdy bar scene and not the popular USO dances that made
the pages of the local newspaper. According to a Portsmouth Herald editorial of 19
March 1943, the Portsmouth Police department had been totally ineffective in controlling
acts o f vandalism perpetrated upon the city’s business establishments. The Herald
reported that, “Almost nightly, merchants suffer loses due to broken glass, destroyed
signs, and from acts of indecency.” The grossly understaffed Portsmouth Police
department had only eighteen patrolmen, when national standards required thirty-five for
a city the size of Portsmouth. With civic pressure mounting to gain control of the

74 Oral interview with Eileen Foley, 30 August 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
75 Ibid
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situation, and unable to hire more policemen because of the manpower shortage, the
Police Department requested more military police, from the shipyard, to patrol
Portsmouth’s streets between 6:00 pm and 2:00 am.

7 f\

One of the more troubling

consequences of the increased industrial activity at the yard was increased drunkenness
and vandalism on the streets of Portsmouth.
One might question how the relatively small population of enlisted men at the
Portsmouth Navy Yard could cause such havoc. For a starter, the number of enlisted men
at the yard peaked at about 1,300 in late 1942 and early 1943, including several hundred
Marines. As the war went on, many of the submarine sailors at the yard\ were veterans of
war patrols who had returned to the yard to put the next submarine in commission.
Likewise, the Marines who guarded the yard were often assigned to the shipyard after
having experienced combat. Thus, many were battle tested young men looking to take
full advantage of their respite at Portsmouth before going back to war. Battle tested
submarine sailors and Marines, mixing at the same local bars with Army enlisted men
stationed in the area, occasionally made for an explosive mixture.77
Seeking to call a “spade a spade,”78 the 14 May 1943 Portsmouth Herald editorial
drew attention to Portsmouth’s teenage problem, but likened it to the problems
experienced at other important defense areas and armed services centers. In particular, the
editorial took some satisfaction in knowing that Portsmouth’s problem was not as bad as
the teen age problem at Portland, Maine where, “The police blotter coldly reports the fact

76 Portsmouth Herald, 5 Apr 1943, “Army, Navy Asked to Aid Police Here,” 1.
77 According to William Tebo, only beer was legal and, supposedly, available at the local bars.
78 Portsmouth Herald, 14 May 1943, “Spade’s a Spade,” 4.
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that 14, 15, and 16 year old girls are openly soliciting and that they are just average cases
among the more than 100 teenage girls arrested in six months.”79 Reading local
newspaper reports between December 1942 and June 1943, it is obvious that the city of
Portsmouth was suffering growing pains in its new role as a navy town, and that city
officials were overly complacent and comfortable with the belief that things were not as
bad as some believed.
After the summer o f 1943, the press had very little to say the rest of the year about
Portsmouth’s girl problem, vandalism perpetrated by military enlisted men, prostitution,
or venereal disease. It is somewhat revealing of the community’s state of denial that the
Portsmouth Herald’s end-of-the-year list of twenty resolutions for 1944 contained several
about postwar planning, but did not mention anything about eliminating vice and
restoring order to the city. One would like to think that, during the previous six months,
these issues had been brought under control or eliminated, but that was clearly not the
case. The VD rate at the shipyard continued to climb to new heights and the navy
continued to put pressure on city officials to clean up the town.
Shipyard officials presented the New Hampshire Board of Health with
quantifiable evidence that identified the sites in Portsmouth that were sources of venereal
disease. Armed with that information, federal health officials formed the Portsmouth
Social Protection committee that, in turn, exerted pressure on city officials to take action
against known sites of prostitution. For example, the navy advised the State Board of
Health in May 1944 that 24 of the 97 cases of VD reported in Portsmouth in 1943 had

79

Ibid.

381

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

0/1

been acquired through contacts at the Dolphin Hotel.

Eight additional cases during the

first quarter of 1944 had also been traced to the same hotel. The next highest figure for
any particular site in Portsmouth for 1943 was five cases.

O 1

With almost five times the

VD rate of any other Portsmouth establishment, the Dolphin Hotel apparently did a good
business - whatever that business was.
The report of the Portsmouth Social Protection Committee to the mayor,
published on the front page o f the 14 July 1944 Portsmouth Herald, sounded a call for
action to resolve the city’s widespread venereal disease problem. Yet, like other
newspaper accounts, the word “prostitute” did not appear in the report. Instead, the article
reported that “vice conditions” needed to be corrected to prevent the spread of “social
diseases,” “transient girls” were to be kept away from “exposure places,” and taxi drivers
were to cease acting as “producers.” In the only instance where the words “venereal
disease” appeared, the report noted that, “Ninety-seven of 200 cases of venereal disease
in New Hampshire are attributed to Portsmouth.” Even more damning, the report
observed that “Portsmouth is known as an open city; city officials not interested.” The
committee’s report to Mayor Dale concluded:
That you as mayor, [should] through proper channels bring pressure to bear upon
the law enforcement force which would make it possible to correct the deplorable
conditions in the community which has been brought to our attention by the navy
department, Federal Security Agency, and other social agencies.82

80 For those familiar with downtown Portsmouth, the Dolphin Hotel was located at the site
presently occupied by the Metro Restaurant just o ff Market Square.
81 Portsmouth Herald, 1 Jun 1944, “Navy; Police Fight Vice; Find Dolphin Hotel Chief Venereal
Infection Source,” 1.
82 Portsmouth Herald, 14 Jun 1944, “Mayor Promises Action Here on Vice Conditions,” 1
(emphasis added).
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A previously annoying, but tolerable, situation described as Portsmouth’s “girl problem”
had become a deplorable and intolerable blight on the city that needed immediate
correction. Portsmouth’s beleaguered and grossly understaffed police force took issue
with the committee’s accusations that they had been lax in the performance of their
duties. However, the department subsequently redoubled its efforts to rid the city of the
conditions reported.

O'!

Six months after the increased campaign against vice and venereal disease,
Cecelia T. McGovern, associate social protection representative of the Community War
services, reported that conditions in Portsmouth had improved considerably. According to
McGovern, the venereal disease control officer of the First Naval District had indicated
that “due to the alertness o f the local police and increased vigilance on their part,
Portsmouth has not been named as the source of venereal disease as often as it was
previous to the formation o f the committee last spring.” In a backhanded compliment,
Portsmouth had been praised with faint damnation for its relative progress in controlling
venereal disease. While the city was apparently less often identified as a source of
venereal disease, the VD rate amongst shipyard sailors and marines continued to climb
from 68.56 per thousand in 1944 to 104.44 per thousand in 1945.

nr

Enlisted men were

still managing to become infected with VD somewhere in or around the city of
Portsmouth.

83 Portsmouth Herald, 22 Jun 1944, “Police Board Denies Laxity in Vice Fight,” 1.
84 Portsmouth Herald, 20 Oct 1944, “City’s Venereal Disease Record Shows Improvement,
Report Says,” 1.
85 See Table 14 in the Medical section o f this chapter.
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Having identified the victims of venereal disease as enlisted men, it is important
to highlight the double standard of the times noted by Alan M. Brandt:
The word “promiscuous” was firmly anchored to “girl” - a promiscuous man was,
by definition, an oxymoron. Women in this view, were the keepers of sexual
mores . . . “They” infected the soldiers. In this view, venereal disease could only
be transmitted in one direction.86
Brandt suggests that navy yard officials may have misidentified the victims and that,
perhaps, infected enlisted men were spreading the disease to previously uninfected local
girls. While the sources of the disease may have been varied, many, and debatable, the
increased rate of disease towards the end of the war was a fact.
Venereal disease was still an issue in the city, in March 1946, when operators of
nineteen Portsmouth restaurants, taverns, and hotels were summoned to city hall for a
meeting with Mayor Dondero and a dozen representatives from the military and state
0
-1

who were once again concerned about the venereal disease rate in Portsmouth.

The

Dolphin Hotel and Restaurant, on probation since the Navy’s efforts in the summer of
1944 to clean up the city, was placed off limits for military personnel at this time. It
appears that the only times that the subject of venereal disease received attention from
local leaders was when the military officials demanded action to control the spread of the
disease. Except for those occasions, the press and city officials chose to avoid the subject.
Out o f sight out of mind seems to have been the city’s modus operandi for dealing with
the issue.
While the campaign against VD was showing slow and debatable progress, the
city also continued to be plagued with drunk and disorderly sailors on liberty in
86 Alan M. Brandt, The Magic Bullet, 168.
87 Portsmouth Herald, 19 Mar 1946, “Army, Navy Press Fight Against Disease Here,” 1.
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downtown Portsmouth. On 18 January 1945, it took all nine police officers on the night
shift to break up a brawl on Congress Street, between navy yard sailors, at 1:30 in the
morning. The fight had started in a local diner and spilled over into the street. Seven
sailors involved in the brawl were arrested for drunk and disorderly conduct and,
incredibly, two other sailors were arrested for drunkenness when they stormed the police
on

station in an attempt to liberate their comrades.

It was not an easy job to be a

Portsmouth policeman on the night shift during the war.
Postwar Worries
One of the biggest problems that mobilization brought to Portsmouth was the fear
of what the inevitable postwar recession might bring. Fresh in the minds of many were
the conditions that developed quickly after World War I. James Tucker, the head of the
local Chamber of Commerce remembered “Committees of Portsmouth citizens rushing to
Washington for relief after the armistice had been declared and practically all work
discontinued at the local navy yard.”

OQ

He also recalled “how servicemen sold pencils

and peddled apples on the streets,” and, if humanly possible, he wanted to avoid similar
conditions after the current war.
The Portsmouth Herald had raised the initial alarm with Franklin E. Jordan’s
series of articles in the summer of 1941 but, once the war swung into full gear, other
issues pushed postwar concerns to the background for a few years. By mid-1943, the
progress of the war was such that people became confident of ultimate victory and local
concerns began to compete with global issues for attention once again.

88 Portsmouth Herald, 18 Jan 1945, “Arrest, Fine Yard Sailors After Brawl,” 1.
89 Portsmouth Herald, 8 Jul 1943, “Portsmouth Hopes to Keep Yard Booming After Victory,” 1.
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In July 1943, the Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce launched a campaign to
keep the yard booming after the war through a gradual tapering of submarine
construction, the return o f all farmed-out work to the shipyard, and the use, by private
industry, of whatever yard facilities the government did not plan to use.90 A commitment
to these objectives was obtained from local government and business leaders,
Congressmen, and shipyard officials at a conference in late July.
The Portsmouth Herald’s editorial platform, which had changed from a strong
neutrality position to a win-the-war position in March of 1941, changed again in late
November 1943 to reflect confidence in victory. This time the first plank of the platform
required “Complete Victory Over the Axis with No Appeasement” and the second plank
pointed towards “A Just and Lasting Peace Enforced by a Truly United Nations.” The
third plank, “A Postwar Prosperity Plan for Greater Portsmouth,” highlighted the
Chamber of Commerce’s campaign for postwar prosperity and helped to focus
community attention on issues needed to guarantee that prosperity. Thus, six months
before D-day, and well before the conclusion of the war, local leaders were targeting their
own deliverance plan for Portsmouth and the Seacoast area. In late 1943, when naval
officials were trying to gain the city’s attention to solve a prostitution problem, the city’s
top priority was its future.
The Portsmouth Herald’s managing editor, Franklin E. Jordan, who had raised
the initial concerns about postwar Portsmouth in the summer of 1941, updated those
concerns in a fifteen part series of articles in March 1944. This time Jordan was even
more emphatic in his belief that the city’s future was inexorably tied to the shipyard’s
fate. Jordan wrote, “Our navy yard is Portsmouth - whether we like it or not,” and
90 Ibid.
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repeatedly stressed that, “Portsmouth’s future fate will be determined by its dependence
on the navy yard.” The message was clear: Portsmouth’s new found prosperity would be
short lived if the economic engine across the river slowed or shut down.91
Noting the importance of the shipyard monies that were being pumped into the
local economies, Jordan wrote, “Our navy yard provides incomes for almost four out of
every five families and, indirectly, about one of every three service workers.”

09

Jordan

emphasized that, unlike many communities that had converted peacetime industries to
war industries, Portsmouth had no prewar industrial base to resurrect after the war.
According to Jordan, “The city has practically no converted factories of machinery. This
[income on which the city depends] comes from work done on government land, in
government buildings, with government machinery, all designed to produce articles of
war.” So then, Jordan asked, what happens when the navy yard returns to peacetime
production and employment levels? Where do the excess employees go and how does the
community compensate for the lost incomes?
Jordan decided the area’s most valuable asset in 1944 was a large skilled
workforce. This was in stark contrast to the prewar situation, when industry had shunned
the area because of a lack of skilled workers. The federal training programs had created
thousands of welders, pipe fitters, mechanics, and other craftsmen. The challenge was,
first, to maintain as much work as possible at the yard after the war and, second, to create
other opportunities for the soon-to-be excess of skilled workers. It was to these ends that
the local Chamber of Commerce, city officials, and Congressman dedicated their efforts
in late 1944.
91 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Mar 1944, “Portsmouth and Peace,” 1.
92 Ibid
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The concerns of Franklin Jordan and the Chamber of Commerce began to be
realized in July 1944, when Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard advised
Commandant Withers that recent successes in the Pacific had reduced the need for large
numbers of submarines and, consequently, a considerable number of submarines would
be canceled from the current building program.

Without providing numbers, Bard said

that Portsmouth Navy Yard’s workload would be reduced accordingly. Portsmouth and
the other submarine building shipyards had become victims of their own success. Having
produced the tremendous numbers of submarines that had contributed significantly to
winning the war in the Pacific, the Japanese Navy and shipping had been forced into a
smaller area, in turn reducing the need for United States submarines. Instead of more
submarines, the Navy urgently needed aircraft carriers, cruisers, amphibious assault
ships, cargo carriers, tankers, and other weapons of war to carry the fight to the Japanese
homeland.
Faced with the first official notice of shipyard cutback, the Portsmouth Chamber
o f Commerce published a study that reiterated its position of a year earlier, calling for the
continuance of the maximum possible workload at the shipyard after the war.94 The
awkward and lengthy title of the study summarized the community’s fears, “Can the One
Step Which Might Separate a ‘Boom-Town’ from a ‘Bust-Town’ be Avoided or Must
Portsmouth do an Economic Back-somersault.” The one step, of course, was continued
high navy yard employment. Boom-town or Bust-town? That was the question that was

93 Portsmouth Herald, 31 Jul 1944, “Navy Slashes Sub Construction Next Year at Portsmouth
Yard; Pacific Success Cause Cutback; No Discharges Seen,” 1.
94 Portsmouth Herald, 4 Aug 1944, “James Tucker Outlines Five Point Reconversion Plan for City
before Rotarians,” 1.
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on Jordan’s mind, in the summer of 1941, when he wrote of Portsmouth’s greatest
problem, and that continued to be chief concern of the Chamber of Commerce in 1944.
Another Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce study, of a similar nature, entitled
“The U.S. Navy Yard: Portsmouth’s One Big Industry” documented local population and
economic changes that had occurred during the war and also argued the need for
continued strong navy yard employment after the war. Citing a total of 12,981 New
Hampshire residents employed at the shipyard, and assuming an average family size of
four people, the Chamber of Commerce concluded that about 52,000 New Hampshire
residents were dependent on a shipyard paycheck.95 The Chamber’s assumption of a
family size of four may be high, considering the probability of multiple family members
working at the yard, but there is no avoiding the conclusion that the local economy was
heavily dependent on the shipyard.
During the latter half of 1944, New Hampshire’s Congressmen were relentless in
their efforts to secure work for Portsmouth Navy Yard. Succumbing somewhat to that
pressure, Rear Admiral E. L. Cochrane, Chief o f the Bureau of Ships, clarified the navy’s
intention to give Portsmouth and Electric Boat preferential treatment, during the
forthcoming curtailment, because they were the “two leading yards on matters of
submarine design.”96 According to Cochrane, the bulk of the cutbacks would be taken
from the other four yards building submarines and Portsmouth and Electric Boat would
“carry along on a reduced scale into 1947.” Senator Russell Tobey reassured the

95 Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce letter o f 3 July 1944 to Rear Admiral Thomas Withers with
enclosure “The U.S. Navy Yard: Portsmouth’s One Big Industry.” Thayer Cumings Library and Archives,
Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 1, Folder 5, “Business and Industry.”
96 Quoted in Portsmouth Herald, 21 August 1944, “Chamber Told o f Plans for Navy Work,” 1.
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Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce on 29 Aug 1944 that he had extracted a pledge from
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard that the preferential treatment, planned for
the yard, would include a fair share of the postwar overhaul and repair workload. On 27
October 1944, Rear Admiral E. L. Cochrane, reassured 400 shipyard employees, during
an address at the yard, that “A workload of no small proportions is being retained at
Portsmouth,” and that the yard would be maintained “as a going submarine design
building yard - to be ready to take us into the next period of development.”97 Despite the
assurances, city officials remained apprehensive about the future.
The apprehension that many held for Portsmouth’s future in 1944 was prevalent
in many towns throughout the country. The war had brought industry and prosperity to
many areas that now feared for the vacuum that would be left when those wartime
industries were shut down. Marc Scott Miller, in his work, The Irony o f Victory: World
War H and Lowell, Massachusetts, notes that “World War II artificially stimulated
Lowell’s economy, orienting it towards military rather than civilian and human needs.
QO

Continued growth depended, in large part, upon continuing war production.”

Such was

the case in hundreds of towns in 1944. As it turned out, Portsmouth fared much better
than Lowell, which, after the brief recovery provided by the war, continued its prewar
economic decline.
Reminiscent o f James Tucker’s memories of how various committees from
Portsmouth traveled to Washington immediately after World War I to solicit work for the

97 Quoted in Portsm outh H erald, 27 Oct 1944, “Adm. Cochrane says Portsmouth Subs Play Major
Role in Pacific,” 1.
98 Marc Scott Miller. The Irony o f Victory: W orld War II a n d Lowell, M assachusetts (Chicago:
University o f Illinois Press, 1988), 206.
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yard, three representatives from Ranger Lodge 836, International Association of
Machinists, traveled to Washington in early December 1944 looking for work for the
yard. True to the Navy’s elevated priorities for the weapons and equipment needed for
the final push to Japan, the committee returned with a guarantee for work for the
construction of, not more submarines, but pontoons for advanced bases." The
streamlining of shipyard operations for submarine construction, that had produced thirtytwo submarines in 1944, would be o f little use in the construction of pontoons. The times
were changing.
In August 1945, the yard returned to a five-day, forty hours work week for the
first time in five years. At the same time, yard officials discontinued the third (night) shift
and announced plans to return to one shift operations as soon as possible.100 Signs of
drastic employment reductions were everywhere. Late 1945 and early 1946 were filled
with frequent rumors and fears about employment reductions at the yard, followed
quickly by reassurances from the Navy and Congressmen that Portsmouth Navy Yard
would be treated fairly with regard to reductions in employment. None were denying
reductions, but all were claiming that the reductions would be as gradual as possible. The
Chamber of Commerce report, at the close of 1945, claimed satisfaction to date with the
community’s efforts to control the reduction in workforce at the yard:
Because of the continuing efforts which the Chamber of Commerce
inaugurated in July 1943 to soften this economic blow [employment
reductions at the navy yard] and because of like efforts by organized labor at
the yard, the local community has not yet suffered severely in a business way.
Work has been tapered off, arrangements are being made eventually to return
99 Portsmouth Herald, 12 December 1944, “Union Gets Wash. Agreement o f Future Work at
Navy Yard.” 1.
100 Portsmouth Periscope, 27 August 1945, 1.
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farmout work manufacturing processes to the yard . . . new types of work
have been found to help take up the slack and more repair work has been sent
to Portsmouth.101
This expressed satisfaction would wane in the coming months when reductions in
employment were much greater than expected.
The ultimate goal of the Chamber of Commerce was to rally public,
Congressional, and, hopefully, federal support for maximum postwar employment at the
yard. The Chamber believed that the federal government, having brought the boom, was
responsible for the prevention o f the much feared bust:
A further factor is that the Federal Government, having expanded the
population and productive powers of Portsmouth, Kittery, and the environs,
bears a direct and unavoidable responsibility to see that when contraction
occurs, the least possible dislocation of life and services is experienced.
Housing projects without tenants, expensive sewer and water services built to
meet the war emergency but no longer needed in peacetime, and a large
1(Y)
group of unemployed, should not be left as burdens upon the community.
The analysis of how the relationship, between the federal government and the
community, played out in the postwar years is a study unto itself that is well beyond the
scope of this dissertation. Suffice it to say that Portsmouth Navy Yard and the city of
Portsmouth have enjoyed a very successful partnership since 1945.
Politics
In discussing wartime political changes in California, Roger W. Lotcin makes the
observation that women made little progress in gaining political office during the war. He
finds this a little surprising because “With so many males absent and absentee-voting

101 Portsmouth Herald, 8 Jan 1946, “Chamber Official Reports ’45 Activities to Members,” 1.
102

“ Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense Area,” 123. Cumings Library and
Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State Council o f
Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth..”
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turnouts light, women were certainly the potential majority of the electorate.”103 He
suggests that the reason may be because “there was no labor shortage in politics as there
was in the labor force.”104 Jacqueline R. Braitman answers that, while women made very
little electoral progress during the war [in California], they advanced in other, less visible,
political spheres instead.105
Unlike California women, Portsmouth women did make significant electoral
progress during the war. This progress was highlighted by the precedent setting election
of Mary Dondero as mayor of Portsmouth in November 1944. Dondero was the first
female mayor of Portsmouth and the first woman elected to the position of mayor in the
state of New Hampshire. After having been elected by seven votes in 1944, she was
reelected to a second term in November 1945 by the largest plurality in the history of the
city, and then defeated by one vote in 1946.
It was a time of great political turmoil as the Republicans’ long-standing grip on
the city’s politics was challenged by the progressive ideology of the Democrats and Mary
Dondero. The Portsmouth Herald, a strong Dondero supporter at the time,
enthusiastically reported her reelection ini 945:
Mayor wins all Five Wards to Rout G O P... Mayor Mary C. Dondero, first
woman chief executive in the history of the City of Portsmouth, yesterday
won an overwhelming victory in her quest for a second term. .. In doing so

103 Roger W. Lotcin, “The Historians’ War or The Home Front’s War?: Some Thoughts for
Western Historians,” The Western H istorical Q uarterly Journal vol. 26, No.2 (Summer 1995), 191.
104 Roger W. Lotchin. “California Cities and the Hurricane o f Change: World War II in the San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego Metropolitan Areas,” P acific H istorical R eview 63 (August 1994),
414-416.
105 Jacqueline R. Braitman, “Partisans in Overalls: New Perspectives on Women and Politics in
Wartime California.” The Way We R eally Were: The G olden State in the S econ d G rea t War. Roger W.
Lotchin, ed. (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 2000), 215-235.
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she won a 2,494-vote victory over the same Republican opponent whom she
barely nosed out by seven votes a year ago.106
Similarly, the Portsmouth Herald’s editorial on 7 November 1945 hailed Dondero’s
reelection as a changing of the guard:
An aroused Portsmouth citizenry showed its confidence in Mayor Dondero’s
integrity and administration and repudiated the tactics of the Republican
machine by reelecting her by an overwhelming majority and, with the same
vote, riding the Republicans out of town on the well known rail.107
The Herald’s obvious delight with Dondero’s reelection was not just a partisan reaction
to a Democratic victory. The paper had repeatedly expressed discontent with FDR’s New
Deal politics108 and had endorsed Republican Governor Dewey over FDR in the last
presidential election. The newspaper’s endorsement of the new mayor had more to do
with her honest and open style of government than the fact that she was a Democrat. Of
course, the Herald did not know, at the time, that the Republicans would ride the same
rail back into town the next year,
How much did events at the shipyard have to do with the transformation of
Portsmouth city government in 1944? One can argue that the large influx of workers and
military personnel stressed city services as never before and made the incumbent
Republican administrations more vulnerable than they had ever been in the past. The
Herald repeatedly criticized the Republican incumbents for slow, secretive, and
bureaucratic practices when dealing with the challenges presented the city during the war
years. Dilapidated housing, a perceived inadequate police force, and a community water

106Portsmouth Herald, 7 N ovi 945, “Mayor Carries all Five Wards to Rout GOP,” 1.
107 Portsmouth Herald, 7 Nov 1945, “A Vote o f Confidence and Repudiation,” 4.
108 Portsmouth Herald, 4 Nov 1945, “Had Enough - More Than Enough?,” 4.
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shortage were just a few of those challenges. As problems mounted, it seems reasonable
to assume that the citizenry would become less tolerant of business-as-usual government
and look for a change in leadership.
What about Roger W. Lotchin’s argument that many males were absent, absenteevoting turnouts were light, and women were potentially the majority of the electorate?
Could Dondero’s election have been facilitated by a preponderance of woman voters?
Table 25 suggests that the argument may have merit.
Table 25 - Portsmouth Residents by Sex109
1930

1940

1944 (assumes 34.3 %
increase and 10%
of men in service)

Women

7250

7610

10,197

Men

7211

7245

8,737

The table shows that the number of Portsmouth female residents increased, between 1930
and 1940, until there were 365 more female residents in 1940. Lacking hard data, the
constructed figures for 1944 reflect an average 34% increase in population through 1943
and a reduction in the male population by 10% to account for military service. Keeping in
mind that the figures represent all residents, and not just voters, it still appears that
women would have been a decided majority in the 1944 elections.110 Admittedly, Table

109 The 1930 and 1940 figures are from “Survey o f Health and Welfare in the Portsmouth Defense
Area,” Table in appendix entitled “Population Sex, 1930 —1940.” As indicated, the 1944 figures assume
the 34.3% increase that the survey attributes to the entire area between 1940 and 1943 and a 10% reduction
for males to account for military service. “Portsmouth Chamber o f Commerce,” 3. Thayer Cumings
Library and Archives, Strawbery Banke Museum, Portsmouth, N.H., MS 96, Box 2, Folder 1, “State
Council o f Defense, Local Committees: Portsmouth..”
110 At the risk o f extrapolating an estimate from an approximation, one could apply age
distribution percentages from Table 19 and conclude that there were about 6600 women and 5700 men o f
voting age in 1944.
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25 does not speak to the number of women registered to vote or the number that actually
voted for Dondero. However, the table does suggest a demographic that may have
worked to Mary Dondero’s advantage in the November 1944 election.
There is another wrinkle to this analysis of female voters. Mary Dondero was
enormously popular with mothers because of the attention she showered on sons and
daughters leaving for military service. According to Eileen Foley, her mother, as a
Councilwoman and later as mayor, presented every person leaving for the service with a
carton of cigarettes, a box of chocolate, and writing paper. The presentations took place
in the center of town outside Jarvis’s Restaurant, after which Mrs. Dondero, waving a
large American flag, would lead the assembled group, accompanied by the small high
school band, to the train station.111 This practice endeared her to many mothers and,
unquestionably, garnered her many female votes.
In November 1944, Dondero was one of several Democrats elected in
unprecedented numbers to Portsmouth city offices. Elected by only seven votes in
November 1944, the refreshingly open style of government practiced by Mary Dondero
was obviously well received, as evidenced by her landslide victory in November 1945.
Dondero introduced a new era in Portsmouth government, but she very well may not
have gotten the seven votes she needed for her initial victory in 1944 had the city not
been challenged with wartime issues.

jp

111 Interview with Eileen Dondero Foley, 30 Aug 2006, at her home in Portsmouth, N.H.
112 When interviewed on 30 August 2006 at her home in Portsmouth, N.H., Eileen Foley, Mary C.
Dondero’s daughter, attributed her mother’s political victoiy in November 1944 solely to her popularity
with the people o f Portsmouth. She particularly emphasized the gifts and small parade given each new
recruit. Foley recalls that her mother did the same for her in 1944 when she left Portsmouth for the WAC.
At any rate, Eileen Foley believed that it was her mother’s patriotism, visibility, and popularity that got her
elected and not Portsmouth’s turmoil as I argue. While I share Foley’s assessment o f her mother’s
enormous popularity at the time, the fact that a number o f other Democrats were also elected for the first
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Another shipyard boomtown, Kirkland, Washington, experienced a Democratic
landslide in the 1944 election that the local newspaper, the East Side Journal, attributed
to newcomers voting for the first time in the state. The paper linked political affiliation
with length of residence and social class, implying that the thousands of industrial
workers that had been added to the rolls of the local precincts had skewed the vote
•

•

decidedly in the Democrat’s favor.

11

This demographic dynamic may have also

contributed to the Democrats’ success in the Portsmouth elections in 1944 and 1945.
After winning by the largest plurality ever in 1945, Dondero lost the November
1946 election initially by eight votes and, after several appeals and a recount, lost by one
vote to her Republican opponent.114 Partisan politics ran rampant through the city during
this period. The Republican stronghold had been shaken, but not ridden out of town on a
rail, as the local newspaper had reported a year earlier. Still, Portsmouth politics were
never the same after Mary Dondero’s election in November 1944. Democrats and women
have held important political leadership positions ever since.
As contentious as the political scene was in Portsmouth towards the end of the
war, to the credit of both Republicans and Democrats, there were no reported scandals or
political graft. There was not the case in other boomtowns where the war brought huge
federal contracts, and temptations, to public officials administering those contracts. In

time in November 1944 seems to point to factors, in addition to popularity, that brought Mayor Dondero
and the Democrats to power. When interviewed, William Tebo noted that he had missed getting Mary
Dondero’s going away package because his parents drove him to Concord to catch the train rather than
leaving from the Portsmouth train station. Mary Dondero, dedicated to departing servicemen as she was,
later delivered the package to Tebo’s parents to give to him. Oral interview with William Tebo at the
Portsmouth Navy Yard Museum, 3 November 2006.

113 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, a Small Town during
World War II.” 43-44.
114 Portsmouth Herald, 12 Dec 1946, “Dondero May Continue [State] Senatorial Seat Fight,” 1.
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Kirkland, Washington, the city treasurer, mayor, attorney, and a councilman were
indicted on grand larceny charges involving government contracts and resigned.115 The
Portsmouth political scene was mild in comparison. It was filled with hotly contested
political elections and infighting, but no criminal activity.

Riding the economic engine of the Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war,
Portsmouth and its environs were transformed, in a few years, from an area with a rapidly
growing rural and farm population, for the ten years preceding the war, to a prosperous
industrial community of 20,000 with many new, and decidedly younger, residents. The
newfound prosperity brought growth in purchasing power and retail sales far above that
of the rest o f the state, which lost ground to the nation. Sociological problems
accompanied the great influx of workers, military, and federal monies. Portsmouth, a
quiet vacation destination before the war, became a military town with increased vice, a
housing shortage, and inadequate services. Over a thousand new housing units were
constructed along with new schools, new streets and roads, and tremendous extensions of
water and sewer mains, telephone facilities, and other utilities. Having achieved so many
gains during the war, the seacoast community was left heavily dependent on continued
high shipyard employment to protect those gains after the war. This exceptional
dependency has been painfully revisited on numerous occasions since 1945 each time the
yard was threatened with workforce reductions or closure. Lastly, the political change to
female Democratic leadership at the end of the war, a watershed in Portsmouth politics,
has had an equally lasting impact on the city.
115 Lorraine McConaghy, “Wartime Boomtown: Kirkland, Washington, a Small Town during
World War II,” 45.
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CHAPTER IX

TRANSFORMATIONS

“Our navy yard is Portsmouth - whether we Like it or not. . . . Portsmouth’s future
fate will be determined by its dependence on the navy yard.” 1
Frank E. Jordan
Portsmouth Herald
21 March 1944

An overarching theme for this dissertation has been the transformation of
Portsmouth Navy Yard and the surrounding communities as the result of the activities at
the yard during the war. Also, the futures of both were, to a large extent, determined by
that same activity. This chapter summarizes those transformations and important postwar
events.
Shipyard
During the war, the shipyard continued to transform itself by expanding its
boundaries through the reclamation of wetlands and shoal waters. This practice continued
a tradition that extended back to the yard’s establishment in 1800. That tradition would
continue unabated for another twenty-five years or so before the potential environmental
consequences o f such practices would be realized. The significant physical changes that
took place at the shipyard during the war are readily apparent by comparing the pre and

1Portsmouth Herald, 21 Mar 1944, “Portsmouth and Peace,” 1.
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postwar maps of the yard in the appendix, Figures A-l and A-2 respectively. Referral to
these maps will be helpful in understanding the summary that follows.
The most obvious change was that the ever expanding shipyard had extended
itself about a quarter of a mile into the river towards Strawbery Banke by the acquisition
of yet another island, Pumpkin Island, and the surrounding shoal waters. The trapezoidal
shaped extension is the new fitting-out pier that added about a half mile of submarine
berths. During the war, those berths were filled to capacity with submarines stepping off
the building ways at record setting rates. Shortly after the war ended, the berths were kept
filled to capacity with captured German submarines, and excess United States
submarines, waiting to be overhauled, mothballed, or purchased by foreign countries. The
piers would never again be as active as they were during and immediately after the war.
However, during the peak years o f the Cold War, with the need to overhaul the nation’s
large nuclear powered submarine fleet, the piers again bristled with activity. Today, the
inactive piers stand as moot testimony to the excess capacity at Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard due to the extensive build-up during Word War II.
The prewar map of the shipyard does not even show Jamaica Island, purchased
during the war for an ammunition storage site. The postwar map shows a fully developed
Jamaica Island, complete with ammunition storage bunkers and a connecting road that
runs over a rather sizeable landfill. That landfill would be included in the infamous
Jamaica Island Superfund site. Extending from the base of that landfill out into the back
channel is a large peninsula that was not there in 1939, the result of more landfill.2 In
1945, the quarters for the Commanding Officer of the Hospital were constructed on this
2 According to James Dolph, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard historian, all o f the land fill in the
vicinity o f this peninsula, known locally as Strawberry Point, is considered to be part o f the EPA
designated Jamaica Island Superfund site. Telephone interview with James Dolph o f 26 March 2007.
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peninsula. Hospital wards and nurses quarters were built on the landfill immediately to
the west of the road leading to the quarters. This peninsula, and the surrounding area,
would also become one of the more active of the Superfund sites, requiring millions of
dollars in clean-up costs. It is a tragically ironic sign of the times that a doctor’s living
quarters would be constructed on a hazardous waste landfill.
Probably as important as the physical transformations that occurred at the
shipyard during the war was a transformation that did not happen. There was, apparently,
no more concern for the dangers of industrial pollution at the end of the war than there
was at the beginning. After giving brief consideration, before the war, to compliance with
state policies for control of sewage discharge into the Piscataqua River, the issue waned
in importance once the war began. The shipyard was dumping much more raw sewage
and industrial effluents into the river in 1945 than it did in 1939. The shipyard was not
alone, as the local communities, with their greatly increased populations, were doing the
same.
The physical appearance of the yard changed radically, with the addition of many
new buildings and extensions to old buildings, the most significant of which was the
upgrading o f Building 50 early in the war, the large black structure that dominates the
shipyard skyline when viewed from across the river at Prescott Park. This structure
housed the building ways that increased from two to five during the war. Also, the
building was effectively doubled in size, with an extension to allow for the nearby

3 Cultural Resources Survey, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, United States Department o f Defense,
Legacy Resource Management Program, April 2003. Prepared by the Louis Berger Group, Inc. for the
Engineering Field Activity Northeast Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Table M -l. Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard Museum Archives, Kittery, Me.
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construction, assembly, and easy transport of submarine sections to the building ways.
During the 25 years of submarine construction after 1945, only 23 submarines, 13 diesel
and 10 nuclear powered, were built on the building ways. The last was the USS Sand
Lance (SS660), completed in 1972. After 1945, the yard completed, on average, less
than one submarine a year and never more than three submarines in any one year, a far
cry from 32 in ’44. In the interest of fair reporting, submarines became increasingly
complex technological marvels after the war, in comparison to the thirty-two fleet boats
that the yard delivered in 1944.4 Today Building 50 also stands as a testament to excess
capacity at the yard. Material and parts are stored in this building that once launched
submarines at record rates during the war.
The wartime construction of the fitting out pier, Dry Dock #1, and the
Shipbuilding Basin, had the effect of shifting shipyard operations decidedly westward.
Prior to the war, the center of the industrial work in the yard was located near the only
dry dock at the time (Dry Dock #2) and the nearby building ways, critical shops, and the
old fitting-out piers. During the war, and most certainly after the war, when the building
ways saw less and less activity, the industrial heart of the yard moved westward to the
new fitting out piers.
The creation of Squalus Memorial Park, in the heart of the shipyard, is another
important physical transformation that occurred as the result of the war. The Squalus,
sunk off the Isle of Shoals in May 1939, recovered in October 1939, rebuilt in 1940, and

4 The primary technical advancement was nuclear power versus diesel power. Other technical
improvements included thicker high strength allotted pressure hull steels, shipboard atmosphere control
equipment (carbon dioxide scrubbers, oxygen generators, carbon monoxide scrubbers, and increased use o f
electronics for communications, navigation, and fire control equipment. Missile tubes, with the associated
equipment needed to house, monitor, and fire ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, added another
dimension to the technical complexity o f later submarines.
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recommissioned as the Sailfish, went on to enjoy twelve very successful war patrols in
the Pacific. The submarine was credited with the sinking of two Japanese carriers, a light
cruiser, two submarines, three destroyers, and more than twenty merchant ships.5 The
submarine returned to the yard in late 1945 for decommissioning and scrapping. Prior to
such a regrettable ending for such a fine ship, New Hampshire Governor Charles Dale6
and New Hampshire Senator Russell Tobey wrote Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal
and obtained the navy’s approval to permanently place the submarine’s conning tower
and bridge in the center of the yard, as a suitable memorial to the men who lost their lives
when the submarine sank, as well as the men who fought her so gallantly during the war.7
Today, this memorial serves as the site of the yard’s most important gatherings and
official ceremonies, during which the conning tower and bridge of the Squalus serve as a
speaker’s platform. On such occasions, one cannot help but be reminded of the
remarkable World War II accomplishments of Portsmouth Navy Yard.

Less apparent than the physical transformations were the contributions that
Portsmouth Navy Yard made to changes in the U.S. Navy’s submarine technical and
industrial strategy. If nothing else, the performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard, during the
war, validated the policy change that the U.S. Navy had initiated after World War I to
gain technical control of submarine construction. Unlike during World War I, when the
Navy had little or no technical input to the design of the submarines built by private

5 Portsmouth Herald, 30 Oct 1945, “Tribute Paid to Gallant USS Sailfish,” 1.
6 Governor Dale attended the triple simultaneous launching on 27 Jan 1944 as the Mayor o f
Portsmouth.
7Portsmouth Herald, 31 December 1945, “Dale, Tobey Act to Get Sailfish Conning Tower for
Memorial,” 1.
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industry, the U.S. Navy directed and controlled all technical upgrades during World War
II. Not only did the U.S. Navy control submarine design and technology, it was able to
feed back wartime experience to the Design Division at Portsmouth Navy Yard and have
the desired technical alterations installed on the next order of submarines. Private
industry, on the other hand, often resisted technical changes to contracts in the midst of
large production orders. Rear Admiral Withers and Portsmouth Navy Yard welcomed
those changes.
Dr. Gary Weir argues that the dramatic increase, in both the submarine force and
industrial base between 1940 and 1943, “marked the birth of the naval-industrial complex
o

for submarines.” According to Weir, “In the crucible of the interwar period, naval
authorities, plagued by fiscal and technical trials, defined the vessel and the strategy they
wished to employ as well as the character of the naval-industrial relationship.”9 The Navy
then used its dominant position, early in World War II, to form and secure the desired
control over submarine technical and production matters. Portsmouth was an integral part
of the grand naval strategy that so successfully transformed the future relationship
between private industry and the submarine force. That relationship contributed
significantly to the successful build-up of the United States nuclear submarine fleet that
became such a powerful deterrent to Soviet aggression during the Cold War.
Just as the Navy successfully culminated a policy transformation during the war
that had been in progress for thirty years, Portsmouth Navy Yard completed a long-term
strategic transformation, from a multi-purpose shipyard to a shipyard specializing in
submarine construction. The favored treatment that the shipyard received from the U.S.
8 Gary Weir, Forged in War, 35.
9 Ibid
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Navy between 1920 and 1940 led to the development of a strong design team and many
orders for new submarines prior to, and during, World War II. The shipyard capitalized
on that favored treatment and, by the time mobilization began to accelerate in the late
1930s, the yard had acquired a reputation for excellence in submarine construction.
Capitalizing on that reputation and wartime needs, the yard was able to convince the
powers that be in Washington to direct as much new construction work as possible to the
yard to the exclusion of almost all other work. With the newly created Bureau of Ships
overwhelmed with other responsibilities, Portsmouth, being one of the best performing
and highly respected navy yards, was, for the most part, left to manage its own affairs.
With the deck stacked in its favor, the yard thrived beyond all expectations. By 1944,
Portsmouth Navy Yard had completed its transformation from a developing submarine
shipyard, with a mix of miscellaneous work, to the preeminent designer and builder of
submarines for the U.S. Navy.
The end of the war quickly brought an end to the ultra-efficient shipyard with
processes streamlined for new construction. The yard was quickly transformed back to
prewar conditions, with employment levels closer to 6,000 than the peak of 20,469 in
1943. A potpourri of postwar work included orders for submarine repairs and overhauls,
the manufacture of miscellaneous pontoons and yard craft, and the work needed to
prepare submarines for the mothball fleet, disposal, or sale to foreign nations. More and
more, the building of new submarines was pushed to a secondary role. After building 32
in ‘44, the yard built 12 submarines in 1945,3 in 1946, none in 1947, 1 in 1948, none in
1949, and none in 1950.
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By 1950, employment had fallen to a little over 4,000 workers, about the same
employment that the yard had in 1939. The shipyard had come full cycle and the ultra
efficient shipyard, streamlined for the construction of submarines, receded into the past.
The shipyard kept remnants of the mass production techniques it had employed but, for
the most part, wartime innovations found less and less application as the workload
dropped. The construction of multiple submarines was discontinued in Dry Dock #1 and
the Building Basin, the stepping of submarines from berth to berth for specific work
items lost its production advantages, and paperwork and record keeping returned in
spades. By the 1970s, the yard had acquired a specialty in the repair and overhaul of
nuclear submarines that continues until this day. However, that specialty, unlike the
repetitious construction of World War II diesel submarines, in no way lends itself to
streamlining procedures for mass production.
Community
The great increase in employment and activity at the shipyard, during the war,
transformed southern Maine and the seacoast region of New Hampshire from rural and
farming communities to a much more densely populated and urbanized area. A
tremendous transformation occurred in housing as over a 1,500 new housing units were
constructed at the three Federal Government sponsored housing projects. These projects,
as urgently needed as they were, met with a certain amount of initial, and continuing,
disapproval from local civic leaders because of their hasty and utilitarian construction.
Significant infrastructure development included new schools, new streets and roads, and
tremendous extensions of water and sewer mains, telephone facilities, and other utilities.
Urbanized and industrialized, Portsmouth was a radically changed city in 1945, as
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compared to the “prosperous New England port, steeped in history and thriving as a
summer resort,” that the New York Times reporter had described in October 1942.
The state of New Hampshire was also transformed as the result of activity at the
yard during the war. While the local seacoast region of New Hampshire experienced a
20.9% increase in population during the war, the state of New Hampshire experienced a
significant decrease in the overall state population of 6.6 %. The center of New
Hampshire’s population, commerce, and manufacturing shifted dramatically towards
Portsmouth. Towards the end of the war, the effective annual purchasing income of
Portsmouth residents was slightly greater than the average in the United States, and
considerably higher than the average of the state of New Hampshire, as the state’s center
of prosperity also gravitated towards Portsmouth.
The Portsmouth area was also transformed from an area that was shunned for
manufacturing development prior to the war, because of a lack of skilled workers, to an
area attractive to manufacturers because of an abundance of skilled workers. The
extensive, federally funded, and locally administered, training programs needed to supply
the shipyard with trained employees during the war, created an excess of skilled workers
and training facilities when both were in much less demand after the war. In 1945, with
the war winding down, the city o f Portsmouth struck a deal with the state whereby the
city agreed to rent the Morley Company building, which housed the federal vocational
school, in return for the state establishing one of the first state trade schools.10 The city
and state took advantage o f the machinery and equipment in the federal vocational school
that was already under the control of the state board of education, to launch the state trade

10 Portsmouth Herald, 21 Jul 1945, “Portsmouth is Chosen site for Trade School,” 1.
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school system that evolved into the New Hampshire Technical Colleges. Thus, the city
insured a steady supply of skilled workers for the future.

Women were transformed from housewives to become valuable employees of the
shipyard shops and community, during the war years. They gradually, but steadily,
progressed from helpers and clerks to machinists, welders, and trained supervisors. Many
of the women employees of the shipyard returned to their housewife duties after the war,
as was the custom across the nation. From a peak of 19,000,000 working women in the
United States during the war, the total in January 1946 had dropped to 15,630,000.11 The
number of Portsmouth Navy Yard female employees also dropped precipitously after the
war, but women had definitely made their mark and proved their worth. The local
transformation o f women to the workplace may have been put on hold at the end of the
war, but it returned even stronger twenty years later.
The transformation that Mary Dondero brought about in the Portsmouth city
government was more immediate and permanent. Dondero’s election in November 1944
as the first female mayor of Portsmouth, and the first ever in the state of New Hampshire,
ousted the city’s traditional male dominated, conservative, Republican government and
set in motion a change in Portsmouth politics that saw women and Democrats fill
influential positions in city government for much of the next half century .
At the start o f Dondero’s second term, in January 1946, her 26 year old daughter,
Eileen Dondero, was elected by the city council to serve as city clerk, the first female city
clerk in the history of the city. Eileen Dondero, a painter’s helper at the shipyard during
the war, has been a strong and loyal supporter of the yard ever since. She went on to
11 Portsmouth Herald, 4 Mar 1946, “Rosie the Riveter Swaps Her Coveralls for an Apron,” 1.
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serve 18 years as the mayor of Portsmouth, 1968 to 1972 and again from 1984 to 1998.
Her election in 1984 marked the beginning of twenty-two continuous years during which
women held the position of mayor in the city of Portsmouth. Since 1944, Portsmouth has
been largely a progressive Democratic city with women filling many important political
offices. Much of the credit for that transformation is due to Mary Dondero and Eileen
Dondero Foley, both of whom maintained strong ties to the yard during their political
careers as the result of being employed there during the war.
Other Transformations
Three other transformations deserve mention to complete the picture of events at
Portsmouth Navy Yard during the war. These include a sudden and unfortunate career
crisis for Rear Admiral Withers in the summer of 1945, the further consolidation of
responsibilities in the Bureau of Ships for management of navy yard affairs in late 1945,
and the EPA studies of the shipyard that resulted in Superfund status in 1994.

Rear Admiral Withers enhanced his well established, prewar reputation even
more with the outstanding performance of Portsmouth Navy Yard under his command
during the war. However, despite a distinguished naval career of almost forty years and
an illustrious record at Portsmouth, his tour of duty and his career ended on a sour note in
June 1945, when the Naval Inspector General found Withers to be derelict in the
performance of his duties involving the handling of surrendered German submarines and
prisoners o f war.
Four German submarines, U-805, U-873, U-1228, and U- 234 had been escorted
to Portsmouth Navy Yard by U.S. destroyers between 15 and 19 May 1945 for
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observation, selective stripping, and processing of prisoners in accordance with guidance
from the Chief of Naval Operations, in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention. It
soon became apparent that irregularities had occurred during the interrogation of German
prisoners and, on 24 May 1945, Commandant Withers appointed Captain Armand M.
Morgan to head a Board o f Investigation “to inquire into and report upon the handling of
German prisoners of war” including “the alleged extensive looting of personal baggage of
these prisoners while at the Naval Prison, Portsmouth N.H., during the period 16 May
1945 to 21 May 1945.”

t

The investigation was quickly elevated to the Naval Inspector

General’s office and Commandant Withers became one of the accused rather than the
senior investigating officer.
In a classic case of the Commanding Officer being held responsible for the
actions o f his subordinates, the investigation of the Naval Inspector General found
Withers ultimately responsible for the looting of the surrendered German submarines and
the robbing and maltreatment of German prisoners of war:
That the Commandant of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Rear Admiral Withers,
U.S Navy, was derelict in his performance of duty in that he failed to
recognize and accept his command responsibility to issue clear, concise
instructions to his subordinates with regard to receiving, securing,
safeguarding, and stripping U-boats surrendered in the Navy Yard,
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and to safeguard the persons and property, both
private and public, of German prisoners who were in his custody. He further
failed to take effective action when violations of the Chief of Naval
11
Operations’ order and the Geneva Convention were brought to his attention.

12 Commandant Portsmouth Navy Yard Rear Admiral T. Withers memo o f 24 May 1945 to
Captain Armand M. Morgan, USN, Subject: Board o f Investigation to inquire into and report upon the
handling o f German prisoners o f war. NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base 1930-1950, Box
14, Folder A17 “Boards o f Investigation 1925 tO 1946.”
13 www.uboatarchive.netU-873NIGReport.htm. Report o f the Naval Inspector General Regarding
Irregularities Connected with the Handling o f Surrendered German Submarines, Serial: 01783 o f 19 June
1945,2.
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Appropriate administrative or disciplinary action was recommended for Rear Admiral
Thomas Withers, Captain Clifford H. Roper, three Marine Corps Officers attached to the
Naval Prison, two Medical Officers, and one civilian of the Office o f Naval Intelligence,
Mr. Jack Henry Alberti.
Three hundred and eighty three pages of testimony led to the conclusion that U805 had been looted by sailors and marines, U-boat liquors were “breached,” German
prisoners were robbed o f Swiss francs, wrist watches, uniform ribbons and decorations,
and other personal effects. In addition, Mr. Alberti, dressed as a Lieutenant Commander,
USN, had interrogated the Commanding Officer o f U-873, Captain-Lieutenant Fritz
Steinhoff, in a humiliating manner by having an enlisted man slap him to obtain
information. Steinhoff later committed suicide after he had been transported to Boston for
confinement pending transfer to a prisoner of war camp. According to a report in the
Portsmouth Herald of 19 May 1945, “Steinhoff slashed himself with a part of an eyeglass
which he shattered in his cell in Charles Street jail.”14
Just to be clear, the looting was attributed to enlisted marines and sailors assigned
to the advance boarding parties and not to any Industrial Department personnel. In fact,
the report of the Naval Inspector General found “That the Industrial Division of the Navy
Yard, Portsmouth performed in a satisfactory manner the receiving, safeguarding, and
stripping of the U-boats after the boats were turned over to them for that purpose.” 15
There was no press coverage of the investigation at Portsmouth Navy Yard in

14 Portsmouth Herald, 19 May 1945, “U-234 Brings Air Force Gen. Ulrich and 2 Dead Japs,” 1.
15 www.uboatarchive.netU-873NIGReport.htm. Report o f the Naval Inspector General Regarding
Irregularities Connected with the Handling o f Surrendered German Submarines, Serial: 01783 o f 19 June
1945, 3.
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1945.16 Perhaps, like the presence of British submarines at the yard in the summer of
1941, the press had been asked by navy officials to refrain from reporting a controversial
event at the shipyard. Whatever the reason for the lack of coverage, it is difficult to
imagine that today’s press would not exploit a similar news event.
The Inspector General’s report was especially critical of the officers who had
accommodated and allowed Mr Alberti to abuse prisoners. The report found:
That the supine attitude of the Commanding Officer of the Naval Prison,
Colonel Rossell, USMC, and of Lieutenant Commander Hatton, USNR,
Office of Naval Intelligence, in permitting Mr. Alberti to conduct himself in
the manner which he did, with the German prisoners of War, is most
17
reprehensible.
•

In the United States Navy, the Commanding Officer is ultimately held responsible, when
his ship goes aground, for whatever reason, and usually pays the price with an
abbreviated career. Rear Admiral Withers’ command had gone aground, with the
maltreatment of the German prisoners, and Withers bore the responsibility. His career,
which began in 1906, could hardly be termed abbreviated, but it was essentially over in
June 1945 when he was found to be derelict in his performance of his duties.
Rear Admiral Withers remained as commandant until he was relieved by Rear
Admiral J.H. Brown on 15 November 1945.18 Withers’ problems continued in the fall of

16A careful review o f the Portsmouth H erald during the entire year o f 1945 found no mention o f
the investigation at the Portsmouth Navy Yard. Furthermore, extensive research into Portsmouth Navy
Yard files at NARA Waltham, Ma., NARA at College Park, and the other sources cited under the
bibliography o f this study revealed nothing about the investigation. A routine internet search for “Withers”
produced the “Report o f the Naval Inspector General Regarding Irregularities Connected with the Handling
o f Surrendered German Submarines.”
17 www.uboatarchive.netU-873NIGReport.htm. “Report o f the Naval Inspector General
Regarding Irregularities Connected with the Handling o f Surrendered German Submarines,” Serial: 01783
o f 19 June 1945,4.
1R

Portsmouth Naval Base Order No. 20-45 o f 15 November 1945. NARA Waltham, RG 181,
Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, Box 9, Folder A7-1 “Notices Navy Yard and Naval Base
Jan 1 1945- t o 1950.”
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1945 as he spent considerable time in the Portsmouth Naval Yard hospital in ill health. In
October 1945, the Portsmouth Herald noted that Captain Sidney E. Dudley was the
acting commandant because “Rear Admiral Withers is presently in the Portsmouth Naval
Hospital where he is recovering from a long illness.”19 The article added that Withers
“will undoubtedly remain in that capacity [in the hospital] until Admiral Brown
arrives.”20 There was no celebratory change of command ceremony as is typical for such
occasions. Withers retired on 15 November 1945 while in the Portsmouth Naval Hospital
and faded from the shipyard scene with far less recognition than he should have gotten
for his remarkable tour of duty at Portsmouth Navy Yard.
Withers continued to be confined to the Portsmouth Naval Hospital “suffering
from a serious illness’ until January 1946 when he was transferred to the Brooklyn Naval
Hospital and then to the West Coast where he was “hospitalized much of the time” until
his death on 25 June 1953.

91

The last years of this submarine hero and shipyard

commander extraordinaire were filled with far more angst and misery than deserved.

A central theme of this study is that navy yards, to a large extent, were left to
manage their own affairs during the war, because the newly created Bureau of Ships was
overwhelmed with other responsibilities, and that Portsmouth Navy Yard thrived in this
entrepreneurial environment. The establishment of the Bureau o f Ships, in June 1941, to
replace the competing Bureau of Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair,
clarified many navy yard organizational and administrational issues. However, other

19Portsmouth Herald, 16 Oct 1945, “John L. Brown Assigned Here,” 1.
20 Ibid.
21 Portsmouth Herald, 27 Jun 1953, “Rear Adm. Withers, Ex-Yard Head, Dies in California,” 1.
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agencies and bureaus continued to direct various fragments of operations at navy yards.
In addition to the Bureau of Ships, the offices of the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of
Naval Operations, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery and others issued directions to navy yards during the war. As late
as December 1944, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who continued to be frustrated
with the inefficient administration of the navy yards, wrote, “What I want is some man
whose sole job is to examine the functions, to compare operations and handle difficulties
[at navy yards.] We should have one man to go to.”22
With the war winding down in the summer of 1945, a move developed to improve
the overall operating efficiency of navy yards by further clarifying organizational
responsibilities and putting one man in charge, as Secretary James Forrestal had directed.
A Survey Conducted by the Industrial Survey Division in the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy in July 1945 concluded that:
The attainment of greater and enduring improvements in the operating
efficiency of the Navy Yards and Naval Drydocks will be materially
facilitated by a realignment and clarification of the organization and
administration of these establishments . . . by concentrating full authority and
responsibility for Departmental administration of these establishments in a
single agency of the Navy Department.23
By the end of 1945, a full scale reorganization of navy yard administration and
management was in progress, that ultimately resulted in increased responsibilities for the
Bureau of Ships, and a reorganization of navy yards that gave the commandant full
22 Organization Planning and Procedures ltr o f 13 July 1945 to Assistant Secretary o f the Navy
Ralph A. Bard. NARA College Park, RG 19, Bureau o f Ships General Correspondence 1940-45, Box 785,
Folder NY1/A3.
23

“Review o f the Organization and Administration o f Navy Yards and Drydocks,” A Survey
Conducted by the Industrial Survey Division in the Office o f the Secretary o f the Navy dated 13 July 1945.
NARA College Park, Record Group 38, Chief o f Naval Operations General Correspondence, Box 1182,
Folder NY/A3-1.
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responsibility for all operations at his navy yard. Name changes accompanied the
reorganization; commandants became commanding officers and navy yards became naval
shipyards. In December 1945, Portsmouth Navy Yard became Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard,24 the title it holds today.

The extensive dumping of industrial waste for landfills, and the sewage discharge
to the Piscsataqua River, continued long after the war. These and other sites became the
subjects of exhaustive EPA investigations in the 1980s that led to the shipyard being
included on the National Priorities List (NPL) for Superfund projects effective 31 May
1994.25
As required by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), an initial assessment of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was
completed in June 1983. CERCLA (Superfund) is an EPA national program to identify
and assess past hazardous waste disposal sites posing a potential threat to human health
or the enviroiiment. The initial assessment of Portsmouth Shipyard examined four sites
and concluded, “while none of the sites poses an immediate threat,. . . one site warrants
further investigation. . . to assess potential long-term impacts.”26 That site was the
Jamaica Island Landfill that had been used for disposal of potentially toxic and hazardous

24 Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal ALNAVSTA #38 o f 5 Dec 1945. NARA College Park,
RG 24, Bureau o f Naval Personnel General Correspondence 1941-45, Box 1601, Folder NY.

25/ bid.
26 Initial Assessment Study o f Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, N ew Hampshire, NESA
13-032, Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity, Port Hueneme, California 93043, June 1983,
iii.
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materials.27 The study also recommended that two mercury burial sites be marked and not
disturbed. The last site, an industrial waste discharge to the Piscataqua River that was
discontinued in 1975, was recommended for additional sampling during the next
dredging activity at the shipyard. Further investigations during the 1980s culminated in
the designation of the shipyard as a Superfund project.
The initially identified Jamaica Landfill was reported to be the most contaminated
site on the shipyard. This 25 acre landfill served as the shipyard’s dump from 1945 to
1975. However, as shown in this study, the Jamaica Island Landfill and the filling of the
back channel started before the end of the war. It is estimated that 50 acres of the 287
acre shipyard were designated as Superfund sites. Reclamation projects have included the
removal of seven underground storage tanks (1994), removal of mercury vaults from
Jamaica Island (1997 and 2000), stabilizing contaminated shore lines, and capping
contaminated soils (1999). The remedy for the Jamaica Landfill involved the construction
of a saltwater marsh (2002) and the capping of excavated debris (2003).28 The U.S. Navy,
by May 2005, had spent $48.6 million cleaning up the yard and it was estimated that
another $35 million would be needed to complete the job.

Portsmouth Navy Yard’s

long time practice of recovering lowlands through industrial dumping had come to a
disruptive and costly conclusipn.

27 Ibid.

28 http://vosemite.epa.gov/rl/nDl pad.nsf. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Waste Site,
Cleanup & Reuse in New England.
29 http://www.nhpr.org/node/8782. New Hampshire Public Radio Commentary, “Contamination
A Big Problem at the Shipyard,” by Rebecca Kaufman, 13 My 2005.
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Rather late in the war, on 17 February 1945, USS Redfish limped up the
Piscataqua River towards Portsmouth Navy Yard, completing a transit from halfway
around the world. Redfish had been damaged two months earlier by Japanese destroyers,
after sinking the carrier Unryu in the East China Sea. The crew of the Redfish, one of the
three submarines launched simultaneously on 27 January 1944 and subsequently
completed on 12 April 1944, never expected to be back at Portsmouth so soon. After
transiting back to Pearl Harbor from the East China Sea, the crew had been told that the
submarine would have to go back to Portsmouth for repairs because Pearl Harbor and all
the West Coast yards were full. Torpedoman Second Class Dan Maclsaac, who was on
deck with the line handlers as the submarine steamed up the river, could not have been
more pleased that his submarine was returning to Portsmouth.
Maclsaac had been in the Forward Torpedo Room, after sinking the Unryu, when
three Japanese destroyers exploded seven depth charges off the starboard bow of the
submerged Redfish. No one onboard was closer to the explosions. Maclsaac was thrown
to the forward end of the compartment where he lay in the bilge, unconscious, for a few
minutes. The explosions cracked the pressure hull and damaged piping, torpedo tubes,
and other equipment in the room. Maclsaac awoke to the sound of rushing water,
realizing that he and his shipmates had to quickly isolate the leaks, as best they could, if
the submarine was to be saved. Using wrenches, rags, and whatever was available,
Maclsaac and his mates stopped the leaks as the Redfish laid on the bottom of the East
China Sea for four hours to escape detection and avoid further attacks.
30 Interview with Dan Maclsaac , 9 Nov 2006, at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Museum. The
Redfish events that follow are all from the interview and Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in
World War II, 407.
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As soon as Maclsaac and his mates had gained control of the flooding, the
Commanding Officer, Commander L.D. McGregor, came forward from the conning
tower to assess the damage. Today, over sixty years later, Maclsaac remembers the
Captain’s exact words to him and his shipmates, “You can thank God that you were in a
Portsmouth boat.” Such was Portsmouth’s reputation in the submarine fleet. Redfish was
coming home for repairs but Maclsaac, Commander McGregor, and the rest of the crew
were coming home to say “Thank you” to the men and women who had built their fine
ship.
The submarine was greeted at the pier by shipyard officials, and hundreds of
workers, eager to inspect their workmanship. Maclsaac, who was responsible for the
Torpedo Room, where most of the damage had occurred, remembers worker after worker
inspecting damaged pipes, tubes, and equipment to see if they could, or should, have
done something differently. As Maclsaac pointed out the damage and told the story of the
attack, the workers empathized with the crew and delighted in the fact that their work had
held up to such a pounding and enabled the submarine and crew to survive. Maclsaac,
who had gained considerable respect for Portsmouth workmanship while his submarine
was being built, was convinced, more than ever, that the men and women at Portsmouth
Navy Yard were an unusually dedicated and talented workforce.
The Redfish completed repairs in May 1945 and made the long transit back to the
Pacific to resume war patrols until the end of the war. A few months after the Redfish
steamed back out of Portsmouth Harbor, the submarine action in the Pacific began to
wind down and more and more submarines found their way back to Portsmouth. The
submarine traffic in the Piscataqua River was heavy in late 1945 and the first half of
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1946, as an average of eight submarines a month arrived at the yard for work of some
description.

a i

By the summer of 1946, the shipyard was inundated with submarines and
immersed in a potpourri of miscellaneous work assignments. Many of the submarines had
returned to the shipyard to be scrapped, prepared for sale to foreign nations, or moth
balled.32 Orders for the construction of new submarines had stopped. The shipyard’s
finely tuned operation, which had pushed Redfish and seventy-eight other submarines to
war in record numbers, had come to a sudden and grinding halt. Priorities had changed,
from construction of submarines to the disposal of submarines, and a remarkable period
of submarine construction had come to a close for Portsmouth Navy Yard.

31

“U.S. Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, N.H. Schedule o f Ship Repair, Alteration, and
Decommissioning” o f 21 Jan 1946, NARA, Waltham, Record Group 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General
Correspondence, 1930-1950, Box 18, Folder 3-7, “Docking - General.”

32 Portsmouth Navy Yard was considered and rejected as a site for berthing o f vessels out o f
commission (a moth-balled fleet). A Memo to the Commandant from R.D. Spalding o f the U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Service dated 13 Oct 1944, Subject: Hydrographic conditions at the Navy Yard and in Great Bay
Area in connection with berthing o f vessels out o f commission, concluded that a large portion o f the
waterfront space at the shipyard is developed, but unavailable or unsuitable for berthing medium-draft
vessels in quantity. Excessive tides and currents and winter ice conditions were also cited as undesirable
elements for long-term berthing o f ships or submarines. The only feasible alternative was to develop and
dredge the more sheltered and protected back channel for berthing - a costly proposition. This U.S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey presented costs for this option that included locations for “48 submarines, 2 tenders
and certain minor craft.” The proposal went no further and the East Coast submarine moth-balled
submarine fleet was ultimately located at Philadelphia Navy Yard. The survey referred to is held at NARA,
Waltham, Record Group 181, Portsmouth Naval Base General Correspondence, 1930-1950, Box 18, Folder
3-7, “Docking - General.”
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Figure A-3: Portsmouth Navy Yard Manpower Curves by Work Category, 1940-45. Portsmouth Navy Yard
during World War IIAdministrative History. Chapter l:N ew Construction and Repair, c. Production Graphs.
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Figure A-4: Portsmouth Navy Yard Manhours per Submarine, 1940-45. Portsmouth Navy Yard
during World War II Administrative History. Chapter 1: New Construction and Repair, c. Production Graphs.

Figure A-5: Portsmouth Navy Yard Showing Original Islands with Fill. Source cited
above.
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Figure A-6: Proposed Site Portsmouth Navy Yard (cira 1800). Preble, George
Henry, Rear Admiral, USN. History o f the United States Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, New
Hampshire.
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Figure A-7: PNY w/o Jamaica Island (1941).
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base
Central Files, RG 181, Box 1, Folder A l/N l - “Plans,
Projects, Policies.”

Figure A-8: PNY with Jamaica Island (1945) and Fill
NARA Waltham, RG 181, Portsmouth Naval Base
Central Files, RG 181, Box 1, Folder A l/N l - “Plans,
Projects, Policies, PKG 2.”
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